JUDGMENT : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The applicant has preferred the present revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, feeling aggrieved by the order dated 04.07.2025 passed by the First District Judge, Katghora, Distt. - Korba (C.G.), whereby the application filed by the defendant under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. was dismissed. 2. Facts of the case, as canvased by the applicant, are that the present revision petition arises out of an election petition filed by respondent No.1, Atmanaryan Patel, challenging the election of the present applicant as the President of the Municipal Council. Respondent No.1 has filed the election petition under Section 20 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act 1961”). The applicant was duly elected as the President of the Municipal Council, and this election has been challenged by respondent No.1 before the Additional District Judge, Katghora. However, the applicant submits that the Additional District Judge does not have jurisdiction to entertain the election petition as per the provisions of Section 20 of the Act 1961. Despite this jurisdictional bar, the concerned Court proceeded to entertain the petition. In response to the filing of the election petition, the applicant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), contending that the election petition was filed in a wrong Court and, therefore, ought to be dismissed at the outset. However, the Additional District Judge dismissed the application filed by applicant by the impugned order dated 04.07.2025. The applicant is aggrieved by this order and has thus preferred the present revision petition. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that the Additional District Judge, Katghora, lacks jurisdiction to entertain the election petition. Section 20 of the Act of 1961 explicitly provides the forum for filing election petitions related to Municipal elections. The relevant provisions of Section 20 state that in case of the election of the President, any voter of the Municipal area may challenge the election by filing the election petition before the Court of the District Judge where such election was held, specifically within the revenue district in which the Court of District Judge is situated. In any other case, the election petition must be filed before the Additional District Judge having a permanent seat of his Court within the revenue district where the election or nomination took place. In any other case, the election petition must be filed before the Additional District Judge having a permanent seat of his Court within the revenue district where the election or nomination took place. Where there is more than one Additional District Judge in a revenue district, the District Judge must specify which Additional District Judge is empowered to entertain the election petitions. It is submitted that Katghora is not a revenue district but a Tahsil or subdivision within the Revenue District of Korba. Korba alone qualifies as the revenue district with a permanent seat of the District Judge. Therefore, as per the mandatory provisions of Section 20, the election petition challenging the election of the President must be filed before the District Judge of Korba and not before the Additional District Judge at Katghora. Learned counsel for the applicant relies on the judgment of this Court in Taukir Dani vs. Chandagi Ram & Ors. (Civil Revision No. 23/2006) , wherein it was held that filing an election petition in a Court not specified by the District Judge under Section 20 is improper and amounts to lack of jurisdiction. The Court in that case emphasized that such statutory provisions relating to jurisdiction are mandatory and any filing in a wrong Court must be rejected or returned. The impugned order dismissing the application filed by petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is therefore contrary to the clear provisions of the Act and binding judicial precedent. It is further contended by learned counsel for applicant that the election petition filed by respondent No.1 is not properly verified in accordance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 15 of the CPC, which prescribes the manner and form of verification of pleadings. The verification of pleadings requires that the party verifying the pleading specify which parts are based on personal knowledge and which parts are based on information received and believed to be true. The verification must be signed by the person verifying it, stating the date and place of verification, and must be supported by an affidavit. In the present case, the verification of the election petition has not complied with these mandatory requirements, rendering the petition defective and liable to be rejected. Learned counsel for the applicant also submits that respondents No. 5 to 7 (official respondents, namely the Commission and Returning Officer) have been improperly made parties to the election petition. In the present case, the verification of the election petition has not complied with these mandatory requirements, rendering the petition defective and liable to be rejected. Learned counsel for the applicant also submits that respondents No. 5 to 7 (official respondents, namely the Commission and Returning Officer) have been improperly made parties to the election petition. Section 21 of the Act 1961 specifically prescribes who may be made respondents in an election petition, and election officers are not included within this list. Therefore, including the Commission and Returning Officer as respondents is beyond the scope of the statute and is contrary to the express provisions of the Act. The impugned order dated 04.07.2025 passed by the Additional District Judge, Katghora, is erroneous and contrary to the statutory provisions and binding judicial precedents. The order wrongly relies on a distribution memo issued by the District Judge to confer jurisdiction upon the Additional District Judge at Katghora. It is submitted that such an administrative order cannot override or supersede the clear and mandatory statutory provisions regarding jurisdiction contained in Section 20 of the Act 1961. Katghora being only a Tahsil under the revenue district of Korba, the jurisdiction to entertain the election petition challenging the election of the President rests exclusively with the District Judge of Korba. The Additional District Judge, Katghora, has no jurisdiction to entertain the election petition as per the provisions of Section 20 of the Act of 1961, and the binding decision in Taukir Dani (supra). The impugned order dated 04.07.2025 is contrary to the provisions of the CPC and the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961. The election petition was filed before the wrong Court which lacks jurisdiction, thus is liable to be dismissed. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to allow the present revision petition, set aside the impugned order dated 04.07.2025 passed by the Additional District Judge, Katghora, District Korba in Election Petition/Case No. 01/2025, declare that the Additional District Judge, Katghora, has no jurisdiction to entertain the election petition filed by respondent No.1 and dismiss the election petition filed before the Additional District Judge, Katghora, as having been filed in a Court without jurisdiction. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 would submit that the present civil revision petition is misconceived and devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed at the very threshold. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 would submit that the present civil revision petition is misconceived and devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed at the very threshold. It is submitted that the election petition has been instituted before the learned Court of District Judge-II, Katghora, Korba, strictly in consonance with the applicable legal provisions, including the amendment dated 03.04.2024 to Section 11 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Court (Amendment) Act, 2024, and the relevant provisions of Section 20 of the Chhattisgarh Municipality Act, 1961. The said amendment, which clearly delineates the jurisdictional authority of District Judges in such matters, places no embargo or limitation on the jurisdiction of District Judge-II to entertain such petitions, and thus, the objections raised by the appellant on the point of jurisdiction are wholly unfounded and legally untenable. In support of this, a copy of the amendment notification dated 03.04.2024 has been annexed with this petition. It is further submitted that the case law relied upon by the applicant does not apply to the present factual and legal context, as the statutory scheme has since been amended, and the newly conferred jurisdiction rightly vests in the Court of District Judge- II. The reliance placed by the applicant on pre-amendment jurisprudence is, therefore, misplaced and devoid of legal weight. The objections regarding verification of the election petition are hyper- technical and untenable in law, as any defect in the verification clause is merely procedural and curable in nature, and cannot be made a ground for dismissal of the petition at the threshold. The District Judge- II has already considered the matter under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and by a reasoned order, partially allowed the application by directing deletion of the Chhattisgarh State Election Commission (Respondent No. 5 in the present revision) from the array of parties. Said directions shall be duly complied with during the course of further proceedings. The work distribution memo issued by the Principal District Judge, which assigns jurisdiction to District Judge-II, Katghora, is in strict conformity with the recent amendments to the Chhattisgarh Civil Court Act, 1958, and is fully aligned with the terminology and intent of the Chhattisgarh Municipality Act, 1961, which authorizes presentation of election petitions before the District Judge. The work distribution memo issued by the Principal District Judge, which assigns jurisdiction to District Judge-II, Katghora, is in strict conformity with the recent amendments to the Chhattisgarh Civil Court Act, 1958, and is fully aligned with the terminology and intent of the Chhattisgarh Municipality Act, 1961, which authorizes presentation of election petitions before the District Judge. The petition has, thus, been filed before the appropriate forum and the objections raised by the applicant in this regard are contrary to the scheme of law and liable to be rejected outright. Lastly, it is submitted that the learned District Judge-II has rightly exercised jurisdiction and discretion in rejecting the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, as none of the grounds for rejection of the plaint, as enumerated under the said provision, are made out in the present case. The impugned order suffers from no legal infirmity and the revision petition, based on misconceived and meritless grounds, is wholly liable to be dismissed. 5. Mr. Varun Sharma, Advocate for the respondent No. 3 and 4 would submit that the present revision petition filed by the applicant under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is wholly misconceived and liable to be dismissed. The applicant has wrongly invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 CPC, ignoring the fact that the order passed by the Election Judge in election petitions filed under the Act of 1961 is revisable only under the specific provisions and rules framed for this purpose. The Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Election Petition) Rules, 1962, provide a distinct and exclusive mechanism for challenging such orders, and the present petition filed under the general provision of Section 115 CPC is not maintainable. It is further submitted that the present revision petition suffers from a fatal defect of non-compliance regarding the mandatory security deposit of Rs. 250.00 as prescribed under the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Election Petition) Rules, 1962. This mandatory requirement has been deliberately or otherwise ignored by the applicant, thereby vitiating the maintainability of the present petition. The defect of non-compliance of such mandatory conditions is not a mere procedural irregularity but a substantive defect that is not curable in law. This Court has, on several occasions, consistently dismissed revision petitions on the sole ground of non-compliance of mandatory provisions such as the security deposit, and no exception can be made in the present case. The defect of non-compliance of such mandatory conditions is not a mere procedural irregularity but a substantive defect that is not curable in law. This Court has, on several occasions, consistently dismissed revision petitions on the sole ground of non-compliance of mandatory provisions such as the security deposit, and no exception can be made in the present case. The applicant has challenged the order dated 04/07/2025 passed by the Election Judge, which rejected the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, wherein the applicant questioned the territorial jurisdiction of the Election Judge. It is further submitted that the said order is not interlocutory in nature but a final order. The reason being, if the objection raised by the applicant regarding jurisdiction were allowed, it would result in the termination of the entire election petition proceedings. Hence, the order is a final adjudication on the maintainability of the petition and is rightly subject to challenge only in accordance with the prescribed procedure under the Act and rules. It is submitted that the nomenclature of the Additional District Judge has been changed to “District Judge” by virtue of the Notification dated 03/04/2024. Consequently, the impugned order was passed by the District Judge only, thereby negating the contention of applicant that the order was passed by an inferior forum. This statutory change also clarifies and consolidates the judicial hierarchy for all practical and legal purposes. The contention of the applicant that Section 20 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961, has been implicitly amended by the State Legislature to refer to the Principal District Judge instead of the District Judge is entirely fallacious and without any legal basis. The said provision remains unamended, and the assertion made by applicant that the term “District Judge” automatically refers to the Principal District Judge is wholly misconceived and contrary to the settled position of law. Since the permanent seat of the District Judge at Katghora is situated within the same revenue district as the Principal District Judge at Korba, the presentation of the election petition before the District Judge, Katghora, is both proper and legally valid. It is pertinent to clarify that the Principal District Judge is not a “persona designata” and cannot exclusively claim jurisdiction to entertain such petitions. It is pertinent to clarify that the Principal District Judge is not a “persona designata” and cannot exclusively claim jurisdiction to entertain such petitions. This legal position has been consistently upheld by larger benches of this Court as well as the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which have held that where the revenue district remains the same, there is no illegality in presenting the election petition before the Additional District Judge or in transferring the matter within the jurisdiction of the District Judge or Additional District Judge of the same revenue district. The reliance placed by the applicant on the judgment of this Court in Civil Revision No. 23/2006 is wholly misplaced. In that case, the facts were materially different as the election petition was tried by a Judge from a different revenue district, which is not the case here. Therefore, the precedents cited by the applicant do not support the present contention and are of no assistance. 6. It is further contention of learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 and 4 that the objection raised by the applicant concerning the verification of the election petition is also untenable and not maintainable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified that defects in verification are not fatal and are, in fact, curable. Hence, this cannot be a ground for dismissal or rejection of the petition at the threshold. Finally, it is submitted that the contention of applicant that Katghora falls under Korba, which has its own seat of District Judge, and that the Additional District Judge at Katghora is incompetent to hear election disputes under Section 20 of the Act, is without any legal foundation. After the Notification dated 03/04/2024, the District Judge and the Additional District Judge are considered one and the same judicial authority for all purposes. Even prior to this amendment, both were declared to be one and the same for the purposes of election petitions under the provisions of the Civil Courts Act, 1958. Therefore, the election petition has been presented before the proper and competent forum, and the objections raised by the applicant in this regard are baseless and liable to be rejected. 7. Even prior to this amendment, both were declared to be one and the same for the purposes of election petitions under the provisions of the Civil Courts Act, 1958. Therefore, the election petition has been presented before the proper and competent forum, and the objections raised by the applicant in this regard are baseless and liable to be rejected. 7. In support of their contention, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the decisions in the matter of Om Solanki vs. Rajkumar , reported in 2016 SCC OnLine MP 6875 , Saritha S. Nair vs. Hibi Eden , reported in (2021) 14 SCC 148 , Babulal vs. Dattatreya , reported in ILR 1971 MP 412, Deepak Sharma @ Bunty vs. Dinesh Dewangan , reported in (2009) 3 CGLJ 347 , Smt. Gulshaad Shabdar Khan vs. Smt. Ganga Sahu , Order passed in CR. No. 111/2016 dated 02.01.2017 and Suo Moto vs. State of C.G. Order passed in WP227/299/2018 dated 12.10.2018. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the documents annexed along with the revision. 9. In order to determine the dispute raised, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961 dealing with election petition. Section 20 of the Act of 1961 provides that election petition can be presented on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 22. Section 22 provides grounds for declaring election or nomination to be void. Section 20 and Section 22 of the Act of 1961 is quoted below for ready reference : “20. Election petitions - (1) No election or [nomination] under this Act shall be called into question except by a petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this section. Section 22 provides grounds for declaring election or nomination to be void. Section 20 and Section 22 of the Act of 1961 is quoted below for ready reference : “20. Election petitions - (1) No election or [nomination] under this Act shall be called into question except by a petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) Such petition may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in Section 22 : (a) by any candidate at such election or [nomination]; or (b) (i) in the case of an election of a Councillor, by any voter of the ward concerned; (ii) in the case of a [nomination] of Councillor, by any Councillor; (iii) in the case of election of President by any Councillor; to the District Judge, where such election [or nomination] is held within the revenue district in which the Court of the District Judge is situate, and in any other case, to the Additional District Judge having the permanent seat of his Court within the revenue district in which such election [or nomination] is held and if there be more than one such Additional District Judge within the said revenue district, to such one of them as the District Judge may specify for the purpose (hereinafter such District Judge or Additional District Judge referred to as Judge). (3) No petition presented under sub-section (2), shall be admitted unless : (i) it is presented within thirty days from the date on which the result of such election [or nomination] was notified in the Gazette; and (ii) it is a accompanied by a Government Treasury receipt showing a deposit of two hundred rupees, in the case of [election or nomination to municipal Councils] and one hundred rupee, in the case of [election or nomination to Nagar Panchayats]. (4) A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition : (a) where the petitioner, in addition to claiming a declaration that the election [or nomination], as the case: may be, of all or any of the returned candidates is void, claims a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected [or nominated], all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates; and (b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition. (5) An election petition shall : (a) contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) set forth with sufficient particulars, the ground or grounds on which the election [or nomination] is called in question; (c) be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), for the verification of pleadings. xxx xxx xxx 22. Grounds for declaring election or [nomination] to be void - (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the Judge is of the opinion : (a) that on the date of his election or [nomination] a returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified, to be chosen as a [President or a Councillor], or (b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by returned candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his agent; or (c) that any nomination paper has been improperly rejected; or (d) that the result of the election or [nomination], in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected : (i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination; or (ii) by the improper acceptance or refusal of any vote or reception of any vote which is void; or (iii) by the non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or of any rules or orders made thereunder save the rules framed under [Section 32] in so far as they relate to preparation and revision of list of voters. He shall declare the election or [nomination] of the returned candidate to be void. He shall declare the election or [nomination] of the returned candidate to be void. (2) If in the opinion of the judge a returned candidate has been guilty by an agent of any corrupt practice, but the judge is satisfied : (a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election or [nomination] by the candidate and every such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the instructions, and without the consent of the candidate; (b) that the candidate took all reasonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt practice at the election or [nomination]; and (c) that in all other respects the election or [nomination] was free from any corrupt practice on the part of the candidate or any of his agents; then, the Judge may decide that the election or [nomination] of the returned candidate is not void.” 10.Section 24 deals with decision on election petition. Section 26(1) provides that no appeal shall lie against the decision of the Judge on the petition, whereas, Section 26 (2) provides that any party aggrieved by the decision of the Judge on the petition may, within thirty days from the date of such decision, apply to the High Court for revision on the grounds mentioned therein. Section 24 and Section 26 of the Act of 1961 is extracted hereunder : “ 24. Section 24 and Section 26 of the Act of 1961 is extracted hereunder : “ 24. Decision on election petition - (1) At the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the Judge shall make an order - (a) dismissing the election petition; or (b) declaring the election or [nomination] of all or any of the returned candidates to be void; or (c) declaring the election or [nomination] of all or any of the returned candidates to be void and the petitioner and any other candidate to have been duly elected or [nominated] (2) If any person who has filed an election petition has, in addition to calling in question the election or [nomination] of the returned candidate, claimed declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected or [nominated] and the Judge is of opinion : (a) that in fact the petitioner or such other candidate received a majority of the valid votes; or (b) that but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate the petitioner or such other candidate would have obtained a majority of the valid votes; the Judge shall, after declaring the election or [nomination] of the returned candidate, to be void, declare the petitioner or such other candidate, as the case may be, to have been duly elected or [nominated]. (3) At the time of making an order under this section, the Judge shall also make an order : (a) where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the election or [nomination] regarding : (i) a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has not been proved to have been committed at the election or [nomination] and the nature of that corrupt practice; and (ii) the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice and the nature of that practice; and (b) fixing the total amount of costs payable, and specifying the person by and to whom costs shall be paid; Provided that a person who is not a party to the petition shall not be named in the order under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) unless : (a) he has been given notice to appear before the Judge and show cause why he should not be so named; and (b) if he appears in pursuance of the notice, he has been given an opportunity of cross-examining any witness who has already been examined by the Judge and has given evidence against him, of calling evidence in his defence and of being heard 26.Finality of decision - (1) No appeal shall lie against the decision of the Judge on the petition. (2) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Judge on the petition may, within thirty days from the date of such decision, apply to the High Court for revision on any of the following grounds : (a) that the decision is contrary to law; (b) that the Judge has exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him by law; but subject to such orders as the High Court may pass thereon, such decision shall be final.” 11. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) and clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 355 read with Section 23 of the Act of 1961, the State Government has framed rules known as the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Election Petition) Rules, 1962, for trying election petition as well as procedural requirements for filing revision. Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962 provides for revision which reads as under: " 19. Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962 provides for revision which reads as under: " 19. Revision .- (1) No petition by way of revision shall lie against any interlocutory order passed by the Judge. (2) At the time of presentation of the petition for revision under sub-section (2) of section 26 against the decision of the Judge, the petitioner shall deposit with the High Court a sum of Rs. 250 as security for the costs of the revision. If the provisions of this rule are not complied with the High Cort shall dismiss the petition." 12. A meticulous examination of sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Election Petition) Rules, 1962 unequivocally clarifies the legislative intent and procedural mandate regarding the timing and nature of the security deposit. The initial clause of the said sub-rule expressly stipulates that the petitioner, at the time of presentation of the petition for revision, must furnish a security deposit amounting to Rs. 250/- to the High Court, which serves as security for the costs associated with the revision proceedings. This provision is not merely directory but is of a mandatory character, designed to ensure that frivolous or vexatious revisions are discouraged, and the resources of Court are protected from undue strain. 13. The term "presentation" in this legal context carries significant weight and requires careful interpretation. It is a term of art that encompasses various connotations depending on its application within judicial and procedural frameworks. Generally, "presentation" may be understood in its broadest sense as the act of formally delivering or submitting a petition, document, or appeal for consideration before a competent authority or Court. Dictionaries commonly define "presentation" as the act of filing, delivering, or exhibiting a document. Hence, when read in the context of the Rules, "presentation" must be construed to mean the actual filing or submission of the revision petition before the Registry or Court, marking the commencement of the legal challenge. 14. Second part of sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962 provides, "if the provisions of this rule are not complied with the High Court shall dismiss the petition". In this second part, the legislature has consciously provided the consequence of non-fulfillment of the condition enumerated in the first part of the rule by providing that the Court "shall" dismiss the revision petition. 15. In this second part, the legislature has consciously provided the consequence of non-fulfillment of the condition enumerated in the first part of the rule by providing that the Court "shall" dismiss the revision petition. 15. Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (12th Edition 2010) unmistakably provides that when consequence of nullification on failure to comply with a prescribed requirement is provided by the statute itself, there can be no manner of doubt that such statutory requirement must be interpreted as mandatory. (Also see Rajsekhar Gogoi v. State of Assam2.) 16.In a decision in the matter of Sharif-ud-din v. Abdul Gani Lone reported in (1980) 1 SCC 403 , Justice E.S. Venkataramiah delivering the judgment for the Supreme Court observed that whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to accept the argument that failure to comply with the said requirement should lead to any other consequences. 17. In the matter of M.Y. Ghorpade v. Shivaji Rao M. Poal and others reported in (2002) 7 SCC 289 , the Supreme Court while considering Section 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which provides that at the time of presenting an election petition, the petitioner shall deposit in the High Court in accordance with the Rules of the High Court a sum of two thousand rupees as security for the costs of the petition, it has been held that the requirement of making a security deposit of Rs.2,000/- is mandatory and the same has to be made while presenting an election petition, but the mode of deposit as well as the person who could make a deposit is directory. 18.In the matter of Charan Lal Sahu v. Nandkishore Bhatt and others reported in AIR 1973 SC 2464 , it was held by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the High Court has no option but to reject the election petition which is not accompanied by payment of security as provided in Sections 86 and 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as Section 86(1) of the said Act provides that High Court shall dismiss an election which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117. That decision has been followed subsequently by the Supreme Court in the matter of Aeltemesh Rein v. Chandulal Chandrakar and others , reported in AIR 1981 SC 1199 . 19.Not only this, the M.P. High Court also in the matter of Radheshyam Nandlalji Patidar v. Jagdish Gangaram Patidar and others, reported in 1995 M.P.L.J. 909 , has clearly held that Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1962 is mandatory and the petitioner has to deposit security deposit of Rs.250/- at the time of presentation of revision petition and if he fails to do so, the revision petition would be liable to be dismissed. 20.The judgment rendered in the matter of Radheshyam Nandlalji Patidar (supra) has been followed with approval subsequently by that Court in the matter of Aslam Beg Mirdha v. Babulal and others reported in 1997 (2) JLJ 154 , clearly holding the provisions under Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1962 are mandatory, security amount has to be deposited along with the revision petition and the High Court has no discretion to condone the lapse. It is further held that the revision petition is not maintainable, as the provisions of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962 are mandatory and not directory and observed in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 as under: - "18. The judgment referred in the cases of Kailash Narayan (supra) and Ravi Thakur (supra), and directly in conflict with the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Babulal & another v. State of M.P. & others, 1985 JLJ 644 , while considering the provisions of Rule 7 and Rule 8 of Panchayat (Election Petition, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1962 it was held that on account of deficiency in deposit of security amount the election petition should be dismissed. It was held that the rule is mandatory. Law does not provide any extension of time to deposit security amount. The amount deserves to be deposited at the time of presentation of the petition, as held in the case of Charan Lal Sahu (supra) and in the case of Aoltemesh Rein (supra). 19. The law is also settled by this Court in respect of section 26 of the Act and Rule 19 of the Rules in the case of Radheshyam (supra). 20. 19. The law is also settled by this Court in respect of section 26 of the Act and Rule 19 of the Rules in the case of Radheshyam (supra). 20. Since the mandatory provision of deposit of security at the time of presentation of petition was not complied with, the Court has no option but to dismiss the revision petition under Rule 19 of the Rules. Language of Rule 19 is plain and simple. Since elections of Municipality are subject to challenge under the provision of Article 243ZG of the Constitution of India, the Court had no power to exercise the jurisdiction in extending the period to deposit the security or to condone the delay to deposit the security amount." 21. The above stated two judgments i.e. Radheshyam Nandlalji Patidar (supra) and Aslam Beg Mirdha (supra) have been followed with approval in the matter of Deepak Kumar Soni v. Ashok Kumar and others , reported in 2015 (1) M.P.H.T. 388 by the M.P. High Court. 22.In Sharif-ud-din (supra), Justice E.S. Venkataramiah delivering judgment for the Supreme Court observed that whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow. 23.Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.Y. Ghorpade (supra) considering the pari materia provisions contained in Section 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 has held that the aforesaid provision requires deposit of Rs.2,000/- to be made at the time of presenting an election petition. The object of having the aforesaid provision could be to discourage entertaining frivolous election petitions and to make provision for cost in favour of the parties who ultimately succeed in the election petition. 24.Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Om Solanki (Supra) has held as under : “11. Revision lies against an order, which rejects an objection raised in respect of maintainability of an election petition. An order rejecting a plea on a point, which when accepted will conclude the particular proceedings cannot be called an interlocutory order. xxx xxx xxx 14. In the case in hand, the Court of Addl. Revision lies against an order, which rejects an objection raised in respect of maintainability of an election petition. An order rejecting a plea on a point, which when accepted will conclude the particular proceedings cannot be called an interlocutory order. xxx xxx xxx 14. In the case in hand, the Court of Addl. District Judge is a court established under Section 5 (b) of the M.P. Civil Court Act, 1958, under Section 20 of the Municipalities Act, 1961, the jurisdiction conferred on the District Judge is as the presiding officer of a established Court and not as Persona designata and consequently, it is upon for him to act in its exercise of general power under Section 7 of the M.P. Civil Courts Act, or Section 24 of C.P.C, to transfer the election petition filed before him to the Addl. District Judge situated at the same place and that is how, the Addl. District Judge conferred jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide an election petition, which is only exception of a pre - established civil Court. The conferral of such jurisdiction does not convert the court of Addl. District judge into an election tribunal.” 25. In the matter of Saritha S. Nair (Supra) , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “43. Though all the aforesaid decisions were taken note of by a two-member Bench in P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan [P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan, (2012) 5 SCC 511 ] , the Court held in that case that the absence of proper verification may lead to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 81 had not been fulfilled and that the cause of action for the election petition would remain incomplete. Such a view does not appear to be in conformity with the series of decisions referred to in the previous paragraphs and hence P.A. Mohammed Riyas [P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan, (2012) 5 SCC 511 ] cannot be taken to lay down the law correctly. It appears from the penultimate paragraph of the decision in P.A. Mohammed Riyas [P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan, (2012) 5 SCC 511 ] that the Court was pushed to take such an extreme view in that case on account of the fact that the petitioner therein had an opportunity to cure the defect, but he failed to do so. It appears from the penultimate paragraph of the decision in P.A. Mohammed Riyas [P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan, (2012) 5 SCC 511 ] that the Court was pushed to take such an extreme view in that case on account of the fact that the petitioner therein had an opportunity to cure the defect, but he failed to do so. Therefore, P.A. Mohammed Riyas [P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan, (2012) 5 SCC 511 ] appears to have turned on its peculiar facts. In any case P.A. Mohammed Riyas [P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan, (2012) 5 SCC 511 ] was overruled in G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar [G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 715] on the question whether it is imperative for an election petitioner to file an affidavit in terms of Order 6 Rule 15(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in support of the averments made in the election petition in addition to an affidavit (in a case where resort to corrupt practices have been alleged against the returned candidate) as required by the proviso to Section 83(1). As a matter of fact, even the filing of a defective affidavit, which is not in Form 25 as prescribed by the Rules, was held in G.M. Siddeshwar [G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 715] to be a curable defect and the petitioner was held entitled to an opportunity to cure the defect. 44. The upshot of the above discussion is that a defective verification is a curable defect. An election petition cannot be thrown out in limine, on the ground that the verification is defective.” 26. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Deepak Sharma @ Bunty (Supra) has held as under : “24. It is crystal clear that the provisions contained in Rule 19(2) of Rides, 1963 requires the petitioner to deposit the amount of Rs. 250/- as security deposit at the time of presentation of the petition and not subsequent thereto. As held earlier, the provisions are mandatory in nature and its non-compliance is fatal, therefore; if the revision has been filed without depositing the amount of security, then it is fatal to the revision and the defect cannot be cured by depositing the same on a date subsequent to the filing of the revision. As held earlier, the provisions are mandatory in nature and its non-compliance is fatal, therefore; if the revision has been filed without depositing the amount of security, then it is fatal to the revision and the defect cannot be cured by depositing the same on a date subsequent to the filing of the revision. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrakant Uttam Chodankar v. Dayanand Rayu Mandrakar; has observed in para 68 as under: “68. In Ch. Subbarao v. Member, Election Tribunal; AIR 1964 SC 1027 : (1964) 6 SCR 213 , the Constitution Bench accepted the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant therein to the effect that the election petition was not to be equated to an election at law or in equity, but as the rights are purely creature of the statute, if the statute renders any particular requirement mandatory, the courts possess and can exercise no dispensing power of waive non-compliance. The Constitution Bench following Murarka Radhe Shyam case held : (AIR pp. 1033–34, para 26). “We do not however consider that there is really need for so much refinement when one has to look at whether there is a substantial compliance with the requirement of this provision. If the signatures now found on the copies were intended to authenticate the document to which it is appended viz. the copy, it would only mean that the copy did not reproduce the signature in the original. There is no compelling necessity to hold that the signatures were merely intended to be a copy of those on the original in order to spell out a non-compliance with Section 81(3), seeing that a signature in original was not needed on the copy and a writing copying out the name of the signatory would suffice.” 27. There is no compelling necessity to hold that the signatures were merely intended to be a copy of those on the original in order to spell out a non-compliance with Section 81(3), seeing that a signature in original was not needed on the copy and a writing copying out the name of the signatory would suffice.” 27. On the basis of aforesaid analysis and in light of the provisions contained in Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1962, this Court do not have slightest doubt that the rule provides mandatorily to the person filing revision petition under sub-section (2) of Section 26 of the Act of 1961 to imperatively deposit Rs.250/- as security for the costs of the revision and if security for the costs is not deposited, the consequence has also been provided which is dismissal of revision petition by the Court and as such, this Court has no discretion to condone the delay in depositing the security deposit. 28. Therefore, Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1962 is mandatory in nature and if compliance of the same has not been made, the result would be that this Court has no option except to dismiss the revision petition. Further, considering Section 20 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961, and an amendment notification dated 03.04.2024, determining that the District Judge-II, Katghora, has jurisdiction to entertain the election petition, thus rendering the objection raised by applicant on jurisdiction unsustainable. 29. Accordingly, this Civil Revision is dismissed