Page 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.24391 of 2025 (In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950) M/s. Rungta Mines Limited, Kolkata & Anr. …. Petitioner (s) -versus- Union of India & Ors. …. Opposite Party (s) Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode: For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Arun Kathpalia, Sr. Adv. Along with Mr. Tanmay Mishra, Advocate For Opposite Party (s) : Ms. Madhavi Divan, Sr. Adv. Along with associates Ms. Swati Smita Pati, Adv. CORAM: DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI DATE OF HEARING:-07.03.2026 DATE OF JUDGMENT:-22.05.2026 Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the investigation initiated by the Opposite Party No. 3 against the present Petitioner No. 1 as also their impleadment as an Opposite Party in Suo Moto Case No. 02 of 2021, the same being illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction inter alia as it has been initiated in the absence of the jurisdiction Section 26(1) order having been passed by the Opposite Party No. 2 under the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 2 I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE 2. The genesis of the present dispute traces back to a complaint dated 6.3.2021, filed by the Coimbatore Corporation Contractors Welfare Association (hereinafter, “CCCWA”) before the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”), alleging that nine steel manufacturers, namely, (i) Tata Steel Ltd., (ii) JSW Steel, (iii) SAIL Steel, (iv) Vizag Steel, (v) Tirumala TMT, (vi) Kamachi TMT, (vii) Agni Steel, (viii) Indrola Steel, and (ix) Kiscol TMT (collectively referred to as the “Steel Manufacturers”), were engaged in cartelisation by fixing steel prices in the State of Tamil Nadu with a view to earn unlawful profits. 3. Subsequently, on 25.3.2021, CCCWA instituted Criminal Original Petition No. 6153 of 2021 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras, seeking directions to the CBI to register a criminal case on the basis of the aforesaid complaint. 4. In the interregnum, the CBI, by communication dated 30.4.2021, fowarded the CCCWA complaint to the Director General (Investigation), Competition Commission of India (Opposite Party No. 3), taking the view that it lacked jurisdiction to investigate the matter. 5. During the proceedings before the Hon’ble Madras High Court, the learned Special Public Prosecutor produced a letter dated 26.5.2021, indicating that the complaint had already been forwarded to the Director General (Investigation), CCI. Taking note of the same, the Hon’ble Madras High Court, by order dated 29.7.2021, directed the Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 3 Director General to proceed further and take necessary and appropriate action on the complaint ‘in accordance with law’ within a period of four weeks. 6. Pursuant thereto, the Competition Commission of India (Opposite Party No. 2) convened a meeting on 17.8.2021, in which the Director General was also present. Thereafter, on 23.8.2021, the Commission directed its Secretariat Division to register the matter as a suo motu case and instructed the Director General to investigate the same in terms of the directions contained in the order dated 29.7.2021 passed by the Hon’ble Madras High Court. 7. It is important to note here that the Petitioner No. 1 was not named in the initial CCCWA complaint which was limited to allegations against the Steel Manufacturers operating in the state of Tamil Nadu. 8. Notwithstanding the above, on 16.12.2022, the Director General conducted a search and seizure operation at the premises of Petitioner No. 1. It is the case of the Petitioner that, at no stage during the said operation, was it apprised of its status or the nature of its involvement in the investigation. In the absence of any indication to the contrary, the Petitioner understood its role, if any, to be only that of a third party. 9. Thereafter, on 27.3.2023, summons were issued to two employees of the Petitioner No. 1, namely, Mr. Anand Sharma, Senior General Manager (Commercial), and Mr. Arvind Kumar, Senior General Manager (Sales & Marketing), directing them to appear before the Director General on 5.4.2023. Even at this stage, no clarification is Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 4 alleged to have been provided regarding the nature or scope of the investigation insofar as it concerned the Petitioner. 10. The Director General submitted its investigation report to the Competition Commission of India on 5.1.2024. Upon consideration of the said report, the Commission, on 5.4.2024, directed further investigation under Section 26(3A) of the Competition Act, 2002. In compliance thereof, a supplementary investigation report was submitted by the Director General on 11.4.2025. 11. In or about May 2025, during the course of an internal legal audit, the Petitioner No. 1 sought to ascertain the outcome of the earlier summons issued to its employees. Upon obtaining legal advice, and in light of the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in MRF Ltd. v. CCI & Ors.1, the Petitioner was advised to seek inspection of the records of the case. 12. Accordingly, on 18.7.2025, the Petitioner No. 1 filed an application seeking inspection of the records in Suo Motu Case No. 02 of 2021 under Regulation 38 of the CCI (General) Regulations, 2024. 13. While the same was pending, on 23.7.2025, the Commission again considered the investigation materials and directed the Director General to undertake further investigation under Section 26(3A) of the Act and submit an additional supplementary report within a stipulated time frame. 14. The Commission, by order dated 8.8.2025, allowed the application for inspection. Upon inspection of the records on 11.8.2025, the Petitioner 1 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 2244 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 5 discovered, for the first time, that it had been treated as an “Opposite Party” in the proceedings and that the CCCWA complaint and the order dated 29.7.2021 of the Hon’ble Madras High Court had been construed as “information” within the meaning of Section 19(1) of the Competition Act, prior to the registration of the suo motu case. 15. Thereafter, the Petitioner applied for certified copies of the relevant records on 12.8.2025, which were furnished on 20.8.2025. It is in the above backdrop that the Petitioner No. 1, upon gaining knowledge on 11.8.2025 that it had been arrayed as an “Opposite Party” in the proceedings arising out of Suo Motu Case No. 02 of 2021, and upon perusing the records which indicated that no prior notice or opportunity of hearing had been afforded to it before such impleadment, has approached this Court. 16. The Petitioner has instituted the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia seeking quashing of the investigation and all consequential proceedings arising out of Suo Motu Case No. 02 of 2021, insofar as they relate to the Petitioner. 17. Now that the broad facts leading up to the instant Petition have been laid down, this Court shall endeavour to fully summarise the contentions of the Parties. II. PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS: 18. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the impugned investigation is, on the face of it, without jurisdiction, having been initiated in the absence of a mandatory order under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002. It is contended that the statutory scheme Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 6 requires the Competition Commission of India to first form a prima facie opinion, upon due application of mind, before directing an investigation by the Director General. According to the Ld. counsel, this requirement is not a mere formality but goes to the root of the matter and is a condition precedent for the assumption of jurisdiction. In the present case, it is submitted that no such order exists, nor is there any material to indicate that the allegations were considered qua the Petitioner. On that basis, it is urged that the investigation, insofar as it concerns the Petitioner, stands vitiated at its inception. 19. It is further submitted that the reliance placed by the Opposite Parties on the order dated 29.7.2021 passed by the Hon’ble Madras High Court is misconceived. Ld. Counsel submits that the said order merely directed the Director General to take appropriate steps “in accordance with law” and did not, in any manner, dispense with or override the requirement under Section 26(1). It is pointed out that the Hon’ble High Court did not examine the merits of the allegations nor did it form any prima facie view of contravention under the Act. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the said order cannot be treated as a substitute for the Commission’s independent satisfaction. Any such interpretation, according to Ld. Counsel, would amount to an abdication of statutory duty and would effectively bypass the legislative framework governing competition law. 20. Ld. Counsel further submits that the Director General has acted beyond the scope of his statutory mandate by initiating and continuing investigation against the Petitioner in the absence of any Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 7 direction to expand the investigation by the Commission. It is contended that the Director General is merely an investigative arm and cannot assume jurisdiction on its own or expand the scope of investigation to include entities not contemplated by the Commission. In the present case, it is pointed out that neither the original complaint, nor the order of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, nor even the minutes of the Commission’s meeting make any reference to the Petitioner. The inclusion of the Petitioner, therefore, according to the Ld. Counsel, amounts to an exercise of power dehors the statute and renders the proceedings ultra vires. 21. It is further contended that the manner in which the Petitioner has been impleaded as an “Opposite Party” is in clear violation of the principles of natural justice. Ld. Counsel further submits that the Petitioner was never issued any notice, nor was it afforded an opportunity to contest its inclusion before being subjected to coercive measures such as search and seizure and the issuance of summons. It is further argued that such impleadment carries serious civil and reputational consequences and cannot be undertaken in a manner lacking transparency. Reliance is placed on the decision in MRF Ltd. v. CCI & Ors. (supra), wherein it has been held that an entity must be informed and given an opportunity of hearing before being arrayed as an opposite party in investigation proceedings. 22. It is also submitted that the Petitioner has no nexus with the allegations forming the subject matter of the investigation. It is pointed out that the CCCWA complaint relates to alleged cartelisation in the Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 8 State of Tamil Nadu, whereas the Petitioner neither operates in the relevant market nor was engaged in any government procurement in that State. It is further submitted that the Petitioner was not named in the complaint and holds only a negligible market share in India. In such circumstances, its inclusion is said to be wholly arbitrary. It is further submitted that such selective targeting, while ignoring other major players, reflects non-application of mind and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 23. On the question of delay and laches, it is submitted that the Petitioner had no knowledge of its status as an “Opposite Party” until inspection of records was permitted on 8.8.2025 and carried out on 11.8.2025. Prior thereto, the Petitioner proceeded on the bona fide understanding that it was being treated only as a third party, there being no communication to indicate otherwise. It is contended that the cause of action arose only upon discovery of its impleadment and the underlying jurisdictional defects. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the writ petition cannot be said to be belated. It is further urged that where proceedings are void for lack of jurisdiction, delay cannot cure the illegality. III. OPPOSITE PARTY’S SUBMISSIONS: 24. Per contra, Ld. Counsel appearing for the Opposite Parties submits that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed at the threshold on the ground of delay and laches. It is contended that the Petitioner actively participated in the investigation proceedings, including during the search and seizure operations and in response to summons Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 9 issued to its employees, without raising any objection at the relevant time. It is further submitted that the investigation has since culminated in the submission of the main report as well as supplementary reports before the Competition Commission of India. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the Petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the proceedings at this belated stage. The writ petition, it is submitted, is therefore both delayed and, in any event, rendered infructuous. 25. It is further contended that, in the peculiar facts of the present case, the absence of a formal order under Section 26(1) does not vitiate the investigation. Ld. Counsel submits that the Hon’ble Madras High Court, by its order dated 29.7.2021, directed the Director General to proceed further and take necessary action on the complaint. According to the Opposite Parties, this direction was not merely recommendatory but constituted a binding mandate requiring investigation. In view of such judicial direction, it is submitted that the usual procedural sequence contemplated under Section 26(1) stood modified, and the Director General was justified in proceeding accordingly. 26. It is further submitted that the Competition Commission of India and the Director General perform distinct but complementary roles under the statutory framework. While the Commission exercises adjudicatory functions, the Director General is entrusted with investigative powers under Sections 16 and 41 of the Act. It is contended that once the matter was taken cognizance of pursuant to the High Court’s order and registered as a suo motu case, the Commission’s decision to proceed necessarily implies the existence of Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 10 a prima facie opinion. It is submitted that such opinion need not always be recorded in a formal or reasoned order and may be gathered from the decision-making process. 27. It is also submitted that the scope of investigation by the Director General is not confined to the entities named in the original complaint. The Director General is empowered to conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the alleged anti-competitive conduct and may, in the course of such investigation, examine the role of other entities whose involvement comes to light. The mere fact that the Petitioner was not named in the initial complaint, it is argued, does not preclude investigation against it. Any challenge at this stage is said to be premature. 28. It is further contended that no prejudice has been caused to the Petitioner so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The proceedings before the Commission are inquisitorial in nature, and adequate opportunity will be available to the Petitioner at the appropriate stage to present its defence. It is contended that at the stage of investigation, prior notice is not required before gathering material or issuing summons. The principles of natural justice, it is submitted, do not apply in their full rigour at this stage. 29. It is also contended that the allegations of arbitrariness and selective targeting are unfounded. The investigation, according to the Ld. Counsel, has been conducted in a comprehensive manner, and the inclusion of the Petitioner is based on material gathered during the course of investigation. The Director General, it is submitted, is vested Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 11 with discretion in determining the scope and direction of investigation, and such discretion ought not to be interfered with lightly. It is urged that no case for interference under Article 226 is made out, particularly when adequate remedies are available before the Commission. Interference at this stage, it is submitted, would impede the functioning of a specialised statutory authority and frustrate the object of the Competition Act. IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION: 30. In view of the rival submissions advanced by Ld. Counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the materials on record, the following issues arise for consideration before this Court: A. Whether the order dated 29.7.2021 passed by the Hon’ble Madras High Court can be construed as dispensing with or substituting the statutory requirement under Section 26(1) of the Act? B. Whether the investigation initiated by the Director General against the Petitioner is vitiated for want of a prior order under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, forming a prima facie opinion by the Competition Commission of India? C. Whether the Director General acted beyond the scope of its statutory mandate by including the Petitioner within the ambit of investigation in the absence of any specific direction by the Commission? Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 12 D. Whether the impleadment of the Petitioner as an “Opposite Party”, without prior notice or opportunity of hearing, is violative of the principles of natural justice? E. Whether the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay, laches, prematurity, or lack of territorial jurisdiction especially in light of the stage of the investigation proceedings? A. WHETHER THE ORDER DATED 29.7.2021 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE MADRAS HIGH COURT CAN BE CONSTRUED AS DISPENSING WITH OR SUBSTITUTING THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 26(1) OF THE ACT? 31. The first issue that arises for consideration relates to the true import and effect of the order dated 29.7.2021 passed by the Hon’ble Madras High Court, and whether the same can be construed as dispensing with the statutory requirement of formation of a prima facie opinion under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act. The Opposite Parties contend that the said order constitutes a binding judicial mandate to investigate, thereby obviating the need to follow the procedure contemplated under the Act. The Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that the order merely directs action “in accordance with law” and cannot be read as overriding the statutory scheme. 32. Section 26(1) of the Act provides that upon receipt of information under Section 19, if the Commission is of the opinion that there exists a prima facie case, it shall direct the Director General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter. The relevant portion is reproduced herein for the sake of convenience: Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 13 “26. (1) On receipt of a reference from the Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority or on its own knowledge or information received under section 19, if the Commission is of the opinion that there exists a prima facie case, it shall direct the Director General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter: Provided that if the subject matter of an information received is, in the opinion of the Commission, substantially the same as or has been covered by any previous information received, then the new information may be clubbed with the previous information.” The language employed is both conditional and mandatory. The formation of an opinion regarding the existence of a prima facie case is the condition precedent, and upon such formation, a direction to investigate follows. The use of the expression “shall” indicates that once such opinion is formed, the direction must be issued; at the same time, it makes it clear that the formation of such opinion is indispensable. 33. The statutory scheme, when viewed as a whole, reinforces this position. Section 19 empowers the Commission to receive information, while Section 26 delineates the procedural steps that follow. The requirement of a prima facie opinion operates as a threshold safeguard before the investigative machinery is set in motion. It is not an empty formality; rather, it is intended to ensure that the coercive powers of investigation are invoked only upon due application of mind. 34. At the outset, it becomes necessary to notice the nature of the proceedings before the Hon’ble Madras High Court. The order in Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 14 question came to be passed in a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein the grievance of the complainant was directed against the inaction of the CBI. The High Court was not exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in relation to the Competition Act, nor was it called upon to examine any issue arising under the said Act. The Competition Commission of India was not a party to those proceedings, and the scope of adjudication was confined to the prayer made therein. 35. The operative portion of the order assumes importance. The Hon’ble Court, upon noticing that the complaint had already been forwarded to the Director General, directed the latter to “proceed further in this regard and take necessary and appropriate action on the complaint… in accordance with law.” The expression “in accordance with law” is of significance. It indicates that the authority concerned is required to act within the framework of the law governing it. 36. The submission of the Opposite Parties that the said direction amounts to a mandate to investigate, independent of statutory requirements, does not merit acceptance. A judicial direction to act “in accordance with law” cannot be construed as dispensing with the law itself. Such an interpretation would not only be inconsistent with the language employed but would also run contrary to settled principles. 37. The CCI has committed a fatal error of misconstruing the Madras High Court order as one of a mandamus directing investigation, as is admitted at paragraph 11 of its Counter Affidavit, where it has stated: "11. That it is also a settled principle of law when the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature under the writ Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 15 jurisdiction directs and/or issues a mandate for conduction an investigation concerning the public at large, no sanction is required from any other authority under the relevant statute which in the present case has been resorted to an substantially acted upon by the OP No. 3" 38. It is well settled that judicial orders must be read in the context in which they are passed. The Hon’ble Madras High Court was not exercising its powers under writ jurisdiction, did not issue any mandate for conduct of investigation, did not examine the merits of the allegations contained in the complaint, nor did it record any finding suggestive of contravention of the Competition Act. There is nothing in the order to indicate that the Court formed any prima facie opinion of the nature contemplated under Section 26(1). 39. In the absence of such examination, the order cannot be construed as a substitute for the Commission’s statutory satisfaction. The requirement under Section 26(1) is that the Commission must apply its own mind to the material before it and arrive at an independent conclusion regarding the existence of a prima facie case. This function is entrusted to the Commission under the statute and cannot be supplanted by inference. 40. The record indicates that the Commission, in its minutes dated 23.8.2021, appears to have treated the High Court’s order as the basis for directing investigation, without undertaking any independent evaluation. Such an approach reflects a misappreciation of the scope of the judicial direction. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 16 41. The statutory scheme does not contemplate any exception to the requirement of forming a prima facie opinion. Whether the information is received from an external source, referred by another authority, or taken cognizance of suo motu, the requirement remains the same. The Commission must form an opinion that a prima facie case exists. 42. The argument that the judicial direction modifies the statutory procedure is also untenable. Courts do not ordinarily intend to override statutory provisions unless such intention is expressly indicated. In the present case, no such intention can be discerned. On the contrary, the direction to act “in accordance with law” reinforces the obligation to adhere to the statutory framework. 43. It is also of some relevance that the order was passed in proceedings to which the Competition Commission was not a party. It would be difficult to hold that such an order binds the Commission in a manner that alters its statutory obligations, without affording it an opportunity of being heard. 44. In the considered view of this Court, the reliance placed on the order dated 29.7.2021 is misplaced. The said order neither dispenses with nor substitutes the requirement under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act. It merely requires the authority to proceed in accordance with law, which necessarily includes compliance with the statutory procedure. 45. Accordingly, this Court holds that the order dated 29.7.2021 passed by the Hon’ble Madras High Court does not dispense with the Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 17 requirement under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, nor can it be construed as a substitute for the Commission’s statutory satisfaction. B. WHETHER THE INVESTIGATION INITIATED BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS VITIATED FOR WANT OF A PRIOR ORDER UNDER SECTION 26(1) OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002, FORMING A PRIMA FACIE OPINION BY THE COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA? 46. The next issue that falls for consideration goes to the root of the controversy, namely, whether the investigation undertaken by the Director General suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity on account of the absence of a prior order under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002. The Petitioners contend that such an order is a sine qua non for the initiation of investigation and that its absence renders the entire proceedings qua them, void ab initio. The Opposite Parties, however, seek to sustain the investigation by contending that the decision to proceed itself reflects the formation of a prima facie opinion. The issue, therefore, calls for an examination of the statutory framework, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and its application to the facts at hand. 47. It is no doubt correct that a direction under Section 26(1) is administrative in nature and does not, by itself, determine rights or liabilities. However, that does not dilute the requirement of its existence. The administrative character of the order pertains to its nature, not to the necessity of complying with the statutory precondition. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 18 48. The legal position stands settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Limited2. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while interpreting Section 26(1), held that the Commission must form an opinion as to the existence of a prima facie case and must indicate such opinion, even if briefly. It was also clarified that the Director General cannot initiate investigation suo motu and is required to act pursuant to a direction issued under Section 26(1). 49. The importance of this requirement becomes evident when one considers the consequences that follow from such a direction. Upon issuance of a direction to investigate, the Director General is vested with wide-ranging powers, including search and seizure, summoning of individuals, and examination of records. These powers, though exercised at a preliminary stage, are intrusive in nature and are capable of affecting business operations, reputation, and commercial standing. It is for this reason that the statute mandates the formation of a prima facie opinion as a threshold safeguard. 50. The Opposite Parties have sought to contend that the formation of a prima facie opinion can be inferred from the act of registering a suo motu case and directing investigation. The submission, though it may appear attractive at first glance, does not withstand closer scrutiny. 51. The Opposite Parties rely very heavily on the Hon’ble Madras High Court’s judgment in Agni Steels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India3 wherein, 2 (2010) 10 SCC 744 3 W.P. No. 11911 of 2023, dated 19.10.2023 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 19 the Hon’ble Madras High Court was pleased to observe that the Commission is empowered to initiate an inquiry either suo motu or on receipt of information under Section 19 of the Act. The Court clarified that while formation of a prima facie opinion is mandatory under Section 26(1), such opinion may be implicit in the decision to register a suo motu case and need not always be expressed in a specific form, particularly where a Court has directed the Commission to proceed with an investigation. It is further contended that this order has attained finality as the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 10.11.2023 declined to interfere with the same. 52. In Agni Steel (supra), the Hon’ble Madras High Court upheld the investigation in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, where the entity under investigation was expressly named in the CCCWA complaint, and there existed material before the Commission linking it to the alleged cartelisation. It is in that limited factual context that the Court held that the Commission’s prima facie satisfaction, though not expressly recorded in formulaic terms, could be inferred from the surrounding record. In stark contrast, the present case suffers from a complete absence of jurisdictional foundation. 53. The Petitioners before this Court, were neither named in the CCCWA complaint nor linked by any material whatsoever to the alleged contravention. Further, there is no order under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act qua the Petitioners—no consideration of information, no formation of prima facie opinion, and no reasons recorded. Moreover, the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition against Agni Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 20 Steel (supra) in limine does not lend finality to the judgment nor elevate it to a binding precedent. It is well settled, inter alia in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala4, that a non-speaking dismissal of an SLP does not result in merger, nor does it constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution. Such dismissal merely indicates that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was not inclined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, and cannot be read as affirmation of the reasoning of the High Court. 54. The requirement under Section 26(1) is not merely that the Commission should be satisfied; it must also indicate, even if in brief terms, that such satisfaction has been arrived at. Section 26(1) demands more than a silent satisfaction. The statute expects the Commission to show, however briefly, that it has applied its mind. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also emphasized that the Commission must express its mind, though detailed reasons are not required. What is contemplated is at least a minimal articulation of the basis on which the Commission considers it appropriate to proceed. 55. Turning to the facts of the present case, the minutes of the meeting dated 23.8.2021 assume significance. A perusal thereof indicates that the Commission directed the Secretariat to register the matter as a suo motu case and instructed the Director General to investigate in terms of the directions contained in the order dated 29.7.2021 passed by the Hon’ble Madras High Court. 4 (2000) 6 SCC 359 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 21 56. In the instant case, what is noticeably absent from the said minutes is any reference to the contents of the CCCWA complaint, any consideration of the allegations made therein, or any indication that the Commission formed an independent prima facie view. There is no discussion of the material placed before it, nor any indication of application of mind to the allegations. 57. The absence is not merely of elaborate reasoning; there is no indication of reasoning at all. The minutes do not record that the Commission was satisfied about the existence of a prima facie case, nor do they reflect any exercise of consideration. The direction to investigate appears to have followed on the basis of the Hon’ble High Court’s order, without the statutory exercise mandated under Section 26(1). 58. The contention that the Commission’s decision to proceed implies the existence of satisfaction is further weakened by the nature of the record. Where a statute requires the formation of an opinion, the record must, at least in substance, reflect that such opinion was formed. In the present case, the record is silent in that regard, and that silence assumes significance. 59. The consequences of such omission cannot be overlooked. The powers exercised by the Director General, including search and seizure and summoning of individuals, are not routine administrative steps. They have serious civil and reputational implications. The statutory requirement of a prima facie opinion serves as a necessary check against arbitrary exercise of such powers. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 22 60. The submission of the Opposite Parties that the defect, if any, is curable cannot be accepted. A defect of this nature goes to the root of the matter. The formation of a prima facie opinion is a jurisdictional fact, and its absence renders the initiation of investigation without authority. 61. Moreover, a jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by subsequent action. The Commission cannot, at a later stage, supply reasons or seek to justify an investigation that was initiated without compliance with the statutory requirement. 62. This Court is also mindful of the submission that an order under Section 26(1) is administrative in nature. While that proposition is correct, it does not obviate the requirement of compliance with the statutory precondition. The administrative character of the order does not dispense with the necessity of forming the opinion mandated by the statute. 63. In the considered view of this Court, the present case discloses a clear absence of the foundational requirement under Section 26(1). The Commission has neither formed nor recorded a prima facie opinion, and the Director General has proceeded to investigate in the absence of a valid direction. 64. Such investigation, in the absence of jurisdictional foundation, cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, this Court holds that the investigation initiated against the Petitioner is vitiated for want of a prior order under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 23 65. It is clarified that this Court has not examined the merits of the allegations or the sufficiency of material against the Petitioners. The consideration is confined to the existence of the jurisdictional facts necessary to trigger the investigative process under Section 26(1). C. WHETHER THE DIRECTOR GENERAL ACTED BEYOND THE SCOPE OF ITS STATUTORY MANDATE BY INCLUDING THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE AMBIT OF INVESTIGATION IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC DIRECTION BY THE COMMISSION? 66. The third issue that arises for consideration concerns the scope of the powers of the Director General under the Competition Act and whether, in the facts of the present case, the inclusion of the Petitioner within the ambit of investigation was within the bounds of such authority. The Petitioners contend that the Director General has acted beyond jurisdiction by initiating and continuing investigation against an entity not named in the original complaint and in the absence of any specific direction by the Commission. The Opposite Parties, on the other hand, submit that the Director General is vested with wide investigative powers and is entitled to examine the role of any entity whose involvement comes to light during the course of investigation. 67. This Court considers it apposite to first delineate the statutory position of the Director General. Under Sections 16 and 41 of the Competition Act, the Director General functions as the investigative arm of the Competition Commission of India. The Director General does not possess independent adjudicatory powers and acts in furtherance of directions issued by the Commission. This position is not in dispute. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 24 68. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in CCI v. SAIL (supra) has clearly held that the Director General cannot initiate investigation suo motu and is required to act strictly in terms of the direction issued by the Commission under Section 26(1). The powers of the Director General, though wide in the matter of fact-finding, are circumscribed by the scope of the inquiry as determined by the Commission. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "31(5) In consonance with the settled principles of administrative jurisprudence, the Commission is expected to record at least some reason even while forming a prima facie view. However, while passing directions and orders dealing with the rights of the parties in its adjudicatory and determinative capacity, it is required of the Commission to pass speaking orders, upon due application of mind, responding to all the contentions raised before it by the rival parties. xxx 37. As already noticed, in exercise of its powers, the Commission is expected to form its opinion as to the existence of a prima facie case for contravention of certain provisions of the Act and then pass a direction to the Director General to cause an investigation into the matter. xxx 38. In contradistinction, the direction under Section 26(1) after formation of a prima facie opinion is a direction simpliciter to cause an investigation into the matter. Issuance of such a direction, at the face of it, is an administrative direction to one of its own wings departmentally and is without entering upon any adjudicatory process. It does not effectively determine any right or obligation of the parties to the lis. xxx 97. Section 26, under its different sub-sections, requires the Commission to issue various directions, take decisions and Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 25 pass orders, some of which are even appealable before the Tribunal. Even if it is a direction under any of the provisions and not a decision, conclusion or order passed on merits by the Commission, it is expected that the same would be supported by some reasoning. At the stage of forming a prima facie view, as required under Section 26(1) of the Act, the Commission may not really record detailed reasons, but must express its mind in no uncertain terms that it is of the view that prima facie case exists, requiring issuance of direction for investigation to the Director General. Such view should be recorded with reference to the information furnished to the Commission. Such opinion should be formed on the basis of the records, including the information furnished and reference made to the Commission under the various provisions of the Act, as aforereferred. However, other decisions and orders, which are not directions simpliciter and determining the rights of the parties, should be well reasoned analysing and deciding the rival contentions raised before the Commission by the parties. In other words, the Commission is expected to express prima facie view in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, without entering into any adjudicatory or determinative process and by recording minimum reasons substantiating the formation of such opinion, while all its other orders and decisions should be well reasoned. xxx 116. Inquiry and investigation are quite distinguishable, as is clear from various provisions of the Act as well as the scheme framed thereunder. The Director General is expected to conduct an investigation only in terms of the direction of the Commission under Section 26(1) of the Act. The Director General, unlike the investigation under the MRTP Act, 1969, where the Director General can initiate investigation suo motu, cannot do so under the Act. Then the Commission has to consider such report as well as consider the objections and submissions made by other party. Till the time final order is passed by the Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 26 Commission in accordance with law, the inquiry under this Act continues. Both these expressions cannot be treated as synonymous. They are distinct, different in expression and operate in different areas." (emphasis is ours) 69. This position has been consistently reaffirmed in subsequent decisions, including Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd.5, Samir Agrawal v. CCI6, CCI v. State of Mizoram7, and Coal India Ltd. v. CCI8, all of which reiterate that formation of a prima facie opinion under Section 26(1) constitutes the jurisdictional foundation for commencement of an investigation. Investigation by the DG under the Competition Act commences not merely on the receipt of reference/information but only after CCI has formed a prima facie opinion of violation of the provisions of the Act having been committed. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Google Inc. and Ors. v. CCI and Anr.9 was pleased to hold as follows: “… R. Again, as aforesaid, CCI can order/direct investigation only if forms a prima facie opinion of violation of provisions of the Act having been committed. Our Constitutional values and judicial principles by no stretch of imagination would permit an investigation where say CCI orders/directs investigation without forming and expressing a prima facie opinion or where the prima facie opinion though purportedly is formed and expressed is palpably unsustainable. The remedy of Article 226 would definitely be available in such case.” 5 (2019) 2 SCC 521 6 (2021) 3 SCC 136 7 (2022) 13 SCC 1 8 (2023) 7 SCC 827 9 2015 SCC OnLine Del 8992 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 27 70. The Opposite Parties have relied upon the proposition that the Director General may, in the course of investigation, expand the scope of inquiry to include additional parties or facets that come to light. In principle, there can be no serious dispute with this proposition. It is well settled that the investigation is not confined in a rigid manner to the entities named in the original information, and the Director General may examine the role of other participants in the alleged anti- competitive conduct. 71. However, this principle must be understood in its proper context. The power to expand the scope of investigation presupposes the existence of a validly initiated inquiry. It cannot be invoked to justify the assumption of jurisdiction in the absence of such initiation. The distinction between expansion within jurisdiction and assumption of jurisdiction without foundation is of some importance. 72. In the present case, as has already been held while dealing with Issue No. (A), there is no valid order under Section 26(1) forming a prima facie opinion. The foundational requirement for initiation of investigation is thus absent. In such circumstances, the question of the Director General expanding the scope of investigation to include additional entities, including the Petitioner, does not arise. 73. Even otherwise, the factual matrix raises certain concerns regarding the manner in which the investigation has been conducted. The CCCWA complaint specifically named nine steel manufacturers allegedly involved in cartelisation in the State of Tamil Nadu. The Petitioner was not among those named. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 28 74. Notwithstanding the above, the Director General proceeded to conduct search and seizure operations at the premises of the Petitioner, while several entities named in the complaint were not subjected to similar measures. The record does not disclose any clear basis for this differential approach. 75. It is also the case of the Petitioners that they had no apparent nexus with the allegations forming the subject matter of the complaint. The alleged cartel pertains to the State of Tamil Nadu, whereas the Petitioner is stated to operate predominantly in a different geographic market and to hold a negligible market share in India during the relevant period. 76. The Opposite Parties have sought to justify the inclusion of the Petitioner on the ground that material implicating it emerged during the course of investigation. However, no such material has been placed on record to indicate the basis on which such inclusion was made. The absence of any reference to such material in the Commission’s directions further weakens this contention. 77. It must be borne in mind that the powers exercised by the Director General, particularly those relating to search and seizure, are intrusive in nature and have serious implications for the entity concerned. The exercise of such powers must, therefore, be supported by a lawful and reasoned process. 78. The reliance placed by the Opposite Parties on precedents permitting expansion of investigation is, in the facts of the present case, misplaced. Those decisions proceed on the footing that the Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 29 investigation was validly initiated. They do not support a situation where the very foundation of the investigation is absent. 79. It was also submitted that the sufficiency or otherwise of material against the Petitioner is a matter to be examined at the stage of final adjudication. While that may be so in the ordinary course, the present case involves a more fundamental issue, namely, the existence of jurisdiction to investigate. 80. In the considered view of this Court, the inclusion of the Petitioner within the scope of investigation, in the absence of a valid order under Section 26(1) and without any discernible material indicating its involvement, amounts to an exercise of power not contemplated by the statute. 81. Accordingly, this Court holds that the Director General acted beyond the scope of its statutory mandate in including the Petitioner within the ambit of investigation. D. WHETHER THE IMPLEADMENT OF THE PETITIONER AS AN “OPPOSITE PARTY”, WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY OF HEARING, IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE? 82. The fourth issue that arises for consideration is whether the manner in which the Petitioner came to be arrayed as an “Opposite Party” in the investigation is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Petitioners contend that they were neither informed of their status nor afforded any opportunity to contest their inclusion before being subjected to coercive measures such as search and seizure and issuance of summons. The Opposite Parties, on the other hand, submit that at the stage of investigation, strict adherence to principles of Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 30 natural justice is not required and that adequate opportunity would be available at a later stage. 83. It is well settled that the principles of natural justice are not inflexible and their application depends upon the nature of the proceedings in question. In the context of Section 26(1), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the formation of a prima facie opinion is administrative in nature and does not require prior notice or hearing. However, the present case does not concern merely the passing of an order under Section 26(1), but relates to the subsequent conduct of investigation and, more particularly, the manner in which the Petitioner came to be included within its scope. 84. The distinction between the initiation of investigation and the inclusion of a particular entity as an “Opposite Party” assumes significance. While the former may not attract the requirement of prior hearing, the latter carries with it direct civil and reputational consequences. Being arrayed as an “Opposite Party” in a competition proceeding is not without consequence, as it exposes the entity to potential liability and attendant adverse implications. 85. In the present case, the record indicates that the Petitioner was not named in the original complaint and had no prior indication that it was under investigation. Notwithstanding this, the Director General conducted search and seizure operations at its premises on 16.12.2022, followed by issuance of summons to its employees on 27.3.2023. 86. At no point during these proceedings does it appear that the Petitioner was informed of the nature of the allegations, the scope of the Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 31 investigation, or the capacity in which it was being proceeded against. The absence of such information assumes significance in assessing whether the principles of fairness have been adhered to. 87. The Petitioner has stated that it participated in the proceedings under the bona fide belief that it was being treated as a third party. This assertion finds some support in the fact that no communication was issued clarifying its status. It was only upon inspection of records in August 2025 that the Petitioner became aware that it had been treated as an “Opposite Party”. 88. The contention of the Opposite Parties that the conduct of search and seizure and issuance of summons itself constitutes sufficient notice of involvement cannot be accepted. Such actions, in the absence of disclosure regarding the basis or status of involvement, do not amount to notice in the legal sense. 89. Notice, in its true sense, must convey not only that a person is required to participate in proceedings but also the capacity in which such participation is sought. Without such clarity, the affected party is deprived of the opportunity to take an informed decision regarding its response. 90. The requirement of fairness in administrative action entails that an entity should, at the very least, be aware of the case it is required to meet. While detailed disclosure may not be necessary at the investigative stage, the complete absence of any indication regarding the status of the Petitioner cannot be justified. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 32 91. The reliance placed by the Petitioners on the decision in MRF Ltd. v. CCI & Ors. (supra) is not without substance. The said decision underscores the importance of informing an entity of its status in the proceedings, particularly where such status carries legal consequences. It was held by the Hon’ble Madras High Court: “22. It is also my considered view that there has been considerable opaqueness in the manner of conduct of the proceedings and considerable delay on the part of R-1 to R-5 in making available order dated 26-8-2020 to the petitioner. Having expressly stated under letter dated 24-4-2020 that the role of the petitioner is only as a third party, it was incumbent upon the authorities to have solicited the response of the petitioner prior to changing the status, which change has serious and grave implications. xxx 24. In my considered view, an entity is entitled to know the status under which its presence and participation is sought in statutory proceedings. The application of the statutory provisions and connected Regulations, their consequences, as well as available protections would vary depending on the status of the party. Thus, unless a party is aware as to the specific provision under which its involvement is sought and obtained, it would be in the dark as to the measures available to it under the law. xxx 40. Neither Section 41 nor Section 26(4) elaborate on the procedure to be followed when a third party is escalated to the position of contesting/opposite party. However, it is clear that this escalation is triggered by virtue of the reports of the DG under sub-sections (3) and (3-B). 41. If the reports under sub-sections (3) and (3-B) contain recommendations that there is no contravention of the statutory provision, the Commission, under sub-section (5), shall invite objections or suggestions from the Government concerned. On consideration of the objections as well as Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 33 suggestions of the Government concerned, the Commission could close the matter if it agrees with the recommendations of the DG. 42. If the objections/suggestions of the Government are contrary to the reports of the DG and if the Commission concurs, it may direct further investigation into the matter. If on the other hand, the reports under sub-sections (3) and (3-B) recommend contravention of statutory provisions and if the Commission is of the opinion that further enquiry is called for, it shall cause such further enquiry under sub-section (8) of Section 26. 43. Sub-section (8) contains two limbs. The first limb refers to the adverse report of the DG under sub-sections (3) and (3-B) of Section 26. The second limb empowers the Commission to call for further enquiry if it believes it necessary. Thus, the scheme of Section 26 makes it possible for the report of the DG under sub-sections (3) and (3-B) to be the final word on the matter, if the Government concerned concurs and the Commission is of the opinion that the enquiry by the DG has been comprehensive. It thus becomes all the more incumbent for opportunity to be afforded to a third party, prior to conversion of its status from “third person” to “contesting party”.” 92. The submission that adequate opportunity would be afforded at a later stage does not adequately address the grievance raised by the Petitioner. Natural justice is not confined to the stage of final adjudication; it extends to all stages where the rights or interests of a party are affected. 93. The cumulative effect of the above circumstances leads to the conclusion that the Petitioner was not afforded a fair opportunity to know or contest its inclusion in the proceedings. The procedure adopted lacks transparency and does not conform to the requirements Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 34 of fairness. Procedure, in this context, is not a technicality—it is the only assurance against arbitrary power. 94. In the considered opinion of this Court, the impleadment of the Petitioner as an “Opposite Party” without prior notice or intimation, coupled with the conduct of coercive measures, is arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice. E. WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION IS LIABLE TO BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF DELAY, LACHES, PREMATURITY, OR LACK OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE STAGE OF THE INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS? 95. The final issue that arises for consideration pertains to the maintainability of the present writ petition. The Opposite Parties have raised multiple objections, namely, that the petition is liable to be dismissed on account of delay and laches, that it seeks to interfere at an interlocutory stage of investigation, and that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction. The Petitioners, in response, contend that the cause of action arose only upon discovery of their status as an “Opposite Party” in August 2025 and that the present challenge is to a jurisdictional defect, which can be raised at any stage. 96. The doctrine of delay and laches is premised on the principle that a party who sleeps over its rights cannot seek equitable relief at a belated stage. However, the application of this doctrine is not mechanical and must be assessed in the context of when the cause of action actually arose. In the present case, the Petitioners have demonstrated that they were not aware of their status as an “Opposite Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 35 Party” until inspection of records was granted on 8.8.2025 and carried out on 11.8.2025. 97. The sequence of events lends credence to this assertion. The Petitioner was neither named in the original complaint nor informed of its inclusion during the course of investigation. The search and seizure operation and subsequent summons did not disclose the nature of allegations or the status of the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the Petitioner’s understanding that it was participating as a third party cannot be said to be unreasonable. 98. The cause of action, therefore, cannot be traced back to the date of search or summons but must be pegged to the date when the Petitioner acquired knowledge of its impleadment and the underlying jurisdictional defects. The prompt steps taken thereafter, including seeking certified copies and approaching this Court, negate any suggestion of deliberate delay or acquiescence. 99. It is also well settled that where the challenge is to the very jurisdiction of an authority, the doctrine of delay does not operate with the same rigour. A jurisdictional defect strikes at the root of the proceedings and cannot be cured by passage of time. Courts have consistently held that if an action is void ab initio, it can be challenged whenever it comes to the knowledge of the aggrieved party. 100. The objection of prematurity is equally devoid of merit. The Opposite Parties have contended that the investigation has not culminated in a final order and that the Petitioners will have an opportunity to present their case before the Commission. While this proposition holds good Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 36 in cases where the challenge pertains to merits or sufficiency of evidence, it does not apply where the very initiation of proceedings is under challenge. 101. The present writ petition does not seek to interdict a lawful investigation on merits but challenges the absence of jurisdictional foundation and violation of procedural safeguards. Interference in such cases does not amount to premature adjudication but is necessary to prevent continuation of proceedings that are ex facie without authority of law. 102. This Court is also mindful of the submission that an order under Section 26(1) is administrative in nature and ordinarily not amenable to judicial review at an interlocutory stage. However, the present case stands on a different footing, as it involves not the correctness of such an order but the complete absence thereof. The bar on interference in administrative directions cannot be extended to shield actions taken without jurisdiction. 103. The objection relating to territorial jurisdiction also merits some discussion. The Opposite Parties have contended that the investigation pertains to alleged cartelisation in the State of Tamil Nadu and that similar proceedings are pending before other High Courts. The Petitioners, however, submit that a substantial part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 104. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, a High Court may exercise jurisdiction if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its territorial limits. The expression “cause of action” has Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 37 been interpreted broadly to include all material facts which give rise to the grievance. It is not necessary that the entire cause of action must arise within the jurisdiction; even a part thereof would suffice. 105. In the present case, the Petitioner carries on substantial business operations within the State of Odisha. 3 out of its 4 manufacturing units are situated here. Moreover, a significant portion of Petitioner No. 1's sales, and a strong network of local suppliers and customers are situated in the State of Odisha. Any adverse outcome of the investigation will directly and materially affect its business operations which are primarily based in the State of Odisha. The consequences of the impugned investigation, including potential adverse findings, would directly impact its business, reputation, and commercial dealings within the jurisdiction of this Court. The search and seizure, though conducted outside the State, have ramifications that extend to the Petitioner’s operations within Odisha. 106. This, coupled with the continuing effect of the investigation on the Petitioner’s business within the State, furnish a sufficient nexus to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. 107. The allegation of forum shopping also does not merit acceptance. The mere fact that other entities have approached different High Courts in relation to similar investigations does not preclude the Petitioners from seeking relief before this Court, particularly when they are not parties to those proceedings. Each case must always be examined on its own facts. The Petitioners are not parties to the proceedings before any of the other Hon'ble High Courts and accordingly, the Petitioners Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 38 cannot be accused of attempting to re-agitate, circumvent, or obtain a conflicting adjudication on issues under consideration. 108. The principle of comity of courts, while requiring due regard to decisions of coordinate High Courts, does not operate as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction where the cause of action arises within the territorial limits of this Court. Nor does it compel this Court to defer adjudication in the absence of identity of parties and issues. 109. The cumulative effect of the above discussion leads to the conclusion that the objections raised by the Opposite Parties regarding delay, laches, prematurity, and territorial jurisdiction are unsustainable. The Petitioners have approached this Court within a reasonable time from the date of knowledge, and the challenge pertains to a jurisdictional defect that warrants judicial scrutiny. 110. Accordingly, this Court holds that the present writ petition is maintainable and not liable to be dismissed on the grounds urged by the Opposite Parties. V. CONCLUSION: 111. In view of the foregoing analysis and findings returned on the issues framed hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned investigation, insofar as it relates to the Petitioners, suffers from fundamental jurisdictional infirmities and procedural irregularities which go to the root of the matter. The absence of a valid order under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, coupled with the misconstruction of the order dated 29.7.2021 passed by the Hon’ble Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 39 Madras High Court, renders the very initiation of investigation unsustainable in law. 112. This Court has further found that the inclusion of the Petitioners within the ambit of investigation is not supported by any discernible statutory foundation and has been carried out in a manner that reflects non-application of mind. The procedure adopted by the Opposite Parties, particularly in arraying the Petitioners as “Opposite Parties” without prior notice or intimation, falls foul of the principles of natural justice and cannot be countenanced. 113. In such circumstances, permitting the investigation to continue against the Petitioners would amount to allowing an action founded on a jurisdictional vacuum to proceed, which is impermissible in a system governed by rule of law. The statutory safeguards engrafted under the Competition Act cannot be diluted or bypassed under the guise of administrative expediency. 114. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 115. Before parting, this Court deems it appropriate to observe that the Competition Commission of India occupies a pivotal role in ensuring the orderly functioning of markets and in curbing anti-competitive practices that may distort economic efficiency and consumer welfare. The mandate entrusted to the Commission is of considerable significance in a liberalised economy, where fair competition forms the bedrock of growth and public interest. 116. At the same time, the exercise of such regulatory power must be tempered with adherence to statutory safeguards and procedural Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 40 discipline. Investigations under the Competition Act, by their very nature, carry serious civil, commercial, and reputational consequences for the entities concerned. The power to investigate cannot be exercised in a manner that disregards foundational requirements of jurisdiction or fairness. 117. The balance between effective enforcement and protection against arbitrary action is not merely desirable but essential. While the Commission must act with firmness in addressing anti-competitive conduct, such action must be anchored in the framework of the statute and guided by principles of natural justice. Any deviation therefrom risks undermining not only the rights of affected parties but also the institutional credibility of the regulatory process. 118. It is in this context that this Court reiterates that procedural safeguards under the statute are not impediments to enforcement but are integral to ensuring that such enforcement is just, transparent, and sustainable. The rule of law demands that power be exercised not merely in furtherance of legitimate objectives, but strictly within the bounds of the authority conferred by statute. 119. This decision must not be construed as an invitation for routine interference with investigative processes under the Competition Act, but is confined to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case where the foundational jurisdictional requirement is demonstrably absent. 120. It is, therefore, ordered as follows: Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 27-May-2026 15:45:01 Signature Not Verified Page 41 (i) The investigation arising out of Suo Motu Case No. 02 of 2021, insofar as it relates to the Petitioners, is hereby quashed and set aside. (ii) All consequential proceedings, actions, and measures taken by the Opposite Parties against the Petitioners pursuant to the said investigation, including search and seizure operations and summons, stand set aside. (iii) There shall be no order as to costs. 121. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed in the above terms. Ordered accordingly. 122. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated. (Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated 22nd May, 2026/