JUDGMENT : PARTH PRATEEM SAHU, J. 1. Since both these appeals arise out of a common judgment and decree dated 28.07.2017 passed in Civil Suit No. 6757-A/2013, by learned Fourth Additional District Judge, Durg, they are heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to according to their respective status before the Trial Court. 3. First Appeal No.403 of 2017 is filed by defendant No.1 to 3 challenging the finding recorded by the learned trial Court, whereby learned trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff to the effect that plaintiff is entitled for rent to the extent of 1/4 share of plot No.3 and 4, situated at Village Supela, Nehru Road and rent of seven shops situated on Plot No.A-6 situated at Akashganga Industrial Area. 4. First Appeal No. 483/2017 is filed by plaintiff challenging the judgment and decree on the ground of dismissing the claim of plaintiff for receipt of arrears of rent of Rs.1,04,000/-. 5. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that plaintiff filed a civil suit seeking relief of declaration that defendants No.1 to 3 are bound to give share of 1/4 of rent received from suit property in terms of consent letter executed during lifetime of their father and further seek declaration that plaintiff is entitled to receive 1/4 share from defendants No.1 to 3 and from available tenants. In the suit plaintiff has further claimed relief of injunction against defendants No.1 to 3 restraining to cause any hindrance in receipt of 1/4 share of monthly rent and a direction to defendants No.4 to 8 to pay 1/4 share of agreed rent to plaintiff. It is further prayed for sum of Rs.1,04,000/- towards 1/4 share of rent from defendants and the interest thereon. The suit is filed based on the documents Ex.P-1, which is a consent deed stated to be signed by the plaintiff as well as defendants No.1 to 3. In plaint it is further pleaded that the land bearing Plot No. 3, measuring 2200 sq.ft. and Plot No.4 measuring 2200 sq.ft. is allotted in the name of defendant No.2 and 1 situated at village Supela, Nehru Road, Supela, Bhilai out of which in plot No.3 one shop is situated which was given on rent to defendant No.6 -Pramod Kumar Jain. and Plot No.4 measuring 2200 sq.ft. is allotted in the name of defendant No.2 and 1 situated at village Supela, Nehru Road, Supela, Bhilai out of which in plot No.3 one shop is situated which was given on rent to defendant No.6 -Pramod Kumar Jain. The shop situated in Plot No.4 was given on rent to defendant No.4 and in one of the shop, defendant No.5 is in possession. It is also pleaded that one shop situated at plot A-6, situated at Akash Ganga Commercial Area, Supela Bhilai, defendant No.7 is in possession as tenant and one shop is given on rent to Sunil Jain. The said plots were taken on lease by father of plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3 from his own income and has also got constructed the shops. Plot No. 3 of Nehru Road, Supela Bhilai is allotted in the name of defendant No.2 and Plot No.4 of Nehru Road, Supela Bhilai was allotted in name of defendant No.1. Plot A-6 was allotted in name of defendant No.3. Plot No.4 Block-24 Nehru Road Supela Market was alloted in the name of plaintiff but the said plot was lying vacant neither any construction was raised on it nor it was given on lease/rent and is still in possession of plaintiff. It was also pleaded that to avoid any dispute in earnings from joint family property as mentioned above, one consent deed was executed on 08.08.2002, which was signed by plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3. It is also pleaded in the said document (Ex.P-1) that there is mention that all four brothers will have equal rights and share in the said property. Deceased father of plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3 had cleared amongst them that though the property, subject matter of suit is recorded in name of different persons i.e. plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3 but all of them will have equal rights and accordingly deed was executed and after agreement between the plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3 it was notarized. In the plaint, it is also pleaded about rent received from different tenants and the amount of rent also. In the plaint, it is also pleaded about rent received from different tenants and the amount of rent also. As per the consent deed (Ex.P-1) dated 08.08.2002 initially all four brothers were getting 1/4 share from the rent received against the properties, subject matter of civil suit, however, since June, 2012, defendants started acting contrary to the consent deed and started receiving rent separately by them of their own. 6. Defendants No.1 to 3 have jointly filed written statement to the plaint denying all the adverse pleadings made therein. It was further pleaded that different shops have been constructed in the disputed properties on the land, lease of which were executed by Municipal Corporation Bhilai (earlier Special Development Authority), in favour of defendants. They have also pleaded that certain shops have been given on rent to persons named therein. Defendant – Kailash Chauhan got the patta of land on 25.05.2007 and in some portion of the plot shop was constructed, who is possessed by defendant No.6 – Pramod Kumar Jain and he is tenant of Kailash Chauhan. They have also pleaded that from documents placed in the suit, it is apparent that plaintiff was not allotted of Patta of any land by Special Development Authority nor any portion of land was allotted. All taxes are being paid by defendants No.1 to 3. It is also pleaded that agreement/consent deed is not binding upon them as it is not registered documents. It is also pleaded that it is mandatory that documents should be properly stamped, however, no such registered document is available in record. 7. Learned trial Court based on the pleadings made by respective parties formulated 4 issues for consideration. Parties led their evidence and upon appreciation of the documentary and oral evidence brought on record, learned trial Court decreed the suit filed by plaintiff by impugned judgment and decree. 8. Mr. H.B. Agrawal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants/defendants No.1 to 3 in F.A. No.403/2017 would submit that learned trial Court erred in relying upon the document (Ex.P-1) which is in the nature of consent deed considering it to be enforceable in the eyes of law. He submits that from bare perusal of the document (Ex.P-1), which is the basis for filing of the suit by the plaintiff is an unregistered document. He submits that from bare perusal of the document (Ex.P-1), which is the basis for filing of the suit by the plaintiff is an unregistered document. He contended that according to provision U/s. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act, 1908 (In short ‘the Act of 1908’) it requires compulsory registration. The finding recorded by learned trial Court on admissibility of the document (Ex.P-1) is erroneous. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Roshan Singh & Ors. Vs. Zile Singh & Ors. AIR 1988 SC 881 , in case of Yellapu Uma Maheshwari & Anr. Vs. Buddha Jagadheeswararao & Ors. 2016 SAR (Civil) 226 and in case of Sita Ram Bhama Vs. Ramvatar Bhama , (2018) 15 SCC 130 . He next contended that as during the pendency of this appeal all the tenants have vacated the shops, therefore, also the relief as claimed in civil suit has rendered in fructuous as in the suit, plaintiff has claimed 1/4 share in the rent collected from the suit shops and plots. Therefore, the appeal be allowed and entire claim of plaintiff be dismissed. He submits that in proof that all the tenants have vacated the shops, subject matter of civil suit, he has moved an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. supported with an affidavit. 9. Mr. Bhanwarlal Parakh, learned counsel for plaintiff/respondent would oppose the submission of learned counsel for appellant and would submit that the learned trial Court in its impugned judgment and decree has discussed in detail the objection raised by defendants No.1 to 3 therein with regard to the admissibility of the document Ex.P-1 on the ground that it was unregistered document. He further submits that contents of document (Ex.P-1) would show that it is in the nature of family arrangement and not a partition, therefore, it does not require registration. He also contended that plaintiff and defendant No.1 to 3 are the real brothers. The property was obtained on lease though in name of defendants but by their father during his lifetime and at the time of execution of the lease deed, all the children i.e. plaintiff and the defendant No.1 to 3 were minor. He also contended that plaintiff and defendant No.1 to 3 are the real brothers. The property was obtained on lease though in name of defendants but by their father during his lifetime and at the time of execution of the lease deed, all the children i.e. plaintiff and the defendant No.1 to 3 were minor. The documents (Ex.P-1) after its execution was acted upon by the parties to the suit i.e. plaintiff and defendant No.1 to 3 (brothers), therefore, the defendants No.1 to 3 will not be permitted to revert back and question the contents of the document (Ex.P-1). In support of his contention, he places reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kale & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 119 , in case of Narendra Kante Vs. Anuradha Kante & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC 77 , in case of Thulasidhara & Anr. Vs. Narayanppa & Others, (2019) 6 SCC 409 and the decision of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Ishwar Das Matani Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. 2014 (1) MPLJ 355 . He next contended that application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 is not having any force as the contents made therein is not correct. He submits that in the application, under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, it is pleaded that all the tenants have vacated the shops/premises taken on rent by them but affidavit filed by one of the tenant Pramod Kumar Jain dated 12.12.2024 would show that he is still in possession of rented premises, therefore, pleadings made in the application under Order 41 Rule 27 prima facie is not correct. He also contended that said tenant Pramod Kumar Jain has deposited the rent of rented premises and it is paid to plaintiff and the rent receipt dated 30.01.2025 is also placed on record. This tenant has further paid rent on 29.09.2025 and receipt is available with him in his file. It is further submitted on behalf of respondent No.1/plaintiff that during pendency of this appeal, defendant No. No.2 – Kailash Chauhan has submitted an application under Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC for compromising with the plaintiff in this case. This tenant has further paid rent on 29.09.2025 and receipt is available with him in his file. It is further submitted on behalf of respondent No.1/plaintiff that during pendency of this appeal, defendant No. No.2 – Kailash Chauhan has submitted an application under Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC for compromising with the plaintiff in this case. In the application it is pleaded that application was filed on behalf of all the defendants and therefore, it is applicable on all of them more so when the written statement is filed jointly by all the defendants i.e. defendant No.1 to 3. Lastly, referring to the document (Ex.P-1) which is under the heading of the consent deed, he submits that there is clear mention that all the property, subject matter of suit is the joint property and the fruits received from the joint property i.e. rent is to be shared by all brothers i.e. plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3 equally. It also mentions that none of the party to the consent deed (Ex.P-1) can transfer the property mentioned therein without the consent and permission of others, which shows that the shops/plots, subject matter of the suit is the joint property of all. In support of his contention, he referred to the evidence of defendants and would submit that defendants have admitted that shops and the plots, subject matter of the suit was taken on lease by father and at that time all plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3 all were minors. He also submits that respondent/plaintiffs has filed separate appeal bearing F.A. No.483 of 2017 challenging the finding of learned trial Court dismissing the claim of Rs.1,04,000/- towards rent up to his share. 10. Mr. Alok Bakshi, learned counsel for respondent No.8 (in F.A. No.483 of 2017) would submit that respondent No.8 was tenant, however, during pendency of this appeal, he has vacated the rented premises. 11. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused records of trial Court. 12. Perusal of the plaint would show that suit was filed seeking relief of declaration that defendants No.1 to 3 are bound to give share of 1/4 of rent received from suit property in terms of consent letter executed during lifetime of their father and further declaration that plaintiff is entitled to receive 1/4th share from defendants No.1 to 3 and available tenants. In the suit plaintiff has further claimed relief of injunction against defendants No.1 to 3 restraining to cause any hindrance in receipt of 1/4 share of monthly rent and a direction to defendants No.4 to 8 to pay 1/4 share of agreed rent to plaintiff. It is further prayed for sum of Rs.1,04,000/- towards 1/4 share of rent from defendants and the interest thereon. The suit is filed based on the documents Ex.P-1, which is a consent deed stated to be signed by the plaintiff as well as defendants No.1 to 3 and their father. 13. During course of arguments, learned senior counsel for appellants/defendants have pin pointedly raised the ground that document (Ex.P-1), which is relied upon by learned trial Court is inadmissible in evidence because it is unenforceable in the eyes of law. To appreciate the submission of learned counsel for appellants/defendants No.1 to 3, I find it appropriate to peruse the documents (Ex.P-1). 14. Perusal of the document (Ex.P-1) would show that it is titled as consent letter. In first paragraph it bears name of all brothers. It bears signature of all four brothers i.e. plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3 along with signature of others. It also bears signature of Adalat Chauhan, father of plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3. This document mentions that all four signatories are real brothers and are members of joint Hindu family. Adalat Chauhan is Karta of family. The property recorded in name of different brothers is being created by their father Adalat Chauhan from his own income. It also mentions that apart from the property specified therein, there are others plot in possession of brothers and allotment of those land is under process. All four brothers are having equal share and right on all properties as specified therein. Even though the property is recorded in name of all different brothers separately in record, however, all properties are joint property, therefore, they are having equal share irrespective of name recorded of property in record. It also mentions that none of brothers are having right to sale or transfer the property and if the property is required to be sold then it can only be with consent of all four brothers. 15. It also mentions that none of brothers are having right to sale or transfer the property and if the property is required to be sold then it can only be with consent of all four brothers. 15. From perusal of documents, it is apparent that it is not a document of partition but it only consist of concenses of all four brothers named therein including their father about equal share and right over the property mentioned therein. The nature of document appears to be sort of arrangement made by father of plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3 to manage the property. Ex.P-2 and Ex.P-3 are rent agreement in which name of all four brothers is mentioned as owner of property as mentioned therein and subject matter of rent agreement. Document (Ex.P-3) would show that it was signed by all brothers i.e. plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3 showing them to be owner of shop. Registered agreement of Patta is also available in record as Ex.P-36. It was executed on 25.05.2001. Ex.P-35 was executed in month of April, 1997. 16. Case of plaintiff is that all properties as mentioned in consent deed, though patta has been issued in name of different persons separately, however, it is the joint property. To prove the pleadings made in plaint, plaintiff has examined himself as (P.W.-1), one Virendra Kumar Sharma as (P.W.-2). Plaintiff (P.W.-1) in his deposition has stated that there are 7 shops, subject matter of suit and there is dispute with regard to rent. He also stated that when registered patta dated 25.07.2005 was executed of allotment of shops situated at Supela Market, plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3 were minor. Deposition of Virendra Kumar Sharma (P.W.-2) would show that in examination-in- chief, he supported the case of plaintiff. In cross-examination, he stated that he has not seen any documents of allotment of land/share in name of brothers of plaintiff. He also admitted that he has signed (Ex.P-1) on the say of Adalat Chauhan, father of plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3. 17. Defendant No.1- Naresh Chauhan is examined as (D.W.-1). He stated that there is no document to show that Municipal Corporation, Bhilai or Special Development Authority has allotted any portion of property in dispute and executed patta in this regard. In cross-examination he stated that he is not aware about date of birth of other brothers including Kailash, Sanjay and plaintiff. Defendant No.1- Naresh Chauhan is examined as (D.W.-1). He stated that there is no document to show that Municipal Corporation, Bhilai or Special Development Authority has allotted any portion of property in dispute and executed patta in this regard. In cross-examination he stated that he is not aware about date of birth of other brothers including Kailash, Sanjay and plaintiff. He admitted that plaintiff in plaint has not sought declaration of title in the suit. 18. Sanjay Chauhan is examined as (D.W.-2). In para-9 of his cross-examination, this witness admitted his signature in documents (Ex.P- 1) executed on 08.08.2002 and also admitted that signature appended in Ex.P-1 from A to A is of his father and also identified signature of his other brothers. He stated that he has not challenged the documents (Ex.P-1) before any Court of law. This witness also admitted that they are in possession of land and shops, subject matter of suit since the date of allotment of patta in their favour. He also admitted that on the date of recording of their possession all four brothers were minor. Land of which patta was allotted in their favour, his father was doing business of firewood. He also admitted that on the date of recording of possession in allotment letter age of defendant No.1 was 16 years, age of plaintiff as 13-14 years, defendant Kailash as 9-10 years and his own age to be 5 years. The house which is recorded in the name of Naresh Chauhan, electricity connection is in the name of defendant – Kailash Chauhan, however, he denied the suggestion given to him that they are having 1/4 share over the property/shop as mentioned in Ex.P-1. He also admitted that they have not given rent receipt to tenants against rent received by them. He assessed to tax, however, there is no mention of income from rent. He also admitted that they were not having any income when they were minor. This witness also further admitted that property settled in his name he came in possession in the year 1988 and his age at that time was 13 years. He also admitted that name of Kailash Chauhan and Naresh Chauhan (brothers) is recorded since 13.10.1977. He also admitted that they were not having any income when they were minor. This witness also further admitted that property settled in his name he came in possession in the year 1988 and his age at that time was 13 years. He also admitted that name of Kailash Chauhan and Naresh Chauhan (brothers) is recorded since 13.10.1977. From the evidence of this witness (D.W.-2), it is appearing that land was allotted in their name when they are minor meaning thereby all steps for getting the land allotted was taken by their father, Adalat Chauhan and amount for those allotment is deposited under different heads by their father Adalat Chauhan. 19. Now in the light of aforementioned facts of the case and the evidence available in record, the nature of document (Ex.P-1) is to be ascertained. Considering the contents of document in light of evidence available in record, it is appearing that document is not in the nature of giving title to any one in the property mentioned therein or it is not a document of disposition of property by extinguishing right of any party or partition but it is a family settlement. The document was executed in the year 2002, however, from the pleadings and the evidence of the plaintiff it is appearing that dispute arose between the parties much after execution of Ex.P-1 signed by all parties as also by their father. 20. As the parties to the suit i.e. plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 3 have acted upon in terms of document (Ex.P-1) and have enjoyed the benefits therein. Now thereafter they are estopped from challenging the contents of documents and its nature. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kale & Others (supra) while considering the plea of family arrangements and its necessity of its registration has observed thus :- “22. The same view was taken in Bakhtawar v. Sunder Lal [AIR 1926 All 173, 175 : ILR 48 All 213 : 24 ALJ 116] where Lindsay, J., speaking for the Division Bench observed as follows: “It is reasonable to assume that there was a bona fide dispute between the parties which was eventually composed, each party recognizing an antecedent title in the other. In this view of the circumstances I am of opinion that there was no necessity to have this petition registered. In this view of the circumstances I am of opinion that there was no necessity to have this petition registered. It does not in my opinion purport to create, assign, limit, extinguish or declare within the meaning of these expressions as used in Section 17(1)( b ) of the Registration Act. It is merely a recital of fact by which the court is informed that the parties have come to an arrangement.” 24. This Court has also clearly laid down that a family arrangement being binding on the parties to the arrangement clearly operates as an estoppel so as to preclude any of the parties who have taken advantage under the agreement from revoking or challenging the same. We shall deal with this point a little later when we consider the arguments of the respondents on the question of the estoppel. In the light of the decisions indicated above, we shall now try to apply the principles laid down by this Court and the other courts to the facts of the present case. 42. Finally in a recent decision of this Court in S. Shanmugam Pillai case after an exhaustive consideration of the authorities on the subject it was observed as follows: “Equitable principles such as estoppel, election, family settlement, etc. are not mere technical rules of evidence. They have an important purpose to serve in the administration of justice. The ultimate aim of the law is to secure justice. In the recent times in order to render justice between the parties, courts have been liberally relying on those principles. We would hesitate to narrow down their scope. * As observed by this Court in T.V.R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities case, that if a person having full knowledge of his right as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponents at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that agreement when reversion actually falls open.” In these circumstances there can be no doubt that even if the family settlement was not registered it would operate as a complete estoppel against Respondents 4 and 5. Respondent 1 as also the High Court, therefore, committed substantial error of law in not giving effect to the doctrine of estoppel as spelt out by this Court in so many cases. Respondent 1 as also the High Court, therefore, committed substantial error of law in not giving effect to the doctrine of estoppel as spelt out by this Court in so many cases. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon a number of authorities in Rachbha v. Mt Mendha [AIR 1947 All 177 : 1946 ALJ 409] ; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Smt Satyawati Sood [ AIR 1972 Del 171 : ILR (1972) 2 Del 17 (FB)] and some other authorities, which, in our opinion have no bearing on the issues to be decided in this case and it is therefore not necessary for us to refer to the same. 21. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Narendra Kate (supra) while considering the value of unregistered deed of family settlement has observed thus :- “22. Their Lordships in Kale case [ (1976) 3 SCC 119 ] went on further to conclude that a document, which was no more than a memorandum of what had been agreed to, did not require registration. While holding as above, Their Lordships also indicated that even if a family arrangement, which required registration was not registered, it would operate as a complete estoppel against the parties, which had taken advantage thereof.” 22. High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Ishwar Das Matani (supra) observed that the real intention of parties must be gathered from document itself and circumstances attending thereto would also be quite relevant particularly when the relationship between the parties are fiduciary. 23. In case of Thulasidhara & Anr. (supra), Hon’ble Supreme court while considering the evidentiary value of unregistered family settlement/family arrangement has observed thus :- “9.4. It is required to be noted that the deed dated 23-4- 1971, under which the suit property had gone/devolved in favour of Krishnappa, was reduced in writing before the panchayat and panchas, and the same was signed by the village people/panchayat people and all the members of the family including even the plaintiff. Though the plaintiff disputed that the partition was not reduced in writing in the form of document Ext. D-4, on considering the entire evidence on record and even the deposition of the plaintiff (cross-examination), he has specifically admitted that the oral partition had taken place in the year 1971. He has also admitted that he has got the share which tallies with the document dated 23-4-1971 (Ext. D-4). D-4, on considering the entire evidence on record and even the deposition of the plaintiff (cross-examination), he has specifically admitted that the oral partition had taken place in the year 1971. He has also admitted that he has got the share which tallies with the document dated 23-4-1971 (Ext. D-4). Execution of the document/partition deed/Palupatta dated 23-4-1971 has been established and proved by examining different witnesses. The High Court has refused to look into the said document and/or consider document dated 23-4-1971 (Ext. D-4) solely on the ground that it requires registration and therefore as it is unregistered, the same cannot be looked into. However, as observed by this Court in Kale [Kale v. Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 ] that such a family settlement, though not registered, would operate as a complete estoppel against the parties to such a family settlement. In the aforesaid decision, this Court considered its earlier decision in S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai [S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai, (1973) 2 SCC 312 ] in which it was observed as under: (S. Shanmugam Pillai case [S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai, (1973) 2 SCC 312 ] , SCC pp. 319 & 321, paras 13 & 22) 22. As observed by this Court in T.V.R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities case [T.V.R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities v. M. Raghava Mudaliar, AIR 1961 SC 797 ] , that if a person having full knowledge of his right as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponents at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that agreement when reversion actually falls open.” 9.5. As held by this Court in Subraya M.N. [Subraya M.N. v. Vittala M.N., (2016) 8 SCC 705 : (2016) 4 SCC (Civ) 163] even without registration a written document of family settlement/family arrangement can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining the arrangement made thereunder and conduct of the parties. In the present case, as observed hereinabove, even the plaintiff has also categorically admitted that the oral partition had taken place on 23-4-1971 and he also admitted that 3 to 4 panchayat people were also present. However, according to him, the same was not reduced in writing. In the present case, as observed hereinabove, even the plaintiff has also categorically admitted that the oral partition had taken place on 23-4-1971 and he also admitted that 3 to 4 panchayat people were also present. However, according to him, the same was not reduced in writing. Therefore, even accepting the case of the plaintiff that there was an oral partition on 23-4-1971, the document, Ext. D-4 dated 23-4-1971, to which he is also the signatory and all other family members are signatory, can be said to be a list of properties partitioned. Everybody got right/share as per the oral partition/partition. Therefore, the same even can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining the arrangement made thereunder and conduct of the parties. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has committed a grave/manifest error in not looking into and/or not considering the document Ext. D-4 dated 23-4-1971.” 24. If the facts of the case is considered in light of the aforementioned decisions, it is apparent that document (Ex.P-1), which is the foundation of the suit filed by plaintiff is not a document in nature of partition of property relinquishment of right or disposition of property, but it is in the form of family settlement/arrangement for getting the share right in the property mentioned therein equally between four brothers. Though in the pleadings, defendants No.1 to 3 have denied the execution of Ex.P-1 dated 08.08.2002, however, in evidence, in examination in chief Naresh Chauhan (D.W.-1) in para-4 have stated that consent deed dated 08.08.2002 is contrary to law. The consent deed/agreement is not a registered document it does not create any title or transfer any title. In cross-examination para-9, he admits his signature in document (Ex.P-1) dated 08.08.2002, signature of his father and plaintiff and defendant No.2 and 3 is also admitted by him. He also admitted that document was not challenged before any court of law. Similar is the evidence of Sanjay Chauhan (D.W.-2) with regard to the document (Ex.P-1). 25. In cross-examination para-9, he admits his signature in document (Ex.P-1) dated 08.08.2002, signature of his father and plaintiff and defendant No.2 and 3 is also admitted by him. He also admitted that document was not challenged before any court of law. Similar is the evidence of Sanjay Chauhan (D.W.-2) with regard to the document (Ex.P-1). 25. As the defendants No.1 to 3 have not disputed the execution of document, their signatures along with their father, which is executed on 08.08.2002 and since then they have acted upon and enjoyed right and fruits according to the terms of Ex.P-1, therefore, in the opinion of this Court, they are estopped from refusing to comply with the terms of document (Ex.P-1) and to question it only on the ground that it is a unregistered document. 26. Learned trial Court in the facts of the case had correctly recorded a finding that document (Ex.P-1) is a family settlement and it is admissible in evidence without it being registered and stamped. 27. The decision relied upon buy learned counsel for appellant/defendants No.1 to 3 in case of Roshan Singh & Others (supra) is on different facts. In that case, the point which was under consideration was a partition deed and Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered that documents being, severing ownership and causes a change of legal relation to the property divided amongst the parties to it, requires registration under Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act, 1908. Another decision relied upon by learned counsel for appellant/defendants in case of Yellapu Uma Maheshwari & Anr. (supra) , Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the relinquishment of right in respect of the immovable property through a documents and it is held that where there is relinquishment of right in respect of immovable property through a document, it is compulsorily registerable document and if it is not registered, it is not admissible in evidence. 28. In case of Sitaram Bhama (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the memorandum statement of which the property has been partitioned and has prayed for relief of partition of residential house as well as shop. 29. For the forgoing discussions, first grounds raised by learned counsel for appellants/defendants No.1 to 3 that learned trial Court erred in accepting the document Ex.P-1 in evidence is not sustainable and it is repelled. 30. 29. For the forgoing discussions, first grounds raised by learned counsel for appellants/defendants No.1 to 3 that learned trial Court erred in accepting the document Ex.P-1 in evidence is not sustainable and it is repelled. 30. For accepting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, the party has to first establish and meet the requirements as envisaged under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. Unless the requirement so envisaged has been met by the party seeking to produce additional evidence, the document cannot be taken as additional evidence. The requirements are that the trial Court had refused to admit the additional evidence; the evidence was not available despite the exercise of due diligence; and the evidence is required by the Court to effectively adjudicate the dispute pending before it. 31. In case of Jagdish Prasad Patel vs. Shivnath , (2019) 6 SCC 82, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed thus:- “29. Under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the production of additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, is permitted only under three circumstances which are: (I) where the trial court had refused to admit the evidence though it ought to have been admitted; (II) the evidence was not available to the party despite the exercise of due diligence; and (III) the appellate court required the additional evidence so as to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause of like nature. An application for the production of additional evidence cannot be allowed if the appellant was not diligent in producing the relevant documents in the lower court. However, in the interest of justice and when satisfactory reasons are given, the court can receive additional documents." 32. In case of Sanjay Kumar Singh vs. State of Jharkhand , (2022) 7 SCC 247 , Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with issue of admissibility of additional evidence in appellate Court not adduced in the Court of original jurisdiction, has observed thus:- “7. It is true that the general principle is that the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order 41 Rule 27 CPC enables the appellate court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. It is true that the general principle is that the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order 41 Rule 27 CPC enables the appellate court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. It may also be true that the appellate court may permit additional evidence if the conditions laid down in this Rule are found to exist and the parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. However, at the same time, where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and the interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record, such application may be allowed. Even, one of the circumstances in which the production of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the appellate court is to be considered is, whether or not the appellate court requires the additional evidence so as to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause of like nature.” 33. In case of Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation vs. Cork Manufacturing Co. (2007) 8 SCC 120 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that inadvertence to produce the evidence or improper legal advice is no reason for admitting the additional evidence. Para-18 of the said judgment is quoted below for ready reference:- "18. In any view of the matter, Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC also does not empower an appellate court to accept additional evidence on the ground that such evidence could not be produced or filed either before the trial court or before the first appellate court due to inadvertence or lack of proper legal advice. Mr. Mohan, learned Additional Solicitor General however sought to argue that the pleadings made in the application for acceptance of additional evidence would come within the meaning of "substantial cause" under Order 41 Rule 27 (1) (b) of the CPC which would require the appellate court to accept the legal notice in order to pronounce its judgment. We are unable to accept this submission of Mr Mohan. We are unable to accept this submission of Mr Mohan. In our view, lack of proper legal advice or inadvertence to produce the legal notice in evidence is not a ground to hold that there was substantial cause for acceptance of the additional evidence." 34. In case of Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin , (2012) 8 SCC 148 , it was observed that:- "40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this of Rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal." 35. Learned counsel for appellants/defendants No.1 to 3 has also raised grounds that in change circumstances no relief as prayed for in civil suit can be granted is concerned, during pendency of the suit till judgment and decree, premises forming part of the civil suit was rented to other defendants. They were paying rent as tenant. This Court is considering the correctness of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, based on the facts pleaded and evidence brought on record. Therefore, in subsequent development of evicting some premises by some tenants is not fact to be considered at the stage of appeal when relief as prayed for and is granted by learned trial Court is with regard to 1/4 share in the rent received from the subject matter of suit, therefore, the second ground raised by learned counsel for appellants/defendants No.1 to 3 is not sustainable and in view of the aforementioned decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, application U/o. 41 Rule 27 is not having any force and accordingly it is dismissed. Consequently, the second ground raised by learned counsel for appellants/defendants No.1 to 3 is also not sustainable and accordingly it is repelled. 36. Consequently, the second ground raised by learned counsel for appellants/defendants No.1 to 3 is also not sustainable and accordingly it is repelled. 36. So far as the grounds raised by plaintiff in its appeal bearing F.A. No. 483 of 2017 challenging the judgment and decree of dismissing the claim of rent of Rs.1,04,000/- with interest for want of specific evidence in this regard is concerned, perusal of the record would show that in the plaint, plaintiff has not specifically pleaded as to what rent is paid by which tenant and to whom. This specific pleadings and evidence is required in facts of the case where the counsel for appellant/plaintiff has made submission before this Court that one of the tenant i.e. Pramod Kumar Jain has also paid rent to him. Regarding the non-payment of rent, the plaintiff has only referred to notice Ex. P-6, which fails to specify when the tenants stopped paying rent or the exact amount due. No documentary evidence has been provided to show that defendants No. 4 and 8 paid their rent share to defendants No. 1 and 3. The evidence of plaintiff does not clarify the period of default for defendants No. 4 and 8. Moreover, defendant No. 8, Sunil Jain, stated in his affidavit that he has been paying full rent to the plaintiff. In absence of clear and conclusive evidence, in the opinion of this Court, learned trial Court has not committed any error in recording a finding that plaintiff failed to proof that he is entitled for getting Rs.1,04,000/- with interest. 37. For the foregoing discussions, I do not find any error or infirmity in the finding recorded by learned trial Court in the impugned judgment and decree. Consequently, both the appeals F.A. No. 403 of 2017 and F.A. No. 483 of 2017, being sans merit, which are liable to be and are hereby dismissed. 38. The Decree be drawn accordingly. 39. The parties to bear their own costs.