Order : ARVIND KUMAR VERMA, J. With the consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally. The present petition challenges the order dated 01.12.2022 passed by the Sessions Judge, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund (CG) whereby cognizance was taken against the petitioner under Sections 33 EE and 33KA read with Section 33(1)(1)(ii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (“the Act”) and the trial has been directed to proceed before the Special Sessions Court. FACTS OF THE CASE: 2. The petitioner is a private limited company duly incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013 and engaged solely as a distributor of Ayurvedic medicines and not the manufacturer. The case arises from the sampling of Ayurveda medicines and not the manufacturer. The case arises from the sampling of Ayurvedic medicine “Vasavaleha” collected on 07.09.2021 from the third party retail outlet by the District Ayurvedic Officer. The Government Analyst’s report dated 04.12.2021 found the sampled medicine sub-standard. The complaint, initiated by the District Ayurvedic/Unani Medical Officer was presented before the Sessions Court which proceeded to take cognizance and initiated trial proceedings under the aforesaid provisions. 3. The prosecution stems from sampling of Ayurvedic medicine and despite the petitioner being merely a distributor and the medicine manufactured by M/s. Shree Baidyanath Ayurveda Bhawan Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur, the complaint was filed before the Sessions Court, which took cognizance. A bailable warrant was issued on 03.06.2025. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 4. Shri Shrivastava, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner contends that, (i) the offence pertains to Ayurvedic medicine covered under Chapter IV-A of the Act. (ii) Section 33A explicitly excludes the applicability of Chapter IV (relating to Allopathic drugs) to Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani medicines. Therefore, procedural provisions applicable to Chapter IV do not apply. (iii) Section 33M (2) restricts trial of offences under Chapter IV-A to Magistrate Courts only ie. Judicial Magistrate First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate. Trial before a Sessions Court is without jurisdiction. (iv) Section 36AB which empowers designation of Special Courts, applies strictly to offences enumerated under Chapter IV, not Chapter IV-A. (v) The offence punishable with imprisonment for one year qualifies for summary trial under Section 36A exclusively before Magistrates. (vi) The petitioner is merely a distributor; liability for manufacture and quality control does not attach to the distributor. (vii) The cognizance by the Sessions Court is thus manifestly erroneous and results in an abuse of process. 5. (vi) The petitioner is merely a distributor; liability for manufacture and quality control does not attach to the distributor. (vii) The cognizance by the Sessions Court is thus manifestly erroneous and results in an abuse of process. 5. It has been contended that the learned Sessions court has taken cognizance and initiated proceedings against the petitioner under Sections 33EE and 33KA read with Section 33(1)(1)(ii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, pursuant to the prosecution complaint arising from the sampling of Ayurvedic medicine collected on 07.09.2021 which was found to be sub-standard. The offence alleged falls within the ambit of Chapter IV A of the Act, specifically dealing with Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani drugs. He vehemently argued jurisdictional infirmity as the core vice. Section 33EE and 33KA fall under Chapter IV A of the Act governing Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani drugs exclusively. Section 33A unequivocally bars Chapter IV (allopathic drugs) applicability to such medicines while Section 33M(2) mandates trial solely by a Judicial Magistrate First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate: “No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try an offence punishable under this Chapter”. He has placed his reliance in the matter of Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma and Others (in Cr.A. No. 200 of 2020 S:{(Crl.No. 4178 of 2019) to contend that offences under Chapter IV-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 are triable exclusively by a Judicial Magistrate First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate and that cognizance taken by a Sessions Court is without jurisdiction. It is submitted that the statutory scheme under Sections 33A and 33M clearly demarcates the applicability of Chapter IV and Chapter IV-A and, therefore, the proceedings initiated before the Sessions Court are liable to be quashed. 6. Section 36AB empowers Special Courts for enumerated Chapter IV offences only (ie. Sections 13,22,27,etc.) excluding Chapter IVA. The offence, punishable with upto one year’s imprisonment qualifies for summary trial under Section 36A by Magistrates. The Chhattisgarh Notification dated 12.01.2016 designating Sessions courts as Special Courts cannot override this statutory bar, as administrative notifications yield to legislative mandate. The last Chapter of the Act is Chapter V. It bears the Chapter heading "Miscellaneous". Section 36 declares that any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of First Class may pass a sentence in excess of the powers under the CrPC. 7. The last Chapter of the Act is Chapter V. It bears the Chapter heading "Miscellaneous". Section 36 declares that any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of First Class may pass a sentence in excess of the powers under the CrPC. 7. It has been held by the Jammu and Kashmir and Laddakh High Court in the matter of M/S Aristo Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. Vs. UT of J&K CRM(M) No.509/2024 dated 14.11.2025, that setting aside the proceedings against two pharmaceutical companies accused of manufacturing and marketing sub-standard drugs, it has been clarified that while the trial of offences under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act must be conducted by a court of Sessions, there is no bar on a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offences. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order suffers from a jurisdictional defect as the offences pertain to Ayurvedic Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 which mandates that such offences be tried exclusively by a Judicial Magistrate First Class of Metropolitan Magistrate. It is submitted that the notification dated 12.01.2016 relied upon by the respondents, designates Sessions Courts as Special Courts for trial of offences relating to adulterated or spurious drugs under Chapter IV but does not extend to offences under Chapter IV A therefore, the notification cannot confer jurisdiction on the Sessions Court to try offences under Chapter IV-A, making the cognizance and proceedings before the Sessions Court to try offences under Chapter IV-A, making the cognizance and proceedings before the Sessions court legally untenable. 9. Reliance has been placed in the matter of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (1992 Sup (1) SCC 335) for quashing proceedings lacking jurisdiction, constituting abuse of process. Recent elucidation in Neeta Singh Vs. State of UP (2024 SCC Online SC 878) and Apex Court order dated 08.09.2025 clarifies Section 528 BNSS permits quashing cognizance orders for jurisdictional errors, distinguishing Article 226. In the case of Emcure Pharmaceuticals Vs. State of Karnataka (2022) affirmed distinct regime of Chapter IVA. 10. He further submits that the prosecution complaint contains no allegation whatsoever of offences relating to adulterated/spurious drugs punishable under clauses (a)(b) of Section 13, sub section (3) of Section 22, clause (a) and (c) of Section 27, 28 and 28 B or clause (b) of sub section (i) of Section 30. 10. He further submits that the prosecution complaint contains no allegation whatsoever of offences relating to adulterated/spurious drugs punishable under clauses (a)(b) of Section 13, sub section (3) of Section 22, clause (a) and (c) of Section 27, 28 and 28 B or clause (b) of sub section (i) of Section 30. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the order of the High Court of Telangana in Criminal Petition Nos. 58 and 61 of 2023 dated 10.02.2023 ( M/s. Ortin Laboratories Limited Vs. The State of Telangana ) wherein it has been held that the legislation distinctly categorized drugs and cosmetics as either “misbranded””adulterated” “spurious” or simply as drugs or cosmetics. Section 16 of the Act specifies the quality standards that these drugs or cosmetics must meet. 11. It has been held that as per Schedule-II of Cr.P.C.; if an offence is punishable with imprisonment of three years and not more than seven years the offence has to be tried by the Magistrate of First Class. Under Section 36AB of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the offences punishable under Section 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act are tried summarily except the offence triable by the said curt under Section 36AB of the court of Session. Either way, the offence under Drugs Act when the “drug is not of standard quality” has to be tried by the Magistrate of First Class. 12. Further, he has relied upon the case of M/s. R.A. Chem Pharma Limited and Another Vs. State of AP , (in Criminal Petition No. 8092 of 2018, dated 01.11.2018) , wherein the core of the case, decided on November 1, 2018, was the company's challenge to its trial in a Special Court designated for certain offences, arguing that the specific charges (Sections 27(b)(ii) and 27(d)) were not covered by the relevant government order that established the Special Court for other offences. 13. It has further held that the High Court ruled that the Special Court had erroneously assumed jurisdiction, as the charges against the company did not fall under the specific provisions for which the Special Court was constituted. The High Court held that the Special Sessions Judge had wrongly assumed jurisdiction because the alleged offences were not covered by the government order that established the Special Court for specific types of offences. The High Court held that the Special Sessions Judge had wrongly assumed jurisdiction because the alleged offences were not covered by the government order that established the Special Court for specific types of offences. The ruling established that the trial for these specific drug-related offences should not have been conducted in the Special Court and implies that the case should have been handled by the appropriate Magistrate court.” 14. The specific offences enumerated in Section 36AB is for special court jurisdiction. The complaint exclusively pertains to sampling of Ayurvedic medicine under Chapter IVA, which was found sub standard and upon analysis thereby falling outside the ambit of Chapter IV and the notification dated 12.01.2016 rendering sessions court cognizance is wholly without jurisdiction. SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL FOR THE STATE/RESPONDENT 15. Learned State counsel vehemently opposes this misconceived and premature petition, which constitutes a blatant abuse of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNS, 2023. Vide the unchallenged notification dated 12.01.2016 issued by the Government of Chhattisgarh in consultation with the Chief Justice, all Sessions Courts stand expressly designated as Special Courts under Section 36AB of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, vested with plenary competence to try offences relating to adulterated/sub-standard drugs- including the present Chapter IVA contraventions under Sections 33EE and 33KA. Learned State counsel defended reliance on notification dated 12.01.2016 designating Sessions Courts for “offences relating to adulterated drugs…..under the Act”. Cognizance followed hearing : proceedings are art charge framing stage. He submits that the petitioner may seek discharge under BNSS or revision thereafter rendering interference premature. The alleged batch discrepancies and non-response by manufacturer were highlighted as justifying inclusion. 16. It is conceded that Section 528 BNSS does empower the High Court to quash proceedings, including FIRs, charge sheets and even cognizance orders, in appropriate cases. It is submitted that since the petitioner had invoked both Article 226 and 528, the High Court ought to have considered where relief could be granted under the latter provision, subject to the satisfaction of legal requirements. Nevertheless, the State emphasized that the inherent power to quash proceedings is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, only where continuing the proceedings would amount to abuse of process or result in miscarriage of justice. Nevertheless, the State emphasized that the inherent power to quash proceedings is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, only where continuing the proceedings would amount to abuse of process or result in miscarriage of justice. The Sessions Judge, Mahasamund lawfully took cognizance on 01.12.2022 post due hearing, with proceedings at the nascent charge-framing stage; any hyper-technical challenge to jurisdiction files in the teeth of statutory empowerment and settled precedent, warranting outright dismissal. 17. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the records with utmost circumspection as well as provisions of law contained under the said Act. 18. The pivotal question which arises for consideration is whether the Sessions Court was competent to take cognizance of the alleged offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, particularly when the offences pertain to Ayurvedic medicines governed by Chapter IV-A of the Act. 19. At the outset, it is necessary to examine the statutory framework. Section 33A of the Act explicitly excludes the applicability of Chapter IV, which deals with allopathic drugs, to Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani medicines. Chapter IV-A has been specifically enacted to regulate offences relating to such traditional medicines. Therefore, the procedural and substantive provisions applicable to Chapter IV cannot automatically be extended to offences falling under Chapter IV- A.Section 33M of the Act assumes significance in this context. Sub- section (2) thereof categorically provides that no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try an offence punishable under Chapter IV-A. The legislative intent is thus unambiguous: the jurisdiction to try offences under Chapter IV-A is confined to Magistrate Courts of the specified class. 20. The Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma & Others (supra) has authoritatively interpreted Section 33M of the Act. The Apex Court held that the mandate of Section 33M is mandatory in nature and that the jurisdiction to take cognizance and conduct trial of offences under Chapter IV-A vests exclusively in the Judicial Magistrate First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate. The Court further clarified that any deviation from this statutory mandate would render the proceedings vulnerable on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 21. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Court further clarified that any deviation from this statutory mandate would render the proceedings vulnerable on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 21. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The principle emerging from the said decision is that jurisdiction under the Act is not a matter of mere procedural convenience but flows directly from the statute, and any assumption of jurisdiction by a court not empowered under the Act amounts to a fundamental illegality. 22. In the matter of Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma and Others (in Cr.A. No. 200 of 2020 SLP (Crl. No. 4178 of 2019), has held that "33M. Cognizance of offences.- (1) No prosecution under this Chapter shall be instituted except by an Inspector [with the previous sanction of the authority specified under sub-section (4) of section 33G. (2) No Court inferior to that [of a Metropolitan Magistrate or of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class] shall try an offence punishable under this Chapter." 17. The last Chapter of the Act is Chapter V. It bears the Chapter heading "Miscellaneous". Section 36 declares that any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of First Class may pass a sentence in excess of the powers under the CrPC. Section 36A provides that certain offences are to be tried summarily." 23. In the present case, the offence alleged pertains to Ayurvedic medicine and is squarely covered under Chapter IV-A of the Act. Consequently, the Sessions Court, which is not the court contemplated under Section 33M(2), could not have taken cognizance of the offence. The cognizance taken by the Sessions Court is therefore contrary to the express statutory mandate and the law declared by the Supreme Court. It is well settled that when a court acts without jurisdiction, the entire proceedings stand vitiated. Jurisdiction is the very foundation of judicial authority, and any order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity in the eyes of law. Accordingly, this Court finds substance in the contention of the petitioner that the proceedings initiated before the Sessions Court suffer from inherent lack of jurisdiction and cannot be sustained in law. 24. Jurisdiction is the very foundation of judicial authority, and any order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity in the eyes of law. Accordingly, this Court finds substance in the contention of the petitioner that the proceedings initiated before the Sessions Court suffer from inherent lack of jurisdiction and cannot be sustained in law. 24. The present petition assails the order dated 01.12.2022 passed by the Sessions Judge, Mahasamund, whereby cognizance was taken under Sections 33EE and 33KA of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 punishable under Section 33 (1)(a)(ii) thereof, in respect of an alleged sub-standard Ayurvedic medicine. The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 governs both allopathic and traditional medicines under separate statutory chapters. Chapter IV relates to allopathic drugs, while Chapter IV-A specifically regulates Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani drugs. 25. The Act bifurcates regulatory frameworks:Section 33 A expressly excludes Chapter IV’s applicability over Ayurvedic drugs, limiting the statutory scheme applicable to chapter IV-A. Section 33M(2) states no court inferior to a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of First Class shall try offences under Chapter IV-A. The Sessions Courts, even when designated as Special Courts under Section 36AB, are empowered only to try offences under Chapter IV, not Chapter IV-A. Section 36AB prescribes constitution of Special Courts by notification for specific offences concerning adulterated or spurious drugs enumerated under Chapter IV. Its jurisdictional net does not extend to Chapter IV-A offences. Section 36 AB of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is extracted as under: “The Central Government, or the State Government, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, shall, for trial of offences relating to adulterated drugs or spurious drugs and punishable under clauses (a) and (b) of section 13, sub-section (3) of section 22, clauses (a) and (c) of section 27, section 28, section 28A, section 28B and clause (b) of sub-section (l) of section 30 and other offences relating to adulterated drugs or spurious drugs, by notification, designate one or more Courts of Session as a Special Court or Special Courts for such area or areas or for such case or class or group of cases as may be specified in the notification. Explanation.—In this sub-section, “High Court”means the High Court of the State in which a Court of Session designated as Special Court was functioning immediately before such designation. Explanation.—In this sub-section, “High Court”means the High Court of the State in which a Court of Session designated as Special Court was functioning immediately before such designation. (2) While trying an offence under this Act, a Special Court shall also try an offence, other than an offence referred to in sub-section (l), with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial.” 26. The 2016 notification while empowering Sessions Courts for adulterated/spurious drugs,cannot expansively engulf Chapter IVA offences, contravening Section 33A’s exclusionary mandate. Apex court in Medindia Healthcare (2020) and J&K High Court (2025) underscore Chapter-specific jurisdiction; Magistrate Cognizance/ commitment is permissible, but direct Sessions trial impermissible sans enabling provision. Section 36A reinforces summary Magistrate trial for 3 years punishment. Section 36 declares that any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of First Class may pass a sentence in excess of the powers under the CrPC. Section 36A provides that certain offences are to be tried summarily. Section 36AB provides for Special Courts. It declares that the Central Government or the State Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, shall, for certain offences designate one or more Court of Sessions as a Special Court or Special Courts. Sub-section (2) provides that the Special Court may try an offence other than the offences covered by sub-section (1) which may be charged against the accused at the same trial. Section 36AC around which much arguments were addressed reads as follows: "36AC. Offences to be cognizable and non- bailable in certain cases. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),- (a) every offence, relating to adulterated or spurious drug and punishable under clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 13, clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 13, sub-section (3) of section 22, clauses (a) and (c) of section 27, section 28, section 28A, section 28B and 29 sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 30 and other offences relating to adulterated drugs or spurious drugs, shall be cognizable. (b) no person accused, of an offence punishable under clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 13, clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 13, sub-section (3) of section 22, clauses (a) and (c) of section 27, section 28, section 28A, section 28B and sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 30 and other offences relating to adulterated drugs or spurious drugs, shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail: Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years, or is a woman or is sick or infirm, may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs. (2) The limitation on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) is in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. (3) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and the High Court may exercise such powers including the power under clause (b) of sub- section (1) of that section as if the reference to "Magistrate" in that section includes also a reference to a "Special Court" designated under section 36AB." 27. Jurisdiction is sine qua non; proceedings coram non judice are nullities quash-able under Section 528 BNSS to prevent miscarriage. The inherent powers brook no alternate remedy ritual where root infirmity exists. The Apex Court in the matter of Pharmaceutical Traders Association Vs. Union of India (1993) 3 SCC 430 , has underscored that jurisdictional provisions of a statute must be strictly adhered to. Additionally, the principle of strict construction of penal statutes requires the interpretation of jurisdictional clauses consistent with legislative intent to avoid unjust prosecution. 28. The Apex Court in the matter of Pharmaceutical Traders Association Vs. Union of India (1993) 3 SCC 430 , has underscored that jurisdictional provisions of a statute must be strictly adhered to. Additionally, the principle of strict construction of penal statutes requires the interpretation of jurisdictional clauses consistent with legislative intent to avoid unjust prosecution. 28. Furthermore, the petitioner's role as a distributor does not ipso facto attribute liability for manufacture or quality lapses, particularly when standards are maintained and products are sold sealed and under proper documentation, aligning with the Apex court’s view in Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd.Vs. State of Gujarat (2012) 4 SCC 731. 29. The notification of 2016 empowering Sessions Courts as Special Courts for offences relating to adulterated drugs under Chapter IV cannot be extended by analogy or implication to crimes under Chapter IV-A. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by administrative notification contrary to statutory mandate. This is fortified by judicial precedent in State of Punjab Vs. S.L.Gupta (2003) 8 SCC 453, that strict limits on jurisdiction cannot be waived. 30. Regarding the contention of premature intervention, the law laid down in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, provides that lack of jurisdiction is a fundamental error that goes not the root of the matter and can be quashed in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction in public interest and to prevent abuse of process. 31. The Apex Court in the case of Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra clarifies the limits of a High Court's powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash an FIR or charge sheet once a court has taken cognizance of the offense. The ruling establishes that after cognizance is taken, the correct remedy is to use the inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) (formerly Section 482 of the CrPC), which allows for the quashing of the cognizance order itself, not just the FIR and charge sheet. The Supreme Court's decision in this case was to set aside the High Court's dismissal of the petition and direct it to be heard again, explaining the distinction between the two legal provisions. The Supreme Court's decision in this case was to set aside the High Court's dismissal of the petition and direct it to be heard again, explaining the distinction between the two legal provisions. It has observed that: However, from the preamble of the writ petition filed by the petitioner before the Bombay High Court, it is evident that the same sought to invoke the twin jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 528 of the BNSS for having the FIR quashed. It is true that the police report (charge- sheet) had been filed on 14th May, 2025 upon completion of investigation of the FIR, but whether or not cognizance had been taken by the jurisdictional magistrate is not too clear from the impugned order extracted above. So long cognizance of the offence is not taken, a writ or order to quash the FIR/charge-sheet could be issued under Article 226; however, once a judicial order of taking cognizance intervenes, the power under Article 226 though not available to be exercised, power under Section 528, BNSS was available to be exercised to quash not only the FIR/charge-sheet but also the order taking cognizance, provided the same is placed on record along with the requisite pleadings to assail the same and a strong case for such quashing is set up. Significantly, it was reasoned by us in Neeta Singh (supra) that a judicial order not being amenable to challenge before a high court under Article 226 of the Constitution and there being no prayer either under Article 227 thereof or Section 482, Cr. PC, the Allahabad High Court was right in holding the writ petition under Article 226 to have been rendered infructuous.” 32. The impugned order of cognizance by the Sessions Court is legally untenable as the offence arises under Chapter IV-A which mandates trial exclusively before Magistrate courts. The continuation of trial before the Sessions Court is without jurisdiction and an abuse of the process of law. In the interest of justice and to uphold the jurisdictional sanctity enshrined in the statute, the petition stands allowed. 33. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 01.12.2022 along with all consequential proceedings is hereby quashed and set aside. The continuation of trial before the Sessions Court is without jurisdiction and an abuse of the process of law. In the interest of justice and to uphold the jurisdictional sanctity enshrined in the statute, the petition stands allowed. 33. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 01.12.2022 along with all consequential proceedings is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mahasamund, with a direction to either proceed with the complaint itself or forward the complaint to the concerned Judicial Magistrate First Class for taking fresh cognizance and conducting the trial afresh, as may be deemed appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case.