1 2025:CGHC:13254 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 579 of 2017 Ravi Tanti S/o Late Datiram Tanti, Aged About 40 Years R/o Mithumuda, Nawapara, Tahsil And District Raigarh And Civil And Revenue District Raigarh Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Manglu Ram (Died) Through Lrs. As Per Honble Court Order Dated 25-11-2024 1.1 - Smt. Ramayan Yadav W/o Late Magluram Yadav Aged About 66 Years R/o Behind High School, Jawahar Nagar, Akaltara, Tah. Akaltara, Distt. Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 1.2 - Uttam Yadav S/o Late Magluram Yadav Aged About 44 Years R/o Behind High School, Jawahar Nagar, Akaltara, Tah. Akaltara, Distt. Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 1.3 - Nutan Yadav S/o Late Magluram Yadav Aged About 42 Years R/o Behind High School, Jawahar Nagar, Akaltara, Tah. Akaltara, Distt. Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 1.4 - Kamna Yadav D/o Late Magluram Yadav Aged About 36 Years R/o Behind High School, Jawahar Nagar, Akaltara, Tah. Akaltara, Distt. Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Suraj Yadav, D/o Late Patiram Yadav, Aged About 55 Years W/o Shri Shiv Charan R/o Jawaharnagar, Akaltara, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 3 - Ku. Chanda Yadav, D/o Late Patiram Yadav, Aged About 52 Years R/o Jawaharnagar, Akaltara, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 4 - Smt. Bindu Yadav, D/o Late Patiram Yadav, Aged About 47 Years R/o Dipara Gevara, Tah- Gevara, District Korba Chhattisgarh 5 - Atul Yadav, S/o Shri Kishrore Yadav, Aged About 19 Years Mother Late Sidhu Yadav, Digitally signed by AJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI Date: 2025.03.22 11:27:49 +0530 2 R/o Subhas Block - Korba Tah. And Distict Korba Chhattisgarh 6 - Smt. Taramati W/o Shri Mukundlal Yadav, Aged About 45 Years D/o Late Partiram, R/o Mauhdapara, Near Cement Pipe Factory, Tahsil And District Raigarh Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Adv. For Res No.1 (i) to (iv) & 2 to 6 : Mr. Abhishek Saraf, Adv. SB : Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Judgment on Board 20.03.2025 1. This is a Second Appeal filed by the plaintiffs under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the CPC”) against the judgment and decree dated 05.08.2017 passed by the First Additional District Judge to the First Upper District Judge, Raigarh in Civil Appeal No.69/2016, which, in turn, arose out of the judgment and decree dated 12.08.2016 passed by the Second Civil Judge Class-I, District Raigarh (CG) in Regular Civil Suit No.106-A/2011. 2. By the impugned judgment and decree, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant (appellant herein) and, in consequence, upheld the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, which had allowed the plaintiffs’ suit and directed the defendant to vacate the possession of the suit property situated at Mohalla Mitthumunda, Navapara, Tehsil and District Raigarh bearing Khasra No.3/25, Area 0.011 Hectare and also awarded compensation to the plaintiff for damages payable by the defendant to the tune of Rs.1000/- from April 2011 till vacation of the suit property. 3. So the short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether this Second appeal involves any substantial question law within 3 the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC and whether such appeal should be admitted for final hearing? 4. Henceforth, the parties shall be referred to as per their description before the Court below. 5. Facts of the case, in brief, are that respondents/plaintiffs have filed a civil suit on 03.05.2011 claiming vacant possession and damages in respect of the house shown in Schedule-A appended the plaint by making averment, inter alia, that subject property was purchased by father of respondents No.2 to 4, namely, Pati Ram from one Lainuram by way of registered sale deed dated 04.06.1984 for consideration of Rs.5000/-. Further, the defendant has performed love marriage and father of the defendant refused to keep them in his house. Patiram and father of the defendant both were working in the Railway department, therefore, Patiram allowed the defendant to reside in the house temporarily and since then the appellant/defendant is in permissive possession of the suit house. However, when plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate the suit house, he denied to leave the same. Hence, the suit was filed. 6. The appellant/defendant filed his written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and averred that his father, namely, Datiram has given money to the Patiram to the tune of Rs.6000/- for purchasing the suit house and Patiram promised that he would return the amount within one year, failing which, he would give possession of the said house to the defendant. Thereafter, the defendant continued his possession over the said house and perfected title in the suit house. 4 7. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed as many as 5 issues and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Against the said findings, the defendant has preferred the First Appeal which ultimately was dismissed by affirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. It is this judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, which is impugned in the Second Appeal filed by the appellant/defendant. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would submit that the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court have committed an error by not appreciating the evidence in its proper perspective. He further submits that it is an admitted fact that appellant/defendant is in continuous possession for the last 12 years and, therefore, he has perfected the title by way of adverse possession. He places reliance in the matter of Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Ors Vs. Manjit Kuar and Ors [(2019) 8 SCC 729] and referred to Para 62 which reads thus:- "62. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years' period of adverse possession is over, even owner's right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner as the case may be against whom he has prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is that once the right, title or interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession. In case of dispossession by another person by taking law in his hand a possessory suit can be maintained under Article 64, even before the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. By perfection of title on extinguishment of the owner’s title, a person cannot be remediless. In case he has been dispossessed by the owner after having lost the right by adverse possession, he can be evicted by the plaintiff by 5 taking the plea of adverse possession. Similarly, any other person who might have dispossessed the plaintiff having perfected title by way of adverse possession can also be evicted until and unless such other person has perfected title against such a plaintiff by adverse possession. Similarly, under other Articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can sue and maintain a suit." 9. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and also perused the record with utmost circumspection. 10. It is well settled proposition of law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Admittedly, the suit house was purchased by way of registered sale deed by Patiram and even if for sake of argument it is accepted that the father of the defendant financed any amount and due to any relation Patiram has allowed the defendant to reside in the house, even then the same amounts to a permissive possession and that is not adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession fairly means a hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner. 11. So this Court is of the view that both the the Courts have rightly appreciated the evidence on record. Since the plaintiffs are the title holder of the subject property and a decree has been against him for vacating the possession and for the damages, the defendant has no right to remain in possession. Thereby, there is a concurrent finding of facts recorded by the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court. 12. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 6 13. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the two Courts below appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded by both the Courts are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they do not call for any interference. 15.Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine upholding the judgment and decree of both the Courts below. 16. No order as to cost(s). 17.A decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Ajay