JUDGMENT : Per Rajani Dubey, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.06.2016 passed by the Special Judge, S.C./S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities), Act, Raipur (C.G.) in Special Sessions Case No. 11/2015, whereby and whereunder appellant Lokesh Sinha has been held guilty for commission of offence and keeping in view the provision of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, sentenced as described below :- 2. The prosecution story, in brief, is that on the night of 28.03.2015, at about 10:00 p.m., in village Kodobhanth, father of prosecutrix (PW-2) was sleeping in his house with his family. Prosecutrix’s younger sister and the prosecutrix (PW-3) were sleeping in another room. At about 4:00 a.m., younger sister of prosecutrix went out to collect Mahua, and at about 6:00 a.m., father (PW-2) and mother (PW-1) of prosecutrix left for their fields. When they returned home at about 6:00 p.m., the prosecutrix was not present in the house. Parents of the prosecutrix searched for her in the nearby area, but she could not be traced. On 01.04.2015, father of prosecutrix lodged a missing report of his daughter - the prosecutrix at Police Station Mainpur. The police registered Crime No. 40/2015 against an unknown person under Section 363 IPC. The prosecutrix had appeared privately for the Class 10 examination in the year 2015. Prior to that, she was studying in Class 9 in the High School at village Gopalpur, where she became acquainted with accused - Lokesh Sinha, and they used to meet each other. On 28.03.2015, at about 11:00 p.m., the accused asked the prosecutrix over mobile phone to come out of her house. Acting on his request, she came out. The accused met her in front of her house, carrying his belongings, and from there he took her to village Gaurghat. From Gaurghat, he took her on foot towards the Gariaband road. On reaching Teemnapur at about 7:00 a.m., he put her in a bus coming from Mainpur and brought her to Raipur. At Raipur Railway Station, on 29.03.2015, the accused took the prosecutrix to a temple and filled her forehead (maang). They stayed at the railway station for two days while the accused looked for work. On 01.04.2015, the accused sold the prosecutrix’s mobile phone and took her to village Sankara, District Durg on same day. At Raipur Railway Station, on 29.03.2015, the accused took the prosecutrix to a temple and filled her forehead (maang). They stayed at the railway station for two days while the accused looked for work. On 01.04.2015, the accused sold the prosecutrix’s mobile phone and took her to village Sankara, District Durg on same day. In village Sankara, the accused and the prosecutrix worked as labourer in the construction work of the boundary wall of an under-construction factory and resided in the labour quarters. The accused, on the pretext of marriage, kept her with him and had sexual intercourse with her, representing her as his wife. The police recovered the prosecutrix from the accused. With the consent of the prosecutrix and her parents, and with permission obtained from the Tehsildar, Mainpur, her medical/genital examination was conducted by a Medical Officer. The underwear of the prosecutrix was seized. After her medical examination, the prepared slides were also seized. The police prepared spot map of the prosecutrix’s house and also had a map prepared by the Patwari. The birth register entry of the prosecutrix was seized from the Kotwar. From Ramsai Nayak, the Class 8 marksheet and caste certificate of the prosecutrix were seized. The underwear of the accused was also seized, and both the accused and his underwear were medically examined. Statements of witnesses were recorded, and the accused was arrested. The slides and underwear of the prosecutrix were sent for chemical examination. Human spermatozoa were found on the slides of the prosecutrix. After completing the usual investigation, charge sheet was filed before the jurisdictional Court against the accused under Sections 363, 366, 376 IPC, Sections 5, 6 of POCSO Act, 2012 and 3(1)(12) of the S.C./S.T. Act, from where the case was committed to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Raipur, on 03.06.2015, and on 09.06.2015, the case was received on transfer for trial. 3. The learned trial Court framed charges against the accused/appellant under Sections 363, 366, 376 of IPC, 3(2)(5), 3(1)(12) of S.C./S.T. Act and Sections 5 & 6 of POCSO Act, 2012. 4. So as to hold the accused/appellant guilty, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses. Statement of the accused/appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. 5. 4. So as to hold the accused/appellant guilty, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses. Statement of the accused/appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. 5. The trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective parties and considering the material available on record has convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as mentioned in para-1 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is bad, illegal, perverse and contrary to the law applicant to the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record. The evidence of Prosecutrix (PW-3) and her parents are not corroborated with other prosecution witnesses. Learned counsel also submits that on the date of incident, the Prosecutrix was major and was capable of understanding right and wrong and she was the consenting party to the act of the accused but the learned Trial Court did not consider this aspect of the matter and convicted the accused. The accused and the prosecutrix had love affairs with each other and it is the prosecutrix who herself established the sexual relationship with the accused. The learned Trial Court did not properly appreciate the statement of Prosecutrix (PW-3), which points towards that she was above 18 years of age at the time of incident and no offence much less offences under Sections 363, 366, 376 IPC, 6 of POCSO and 3(2)(5) and 3(1) (12) of the S.C./S.T. Act are made out against the accused. The evidence of Prosecutrix (PW-3) is not against the accused and contents of her evidence and admission clearly makes out a case of clear cut consent. Learned counsel further submits that there is no evidence on record to show that the accused allegedly committed the offence knowingly that the prosecutrix was a member of scheduled category. Learned counsel also submits that the learned Trial Court did not consider the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, mother and father of the prosecutrix respectively, wherein they have admitted that the prosecutrix did not inform them regarding the physical relationship with the accused as also regarding the marriage and love. Learned counsel also submits that the learned Trial Court did not consider the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, mother and father of the prosecutrix respectively, wherein they have admitted that the prosecutrix did not inform them regarding the physical relationship with the accused as also regarding the marriage and love. Learned counsel also submits that the prosecutrix roamed with the accused to different locations and she had enough opportunity to make complaint nearby people but she choose to remain silence during entire period and came to the disposal of the accused without any protest there- against, which shows her clear cut consent. Learned counsel also submits that Smt. Kunti Bai (PW-6), Kotwar of the village, has stated that the date of birth of the prosecutrix was 25.05.1997 and it was recorded on 22.06.1987 by her husband, as such, it is proved that she is not the author of said entry. Further, she has stated that at the time of recording date of birth of the prosecutrix, her father had not produced any document regarding the date of birth of the prosecutrix, thus, it is clear that the basis of date of birth which was recorded in the Kotwari register is missing in the case but the learned Trial Court did not consider this aspect and recorded perverse finding. That apart, medical report of the prosecutrix does not support the prosecution case. No external or internal injury was noticed by the doctor and an opinion was given by the Doctor that the prosecutrix was habitual for sexual intercourse. Further, the doctor had referred the prosecutrix to radiology department for her x-ray but the prosecution did not conduct her x-ray, which is fatal to the prosecution case. The learned Trial Court failed to appreciate this important aspect of the case. Thus, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in the matter of Ramsharan Singh V. State of C.G. , [CRA No.967/2021, judgment date 17.08.2023], Shubham Chouhan V. State of C.G. [CRA No.303/2022, judgment date 07.12.2023] and Pardeshi Sidar Vs. State of C.G. [CRA No.1684/2019, judgment date 25.01.2024.]. 7. On the other hand, supporting the impugned judgment it has been argued by the State counsel that the conviction of the accused/appellant is strictly in accordance law and there is no infirmity in the same. 8. State of C.G. [CRA No.1684/2019, judgment date 25.01.2024.]. 7. On the other hand, supporting the impugned judgment it has been argued by the State counsel that the conviction of the accused/appellant is strictly in accordance law and there is no infirmity in the same. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. It is clear from the record of the learned trial Court that the learned trial Court framed charges against the accused/appellant under Sections 363, 366, 376 of IPC, 3(2)(5), 3(1)(12) of S.C./S.T. Act and Sections 5 & 6 of POCSO Act, 2012, and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, and considering the provision of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 363, 366 of IPC, Sections 3(2)(v), 3(1)(xii) of the S.C./S.T. Act and Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012. 10. The first question which arises for consideration by this Court whether on the date of incident the prosecutrix (PW-3) was below 18 years of age. 11. For recording the finding on the age of the prosecutrix, the prosecution heavily relied upon Kotwari Panji (Ex.P-12) and in the Kotwari Panji, the date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded as 25.05.1997. 12. Smt. Kunti Bai (PW-6), village Kotwar, has stated that the date of birth of the prosecutrix was 25.05.1997, and the father of prosecutrix gave information of this date of birth on 22.06.1997. The Kotwari Register is Ex.P-12 and photocopy of the same is Ex.P-12-C. She has stated that on the basis of this Kotwari Panji, she had issued a separate certificate regarding date of birth prosecutrix vide Ex.P-13 and this witness has admitted her signature on ‘A to A’ part thereof. The police had seized Kotwari Panji vide Ex.P-4. In cross- examination, this witness has admitted that no document with regard to date of birth of the prosecutrix was produced by the father of prosecutrix, and it is true that some villagers do not get registered the name immediately after the birth. She has admitted that at the time of birth of prosecutrix, her husband was Kotwar, and she had not written the date of birth of the prosecutrix in Ex.P-12. She has admitted that at the time of birth of prosecutrix, her husband was Kotwar, and she had not written the date of birth of the prosecutrix in Ex.P-12. She has also admitted that many villagers register the date of birth after 4-5 months and she did not know that her husband wrote prosecutrix’s date of birth by guessing. 13. Mother of prosecutrix (PW-1) has admitted in her cross-examination that she cannot tell the exact date of birth of her daughter. She herself admitted that 03 months were left in completing prosecutrix’s 18 years. She did not know the date of birth of her daughter. She has admitted that the police had told her that 03 months were short of turning 18 years of the prosecutrix. 14. Father of prosecutrix (PW-2) has admitted his signature on seizure memo Ex.P-4 of Kotwari Panji, and stated that police had seized mark sheet of prosecutrix from him. In cross-examination, he has admitted that he had not written the date of birth of his 03 children in any copy, and the Kotwar of village has written the date of birth of his daughters. He has admitted that he cannot tell the date of birth of his 03 children. 15. Prosecutrix (PW-3) has stated that she was studying in class 11 th and her date of birth is 25.05.1997. 16. It is clear that the learned Trial Court, on the basis of Kotwari panji (Ex.P-12), recorded its finding that the prosecutrix (PW-3), at the time of incident, was below 18 years of age, but Kunti Bai (PW-6), village Kotwari, has admitted that entry of date of birth of the prosecutrix was written by her husband and she does not know that the said date of birth of the prosecutrix was written by her husband by guessing or not. She has admitted that at the time of entry of date of birth of the prosecutrix, her husband was village Kotwar and the date of birth of the prosecutrix was written by her husband. 17. Dr. B. Bara (PW-11) has stated that upon examination, she found that the prosecutrix had 7 teeth on each side of the upper jaw, seven on the right and seven on the left. Seven teeth were also on each side of the lower jaw of the prosecutrix. 17. Dr. B. Bara (PW-11) has stated that upon examination, she found that the prosecutrix had 7 teeth on each side of the upper jaw, seven on the right and seven on the left. Seven teeth were also on each side of the lower jaw of the prosecutrix. In cross-examination, the Doctor has admitted that x-ray report with regard to the age was not produced before her and she asked the prosecutrix about her age and wrote down her age as 17 years. 18. The Hon’ble Apex court in the matter of Alamelu and another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police , (2011) 2 SCC 385 observed in paras 40 & 48 of its judgment as under :- “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl’s date of birth was 15 th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31 st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows :- “The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party the li Alamelu s, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the Prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 19. This Court in the matter of Shubham (supra) held in para 10 and 11 as under :- “10. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, it emerges that the prosecution could not produced the clinching and legally admissible evidence with respect to the date of birth or age of the prosecutrix so as to hold that on the date of incident she was minor and below 18 years of age. Only on the basis of school admission and discharge register it would not be safe to hold that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of incident. Only on the basis of school admission and discharge register it would not be safe to hold that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of incident. The statement of the prosecutrix her parents and her brother as also the statement of PW-6 Suresh Kumar Sahu, headmaster of the Saraswati Shishu Mandir, Rahod are contradictory to each other and does not inspire confidence upon this Court to hold that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 07.12.2005. 11. In the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, 2006 (5) SCC 584 , relying upon its earlier judgment in case fo Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 supp. SCC 604 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was record.” 20. This Court in Ramsharan (supra) held in para 9 as under :- “9. The Angan Badi papers on the basis of which the date of birth was written on Dakhil Kharij Register according to the statement of father, is not on record. Likewise the mark sheet on the basis of which, the date of birth was written by the doctor to be 16 years was also not produced by the prosecution. The statement of the doctor, therefore, would show the age to be shown as 16 years, on the basis of some document and in absence of such document, it cannot be safely presumed that the prosecution has proved the age of the prosecutrix that she was a minor beyond reasonable doubt. 21. The statement of the doctor, therefore, would show the age to be shown as 16 years, on the basis of some document and in absence of such document, it cannot be safely presumed that the prosecution has proved the age of the prosecutrix that she was a minor beyond reasonable doubt. 21. In the light of above, after considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and evidence of mother of prosecutrix (PW-1), father of prosecutrix (PW-2), Prosecutrix (PW-3) and Kunti Bai (PW-6), it emerges that the prosecution could not produce the clinching and legally admissible evidence with respect to the date fo birth or age of the prosecutrix so as to hold that on the date of incident she was minor and below 18 years of age. Only on the basis of Kotwari Panji, it would not be safe to hold that he prosecutrix was minor on the date of incident. Further, it is evident from the testimony of Kunti Bai (PW-6) that she is not the author of date of birth of the prosecutrix, and at the time of recording the date of birth of the prosecutrix, her husband was village Kotwar. Further, Kunti Bai (PW-6) has clearly admitted that she does not know that her husband recorded the date of birth of the prosecutrix by guessing or not. Thus, in absence of any clinching, credible and corroborative piece of evidence with regard to date of birth of the prosecutrix, we set aside the finding of the learned Trial Court regarding the age that at the time of incident, the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age. 22. Now, the question which arises for consideration by this Court whether the Prosecutrix (PW-3) was subjected to forceful sexual intercourse by the accused after abducting her knowingly that she was member of scheduled category and the conviction can be made on the sole testimony of the Prosecutrix (PW-1). 23. In the case in hand, the prosecution has filed temporary caste certificate (Ex.A/1) of the prosecutrix (PW-3). Perusal of the said certificate goes to show that the prosecutrix (PW- 3) belonged to Bhujiya caste which falls within the category of Scheduled Tribes but it was issued on 21.04.2015 and the date of incident is 28.03.2015, which clearly shows that the same was obtained after lodging of FIR and the same was valid for 06 months. 24. Perusal of the said certificate goes to show that the prosecutrix (PW- 3) belonged to Bhujiya caste which falls within the category of Scheduled Tribes but it was issued on 21.04.2015 and the date of incident is 28.03.2015, which clearly shows that the same was obtained after lodging of FIR and the same was valid for 06 months. 24. While dealing with the issue where the case certificate was issued after the occurrence of incident, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Babulal Patel Vs. The state of M. P. order dated 15.05.2024 , passed in Criminal Appeal No. 648 of 2004 , held in paras 6,7 & 8 as under:- 6. The learned trial court has convicted the accused for the offence of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and for this, reliance has been placed upon the provisional caste certificate of complainant, marked as Ex.P-2. It was issued by Tahsildar on 18.12.2002 and contents thereof reveal that it was issued temporarily while the incident of the present case occurred on 8.12.2002, therefore, it is clear that this provisional caste certificate was obtained from Tahsildar after the date of incident. 7. The circular issued by General Administration Department of Madhya Pradesh Government dated 30.6.2001 with No.F.7-32/2000/s very relevant here because it came into existence prior to the issuance of provisional certificate of Ex. P-2 in this case. This circular makes it clear that the practice of issuing provisional caste certificate is being stopped henceforth and only in exceptional circumstances, the provisional caste certificate would be issued. Those exceptional circumstances have also been discussed in the circular itself and they are: (1) for seeking admission in an education institute. (2) for applying for a Government job. (3) for appearing in an interview. (4) for applying in a Government scheme. Under only these four exceptional conditions and that too when the caste certificate is required immediately, the provisional caste certificate was supposed to be issued; for it an application is duly supported with the affidavit and the reason of urgency was to be made. (3) for appearing in an interview. (4) for applying in a Government scheme. Under only these four exceptional conditions and that too when the caste certificate is required immediately, the provisional caste certificate was supposed to be issued; for it an application is duly supported with the affidavit and the reason of urgency was to be made. The circular further clarifies that the validity period of this caste certificate would be maximum six months and all such cases in which provisional caste certificate is issued shall be enquired into within the prescribed timeframe and if the applicant is not found to be entitled to the certificate, his provisional caste certificate would be cancelled. 8. The above discussed circular was in enforcement when the provisional caste certificate of complainant, marked as Ex.P-2, was issued by Tahsildar. This caste certificate was issued to prove the caste of complainant in a criminal case. Obviously, the purpose of issuing this provisional caste certificate was not covered under the circular of 30.6.2001. Thus, the learned trial court was in error in relying upon the caste certificate of Ex.P-2 which was issued in flagrant violation of the existing circular of Madhya Pradesh Government dated 30.6.2001. In the light of this observation, it is held that the caste of complainant was not duly proved in the case by any credible document.” 25. In the light of aforesaid judgment, in the instant case, it is clear that caste certificate (Ex. A-1) was issued by Tahsildar after the date of incident, but learned Trial Court relied on temporary/provisional caste certificate vide Ex. A-1, which was issued by Tahsildar, Mainput (C.G.), though it was only valid for six months and wrongly convicted the appellant for offence under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(1)(xii) of SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. So, conviction under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(1)(xii) of SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is not sustainable, as such, findings recorded by learned Trial Court in this regard are set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the said charge. 26. Prosecutrix (PW-3) has stated in her examination-in-chief that on the date of incident at about 10.00 PM, when she went to her kitchen garden to answer the call of nature, the accused/appellant came there. When she wanted go inside her house, the accused/appellant came to her and told that they would perform marriage after fleeing. 26. Prosecutrix (PW-3) has stated in her examination-in-chief that on the date of incident at about 10.00 PM, when she went to her kitchen garden to answer the call of nature, the accused/appellant came there. When she wanted go inside her house, the accused/appellant came to her and told that they would perform marriage after fleeing. The accused/appellant had also told that he would die or kill her if she does not come with him. She has also stated that at that time, the accused/appellant came with his clothes in bag. She had denied to go with the accused/appellant. At that time, the accused/appellant took her to Raipur with him. The prosecutrix and accused/appellant came on foot to village Timanpur and from there they went to Raipur. The prosecutrix, in para 10 and 11 of her cross-examination, has admitted this suggestion that they went to Raipur in a bus. They came to Raipur from village Timanpur in a bus and at the relevant time many passengers were in bus. She did not tell anyone in the bus that the accused/appellant was taking her forcefully. She self stated that at that time there were 2- 4 passengers sitting in bus and she was sitting in rear seat of the bus and the accused/appellant was also with her, therefore, she could not tell anyone in the bus. She has also admitted that many people were doing labour work with them in village Sankra. She stayed with accused/appellant in one room in village Sankra for 15 days. She has admitted that women labourers were also working with her and she did not inform any labourer there that the accused/appellant commits rape with her forcefully. The prosecutrix (PW-3) has also admitted that she had told the labourers there that the accused/appellant and she are husband and wife. Prosecutrix self stated that the accused/appellant had already told labourers that they are husband and wife and the accused/appellant had told her to say the same. The prosecutrix has also admitted that she gave her statement (Ex.P-10) under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate, wherein she had stated that she accompanied the accused/appellant of her own and she performed marriage with accused/appellant Lokesh, she wanted to live with him and the accused/appellant did no force/pressurize her in any manner. 27. The prosecutrix has also admitted that she gave her statement (Ex.P-10) under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate, wherein she had stated that she accompanied the accused/appellant of her own and she performed marriage with accused/appellant Lokesh, she wanted to live with him and the accused/appellant did no force/pressurize her in any manner. 27. Mother of prosecutrix (PW-1) has stated that on the date of incident when she returned home after collecting mahuwa, she found that her daughter (Prosecutrix) was not in house. She thought that her daughter might have gone for collecting mahuwa. Thereafter, she went to field with lunch and after collecting mahuwa when she came back home at about 12-1.00 pm, she found that her daughter/prosecutrix was not in house. She inquired from girls who used to go with prosecutrix for collecting mahuwa but they showed their ignorance. Thereafter, they extensively searched the prosecutrix around the village but they could not find her. She has also stated that after 15 days, her daughter/prosecutrix found in a village but she doesn't know the name of the village where her daughter was found. 28. Father of prosecutrix (PW-2) in para 11 of his cross- examination has stated that it is incorrect to say that when police brought his daughter, they interrogated his daughter in his presence. This witness has denied this suggestion that his daughter told the police in his presence that his daughter loves the accused/appellant, therefore, she went with him (accused). 29. Upon meticulous consideration of the testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-3), this Court finds that her evidence does not inspire confidence and cannot be characterized as of sterling quality. In her examination-in-chief she alleged that the accused compelled her to accompany him by threatening to kill her, however, her cross-examination demolishes the substratum of coercion. She has categorically admitted that from village Timanpur they travelled to Raipur in a public bus where several passengers were present, yet she did not raise any alarm or disclose to anyone that she was being taken forcibly. She further admitted that she resided with the accused for nearly fifteen days in village Sankra, worked along with other labourers and lived with the accused in a single room, but at no point did she complain to any labourer or villager that the accused was committing forcible sexual intercourse with her. She further admitted that she resided with the accused for nearly fifteen days in village Sankra, worked along with other labourers and lived with the accused in a single room, but at no point did she complain to any labourer or villager that the accused was committing forcible sexual intercourse with her. She also admitted that she herself told the labourers that she and the accused were husband and wife. Most importantly, in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex.P-10) made before the Magistrate, she unequivocally stated before the Magistrate that she had voluntarily accompanied the accused, had married him and desired to reside with him, and that the accused had not pressurized or forced her in any manner. These material admissions, when read cumulatively, clearly indicate that the version of force and threat narrated for the first time during trial is an afterthought and stands contradicted by her own conduct, behaviour, and prior statement before the Magistrate. 30. The evidence of the mother (PW-1) and father (PW-2) does not furnish any corroboration to the allegation of abduction or forcible taking. None of them deposed that the prosecutrix disclosed any allegation of coercion or threat upon her recovery. The father (PW-2) specifically denied that the prosecutrix ever claimed before him or the police that she had been forcibly taken. Their testimonies also reveal that the prosecutrix was missing for several days and no circumstance was brought on record to suggest resistance or inability to seek help during the extensive period she remained with the accused at different locations including while travelling, at Raipur Railway Station, and at the labour site where many other workers, including women, were present. 31. In view of the above, this Court finds that the conduct of the prosecutrix, her voluntary companionship with the accused over several days, her failure to raise alarm at any available opportunity, her admission of representing herself and the accused as husband and wife, and her voluntary statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. collectively demonstrate that she was a consenting party to the relationship. Her testimony is inconsistent, contradictory to her earlier version, and fails to meet the standard of a sterling witness whose sole testimony can sustain a conviction. Consequently, the allegation of force or non-consensual sexual intercourse stands unproved beyond reasonable doubt. 32. Her testimony is inconsistent, contradictory to her earlier version, and fails to meet the standard of a sterling witness whose sole testimony can sustain a conviction. Consequently, the allegation of force or non-consensual sexual intercourse stands unproved beyond reasonable doubt. 32. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of incident. The evidence establishes that the prosecutrix was a major and a consenting party to the act of the appellant. There is no evidence to show that the appellant committed any offence on account of the caste of the prosecutrix. The prosecution case suffers from material inconsistencies and lacks legal proof of essential ingredients of the offences charged. 33. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.06.2016 passed by the Special Judge, S.C./S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities), Act, District Raipur in Special Sessions Trial No.11/2015 are hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him by extending him benefit of doubt. 34. The appellant is on bail. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. (481 of the B.N.S.S.), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 35. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.