Page 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.28768 of 2025 (In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950). ACC Limited, Gujarat … Petitioner (s) -versus- Subrat Ranjan Dash … Opp. Party (s) Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode: For Petitioner (s) : Mr. Saswat Ku. Acharya, Advocate. For Opp. Party (s) : Mr. Avijit Pal, Adv. CORAM: DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI DATE OF HEARING:-07.03.2026 DATE OF JUDGMENT:-15.05.2026 Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J. 1. The present Writ Petition is preferred by the Petitioner challenging order dated 13.8.2025 passed by the Ld. Sr. Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack. I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE: 2. The present Petitioner is the Judgment Debtor (‘JDr’) before the Ld. Sr Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack and the Opposite Party is the Decree Holder (‘DHr’). 3. Arbitral Award dated 3.3.2017 was passed in favour of the Opposite Party directing payment of an amount of Rs.35,63,278/- by the Petitioner. The portion of the award, germane for consideration in this present Petition is extracted below for the sake of convenience: Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 2 “33. Accordingly, the claims of the Claimant are allowed as aforesaid with interest @9% per annum from 15.12.2010 till Award. The Tribunal (Arbitrator) also awards a cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- to be paid by the Respondent – Company to the Claimant. The Respondent – Company is directed to pay the aforesaid amount of Rs. 35,63,278/- (Rupees Thirty Five Lakhs Sixty Three Thousand and Two Hundred Seventy Eight) along with interest @9% from 15.12.2010 till today and cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) within a period of two months from the date of the award, in default, the Claimant is entitled to interest @11% per annum from the date of award till payment.” 4. A challenge u/s 34 of the A&C Act before the Ld. District Judge, Dhenkanal vide ARBP No 156 of 2017 was upheld but the quantum was reduced to Rs.35,11,068/- vide judgment and order dated 15.11.2019 in ARBP No 156 of 2017. 5. Thereafter, the judgment and order dated 15.11.2019 in ARBP No 156 of 2017 was challenged before this Court u/s 37 of the A&C Act in ARBA No. 9 of 2020 which was dismissed vide order dated 14.9.2022. 6. The award therefore, has attained finality. What is here before this Court, is a dispute pertaining to execution of the same. The Opposite Party had approached the Ld. District Judge, Dhenkanal vide Execution Case No. 38 of 2017 seeking execution of Arbitral Award dated 3.3.2017. Due to pendency of the challenge to the said Award under Section 34 and 37 of the A&C Act, the execution case had remained in abeyance, up until ARBA No. 9 of 2020 was dismissed vide order dated 14.9.2022 by this Court. 7. Thereafter, the DHr filed its computation statement on 25.1.2024, revised on 8.5.2024 stating the total decretal amount with interest Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 3 payable. On the ground that the computation was completely misleading as it involved ‘interest on interest’ by adopting the compounding basis instead of the simple basis, the JDr filed its own computation statement on 28.6.2024. 8. After hearing arguments advanced by both the Parties, vide order dated 7.11.2024, the Ld. Sr Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack was pleased to arrive at the following conclusion: “… On careful consideration, this Court is of the opinion that the sum adjusted in the arbitration award is the total amount of the award including the pre-award interest. Moreover, the discretion of the Hon’ble Arbitrator is very cogent which clearly shows in its award that 9% interest was allowed till date of award and thereafter 11% p.a. from the date of award till the payment. The case is posted to 13.12.2024 for further hearing and calculation.” 9. Aggrieved, the JDr had approached this Court in W.P.(C) 1234 of 2025 seeking quashing of the order dated 7.11.2024 and a direction to the Ld. Sr Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack to redetermine the interest by holding that the 11% rate of interest is applicable only on the principal amount of the award (excluding the interest component of 9%). 10. This Court vide it’s judgment and order dated 16.5.2025 was pleased to quash the order dated 7.11.2024 and held the following: “31. This Court therefore disagrees with the finding of the Ld. Sr Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack and deems it appropriate to quash the Impugned Order. 32. During the pendency of ARBP No 156 of 2017, the Ld. District Judge vide order dated 7.12.2018 had directed the Petitioner to make a payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- out of the principal amount of award. The relevant portion of order Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 4 dated 7.12.2018 is extracted below for the sake of convenience: “…The application dt. 12.09.2017 filed by the Petitioner for re-hearing the stay petition is disposed of accordingly. The Petitioner is directed to make payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- out of the principal amount of Rs. 35,63,278/- to the OP/Respondent within a month from the date of this order and the stay shall continue till final disposal of the petition u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. …” 33. Furthermore, during the pendency of ARBA No. 9 of 2020, this Court had also vide order dated 6.3.2020 directed the Petitioner to deposit Rs. 25,00,000/- before the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court to be invested in a Short Term Deposit Plan/Fixed Deposit pursuant to which the Execution Case No. 38 of 2017 pending before the Ld. District Judge, Dhenkanal would remain stayed. It is pertinent to note that the Opposite Party vide I.A. No. 22 of 2020 in ARBA No. 9 of 2020 sought and was permitted to withdraw the amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- so deposited by the present Petitioner vide order dated 28.9.2020. However, this amount was not specifically directed to be paid against the principal amount. The Ld. Sr Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack will keep the above two observations in mind while computing the decretal amount payable. V. CONCLUSION: 34. In the above backdrop of the case, the Writ Petition is allowed only to the extent that the Impugned Order is quashed and set aside. The Ld. Sr. Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack shall proceed to compute the decretal amount payable by the Petitioner afresh and conclude the exercise preferably within 4 weeks from the date of presentation of this order/judgment keeping the above observations in mind. 35. No order as to costs. Ordered accordingly. 36. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.” 11. Pursuant thereto, the DHr filed a fresh computation sheet on 20.6.2025 claiming Rs. 45,59,176/-, later revised to Rs. 45,60,056/- vide Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 5 computation sheet dated 11.7.2025. On the same date, the JDr filed their computation sheet showing Rs. 28,38,101/- as payable. Arguments were then tendered in support of the computation sheets, and vide the present impugned order dated 13.8.2025, the Ld. Senior Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack directed the JDr to pay Rs. 45,65,041.77/- towards full satisfaction of the arbitral award. Aggrieved thereto, the present Writ Petition has been filed. 12. Now that the broad facts leading up to the instant Petition have been laid down, this Court shall endeavour to fully summarise the contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been urged to seeking the exercise of this Court’s plenary powers of review. II. PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS: 13. It is submitted by Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner–Judgment Debtor that the impugned order dated 13.8.2025 suffers from patent illegality and amounts to an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by the executing court. It was urged that while undertaking the recomputation directed by this Court, the Ld. Senior Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack failed to correctly appreciate the nature and effect of the deposits made by the Petitioner during the pendency of earlier proceedings. According to the Petitioner, the amounts of Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.25,00,000/- ought to have been adjusted towards the principal component of the award, and the failure to do so resulted in an inflated calculation of interest. The Petitioner argued that such misapplication of the award terms and prior judicial directions constituted a manifest error apparent on the Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 6 face of the record, thereby justifying interference under the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. 14. It was further submitted that the executing court exceeded its authority by adopting a mode of calculation inconsistent with the spirit of this Court’s earlier order dated 16.5.2025 and by proceeding on assumptions not borne out from the record. It was contended that the arbitral award itself granted only simple interest and did not authorise compounding at any stage. The Petitioner maintained that although the scope of this Court’s writ jurisdiction is limited, the High Court is empowered to step in where the subordinate court’s decision is perverse, arbitrary, or contrary to settled principles governing execution of arbitral awards, and therefore sought setting aside of the impugned computation and a fresh recalculation in accordance with law. III. OPPOSITE PARTY’S SUBMISSIONS: 15. Per contra, it is submitted by Ld. Counsel for the Respondent–Decree Holder contended that the present challenge is wholly misconceived and amounts to an attempt to re-agitate issues that stand concluded by earlier orders of this Court as well as by the executing court. It was submitted that the impugned order dated 13.8.2025 has been passed strictly in compliance with the directions contained in the judgment dated 16.5.2025 and after granting full opportunity to both parties to place their respective computation sheets. According to the Respondent, the executing court, while exercising powers under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Order Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 7 XXI of the CPC, acted within its jurisdiction and applied settled principles relating to appropriation of payments and calculation of post-award interest. The Respondent emphasized that no jurisdictional error, perversity, or violation of natural justice has been demonstrated by the Petitioner so as to warrant interference in supervisory jurisdiction. 16. It was further argued that the petition is not maintainable as it seeks a re-assessment of factual calculations under the guise of constitutional review. The Respondent maintained that disputes relating to arithmetic computation, adjustment of deposits, and interpretation of the award fall squarely within the domain of the executing court under Section 47 CPC, and cannot be converted into a writ challenge merely because the Judgment Debtor is dissatisfied with the outcome. Highlighting the limited scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Respondent submitted that the High Court does not sit as an appellate forum over execution proceedings and cannot substitute its own view where the executing court has adopted a plausible and legally sound method of calculation. The Respondent therefore prayed for dismissal of the petition with observations discouraging repetitive litigation intended to delay satisfaction of the arbitral award. IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION: 17. Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on record, this court has identified the singular following issue that has to be determined which have emerged contentiously during the course of the hearing and is germane to finally decide the lis at hand; Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 8 A. WHETHER THE IMPUGNED ORDER WARRANTS INTERFERENCE BY THIS COURT IN ITS WRIT JURISDICTION? 18. Execution is the enforcement of a decree by a judicial process which enables the decree-holder to realise the fruits of the decree in his favour. The enforcement of an award having been provided for as per terms of Section 36 to be in the same manner, as if, it were a decree of the court, the provisions of the CPC would be applicable to execution proceedings. The court enforcing the award would be a civil court exercising judicial powers and the orders to be passed in these proceedings would be judicial orders. 19. The question as to whether the award of the arbitrator under the 1996 Act tantamounts to a decree or not was also considered in Leela Hotels Limited v. Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited1, and it was held that the language used in Section 36 makes it clear that such an award has to be enforced under the CPC, in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court. It was observed that the language of the section leaves no room for doubt as to the manner in which the award of the arbitrator was to be accepted. 20. Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 places an arbitral award on the same footing as a civil court decree for the purpose of enforcement. Once the statutory conditions are met, the award becomes executable “as if” it were a decree of the court, without requiring any further judicial determination. The expression “as if” creates a legal fiction, enabling the award to be treated as a decree 1 (2012) 1 SCC 302 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 9 solely for enforcement purposes, a principle recognised in Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd2. 21. Since enforcement under Section 36 is to be carried out in the same manner as execution of a decree, the executing court is entitled to exercise all powers available under the Code of Civil Procedure. The execution court therefore functions within the established procedural framework governing decrees, and its authority in this regard is not curtailed by any separate limitation contained in the 1996 Act. In effect, once the award enters the stage of execution, the CPC provides the operative procedural regime. 22. The Code of Civil Procedure contains a comprehensive and self- contained scheme governing execution proceedings. Order XXI addresses a wide range of contingencies and provides remedies not only to decree-holders and judgment-debtors but also to third-party claimants or objectors. Consistent with settled law, all issues relating to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree fall within the exclusive domain of the executing court. Section 47 CPC reinforces this position by mandating that such questions must be decided by the executing court itself, thereby ensuring procedural finality and preventing collateral challenges in separate proceedings. 23. The question as to whether judicial orders of a civil court would be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 came up for consideration in the case of Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath3, upon a 2 (2006) 13 SCC 322 3 (2015) 5 SCC 423 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 10 reference made by a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in terms of an order dated April 15, 2009 in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath4. 24. The two-Judge Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) took notice of an earlier Constitution Bench decision in the case of Sohan Lal v. Union of India5, wherein it was held that a writ of mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus is not to be made against a private individual and also a subsequent three-Judge Bench decision in Mohd. Hanif v. State of Assam6, expressing the general principle that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is extraordinary in nature and is not to be exercised for the purpose of declaring private rights of the parties. Reference was also made to the decision in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Kalyani Banerjee7, wherein it was held that proceedings by way of writ were not appropriate in a case where the decision of the court would amount to a decree declaring a party's title and ordering restoration of possession. 25. The law laid down in the nine-Judge Constitution Bench in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra8, was also referred, wherein after considering the history of writ of certiorari and various English and Indian decisions, a conclusion was drawn that “certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction”. The decision in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar was also seen to have drawn a distinction between judicial orders of inferior 4 (2009) 5 SCC 616 5 AIR 1957 SC 529 6 (1969) 2 SCC 782 7 (1973) 1 SCC 273 8 AIR 1967 SC 1 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 11 courts of civil jurisdiction and orders of inferior tribunals or courts which are not civil courts and which cannot pass judicial orders. 26. 26. Expressing inability to agree with the legal proposition laid down by a two-Judge Bench in the earlier decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai9, to the effect that judicial orders passed by civil courts can be examined and then corrected/reversed by the writ court under Article 226 in exercise of its power under a writ of certiorari, the two-Judge Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) made a reference by observing as follows: “26. The two-Judge Bench in Surya Dev Rai did not, as obviously it could not overrule the ratio in Mirajkar, a Constitution Bench decision of a nine-Judge Bench. But the learned Judges justified their different view in Surya Dev Rai, inter alia on the ground that the law relating to certiorari changed both in England and in India. In support of that opinion, the learned Judges held that the statement of law in Halsbury, on which the ratio in Mirajkar is based, has been changed and in support of that quoted paras 103 and 109 from Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. (Reissue), Vol. 1(1). Those paras are set out below: “103. The prerogative remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus : historical development.— Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal courts of common law prohibited other courts from entertaining matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the common law courts; certiorari was issued to bring the record of an inferior court into the King's Bench for review or to remove indictments for trial in that court; mandamus was directed to inferior courts and tribunals, and to public officers and bodies, to 9 (2003) 6 SCC 675 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 12 order the performance of a public duty. All three were called prerogative writs; … * * * 109. The nature of certiorari and prohibition.— Certiorari lies to bring decisions of an inferior court, tribunal, public authority or any other body of persons before the High Court for review so that the court may determine whether they should be quashed, or to quash such decisions. The order of prohibition is an order issuing out of the High Court and directed to an inferior court or tribunal or public authority which forbids that court or tribunal or authority to act in excess of its jurisdiction or contrary to law. Both certiorari and prohibition are employed for the control of inferior courts, tribunals and public authorities.” The aforesaid paragraphs are based on general principles which are older than the time when Mirajkar (supra) was decided are still good. Those principles nowhere indicate that judgments of an inferior civil court of plenary jurisdiction are amenable to correction by a writ of certiorari. In any event, change of law in England cannot dilute the binding nature of the ratio in Mirajkar and which has not been overruled and is holding the field for decades. 27. It is clear from the law laid down in Mirajkar in para 63 that a distinction has been made between judicial orders of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction and orders of inferior tribunals or court which are not civil courts and which cannot pass judicial orders. Therefore, judicial orders passed by civil courts of plenary jurisdiction stand on a different footing in view of the law pronounced in para 63 in Mirajkar. The passage in the subsequent edition of Halsbury (4th Edn.) which has been quoted in Surya Dev Rai does not show at all that there has been any change in law on the points in issue pointed out above. 30. … this Court unfortunately is in disagreement with the view which has been expressed in Surya Dev Rai insofar Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 13 as correction of or any interference with judicial orders of civil court by a writ of certiorari is concerned. 31. Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not issue a writ of certiorari. Article 227 of the Constitution vests the High Courts with a power of superintendence which is to be very sparingly exercised to keep tribunals and courts within the bounds of their authority. Under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal courts can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. Such power, however, is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law. 32. The essential distinctions in the exercise of power between Articles 226 and 227 are well known and pointed out in Surya Dev Rai and with that we have no disagreement. But we are unable to agree with the legal proposition laid down in Surya Dev Rai that judicial orders passed by a civil court can be examined and then corrected/reversed by the writ court under Article 226 in exercise of its power under a writ of certiorari. We are of the view that the aforesaid proposition laid down in Surya Dev Rai, is contrary to the ratio in Mirajkar and the ratio in Mirajkar has not been overruled in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra12. 33. In view of our difference of opinion with the views expressed in Surya Dev Rai, matter may be placed before His Lordship the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench, to consider the correctness or otherwise of the law laid down in Surya Dev Rai on the question discussed above.” 27. Upon the reference having been made the question which was considered by the three-Judge Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (supra), was stated as follows:— “5. Thus, the question to be decided is : whether the view taken in Surya Dev Rai, that a writ lies under Article 226 of Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 14 the Constitution against the order of the civil court, which has been doubted in the reference order, is the correct view?” 28. The decision of the three-Judge Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) took notice of the nine-Judge Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar, wherein a judicial order of the High Court was challenged as being violative of fundamental rights and the court by majority held that a judicial order of a competent court could not violate a fundamental right, and even if, there was incidental violation it could not be held to be violative of the fundamental right. The following observations were made (Mirajkar case, para 38): “38. The argument that the impugned order affects the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1), is based on a complete misconception about the true nature and character of judicial process and of judicial decisions. When a Judge deals with matters brought before him for his adjudication, he first decides questions of fact on which the parties are at issue, and then applies the relevant law to the said facts. Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Judge are right or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity, can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the appellate court. But it is singularly inappropriate to assume that a judicial decision pronounced by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him for adjudication can affect the fundamental rights of the citizens under Article 19(1). What the judicial decision purports to do is to decide the controversy between the parties brought before the court and nothing more. If this basic and essential aspect of the judicial process is borne in mind, it would be plain that the judicial verdict pronounced by court in or in relation to a matter brought before it for its Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 15 decision cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of citizens under Article 19(1).” 29. The three-Judge Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra), extensively referring to the legal position on the scope of writ of certiorari concluded that orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. It held that the expression “inferior court” is not referable to judicial courts and accordingly judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. It was also held that the scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. It was observed as follows: “25. … Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All the courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all the High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of tribunals or authorities or courts other than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for the High Courts to issue writs to the subordinate courts. Control of working of the subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence under Article 227. Orders of the civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by the statutes, power of superintendence under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression “inferior court” is not referable to the judicial courts, … Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 16 27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. 29. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows: 29.1. Judicial orders of the civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 29.2. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction under Article 226. 29.3. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai, is overruled.” 30. Having regard to the foregoing discussion the legal position which thus emerges is that judicial orders of civil court would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and that challenge there against can be raised only under Article 227. 31. Applying the afore-stated legal principles to the facts of the present case, an order passed by the executing court in proceedings for enforcement of an arbitral award under Section 36 of the Act 1996, being a judicial order passed by a civil court of plenary jurisdiction, the same would not be amenable to a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 32. Article 227 of the Constitution of India confers on every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction, except those constituted under laws relating to the armed forces. The jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and is intended to ensure that subordinate courts function within the limits of Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 17 their authority. It is neither original nor appellate jurisdiction; rather, it is a constitutional mechanism to maintain judicial discipline and legality in the administration of justice. 33. The nature of interference under Article 227 is therefore limited and corrective rather than substitutive. The Court does not re-appreciate evidence or correct mere errors of fact or law as an appellate court would. Its role is confined to keeping inferior courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction and ensuring that their decisions conform to settled legal principles. Even where another view is possible, the Court ordinarily refrains from interfering unless the impugned order suffers from serious jurisdictional defects or manifest illegality. 34. Interference is generally justified where the subordinate court has acted without jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or exceeded the authority granted by law. The Court may also intervene where findings are perverse, meaning they are unsupported by any evidence or are wholly unreasonable. Similarly, grave procedural irregularities, violations of natural justice, or situations leading to manifest miscarriage of justice provide recognised grounds for invoking Article 227 powers. 35. Conversely, Courts ought to typically decline interference where the petition merely challenges factual determinations, seeks rehearing on merits, or attempts to bypass available statutory remedies such as appeal or revision. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is discretionary and ought to be exercised sparingly with self-imposed restraint. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 18 Frequent interference would undermine the independence and finality of decisions rendered by subordinate courts. 36. Another important consideration in the present matter is the limited scope of judicial review at the enforcement stage. As discussed above, writ courts intervene only when there is a clear jurisdictional error, a violation of natural justice, or a manifest illegality that strikes at the root of the process. A disagreement over arithmetic, however strongly felt, does not ordinarily meet this threshold. The reasoning is straightforward: calculation disputes involve factual examination and interpretation of the award, tasks that execution courts are fully equipped to undertake. Expanding writ jurisdiction to cover such matters would blur the line between supervisory review and routine adjudication, a distinction the judiciary has carefully maintained. 37. From a practical standpoint, litigants must recognize that enforcement proceedings are not an opportunity to reopen issues already settled in arbitration. Attempting to bypass the execution process through a writ petition often results in dismissal, additional costs, and unnecessary delay. Lawyers frequently advise parties to focus instead on raising precise objections within the execution framework, where evidence can be examined and clarifications sought. This procedural discipline aligns with the broader objective of arbitration law, which aims to provide finality and minimize prolonged court intervention. 38. This Hon’ble Court, by judgment and order dated 16.5.2025, was pleased to quash the earlier order dated 7.11.2024 and issued clear directions governing the manner in which the decretal amount was to Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 19 be recalculated. While doing so, the Court carefully noted the interim arrangements made during the pendency of the arbitral challenge proceedings. It recorded that by order dated 7.12.2018 in ARBP No. 156 of 2017, the Petitioner had been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- out of the principal award amount as a condition for continuation of the stay. The Court further observed that another deposit of Rs. 25,00,000/- had been made pursuant to order dated 06.03.2020 in ARBA No. 9 of 2020, which was later permitted to be withdrawn by the Opposite Party, though without any explicit direction that it be adjusted towards the principal component. Taking these circumstances into account, this Court directed the Ld. Senior Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack to recompute the decretal amount afresh and conclude the exercise expeditiously. 39. In compliance with the aforesaid judgment, the DHr filed a fresh computation sheet on 20.6.2025, quantifying the dues at Rs. 45,59,176/-, which was subsequently revised to Rs. 45,60,056/- by computation sheet dated 11.7.2025. On the same day, the JDr submitted its own computation asserting that only Rs. 28,38,101/- remained payable. Both parties advanced detailed arguments before the executing court on the correctness of their respective calculations. Upon consideration of the rival submissions and the directions contained in the judgment dated 16.5.2025, the Ld. Senior Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack passed the impugned order dated 13.8.2025 directing the Judgment Debtor to pay a sum of Rs. 45,65,041.77/- towards full and final Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 20 satisfaction of the arbitral award. The calculation of the Ld. Senior Civil Judge is extracted hereto for the sake of convenience: “In view of above findings the calculation is as follows: Award amount = Rs.35,11,088/- Interest @9% p.a from 15.12.2010 to 03.03.2017 (2271 days) as per award = Rs.35,11,088 x 9% x2271/365 =Rs.19,66,113.08p/- In case of default interest from 04.03.2017 to 07.12.2018 (644 days) @11% p.a = Rs.35,11,088 x 11% x644/365 =Rs.6,81,439.65p/- Amount paid by JDr on 07.12.2018 of Rs.10,00,000/- (to be deducted from principal amount) = Rs.35,11,088 - Rs.10,00,000/- = Rs.25,11,088/- So, the total amount on 07.12.2018 = Rs.25,11,088/-+ Rs.19,66,113.08p/- +Rs.6,81,439.65p/- = Rs.51,58,640.73p/- Interest from 08.12.2018 till 13.10.2020 (676 days) 11% p.a. =Rs.25,11,088 x 11% x676/365 =Rs.5,11,573.98p/- Total comes Rs.51,58,640.73p/- + Rs.5,11,573.98p/- =Rs.56,70,214.71p/- Amount paid by JDr on 13.10.2020 = Rs.56,70,214.71p/- -Rs.25,00,000/¬= Rs.31,70,214.73p/-. (to be deducted from total amount as per order passed in W.P(C) No.1234/2025 by Hon'ble High Court) Interest from, 14.10.2020 till 20.06.2025 @ 11% p.a. (1711 days) =225,11,088 x 11% x1711/365 =Rs.12,94,827.04p/- Cost = Rs.1,00,000/- Total outstanding amount = Rs.12,94,827.04p/- + Rs.1,00,000/- + Rs.31,70,214.73p/- = Rs.45,65,041.77p/-“ 40. Despite the clear procedural history and the execution court having undertaken a fresh exercise strictly in terms of this Court’s directions, the JDr has once again invoked the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. 41. Upon a careful consideration of the impugned order dated 13.8.2025, this Court finds no infirmity in the computation undertaken by the Ld. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 21 Senior Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack. The executing court has correctly appreciated the earlier directions issued by this Court and has applied the settled legal principle that payments or deposits made during the pendency of proceedings are liable to be appropriated first towards accrued interest unless specifically directed otherwise. The adjustment carried out by the executing court therefore cannot be faulted either on facts or in law. The calculations reflect a logical and consistent application of the award terms, and the resultant figure of Rs. 45,65,041.77/- does not disclose any mathematical or legal error warranting interference under writ jurisdiction. 42. In view of the above, this Court finds no merit in the challenge raised by the JDr. The impugned computation is reasoned, supported by the record, and in consonance with established principles governing appropriation of payments. Mere dissatisfaction with the outcome cannot constitute a ground for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, particularly when the arbitral award dates back to 2017 and has already undergone multiple rounds of scrutiny. The Court accordingly affirms the computation made by the Ld. Senior Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack and declines to interfere. 43. The conduct of the JDr demonstrates a consistent attempt to avoid satisfaction of the award by initiating successive rounds of proceedings rather than discharging its admitted liabilities. Having participated fully in the recomputation exercise before the executing court and having advanced its own calculation, the JDr cannot now seek to bypass the statutory framework merely because the outcome is Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 26-May-2026 16:09:47 Signature Not Verified Page 22 unfavorable. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is meant to correct grave legal wrongs, not to reopen execution proceedings on questions of calculation. The present petition therefore deserves to be dismissed, as permitting such challenges would undermine the finality of arbitral awards and defeat the very object of expeditious enforcement. V. CONCLUSION: 44. Merely because a litigant finds the ultimate outcome unpalatable cannot justify an endless cycle of proceedings, for the law does not countenance litigation driven by dissatisfaction alone. It is a settled principle that execution must attain finality. Courts are not forums for repeated re-agitation of issues already examined and decided, nor can extraordinary jurisdiction be invoked to prolong a dispute under the guise of recalculation. Persisting with challenges that disclose no legal infirmity serves only to delay the inevitable, consume judicial time, and burden the parties themselves. Litigation must, at some point, give way to compliance. 45. The Petitioner shall thereafter ensure that the amount so computed is paid within 4 weeks of this order. 46. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, disposed of. 47. No order as to costs. Ordered accordingly. (Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 15th May, 2026/-