1 CRA No. 346 of 2016 2025:CGHC:43632 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 346 of 2016 Yogeshwar Sahu S/o Vijay Kumar Sahu Aged About 20 Years R/o Village Sonpairi, Police Station Magarload, Civil And Rev. District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Magarload, District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rahil Arun Kochar, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. U.K.S. Chandel, Dy. AG (Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge) Judgment on Board Per, Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge 28/08/2025 1. This criminal appeal is preferred under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03/03/2016, passed in Special Criminal Case No. 33/2015 by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2025.09.03 17:10:51 +0530 2 CRA No. 346 of 2016 Atrocities) Act, District Dhamtari (C.G.). By the impugned judgment, the appellant was convicted under Sections 376 and 417 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of Rs. 100/- under Section 376 IPC, and rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs. 100/- under Section 417 IPC. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently, with default stipulations for non-payment of fines. 2. The brief facts of the case, as disclosed in the record, are that on 08.07.2015, the prosecutrix (PW-1) lodged a written report alleging that for approximately one and a half years, the appellant, Yogeshwar, had been having sexual intercourse with her under the false pretext of marriage and by assuring her that he would keep her as his wife. On 05.07.2015, when she asked the appellant to take her to his house, he flatly refused. She thereafter narrated the incident to her parents, who convened a village meeting on 06.07.2015 in the presence of village elders. During the said meeting, the appellant denied having married or keeping the prosecutrix as his wife. 3. Based on the written complaint, Crime No. 151/2015 was registered at Police Station Magarlod under Sections 376 and 417 IPC. During the course of investigation, a site inspection was conducted, and the prosecutrix was sent for medical examination with her due consent. The appellant was also medically examined, and the clothing of both parties was seized and forwarded for forensic examination. Call detail records between the prosecutrix and the appellant were obtained. 3 CRA No. 346 of 2016 Witnesses were examined, and relevant documents, including the caste certificate of the prosecutrix and a written note, were seized. After the arrest of the appellant and completion of the investigation, a charge- sheet was filed under Sections 376 and 417 IPC, as well as Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 4. In order to prove the charges, the prosecution examined eleven witnesses. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all allegations, asserted his innocence, and claimed that he had been falsely implicated in the case. The trial court, upon careful appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant as detailed above. Hence, the present appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had been falsely implicated in the present case. It was contended that there existed a voluntary love affair between the prosecutrix and the appellant and that the prosecutrix had engaged in physical relations with the appellant of her own volition. Learned counsel further argued that since the prosecutrix was a major at the time of the alleged incident, the conviction for rape under Section 376 IPC was unsustainable. It was also submitted that there were material contradictions and omissions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, which went to the root of the matter and rendered the conviction legally unsound. Learned counsel prayed for acquittal of 4 CRA No. 346 of 2016 the appellant. 6. Per contra, learned State Counsel contended that there was sufficient evidence on record to substantiate the conviction and that the trial court had rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant under the aforesaid provisions. It is submitted that the impugned judgment required no interference. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 8. It is an undisputed fact that the prosecutrix was a major at the time of the alleged incident. Therefore, the issue that falls for consideration before this Court is whether the act of the appellant constitutes the offence of rape and/or cheating. 9. In her examination-in-chief, the prosecutrix (PW-1) deposed that she had known the appellant since the time she was studying in Class 10. She stated that the appellant had expressed his liking for her and conveyed his intention to marry her. Acting on this assurance, she entered into a relationship with him, which continued from 2011 until July 2015. She further stated that when the appellant declined to marry her, she became distressed and attempted suicide, leaving behind a note; however, her parents intervened and prevented the act. The suicide note, along with a mobile phone belonging to the appellant, was recovered. Her parents then informed the village Sarpanch Balgovind Sahu, pursuant to which two village meetings were 5 CRA No. 346 of 2016 convened in August 2015. In the first meeting, the appellant did not appear, whereas in the second meeting, he admitted knowing her but denied having committed any wrongdoing. During cross-examination, the prosecutrix admitted that she had maintained a relationship with the appellant from 2011 to 2015 based on his assurance of marriage. She further admitted that had the appellant agreed to marry her, neither village proceedings nor a police report would have been initiated. She stated that she had not disclosed the matter to her parents prior to 05.07.2015 and had informed them for the first time on that date. Thereafter, she, along with her parents and uncle, lodged a report at Police Station Magarlod. She also admitted that certain details which she narrated in Court were not mentioned in her written report and that her statement was recorded by the police after some delay. She, however, denied the suggestion that her report was prepared at the instance or dictation of the police. 10. The father of the prosecutrix (PW-2) deposed that around the month of Ashadh, while he was resting in his room, he heard cries from his wife; went to the prosecutrix’s room; and find her hanging with a dupatta. He immediately asked his wife to hold her legs while he climbed up, untied the dupatta from the roof beam, and brought her down. At that time, a suicide note written by the prosecutrix, a mobile phone, and a passport-size photograph of the appellant fell down. The note indicated that she had been in a love relationship with the appellant, who had promised to marry her but later refused, which 6 CRA No. 346 of 2016 caused her to attempt suicide. The witness stated that his wife informed the village Sarpanch, Shri Balgovind Sahu, who visited their house and enquired from the prosecutrix. She narrated the facts to him, and the suicide note was shown to the Sarpanch. On his direction, two village meetings were convened. During the first meeting, the appellant and his family did not appear. In the second meeting, the appellant admitted that he had taken the prosecutrix to a village fair but denied any further relationship. PW-2 further stated that he gave consent for the prosecutrix’s medical examination and that his statement was recorded by the police. On recall, he confirmed that the suicide note was seized by the police and reiterated that the prosecutrix had told him that the appellant had promised to keep her as his wife and had been in a physical relationship with her for about one and a half years on that assurance. During cross-examination, PW-2 admitted that the prosecutrix had not disclosed her relationship with the appellant prior to the date of her suicide attempt. He also admitted that no report was lodged after the first village meeting and that the FIR was lodged only after the second meeting when the appellant denied marriage. He denied the suggestion that the prosecutrix’s suicide attempt was fabricated to exert pressure on the appellant. 11. The mother of the prosecutrix (PW-3) corroborated the account of her husband, confirming that she witnessed the prosecutrix attempting suicide and recovered the note, mobile phone, and photograph of the 7 CRA No. 346 of 2016 appellant. She stated that she informed the Sarpanch, who convened two village meetings, and that during the second meeting, the appellant refused marriage on the ground of caste difference. She further confirmed that the prosecutrix had confided in her that the appellant had promised to keep her as his wife and had been in physical relationship with her for about one and a half years on this assurance. In cross-examination, PW-3 admitted that the prosecutrix had not disclosed her relationship with the appellant prior to the suicide attempt and that no report was lodged after the first village meeting. 12. PW-4, Shri Balgovind Sahu, the village Sarpanch, deposed that he knew both the appellant and the prosecutrix. About two months prior to the incident, the mother of the prosecutrix informed him that the prosecutrix had attempted to hang herself but was saved. Upon enquiry at their house, the prosecutrix disclosed that she was in a love relationship with the appellant and that his refusal to marry her had driven her to attempt suicide. He stated that two village meetings were held in the presence of villagers. In the first meeting, the appellant and his family did not appear; in the second meeting, the appellant denied any wrongdoing. He advised the prosecutrix’s family to take appropriate action, and his statement was later recorded by the police. During cross-examination, he denied having earlier told the police that the prosecutrix had disclosed sexual intercourse but confirmed that FIR was filed only after village meetings. 8 CRA No. 346 of 2016 13. PW-5, Moolchand Tandon, the village Kotwar, deposed that he attended a village meeting convened by the father of the prosecutrix, where the prosecutrix disclosed that she had been in a love relationship with the appellant for about two years, had physical relations on the promise of marriage, and had to terminate a pregnancy. He stated that both the prosecutrix and appellant had attended a village fair (Mela), and while the appellant admitted taking her to the fair, he denied any physical relationship. PW-5 stated that he witnessed seizure of the appellant’s knicker by the police and signed the seizure memo. During cross-examination, PW-5 admitted that no report had been lodged prior to the village meeting and that it is customary for villagers to first inform the Sarpanch or Kotwar about such matters. 14. PW-6, Dr. Sharda Thakur, Block Medical Officer at Community Health Centre, Magarlod, deposed that the prosecutrix, aged 19 years, was brought for medical examination on 08.07.2015. On examination, her vitals were normal, no external injuries were observed, secondary sexual characteristics were fully developed, and a pregnancy test was negative. The hymen was found torn, but she could not give a definite opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse. A green cotton knicker of the prosecutrix was also examined and sent for chemical analysis. During cross-examination, the doctor confirmed the absence of fresh or old injuries. 15. The forensic report (Ex.P/27) revealed that the knicker of the prosecutrix, vaginal slides, and the underwear and pubic hair of the 9 CRA No. 346 of 2016 appellant did not contain any human sperm. The negative results of the forensic analysis substantially weaken the prosecution’s case. 16. Upon meticulous scrutiny of the evidence adduced, it is manifest that the prosecutrix (PW1) was a major, approximately 19 years of age at the time of the alleged incident. She herself deposed that she had maintained a relationship with the appellant for nearly four years, during which she voluntarily engaged in physical intimacy pursuant to the appellant’s assurance of marriage. Such conduct unequivocally establishes the consensual nature of the relationship. In law, consensual relations between adults cannot be equated with the offence of rape merely on the ground that the promise of marriage was subsequently not fulfilled. 17. It is further material to observe that the prosecutrix did not disclose the alleged acts to her parents until the date of her purported suicide attempt on 05.07.2015. Even thereafter, no immediate legal recourse or formal complaint was initiated. Instead, the matter was deliberated in two village assemblies, and only after the appellant declined to marry did the FIR come to be lodged. The prosecutrix herself admitted in cross-examination that had the appellant acquiesced to the matrimonial proposal, neither the village proceedings nor the police complaint would have ensued. Such conditionality in the initiation of the complaint strikes at the very foundation of the prosecution case and renders it inherently doubtful. 18. The testimonies of her parents (PW2 and PW3) lack independent 10 CRA No. 346 of 2016 probative value, being wholly derivative and based on statements made by the prosecutrix post the alleged suicide attempt. Moreover, the accounts of village witnesses are internally inconsistent. The Sarpanch (PW4) deposed that the prosecutrix merely expressed a desire to marry and did not allege sexual intercourse, whereas the Kotwar (PW5) claimed she disclosed sexual relations and termination of pregnancy. These irreconcilable contradictions among ostensibly independent witnesses severely impair the credibility of the prosecution narrative. 19. The medical evidence (PW6, Dr. Sharda Thakur) similarly fails to substantiate the prosecution’s case. Although the hymen was found torn, the medical officer categorically stated that no definitive opinion could be rendered regarding recent sexual intercourse. The pregnancy test was negative, and no clinical indicators of non-consensual sexual activity were observed. 20. The forensic report (Ex. P/27) is likewise adverse to the prosecution. Analysis of all pertinent exhibits including the prosecutrix’s knicker, vaginal slides, and the appellant’s underwear and pubic hair yielded negative results for the presence of spermatozoa. This scientific evidence incontrovertibly negates any possibility of recent sexual intercourse, substantially weakening the prosecution’s case. 21. Viewed in its totality, the evidence indicates that the complaint was precipitated solely by the appellant’s refusal to marry the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix and her family sought to exert pressure through the 11 CRA No. 346 of 2016 village panchayat and subsequently by lodging the FIR. In light of the consensual nature of the relationship, the delayed and conditional lodging of the complaint, contradictions in witness testimonies, absence of medical and forensic corroboration, and the admitted refusal to marry as the sole trigger, the prosecution has manifestly failed to establish the charge under Section 376 IPC. The appellant is accordingly entitled to acquittal. 22. Similarly, the allegations of cheating under Section 417 IPC are wholly unsubstantiated. The prosecutrix, who is a major girl, voluntarily entered into a relationship with the appellant on the assurance of marriage, and no credible evidence indicates fraudulent inducement or deception at the outset. The delayed reporting, contradictions among witnesses, absence of contemporaneous evidence, and the admitted refusal to marry as the only impetus for the complaint collectively render the prosecution’s case unsustainable. Consequently, the appellant is also entitled to acquittal of the charges under Section 417 IPC. 23. It is the trite law that a consensual relationship, even if followed by a breach of a promise to marry, does not amount to rape under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code unless it is proved that the promise was false from the outset and that a promise to marry, when made in good faith, does not per se constitute rape under Section 376 IPC. It is noteworthy to mention here that mere refusal to marry after a consensual relationship does not constitute cheating under Section 417 12 CRA No. 346 of 2016 IPC unless there is evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation. In fact, PW-1 prosecutrix herself categorically admitted the fact that there was a love affair between them and she was a consenting party on each of the occasion the appellant had a physical relationship with her. 24. From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the statement of the prosecutrix who has categorically stated that the appellant has done sexual intercourse with her on the pretext of marriage and whenever the appellant has done the sexual intercouxe she has not raised any objection and also did not make any noise to escape from the hands of the appellant on the count that the appellant will marry with her. She has also stated that she knew the accused. The evidence of the prosecutrix would clearly demonstrate that there was consensual sexual inter course. Since the prosecutrix was not below the age 16 years and the evidence brought on record would demonstrate that she is a consenting party, therefore, on the pretext of marriage, sexual inter course committed by the appellant will fall within the ambit of rape or not, has been examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Maheshwar Tigga vs. State of Jharkhand (2020)10 SCC 108 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held paragraph 17,18, 19 and 20 which is as under:- 17. This court recently in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 2019 SC 327 and in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2019) 9 SCC 608 arising out of an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in similar circumstances where the 13 CRA No. 346 of 2016 relationship originated in a love affair, developed over a period of time accompanied by physical relations, consensual in nature, but the marriage could not fructify because the parties belonged to different castes and communities, quashed the proceedings. 18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the present case and are of the considered opinion that the appellant did not make any false promise or intentional misrepresentation of marriage leading to establishment of physical relationship between the parties. The prosecutrix was herself aware of the obstacles in their relationship because of different religious beliefs. An engagement ceremony was also held in the solemn belief that the societal obstacles would be overcome, but unfortunately differences also arose whether the marriage was to solemnised in the Church or in a Temple and ultimately failed. It is not possible to hold on the evidence available that the appellant right from the inception did not intend to marry the prosecutrix ever and had fraudulently misrepresented only in order to establish physical relation with her. The prosecutrix in her letters acknowledged that the appellant's family was always very nice to her. 19. The appellant has been acquitted of the charge under Section 420 and 504 IPC. No appeal has been preferred against the acquittal. There is no medical evidence on record to sustain the conviction under Section 323 I.P.C. No offence is made out against the appellant under Section 341 I.P.C. considering the statement of prosecutrix that she had gone to live with the appellant for 15 days of her own volition. 20. We have no hesitation in concluding that the consent of the prosecutrix was but a conscious and deliberated choice, as distinct from an involuntary action or denial and which opportunity was available to her, because of her deep-seated love 14 CRA No. 346 of 2016 for the appellant leading her to willingly permit him liberties with her body, which according to normal human behaviour are permitted only to a person with whom one is deeply in love. The observations in this regard in Uday (supra) are considered relevant: "25...It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married. As stated by the prosecutrix the appellant also made such a promise on more than one occasion. In such circumstances the promise loses all significance, particularly when they are overcome with emotions and passion and find themselves in situations and circumstances where they, in a weak moment, succumb to the temptation of having sexual relationship. This is what appears to have happened in this case as well, and the prosecutrix willingly consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant with whom she was deeply in love, not because he promised to desired In marry her, but because she also it. circumstances it would be very these difficult to impute to the appellant knowledge that the prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a misconception of fact arising from his promise. In any event, it was not possible for the appellant to know what was in the mind of the prosecutrix when she consented, because there were more reasons than one for her to consent." 25. Very recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2024) 11 SCC 398, held thus at para 34: “34. In our opinion, the longer the duration of the physical relationship between the partners without protest and insistence by the female partner for marriage would be indicative of a consensual relationship rather than a relationship based on false 15 CRA No. 346 of 2016 promise of marriage by the male partner and thus, based on misconception of fact.” 26. In light of evidence brought on record and on above stated legal position, it is quite clear that on the pretext of marriage sexual intercourse is not a rape, therefore, appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charges framed under Section 376 IPC. 27. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal stands allowed. The appellant is reported to be on bail; his bail bonds shall not be discharged forthwith but shall remain operative for a further period of six months in terms of Section 481 of the BNSS. 28. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Rahul