[2025:RJ-JP:10612] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Restoration Application No. 202/2018 in S.B. Civil Misc. Restoration Application No. 1324/2011 in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 105/2008 1. Smt. Bhuri Devi Since Deceased W/o Late Sh. Radhey Shyam, Seth Ka Madh, Bharatpur, Rajasthan Through Legal Heir Narendra Sharma S/o Late Sh. Radhey Shyam Sharma, Aged About 48 Years, G-775, Gandhi Nagar, Jaipur ----Petitioners Versus 1. Urban Improvement Trust, Bharatpur Through Oic, Uit Bharatpur 2. State Of Rajasthan Through District Collector, Bharatpur 3. State Of Bank Of Bikaner And Jaipur, Collectorate Branch Bharatpur, Now Changed To State Bank Of India, Collectorate Branch, Bharatpur Through Its Manager ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. O.P. Mishra For Respondent(s) : Mr. L.L. Gupta with Ms. Vijyeta Jain Mr. Tanmay Mathur Mr. Prateek Madnani HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN Order 07/03/2025 [2025:RJ-JP:10612] (2 of 8) [CRES-202/2018] 1. Instant restoration application is preferred by applicant to restore Civil Misc. Restoration Application No. 1324/2011 which was filed to restore S.B. Second Appeal No. 105/2008. 2. Office has pointed out a delay of 2378 days and to substantiate the reasons of delay, an application No. 2408/2018 is filed by applicant. 3. Learned counsel for applicant submits that during pendency of civil second appeal Smt. Bhuri Devi suffered from cancer and later she died due to cancer, leaving behind her son who is a blind person. He also submits that all relevant documents were filed on record to show that Smt. Bhuri Devi was suffering from cancer and his son Narendra Singh is a complete blind person. He further submits that in case, the restoration application is not allowed, then property interest of applicant will suffer irreparably. 4. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned counsel for respondents and submits that the only question in the instant restoration is condonation of delay and petitioner-applicant has failed to show sufficient reasons for delay condonation. 5. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Smt. Bhuri Devi has filed a civil suit No. 41/1995 for permanent injunction and same was decreed on 27.11.2003 by learned Additional Civil Judge, (Senior Division) No.1, Bharatpur but on an appeal preferred by UIT, same was allowed on 15.12.2007 as civil regular appeal No. 171/2003 by learned Additional District Judge No.2, Bharatpur. As a result, the judgment and decree passed by Trial Court was set aside and suit was rejected. [2025:RJ-JP:10612] (3 of 8) [CRES-202/2018] 7. Aggrieved from judgment dated 15.12.2007 in civil regular appeal, instant second appeal is preferred by Smt. Bhuri Devi and during pendency of appeal, same was dismissed for non- prosecution on 28.01.2009. Later, a restoration application No. 1324/2011 was filed and same was dismissed on 02.08.2011, as applicant has failed to take steps in pursuant to cure (remove) defect(s) on 23.04.2011. After dismissal of restoration application, instant restoration application is filed on 06.03.2018 and Office has pointed out a delay of 2378 days. 8. A perusal of entire material on record clearly indicate that after dismissal of civil second appeal, a restoration application was filed and same was not taken care of and ultimately it was dismissed for non-compliance, but thereafter another restoration application was filed after substantial delay of 2378 days. Herein, the proceedings also indicate that even on several occasions, no one remain present on behalf of petitioner-applicant. The defect(s) were not cured and on 05.12.2024, this Court has granted 2 weeks’ time for curing the defect(s) in the instant restoration application. 9. A perusal of application under Section 5 of Limitation Act indicate that present applicant Narendra is a blind person and a certificate is available on record, along with death certificate of Smt. Bhuri Devi which indicate that Smt. Bhuri Devi expired on 07.04.2015. No document related to treatment of Bhuri Devi is filed on record. 10. A copy of Will dated 04.12.2014 is also available on record, which indicate that Smt. Bhuri Devi was survived by three sons namely- Murari Lal, Narendra Kumar and Vishnu Kumar but [2025:RJ-JP:10612] (4 of 8) [CRES-202/2018] Narendra Kumar is looking after the litigation and properties of deceased Smt. Bhuri Devi. When this Will came into force after death of Smt. Bhuri Devi in the year 2015, then an application has to be filed on time but herein no such application was filed for three years. 11. A perusal of restoration application No. 1324/11 indicate that no such pleading such as suffering from cancer was mentioned by Smt. Bhuri Devi during her lifetime. Even at the time of execution of Will, nowhere it was mentioned that she was suffering from cancer. No other document is available on record to substantiate the claim mentioned by learned counsel for petitioner-applicant. 12. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period. 13. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be [2025:RJ-JP:10612] (5 of 8) [CRES-202/2018] applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 14. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed [2025:RJ-JP:10612] (6 of 8) [CRES-202/2018] these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay. 15. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds. 16. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come [2025:RJ-JP:10612] (7 of 8) [CRES-202/2018] to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision. 17. 17. Very recently in case of H. Guru Swamy and Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by LRs 2025 INSC 53 Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering application for condonation of delay has observed that the question of limitation is not merely on technical consideration. The Rules of limitation are based on the principle of public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the sword of damocles hanging over the head of litigant for an indefinite period of time. 18. Considering aforesaid, there is no sufficient ground to condone the delay of 2378 days. [2025:RJ-JP:10612] (8 of 8) [CRES-202/2018] 19. In view of aforesaid, application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the restoration application is also dismissed with pending application(s), if any. 20. No order as to costs. (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J MONU /28