JUDGMENT : NARENDRA KUMAR VYAS, J. 1. The plaintiff has filed this First appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against the judgment and decree dated 16-2-2018 passed by the learned District Judge, Rajnandgaon in Civil Suit No. 75-A/2012 by which the suit filed by the plaintiff has been dismissed. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred to hereinafter as per their status shown in the Civil Suit No. 75-A/2012 before the trial Court. 3. Brief Facts reflected from the record are that: (a) The plaintiff filed suit before the trial Court for specific performance of contract mainly contending that the defendant No.1 Punai Bai who is having land bearing Khasra No. 296 and 365 admeasuring 1.02 acres and 0.78 acres total admeasuring 1.80 acres of land situated in village Khorin Bhata, Rajnandgaon (hereinafter referred to as “suit property”) has executed an agreement on 17-3-2003 for sale of suit property at the rate of Rs. 2,25,000/- per acre which comes to total sale consideration at Rs. 4,05,000/-. The said agreement was executed in presence of two witnesses and defendant No.1 has also received Rs. 2,46,000/- through cheque. It is also the case that though at the time of execution of the agreement, advance money was given in cash, but on the request of the defendant No. 1 the amount was given through cheque. It was also agreed between the parties that whenever the plaintiff will pay the remaining amount, sale deed will be executed. (b) It is also case of the plaintiff that after ten months of execution of agreement, the plaintiff has requested the defendant No.1 to execute the sale deed, but she did not reply and avoided execution of the sale deed which has necessitated the plaintiff to send legal notice to defendant No. 1 through his counsel on 6-10-2004 which was refused by her. (c) It is also case of the plaintiff that he is ready and willing to perform his part of contract and due to escalation of value of the suit property, defendant No.1 has not deliberately executed the agreement. The During pendency of the suit, the suit property was sold to defendants No. 3 and 4 on 13-2-2012, therefore, the amendment was sought wherein it has been prayed for declaring the sale deed dated 13-2-2012 to be null and void. 4. The During pendency of the suit, the suit property was sold to defendants No. 3 and 4 on 13-2-2012, therefore, the amendment was sought wherein it has been prayed for declaring the sale deed dated 13-2-2012 to be null and void. 4. The defendant No.1 has filed written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint mainly contending that it is empathetically denied that she has received the amount of Rs. 2,46,000/- in presence of two witnesses. It is also denied that at the time of execution of agreement, defendant No. 1 had agreed that the amount will be given in cash and on her request, the said amount was given by cheque, but in fact no agreement was executed between the plaintiff and defendant No.1. It is also case of the defendant No.1 that the defendant No.1 sold the land bearing Khasra No. 294 area 1.69 acres and 0.83 total area 2.52 acres to plaintiff's wife Chandrabhaga on 25-3-2003 for sale consideration of Rs.3,51,000/- out of which after deducing the amount of Rs.1,05,000/-, he has given the amount of Rs.2,46,000/- and the plaintiff has taken misleading stand that Rs.2,46,000/- is sale consideration of the suit property and filed the suit only to harass the defendant No.1 and in-fact, no agreement was executed between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 and the said agreement is forged and fabricated. It has also been contended that the defendant has sold the property to defendants No.3 and 4 which is legal and justified and same is not liable to be interfered by the trial Court and prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. The defendants No. 3 and 4 have also filed written statement contending that the plaintiff has made false and fabricated agreement and attempted to grab the property of the defendant No.1. It is also case of the defendants No.3 and 4 that the defendants have already taken possession of the suit property and before purchasing of the suit property, they have published notice on 24-1-2012 in daily newspaper “Nandgaon Times” calling objection from any person regarding execution of sale deed of the suit land, if any, but no one has raised any objection. It is also the case of the defendants No. 3 and 4 that after paying the entire dues, they have purchased the suit property and they are the bonafide purchasers, as such, the suit deserves to be dismissed. It is also the case of the defendants No. 3 and 4 that after paying the entire dues, they have purchased the suit property and they are the bonafide purchasers, as such, the suit deserves to be dismissed. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court has famed as many as seven issues and issue No. 1(a) and (b), 3 and 7 are relevant, therefore, they are extracted as under: “ ¼1½ ¼v½ D;k izfroknh us oknh ds lkFk 4]05]000@& esa 1-80 ,dM+ Hkwfe fLFkr dkSfju HkkaBk] jktukanxkao ¼[kljk uacj 296]365@&½ dks foØ; djus dk lkSnk fnukad 17-03-2003 dks laikfnr fd;k Fkk\ ¼c½ vxj gka rks D;k izfroknh us oknh ls 2]46]000@& lkSnk fnukad 17-03-2003 dks izkIr fd;k Fkk\ ¼3½ D;k oknh vuqca/k fnukad 17-03-2003 dh ’ks"k jde vnk dj jftLVªh djkus ds fy, ges’kk rRij jgk gS\ ¼7½ D;k izfroknh Øekad 3 o 4 oknHkwfe ds ln~Hkkfod Øsrk gSa\ ” 7. The plaintiff to substantiate his case has exhibited documents namely copy of bank account of Punai Bai (Ex.P/1), Copy of bank account of Chandrabhagbai (Ex.P/2), Registry notice (Ex.P/3), Postal receipt (Ex.P/4), Registry envelope (Ex.P/5), paper publication (Ex.P/6), Notice (Ex.P/7), sale deed (Ex.P/8), copy of agreement (Ex.P/9), Khasra Panchsala (Ex.P/10), copy of B-1 (Ex.P/11), copy of self-cheque amounting to Rs.2,46,000/- of Chandrabhagbai (Ex.P/12), copy of sale deed (Ex.P/12 to Ex.P/17). The plaintiff to substantiate his case has examined Shailednra Kumar Khare (PW1), plaintiff himself Babulal Soni (PW/2), Nitin Kumar Taank (PW/3), Budhram (PW/4), Dr. Deepti Andharmule, handwriting and finger print expert (PW/5). 8. The defendant No.1 to substantiate her case has exhibited documents i.e., pass book of Punai Bai (Ex.D/1), report of handwriting expert (Ex.D/2) Article -A1 to A13 negatives of photographs, Photographs (Ex.D/3 to Ex.D/15), copy of Register of sold stamp (Ex.D – 2 -C), General notice (Ex.D/3), and Power of Attorney (Ex.D/4). To substantiate her case, defendant No.1 examined herself as DW/1 Punai Bai, Dr. Sunanda Denge (DW/2), Ashok Kumar Sahu (DW/3) and Vinay Kumar Baid (DW/4) and Defendants No.3 and 4 have examined Defendant No.1 and exhibited Notice dated 25.01.2012 (Exhibit D/3), Power of Attorney (Exhibit D/4). 9. It is pertinent to mention here that during trial of the civil suit, defendant No.1 in para 13 of her cross examination has admitted her signature in Ex. 9. It is pertinent to mention here that during trial of the civil suit, defendant No.1 in para 13 of her cross examination has admitted her signature in Ex. P/9 and objection was raised that the defendant's witness could not understand the question regarding her signature in Ex.P/9, therefore, an application was moved for re-examination of the witnesses. Learned trial Court rejected the said objection of the plaintiff and permitted for cross examination of the defendants which was assailed before the single Judge of this Court and the learned Single Judge has dismissed the same. Thereafter, Writ Appeal No. 87 of 2010 was preferred wherein the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has dismissed the appeal. During pendency of the suit, the defendant No.1 moved an application for amendment which was challenged before this Court and this Court also dismissed the same. 10. Learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide its judgment and decree dated 16-2-2018 and recorded its finding that there is serious doubt over correctness and genuineness of signature of the defendant No.1 in Ex.P/9 and the plaintiff is unable to plead and prove the necessary ingredients for grant of decree of specific performance of contract. 11. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree, the plaintiff has preferred this first appeal before this Court mainly contending that the learned trial Court has committed illegality in dismissing the suit without appreciating the evidence and material on record. It has been further contended that the plaintiff is able to establish that the agreement was executed and the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. It has been further contended that the learned trial Court should have considered that the plaintiff sent a notice (Ex.P/3) and requested the defendant No.1 to execute the agreement but the defendant No.1 has not given any reply to the notice. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. He would further submit that the learned trial Court has committed serious illegality in deciding issue No.7 and recorded its finding that the defendants No.3 and 4 are bona fide purchasers of the suit property. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. He would further submit that the learned trial Court has committed serious illegality in deciding issue No.7 and recorded its finding that the defendants No.3 and 4 are bona fide purchasers of the suit property. He would further submit that the learned trial Court should have considered that the plaintiff published a general notice on 8-1-2011 in Dainik Sabera Sanket and Dainik Bhaskar informing that a dispute between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 regarding the suit property is pending before the trial Court, still the defendant No. 3 and 4 have purchased it. Hence, it cannot be said that they are bonafide purchasers of the suit property. 12. He would further submit that from the evidence of Nitin (PW-3) Arjinavis who in his examination-in-chief has stated that he has prepared the documents and from the statement of Budhram (PW-4) who was witness of the agreement it will clarify the essential agreements which are required for establishing valid agreement and that has been duly proved by the plaintiff, thus, he would submit that once an agreement is duly proved the trial Court has committed illegality in dismissing the suit. 13. He would further submit that the signature of defendant No.1 Punai Bai was not tallied, is contrary to the facts and would submit that where there is difference of opinion of two experts, the expert who has more experience should be relied upon, accordingly relying upon the opinion of Dr. Sunita Dhenge in place of Dr. Deepti Andharmule is illegal. He would further submit that the transaction of money has been proved, therefore, the agreement is legal, as such, dismissal of the suit by the learned trial Court suffers from perversity and illegality warranting interference by this Court. To substantiate his arguments, he has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana in the case of Kishan Chand vs. Sitaram reported in 2005 AIR (P& H) 156. 14. Per contra, learned counsel for defendants No. 3 and 4 would submit that the learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence and material on record has recorded its finding which does not suffer from perversity or illegality. 14. Per contra, learned counsel for defendants No. 3 and 4 would submit that the learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence and material on record has recorded its finding which does not suffer from perversity or illegality. He would further submit that the learned trial Court has rightly observed that the agreement ( Ex.P/9) is a suspicious document and the evidence of handwriting expert is conflicting and no witnesses have seen that the defendant No.1 has signed the document, even handwriting expert's evidence is only advisory and same must be corroborated by reliable and direct testimony. Therefore, learned trial Court has rightly recorded its finding with regard to fact that Ex.P/9 is a suspicious document. He would further submit that respondents/defendants No. 3 and 4 are bonafide purchasers of the suit property as they have published a notice on 24-1-2012 in the local daily newspaper “Nandgaon Times” prior to the execution of the sale deed and objections were called and the plaintiff despite publication of notice has not raised any objection with regard to execution of sale deed and accordingly sale deed was executed on 13-2-2012 for sale consideration of Rs.3,10,000/-. It is also contended that prior to purchase of the suit property, they conducted a proper title verification by inspecting the revenue records, thereafter only they have purchased the same. Therefore, it cannot be said that they are not bonafide purchasers of the suit property. It has been further contended that their right is protected under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which prohibits specific performance of a contract against a transferee who acted in good faith and paid valuable consideration, therefore, the relief sought by the plaintiff against the defendants was rightly denied by the learned trial Court and would pray for dismissal of the appeal. To substantiate their submissions, learned counsel for the defendants No.3 and 4 has relied upon the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal alias Manohar Singh vs. Maya , reported in (2003) 9 SCC 478 , Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by Lrs. To substantiate their submissions, learned counsel for the defendants No.3 and 4 has relied upon the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal alias Manohar Singh vs. Maya , reported in (2003) 9 SCC 478 , Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by Lrs. reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179 , Rathnavathi and another vs. Kavita Ganshamdas reported in (2015) 5 SCC 223 , Madhukar and others vs. Sangram and others , reported in (2001) 4 SCC 756 , V. Prabhakara vs. Basavaraj K. (dead) by legal representatives and another reported in (2022) 1 SCC 115. 15. Mr Abhishek Sharma, learned counsel for respondent/defendant No.1 adopted the stand taken by learned counsel for defendants No. 3 and 4 and would submit that the learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence and material on record has passed the judgment and decree which do not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting any interference by this Court and would pray for dismissal of the appeal. 16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection. 17. From the submissions made by the parties, the point emerged for consideration before this Court is: “Whether the finding recorded by the trial Court dismissing the suit is legal, justified and warranting interference by this Court?” To appreciate this point, it is expedient for this Court to go through the evidence adduced before the trial Court. 18. Star witness of plaintiff namely Shailendra Kumar Khare (PW/1), Bank Manager, Bank of India, Branch Rajnandgaon has stated in examination-in-chief that on 21-3-2003 Rs.3,51,000/- was transferred to the account of Smt. Punai Bai from the account of Chandrabhagbai and on the same day Rs.2,46,000/- was also withdrawn from the account of Chandrabhagabai and the said amount was deposited in the account of Punai Bai/defendant No.1. This witness was cross examined by defendant No.1 wherein he has admitted that he cannot say that the amount of Rs.2,46,000/- which has been withdrawn from the account of Chandrabhag Bai has been deposited in the account of Punai Bai/defendant No.1 or not. He has also admitted that he has not brought cheque book or slip of depositing the amount in the bank account of Punai Bai. He has also admitted that he has not brought cheque book or slip of depositing the amount in the bank account of Punai Bai. He has also admitted that he cannot say by seeing Ex.P/1 and Ex.P/2 that on 17- 3-2003 the amount which has been withdrawn from the account of Chandrabhagbai has been deposited in the account of Punai Bai/defendant No.1. This witness again was re-examined by the plaintiff wherein he has placed on record the original cheque No.2193 for Rs.2,46,000/- which is self-cheque and has been issued from Chandrabhagbai's account No. 1566 dated 17-3-2003. He has also stated that Punai Bai/defendant No. 1 herself visited the bank to receive the amount. The said witness was cross-examined by the defendant No.1 wherein he has admitted that the slip relates to 21-2- 2003, at that time, he was not posted in bank, as such, who has put his signature in the deposit slip cannot be said by him and also admitted that the slip was not written before him. He has also admitted that his statement that amount of cheque must have been deposited on the instruction of Punai Bai/defendant No. 1, he has no personal knowledge, but on the basis of cheque and deposit slip he is saying so. He has also admitted that he is not the handwriting expert. He has also clarified that the amount has not been deposited in the account of Punai Bai from Chandrabhaga, but a token was given and through a tokan the amount was deposited in the account of Punai Bai. He has also clarified if the amount of cheque is given in cash then in back page the person to whom the amount has to be given his/her signature has to be marked. 19. Babulal (PW/2) who has supported the case of the plaintiff by way of an affidavit as provided under Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC. He was extensively cross examined by the counsel for the defendant. He has stated that stamp paper (Ex.P/9) has been typed by the grandson of the defendant No.1 and he has not got typed the Ex. P/9, probably grand son of defendant No.1 has got it typed. He has also admitted that while executing the sale deed ( Ex.P/8), no agreement was written. He has stated that stamp paper (Ex.P/9) has been typed by the grandson of the defendant No.1 and he has not got typed the Ex. P/9, probably grand son of defendant No.1 has got it typed. He has also admitted that while executing the sale deed ( Ex.P/8), no agreement was written. He has also admitted that Rs.3,51,000/- was given through cheque before the Registrar which is in the name of his wife. He has also admitted that cheque was given to the defendant No.1 from the account of his wife Chandrabhagbai. He has also denied that Ex.P/9 agreement has not been executed by Punai Bai and he has given wrong information and got signature in the Ikrarnama. He has denied that he is doing sale and purchase of the land. He has denied that at the time of execution of agreement he was not having any money in his account. He has also admitted that he has done sale deed in the name of his wife which was one week ago and documentation was done only and no advance amount was given and the entire amount was paid at the time of execution of sale deed. 20. The other witness (PW/4) Dr. Deepti A. Andharmule, who is handwriting and finger print expert has admitted that she has taken disputed signature of Punai Bai of 2003 and sample of 2017 also, but the vibration should be increased between 2003 and 2017. She voluntarily stated that it is dependable on the circumstances. She has given her report that similarities have significance and sufficient to prove the common authorship in both the sets of signature. From above mentioned reasons, I came to the conclusion that the writer of the questioned signature ‘D’ and the comparatives signatures “C-1 – C-29 & S-1-S-26” has been signed by person. 21. DW/1 Punai Bai was examined who in her evidence has reiterated the stand which she has taken in the written statement and has stated that she has been given amount on 21-3-2003 but earlier she was given money in part which has been given at the time of registration of sale deed on 21-3-2003 by Chandrabhaga Bai. 21. DW/1 Punai Bai was examined who in her evidence has reiterated the stand which she has taken in the written statement and has stated that she has been given amount on 21-3-2003 but earlier she was given money in part which has been given at the time of registration of sale deed on 21-3-2003 by Chandrabhaga Bai. She has also stated that at the time of sale deed, about 3'0 clock, when she was going along with Milan Banjare, at that time, the plaintiff and Babulal have neither executed any agreement for purchase of any other land nor any advance amount was given by Babulal. She has also stated that on 21-3-2003 Babulal discussed with regard to sale of other land, but she has refused, neither any agreement was executed nor she put her signature. In fact, Babulal made an attempt to grab her property. This witness was extensively cross examined. In para 13 she has admitted that she has put her signature on Ex. P/9, therefore, an objection was raised and she was allowed to re- examine, against which the plaintiff has preferred the writ petition which was dismissed and against that the plaintiff preferred writ appeal which was also dismissed and thereafter, this witness was allowed to re-examine wherein she has reiterated the stand that she has not executed any agreement with Babulal for sale of property at village Korin Bhata and she has not put any signature before Budhram and she has also refused having her signature on Ex. P/9. The said witness was again cross examined wherein she has admitted that she used to verify the fact before selling of the property and after examination only she put her signature. She has also admitted in para 24 that she sold the property to Babulal only once and whatever property she sold, she was already been given the money. She has also denied that in Ex.P/9 she has put her signature and now she is giving false statement. 22. Dr. Sunita Dhenge, handwriting expert (DW/2) was also examined and in para 3 of her cross examination she has stated that according to her, agreement dated 17-3-2003 the person who put signature in Q-1 is not author as shown in Article A-1 to A12 before the Court and the report was exhibited as Ex.D/2. 22. Dr. Sunita Dhenge, handwriting expert (DW/2) was also examined and in para 3 of her cross examination she has stated that according to her, agreement dated 17-3-2003 the person who put signature in Q-1 is not author as shown in Article A-1 to A12 before the Court and the report was exhibited as Ex.D/2. This witness was cross examined by the plaintiff and she has also admitted that the photographs were taken in the documents as per the advice of the counsel. The report was also exhibited and she has given the report that the writer of questioned signature Q1 and admitted signature A1 to A12 have different authorship. Questioned Q1 is forged signatures of the writer of Admitted A1 to A12 of Punai Bai. 23. Ashok Kumar Sahu (DW/3) who is stamp vendor was examined wherein he has stated that stamp paper of Ex.P/9 was purchased by Jhameshwar Manikpuri and as a stamp vendor he has put his signature in Part D to D and Jhameshwar Manikpuri has put his signature in Part E to E. In serial No.5443 of register, page No.156 - 157 he put a seal of stamp wherein first party is Punai Bai wife of Bhagoli Satnami, resident of Korin Bhata, and the second party is Babulal, son of Banshilal Soni, resident of G.E. Road, Rajnandgaon has been mentioned which is for agreement. He has also admitted in the cross examination that Jhameshwar Manikpuri used to come to purchase stamp papers on the instructions of Nitin Tank. 24. Milan Banjare witness No.2 of DW/1, who accompanied Punai Bai has stated in examination-in-chief that Babulal has purchased the property in the name of his wife Chandrabhag Bai to the tune of 2.52 acres of land and Punai Bai has told him that she received advance amount and remaining amount of Rs.2,46,000/- was deposited in her account which was given to her. He has also stated that Babulal Soni asked her to sell another property which Punai Bai has refused. 25. Vinay Kumar Baid (DW/4) in examination-in-chief has reiterated the stand taken by him in the written statement and this witness was extensively cross examined by the plaintiff wherein he has stated that he was not aware about the agreement executed between Punai Bai and Babull Soni. 25. Vinay Kumar Baid (DW/4) in examination-in-chief has reiterated the stand taken by him in the written statement and this witness was extensively cross examined by the plaintiff wherein he has stated that he was not aware about the agreement executed between Punai Bai and Babull Soni. He has stated that after receiving the notice by the Court, he was made aware about the pendency of the case. 26. From the evidence brought on record, it is quite vivid that there are serious disputes about the execution of the agreement and the hand writing expert examined by both the parties who have given different opinion, as such, peculiar situation arises when expert opinion on handwriting is countered by contrary expert opinion. Often, a Court is faced with conflicting evidence given by the handwriting experts. This obviously is disruptive to trial and generally weakens the credibility of expert evidence. Assuming that the experts examined by both the parties are suitably qualified, honest and their evidences are based on established principles and scientific methods, logically there should be no divergent opinion especially the diametrically opposite as are witnessed in present case. When there is a dichotomy in opinion, one of the opinion will be correct and other will obviously be erroneous. To overcome with this situation ordinarily, signature and handwriting of a person who is alleged to have signed or written document in question can be proved (i) by calling a witness who wrote the document, (ii) by admission of a person against whom the document is tendered and (iii) by calling a person as witness who saw the document being written/signed. The first two methods are excluded as the scribe of the questioned documents is an interested party. Third method is not feasible as more often there is no eye- witness who will be only seeing the writing or signing of the documents and have no other role to play regarding the said document. Thereafter, the only method for proving handwriting and signature is as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Act of 1872"). Sections 45, 47, 67 and 73 of the Act are relevant to determine the questions. The Section 45 of the Act of 1872 provides opinion of experts which is reproduced below: " 45. Thereafter, the only method for proving handwriting and signature is as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Act of 1872"). Sections 45, 47, 67 and 73 of the Act are relevant to determine the questions. The Section 45 of the Act of 1872 provides opinion of experts which is reproduced below: " 45. Opinions of experts: When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of science, or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions are relevant facts. Such persons are called experts.” Section 73 provides that in order to ascertain whether a finger impression is that of the person by whom it purports to have been made, any finger impression admitted to have been made by that person, may be compared with the one which is to be proved. These provisions have been the subject matter of several decisions of Hon’ble the Supreme Court. 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of The State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram reported in 1979 (2) SCC 158 has held that a court does not exceed its power under Section 73 if it compares the disputed writing with the admitted writing of the party so as to reach its own conclusion. But this Court cautioned : "Although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing, even without the aid of the evidence of any handwriting expert, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence and caution, hesitate to base his finding with regard to the identity of a handwriting which forms the sheet-anchor of the prosecution case against a person accused of an offence, solely on comparison made by himself. It is therefore, not advisable that a Judge should take upon himself the task of comparing the admitted writing with the disputed one to find out whether the two agree with each other; and the prudent course is to obtain the opinion and assistance of an expert." The caution was reiterated in O. Bharathan vs. K. Sudhakaran 1996 (2) SCC 704 . Again in Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of Karnataka [ 1997 (7) SCC 110 ] referring to Section 73 of the Evidence Act, this Court held : "The section does not specify by whom the comparison shall be made. However, looking to the other provisions of the Act, it is clear that such comparison may either be made by a handwriting expert under Section 45 or by anyone familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned as provided by Section 47 or by the Court itself. As a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety, the Court should not normally take upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature or handwriting and in the event of the slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. But this does not mean that the Court has not the power to compare the dispute signature with the admitted signature as this power is clearly available under Section 73 of the Act." 28. Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 1980 (1) SCC 704 has indicated the circumstances in which the Court may itself compare disputed and admitted writings, thus : "The argument that the court should not venture to compare writings itself, as it would thereby assume to itself the role of an expert is entirely without force. Section 73 of the Evidence Act expressly enables the court to compare disputed writings with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether a writing is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written. If it is hazardous to do so, as sometimes said, we are afraid it is one of the hazards to which judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. There may be cases where both sides call experts and the voices of science are heard. There may be cases where neither side calls an expert, being ill able to afford him. In all such cases, it becomes the plain duty of the court to compare the writings and come to its own conclusions. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the court is no expert. Where there are expert opinions, they will aid the court. In all such cases, it becomes the plain duty of the court to compare the writings and come to its own conclusions. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the court is no expert. Where there are expert opinions, they will aid the court. Where there is none, the court will have to seek guidance from some authoritative textbook and the court's own experience and knowledge. But discharge it must, its plain duty, with or without expert, with or without other evidence." 29. Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank & Others reported in 2003 (3) SCC 583 has held as under: “15. While there is no doubt that court can compare the disputed handwriting/signature/finger impression with the admitted handwriting/ signature/finger impression, such comparison by court without the assistance of any expert, has always been considered to be hazardous and risky. When it is said that there is no bar to a court to compare the disputed finger impression with the admitted finger impression, it goes without saying that it can record an opinion or finding on such comparison, only after an analysis of the characteristics of the admitted finger impression and after verifying whether the same characteristics are found in the disputed finger impression. The comparison of the two thumb impressions cannot be casual or by a mere glance. Further, a finding in the judgment that there appeared to be no marked differences between the admitted thumb impression and disputed thumb impression, without anything more, cannot be accepted as a valid finding that the disputed signature is of the person who has put the admitted thumb impression. Where the Court finds that the disputed finger impression and admitted thumb impression are clear and where the court is in a position to identify the characteristics of finger prints, the court may record a finding on comparison, even in the absence of an expert's opinion. But where the disputed thumb impression is smudgy, vague or very light, the court should not hazard a guess by a casual perusal. The decision in Muralilal (supra) and Lalit Popli (supra) should not be construed as laying a proposition that the court is bound to compare the disputed and admitted finger impressions and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. The decision in Muralilal (supra) and Lalit Popli (supra) should not be construed as laying a proposition that the court is bound to compare the disputed and admitted finger impressions and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. When there is a positive denial by the person who is said to have affixed his finger impression and where the finger impression in the disputed document is vague or smudgy or not clear, making it difficult for comparison, the court should hesitate to venture a decision based on its own comparison of the disputed and admitted finger impressions. Further even in cases where the court is constrained to take up such comparison, it should make a thorough study, if necessary with the assistance of counsel, to ascertain the characteristics, similarities and dissimilarities. Necessarily, the judgment should contain the reasons for any conclusion based on comparison of the thumb impression, if it chooses to record a finding thereon. The court should avoid reaching conclusions based on a mere casual or routine glance or perusal. 16. In this case the first defendant had denied having put her finger impression on Ex. A-1. She died during the pendency of the suit before her turn came for giving evidence. The High Court having examined the document has clearly recorded the finding that the thumb mark in Ex. A-1 was pale (that is light) and not clear. The document though dated 1980, was executed on two stamp papers which were purchased in 1973 and 1978. Contrary to the recital in the agreement that possession had been delivered to the plaintiff, the possession was not in fact delivered to plaintiff, but continued with the first defendant and she delivered the possession to the second defendant. The title deeds were not delivered to plaintiff. The attesting witnesses were close relatives of plaintiff and one of them was not examined. The scribe's evidence was unsatisfactory. It was also difficult to believe that the first defendant, an illiterate old woman from a village, would enter into an agreement of sale on 5.1.1980 with plaintiff, and even when he is ready to complete the sale, sell the property to someone else hardly a month thereafter, on 11.2.1980. The scribe's evidence was unsatisfactory. It was also difficult to believe that the first defendant, an illiterate old woman from a village, would enter into an agreement of sale on 5.1.1980 with plaintiff, and even when he is ready to complete the sale, sell the property to someone else hardly a month thereafter, on 11.2.1980. In this background, the finding by the first appellant court, recorded without the benefit of any expert opinion, merely on a casual perusal, that there appeared to be no marked differences between the two thumb impressions, and therefore Ex. A-1 (sale agreement) must have been executed by first defendant, was unsound. The High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of the first appellate court that the Ex.A1 was executed by first defendant.” 30. As such, in the present factual matrix that the defendant No. 1 denied her signature despite extensive cross-examination by the plaintiff and the witness examined by the plaintiff has stated that they have seen the Punai Bai putting her signature in the alleged agreement, the trial Court after appreciating the evidence has recorded its finding in para 34 of the judgment that at the time of execution of agreement (Ex.P/9), the plaintiff was not present. In fact, before (PW/3) Nitin Kumar Tank and (PW/4) Budhram also no agreement was executed but PW/3 Nitin Kumar Tank has admitted in the cross examination that the agreement was signed by the grandson of Punai Bai/defendant No.1 and after putting signature by Punai Bai, he has put his signature. (PW/4) Budhram has also not stated that he has put his signature in Ex.P/9, as such Nitin Kumar Tank (PW/3) cannot be author of the document (Ex. P/9) whereas it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to examine the author of document (Ex. P/9). Learned trial Court has also taken note of fact that both handwriting experts have given different opinions and also considering the fact that the handwriting experts' opinion is weak piece of evidence and no corroborative evidence has been adduced by the plaintiff to substantiate that Punai Bai/defendant No. 1 has executed an agreement and has rightly recorded its finding that the agreement itself is doubtful. 31. The trial Court has also recorded its finding that ealier a sale deed was executed by the defendant No. 1 with the plaintiff which was the sale consideration of Rs. 3,51,000/- out of which Rs. 31. The trial Court has also recorded its finding that ealier a sale deed was executed by the defendant No. 1 with the plaintiff which was the sale consideration of Rs. 3,51,000/- out of which Rs. 2,46,000/- was given to her on 21-3-2003 and this fact is also fortified from the statement of PW-1 i.e. Bank Manager Shailendra Kumar Khare, therefore, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the said amount was given to defendant for sale consideration of the suit land, but no such evidence has been adduced before the trial Court. This finding neither suffers from perversity nor illegality warranting interference by this Court in view of well settled position of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to power of interference by the High Court in the first appeal while hearing the appeal under Section 96 of CPC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Jagdish Singh vs. Madhuri Devi reported in 2008 (10) SCC 497 in paragraph 28 has held as under: “28. At the same time, however, the appellate court is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should not forget that the trial court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses and, hence, the trial court's conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court possesses the same powers as that of the original court, but they have to be exercised with proper care, caution and circumspection. When a finding of fact has been recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial court in appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to well-established principles of law or unreasonable.” 32. Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rathnavathi and Another vs. Kavita Ganashamdas reported in 2015 (5) SCC 223 , in case of V. Prabhakara vs. Basavaraj K. (dead) & Another reported in 2022 (1) SCC 115 has reiterated the same law. 33. The trial Court after appreciating the entire evidence and material on record, has recorded its finding that the agreement is doubtful and has refused to grant discretionary relief of specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff which neither suffers from perversity nor illegality warranting interference by this Court. 33. The trial Court after appreciating the entire evidence and material on record, has recorded its finding that the agreement is doubtful and has refused to grant discretionary relief of specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff which neither suffers from perversity nor illegality warranting interference by this Court. It is pertinent to mention here that prior to amendment of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the jurisdiction to decree specific performance was discretionary, not mandatory. Courts were not bound to grant specific relief merely because it was lawful to do so. This discretion, however, was not arbitrary but was required to be sound, reasonable, and guided by established judicial principles. When there was a serious doubt about the execution or genuineness of the agreement, this would significantly impact the court's exercise of discretion, generally leading to a refusal of specific performance. It is well settled position of law that for applying principles governing this discretion in cases of doubtful agreements, the Court should have considered the evidence and circumstances presented regarding the formation or execution of the contract raising a serious or bona fide doubt as to its genuineness. The court would be hesitant to enforce it specifically, as such the plaintiff has burden to prove the valid and clear existence of the agreement. 34. The trial Court should have also considered the circumstances surrounding the agreement suggested any element of unfairness, unconscionable behavior or potential fraud, which may result in refusing the specific performance of the contract. The Court should consider the conduct of the plaintiff which raises doubts about the legitimacy of the agreement they were seeking to enforce, their claim may be denied on this count. As per Section 20 of the unamended Section 20, if a court found that there was a serious doubt regarding the very execution of the agreement, it had ample discretion to refuse the equitable relief of specific performance. In the present facts and circumstances of the case, the sufficient evidence and material available on record to record finding that agreement was dubious or doubtful. The trial Court on appreciation of facts and evidence has recorded such finding which neither suffers from perversity nor illegality warranting interference by this Court. 35. In the present facts and circumstances of the case, the sufficient evidence and material available on record to record finding that agreement was dubious or doubtful. The trial Court on appreciation of facts and evidence has recorded such finding which neither suffers from perversity nor illegality warranting interference by this Court. 35. Since the finding recorded by the trial Court that there was doubt over the existence of the agreement and no injunction was granted by the trial Court against the defendant No. 1 restraining her to sale the suit property. The submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that subsequent sale to defendants No. 3 and 4 is not bona fide deserves to be rejected by this Court. Even from the records of the trial Court, it is quite vivid that the defendant No. 3 and 4 after publishing the notice on 24-1-2012 in “Nandgaon Times” newspaper wherein no objection was raised by the plaintiff, the defendants No. 3 and 4 have executed the sale deed on 12-3-2012 which cannot be said that it has not been executed after due diligence and after verification of the documents, therefore, their sale deed deserves to be protected. Thus, the finding of the trial Court that the defendant No. 3 and 4 are bona fide purchase does not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court. 36. Considering the evidence and material on record and law on the subject, I am of the view that the learned trial Court has not committed any illegality in dismissing the suit and the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court deserves to be affirmed and accordingly it is affirmed. 37. Consequently, the first appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed. Interim order passed by this Court on 1-8-2018 is vacated. 38. A decree be drawn up accordingly.