1 CRA No.213/2022 2025:CGHC:42655-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 213 of 2022 1 - Thakurdas Yadav S/o Devan Yadav Aged About 45 Years R/o Mahavir Nagar, Chowki Vijaynagar, P.S. Ramanujganj Distrct Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh. 2 - Balgovind Yadav S/o Thakurdas Yadav Aged About 20 Years R/o Mahavir Nagar, Chowki Vijaynagar, P.S. Ramanujganj Distrct Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh. ... Appellants versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Choki Vijaynagar, P.S. Ramanujganj, District, Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellants : Mr. Sunil Tripathi, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per, Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge 22/08/2025 1. This criminal appeal filed by the appellants under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 07/01/2022, passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge Ramanujganj, District: Balrampur-Ramanujganj, C.G. in AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2025.08.26 10:47:04 +0530 2 CRA No.213/2022 Sessions Case No.R-72/2017, whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as Under:- Appellant No.1 (A-1) : Thakurdas Yadav Conviction Sentence U/s 302 of IPC Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/-, in default, imprisonment for 30 days U/s 307/34 of IPC R.I. for 7 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default, imprisonment for 30 days Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently Appellant No.2 (A-2) : Balgovind Yadav Conviction Sentence U/s 302 of IPC Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/-, in default, imprisonment for 30 days U/s 307/34 of IPC R.I. for 7 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default, imprisonment for 30 days Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently 2. Case of the prosecution, is that on 31/07/2017, at around 7:00 pm, the bull of accused Thakurdas had strayed into the maize field of the Lautan Das (since deceased). When Lautan Das went to the house of appellants to complain about it, A-1, armed with a stick, along with A-2, who is the son of A-1, started assaulting Lautan Das. When both the brothers of deceased namely; Lallu Yadav (PW-2) and Lalchand Yadav (PW-3) intervened to rescue, the accused persons also assaulted them. In the said assault, the deceased sustained injuries on his head, Lallu Yadav sustained 3 CRA No.213/2022 injuries on his head and hand, and Lalchand received injuries on his head and back portion of his body. While being taken to the hospital for treatment, Lautan Yadav succumbed to his injuries and died. During investigation, merg intimation was registered vide Ex.P-1 and crime details form was prepared vide Ex.P-3. Thereafter, FIR was registered vide Ex.P-2. The appellants were arrested vide Ex.P-10 and P-11 and their memorandum statements were recorded vide Ex.P-5 and P-6. On the basis of memorandum, sticks and axe were recovered vide seizure memo Ex.P-7 to P-9. The dead-body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination and in the postmortem examination report (Ex.P-17), Dr. Sharad Kumar Gupta (PW-9) opined that the cause of death was hypovolemic shock and Neurogenic shock and nature of death was homicidal. 3. The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited 28 documents. Statement of the appellants under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. were recorded wherein they have pleaded their innocence and false implication in the matter. 4. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record proceeded to convict the appellants herein for the aforementioned offence and sentenced him as mentioned herein-above against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellants-accused herein 4 CRA No.213/2022 questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the appellants have been falsely implicated in the case. The entire case of prosecution is based upon the statement of the interested witnesses, who are family members of deceased and the prosecution has not proved the case against the appellants beyond all the reasonable doubts. As per the statement of the witnesses, the case of the prosecution comes under the purview of section 304 of IPC because assault was made either of the appellants and not with intention to cause death as the act done by them was on account of sudden and provocation, even though PW-9 Dr. Sharad Kumar Gupta examined by the prosecution found single injury on the head of the deceased which was inside wound near below the ear, apart from that, no other injury was found on the body of deceased, hence its crystal clear that, intention to cause death was not there, hence learned trial court wrongly convicted the appellants for the aforesaid offence. As such, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. 6. Per-contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. The learned trial Court 5 CRA No.213/2022 has rightly convicted the appellants for the aforesaid offence, thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. The first and foremost question is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence available on record and particularly considering the postmortem report (Ex.P/17) which is duly proved by the evidence of Dr. Sharad Kumar Gupta (PW-9). Accordingly, taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/17) and the statement of Dr. Sharad Kumar Gupta (PW-9) that the nature of death of deceased was homicidal in nature, we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court is absolutely justified in holding that the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. Accordingly, we hereby affirmed the said finding. 9. In the postmortem report of deceased, Doctor PW-9 has found the following injuries and given opinion: “The body was slightly warm; rigor mortis was absent, and no decomposition was present. On the left temple of the head, there was an incised/deep wound caused by a 6 CRA No.213/2022 sharp-edged weapon, measuring 2.5 inches × 1 inch. Muscular tissue was protruding from the site, and the temporal bone was fractured. Opinion regarding cause and nature of death: The cause of death was excessive hemorrhage and neurogenic shock due to head injury and intracranial bleeding. The death was homicidal in nature, and it had occurred approximately 3 to 3.5 hours prior to the post- mortem examination.” 10.Doctor PW-9, who conducted the medical examination of injured PW-2, Lallu Yadav and PW-3 Lalchand and found following injuries: Injuries sustained by PW-2, Lallu Yadav : On the right and left side of the head, there were contused lacerated wounds measuring 1.5 inch × ½ inch, ½ inch × ½ inch, and 2.5 inch × ¼ inch, from which bleeding was present. On the left wrist, there was a contused swelling measuring ½ inch × ¼ inch, with pain and swelling noted at the site. On the right thumb, there was complaint of pain and blackish discoloration. Injuries sustained by PW-3, Lalchand : On the frontal region of the head, there were two contused lacerated wounds, each measuring 2.5 inch × ¼ inch, with bleeding present. 7 CRA No.213/2022 On the lower part of the left eye, there was pain, swelling, and blackish discoloration (ecchymosis/bruise). Injuries suffered by the Lalchand was grievous in nature 11.Now the question would be whether the appellants herein are the author of the crime in question ? 12.PW-2 Lallu Yadav (injured), who is elder brother of deceased, stated in his evidence that near the house of A-1, field of deceased was there on which a maize crop was cultivated. The said crop was grazed by the bull of A-1. When his brother/deceased objected to the grazing of the crop, A-2 started assaulting with a stick and A-1 assaulted with an axe. Due to the axe blow on the head of deceased, he sustained severe injuries and was bleeding was oozing out. When he intervened the matter, the appellants also assaulted him with sticks on his head and he became unconscious. Thereafter, he was treated in the District Hospital, Ambikapur, and later he came to know that his younger brother/deceased had died. However, in cross- examination of para 9, he categorically stated that he had not seen the appellants to assaulted the deceased. 13. PW-3, Lalchand (injured), another brother of deceased, stated in his evidence that Deceased had planted maize in his field, which the accused grazed with their cattle, and a quarrel took place between them, due to which, appellants killed deceased. At the time of incident, he was at home with his brother Lallu Yadav. 8 CRA No.213/2022 When the appellants assaulted the deceased, aunt of A-2 started crying. On hearing her sound, he along with his brother Lallu Yadav reached the spot, they saw that the deceased was lying on the ground and blood was oozing out. When both of them tried to take the deceased from the spot, the appellants also assaulted them too, due to which, he sustained a head injury and Lallu had an injury on his thumb and head. Thereafter, they were taken to hospital. 14.PW-1 Rammandip Yadav, son of deceased stated in his evidence that on the date of incident i.e. 31.07.2017 at around 7:00 am, the bull of A-1 entered the maize field and was eating the maize. The said maize field was near the house of A-1. At that time, his father went to the house of the appellants to complain, to which, the appellants abused in filthy language to his father and A-2 assaulted him on the back of the head with an axe and A-1 assaulted him with a stick. On hearing the noise, he went to the spot and saw that his father was lying unconscious at the spot due to injuries and the appellants had gone inside their house. Lalita Yadav and Anita Yadav, who were cleaning utensils in their house at the time of the assault, saw the incident and told him about it. 15.PW-4, Lalita Yadav and PW-5, Anita, stated in their evidence that on the date of incident, the cattle of the appellants grazed the field of the deceased, to which, the deceased came to the house 9 CRA No.213/2022 of the appellants to object the same and at that time, A-1 assaulted the deceased with sticks and A-2 assaulted the deceased by means of axe. The appellant also assaulted the Lallu and Lalchand, who sustained injuries. 16.In view of the aforesaid evidence adduced by the prosecution and also considering the material available on record, it is quite vivid that both the appellants have caused severe injuries to PW-2 Lallu Yadav and PW-3, Lalchand which is reflected from the evidence of PW-4, Lalita and PW-5 Anita as also from the medical evidence, Thus, the conviction and sentence imposed upon both the appellants under Section 307/34 of the IPC is just and proper and accordingly the same is maintained. 17.As far as conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellants for commission of murder of the deceased is concerned; from the evidence of the PW-4 Lalita Yadav and PW-5 Anita, they have seen that the A-1 has assaulted the deceased by means of stick, hence, it is manifest that the A-1 has assaulted the deceased with stick and not from the axe. Thus, no case is made out under Section 302 of the IPC against the A-1. 18.In view of above, conviction and sentence imposed upon the A-1- Thakurdas Yadav under Section 302 of IPC is hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the said charges. 19.As far as the conviction and sentence of the A-2 -Balgovind Yadav is concerned, from the evidence of the PW-4 Lalita Yadav 10 CRA No.213/2022 and PW-5 Anita, they have seen that the A-2 has assaulted the deceased by means of axe, due to which, the deceased suffered injuries and died, hence, it is manifest that the A-2 has assaulted the deceased with an axe and in the FSL report, blood was found in the weapon used in the crime i.e. axe. 20.It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh1. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances. 21.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu2 has made the following observations : “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 1 (2012) 8 SCC 289 2 AIR 1956 SC 488 11 CRA No.213/2022 22.It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 of the IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 of the IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. 12 CRA No.213/2022 23.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana3 has observed as under:- “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 24.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while 3 (2002) 3 SCC 327 4 (2009) 15 SCC 635 13 CRA No.213/2022 inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the 14 CRA No.213/2022 accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 25.Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 26.Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act 5 (2012) 8 SCC 450 6 (2017) 3 SCC 247 15 CRA No.213/2022 was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion 16 CRA No.213/2022 requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 27.In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 28.Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: 7 (2019) 6 SCC 122 17 CRA No.213/2022 (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 29.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023 disposed off on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under: “60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) 18 CRA No.213/2022 of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 19 CRA No.213/2022 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood 20 CRA No.213/2022 which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 21 CRA No.213/2022 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the 22 CRA No.213/2022 attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the 23 CRA No.213/2022 act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.” 30.Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that on the date of incident, the bull of the appellants grazed the maize field of the deceased, due to which, the deceased went to the house of the appellant to object the same, thereafter, a sudden dispute arose between the appellants and deceased, and in the heat of passion, A-2 assaulted the deceased by means of axe. It is to notice here that the deceased himself went to the house of the appellants. It means, the appellants were at home before the incident and they have no intention to kill the deceased. There was no premeditation on the part of the accused to cause death of deceased. They had no intention to cause death of deceased, but by causing such injuries, he must had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by him would likely to cause death of deceased, as such, his case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of the A-2 herein completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken 24 CRA No.213/2022 any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 31.Considering the above-stated facts, also considering the evidence of witnesses and taking into consideration that at A-2- Balgovind is aged about 25 years at present, and he is in jail since 31/07/2017 i.e about 8 years 22 days, the conviction of the A-2 under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/converted to Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 32.In the result :  the appeal is allowed in part;  the conviction and sentence imposed on both the appellants for offence under Section 307/34 is hereby maintained;  A-1 Thakurdas Yadav is acquitted from the charge under Section 302 of the IPC.  A-1 is on bail pursuant to the order of this Court passed on 27-2-2023. His bail bonds are cancelled and the surety is discharged. He is directed to surrender within three weeks from today before the Court concerned to serve out the remaining period of sentence imposed under Section 307/34 IPC, as he has undergone the jail sentence of 5 years 6 months 27 days.  Conviction and sentence imposed upon A-2 Balgovind Yadav under Section 302 IPC is converted to Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced him to the period already undergone by him i.e. 8 years 22 days. He is in jail. He be 25 CRA No.213/2022 released forthwith, if not required in any other case, on furnishing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like sum to the satisfaction of the trial Court. The bail bond shall remain in operation for a period of six months as required under the provisions of Section 481 of the BNSS. A-2 shall appear before the higher Court as and when directed. 33. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. SD/- SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Amardeep 26 CRA No.213/2022 . 27 CRA No.213/2022 .Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also inform A-1 that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.