1 CRA No. 880 of 2017 2025:CGHC:34356-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 880 of 2017 [Arising out of judgment dated 21.05.2015 passed in Sessions Trial No.312/2013 by the 3 rd Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.]  Smt. Jamun Bai W/o Naresh Sahu, aged about 30 years, R/o Village Patewa, Police Station Gobra Nawapara, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus  State of Chhattisgarh through the Station House Officer, Police Station Gobra Nawapara, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant :- Mr. D.N. Prajapati, Advocate. For State-Respondent :- Mr. H.A.P.S. Bhatia, Panel Lawyer. Division Bench Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal & Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput Judgment On Board (21.07.2025) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J 1. Assail in the present criminal appeal filed under Section 374(2) of the CrPC preferred by the appellant herein is to ANKIT KUMAR SINGH Digitally signed by ANKIT KUMAR SINGH Date: 2025.07.24 10:45:07 +0530 2 CRA No. 880 of 2017 the legality, validity and correctness of the judgment dated 21.05.2015 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, in Sessions Trial No. 312/2013, by which the appellant herein has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced thereunder to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, ₹ the appellant has to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. Prosecution Case:- 2. The case of the prosecution as projected and accepted by the trial Court is that during the intervening night of 03.11.2013 to 04.11.2013, at village Patewa, Police Station Gobra Nawapara, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, the appellant assaulted her grandmother-in-law Devwati Sahu, with the help of sickle and taboret (पीढ़ा) by which she suffered grievous injuries and died and thereby committed the offence in question. 3 CRA No. 880 of 2017 3. It is further case of the prosecution that on 04.11.2013 Kunjlal (PW-4) reported the matter to the police about death of his mother-in-law Devwati Sahu, pursuant to which merg and FIR were registered vide Exs.P/12 & P/19, respectively. Nazari naksha was prepared vide Ex.P/11. Wheels of investigation started running and the appellant was arrested. Inquest proceedings (Ex.P/7) were conducted and the dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem. As per postmortem report (Ex.P/14) proved by Dr. Jaishri Sahu (PW-8) cause of death was grievous injuries, injuries on vital part of the body i.e. rupture of both lungs and heart and fracture of cervical vertebrae and death was homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P/1) weapons of offence i.e. sickle and taboret (पीढ़ा) and her clothes were seized vide Exs.P/2 & P/5, respectively. Other articles were also seized. Seized articles were sent for chemical analysis to FSL and as per FSL report (Ex.P/22) on the weapons of offence i.e. sickle and taboret and also 4 CRA No. 880 of 2017 on the clothes of the appellant no blood much less human blood was found. 4. After due investigation, appellant herein was charge- sheeted for the aforesaid offence and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law. The appellant / accused abjured her guilt and entered into defence. 5. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution has examined as many as 17 witnesses and exhibited 22 documents and defence in support of its case has not examined any witness, but exhibited 3 documents. 6. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellant / accused for the offence as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant herein questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 5 CRA No. 880 of 2017 Submission of the parties :- 7. Mr. D.N. Prajapati, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the prosecution has not been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He would also submit that there is no eye-witness account to the incident and the appellant has been convicted solely on the basis of weak circumstantial evidence. He would further submit that though the trial Court has invoked Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short “IEA”) to base the conviction of the appellant, but there is no evidence has been brought on record by the prosecution that the appellant and the deceased only two inmates were in the house in question at the relevant point of time and even as per the finding recorded by the trial Court, except the appellant, her husband Naresh Kumar Sahu (PW-9) was also residing in the house in question and thus it cannot be said that the appellant was the sole inmate in the house in question. It is also argued that certain seizures have been effected, but FSL 6 CRA No. 880 of 2017 report is respect of articles so seized does not support the case of the prosecution. Thus, the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt and the appeal deserves to be allowed. 8. Mr. H.A.P.S. Bhatia, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He would also submit that the appellant and the deceased used to live in the house in question and on the date and time of offence the appellant was present, therefore, she is required to explain in her statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC as to how and under what circumstances Devwati Sahu died which she failed and, as such, the trial Court has rightly invoked Section 106 of the IEA to base the conviction of the appellant herein. Thus, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7 CRA No. 880 of 2017 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and perused the with utmost care and circumspection. Discussion & Analysis:- 10.The first question, as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the postmortem report (Ex.P/14) proved by Dr. Jaishri Sahu (PW-8), which, in our considered opinion, is a correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record and which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the finding of the trial Court holding that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. 11.Now, the question for consideration would be whether the appellant has assaulted the deceased? 12.The case of the prosecution is based on the circumstantial evidence and the trial Court has found incriminating circumstances established. The five golden principles 8 CRA No. 880 of 2017 which constitute panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) in paragraph 153 which state as under:- “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established : (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra1 where the following observations were made: Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, 1 (1973) 2 SCC 793 9 CRA No. 880 of 2017 (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 13.To base the conviction of the appellant for the offence in question, the trial Court has culled out the following incriminating circumstances at paragraph No.36 of its judgment :- (1) मृतिका देवव (80 व र्षीय मृतिला) का घटना का समृय अतियक्त का सथ उसका घर मृ तिनावसर ना। (2) मृतिका व अतियक्त का मृध्य खाना- पीना का लिलाए पीरशाना कारना स%बं%धी तिववदे का ना। (3) अतियक्त का मृमृरण्डमृ का आधीर पीर +लिसय व लाकाड़ी का पीढ़ा का- जप्ती तिकाय जना। (4) अतियक्त का घर का देरवज का- चौै12घट पीर खा3ना का धीब्बं पीय जना थ अतियक्त द्वार उसका काई स्पीष्टीकारण ना तिदेय जना। (5) अतियक्त द्वार घटना का स%बं%धी मृ पीलिलास का काई स3चौैना ना तिदेय जना। (6) मृतिका का कारिर तिवतिन्न गं%र उपीतिय=, लिजसका पीरिरणमृ स्वरूपी उसका- मृत्य कारिर @ई, मृतिका का तिकास प्रकार पी@+चौै, इस स%बं%धी मृ अतियक्त/ बंचौैव का- ओर स काई समृधीनाप्रदे स्पीष्टीकारण ना तिदेय जना। 10 CRA No. 880 of 2017 14.The trial Court has proceeded to convict the appellant for offence under Section 302 by invoking Section 106 of the IEA as the dead body of Devwati Sahu was found in the house in question where the appellant used to reside along with the deceased. Therefore, the appellant is required to explain in her statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC as to how and under what circumstances Devwati Sahu died. 15.Now, the question is whether the trial court has rightly invoked Section 106 of the IEA to convict the appellant? 16.At this stage, it would be appropriate to quote Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which states as under:- “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 17.The said provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is 11 CRA No. 880 of 2017 on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 18.In the matter of Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2 their Lordships of the Supreme Court, reviewing its earlier decision on the point of Section 106 of the IEA, have held that Section 106 has to be applied in criminal cases with care and caution and held in paragraphs 41 to 48 as under:- “41. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is evident that the court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. It cannot be said that it has no application to criminal cases. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials in this country that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt 2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1261 12 CRA No. 880 of 2017 of the accused is not in any way modified by the provisions contained in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 42. Section 106 cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden of the accused to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its legitimate burden. So, until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused. 43. Section 106 obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the accused is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution unless the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his knowledge which would render the evidence of the prosecution nugatory. If in such a situation, the accused gives an explanation which may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the accused gets the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the explanation. But if the accused in such a case does not give any explanation at all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation, this by itself is a circumstance which may well turn the scale against him. In the language of Prof. Glanville Williams: “All that the shifting of the evidential burden does at the final stage of the case is to allow 13 CRA No. 880 of 2017 the jury (Court) to take into account the silence of the accused or the absence of satisfactory explanation appearing from his evidence.” 44. To recapitulate the foregoing : What lies at the bottom of the various rules shifting the evidential burden or burden of introducing evidence in proof of one's case as opposed to the persuasive burden or burden of proof, i.e., of proving all the issues remaining with the prosecution and which never shift is the idea that it is impossible for the prosecution to give wholly convincing evidence on certain issues from its own hand and it is therefore for the accused to give evidence on them if he wishes to escape. Positive facts must always be proved by the prosecution. But the same rule cannot always apply to negative facts. It is not for the prosecution to anticipate and eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate an accused. Again, when a person does not act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, it is not for the prosecution to eliminate all the other possible intentions. If the accused had a different intention that is a fact especially within his knowledge and which he must prove (see Professor Glanville Williams—Proof of Guilt, Ch. 7, page 127 and following) and the interesting discussion—para 527 negative averments and para 528—“require affirmative counter-evidence” at page 438 and foil, of Kenny's outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn. 1958. 45. But Section 106 has no application to cases where the fact in question having regard to its nature is such as to be capable of being known not only by the accused but also by others if they happened to be present when it took place. From the illustrations appended to the section, it is clear that an intention not apparent from the character and circumstances of the act must be established 14 CRA No. 880 of 2017 as especially within the knowledge of the person whose act is in question and the fact that a person found travelling without a ticket was possessed of a ticket at a stage prior in point of time to his being found without one, must be especially within the knowledge of the traveler himself:see Section 106 of the Evidence Act, illustrations (a) and (b). 46. A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence which if believed by the court would convince them of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is in a position where he should go forward with counter-vailing evidence if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one. He is not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been established, for the court must still find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict. However, the accused's failure to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded by the court as confirming the conclusion indicated by the evidence presented by the prosecution or as confirming presumptions which might have been rebutted. Although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may therefore as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edn. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 2 p. 37 and foil). Leland v. State reported in 343 U.S. 790=96 L.Ed. 1302, Raffel v. U.S. reported in 271 U.S. 294=70 L.Ed. 1054. 15 CRA No. 880 of 2017 WHAT IS “PRIMA FACIE CASE” IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 106 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT? 47. The Latin expression prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first view", or "based on first impression". According, to Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evi-Ideuce sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”. In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, or if an opposing party introduces contradictory evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties. 48. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death.” 19.Similarly, in the matter of Anees v. The State Govt. of NCT3, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, reviewing its earlier decision on the point of Section 106 of the IEA, have held in paragraphs 47 to 55 as under:- “47. But Section 106 of the Evidence Act has no application to cases where the fact in question, 3 2024 SCC Online SC 757 16 CRA No. 880 of 2017 having regard to its nature, is such as to be capable of being known not only to the accused but also to others, if they happened to be present when it took place. The intention underlying the act or conduct of any individual is seldom a matter which can be conclusively established; it is indeed only known to the person in whose mind the intention is conceived. Therefore, if the prosecution has established that the character and circumstance of an act suggest that it was done with a particular intention, then under illustration (a) to this section, it may be assumed that he had that intention, unless he proves the contrary. 48. A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence, which if believed by the court, would convince them of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused, if in a position, should go forward with counter-vailing evidence, if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one. He is not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been established, for the court must still find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict. However, the accused's failure to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded by the court as confirming the conclusion indicated by the evidence presented by the prosecution or as confirming presumptions which might arise therefrom. Although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may, therefore, as a practical matter 17 CRA No. 880 of 2017 find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution [See: Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2023 SCC OnLine 1261] ii. What is “ prima facie case ” (foundational facts) in the context of Section 106 of the Evidence Act? 49. The Latin expression prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first view”, or “based on first impression”. According to Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”. In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the case or charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties. 50. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding guilt of the accused. 51. The presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. 52. To explain what constitutes a prima facie case to make Section 106 of the Evidence Act applicable, we should refer to the decision of this Court in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad and ors. (2000) 8 SCC 382, wherein this Court has observed 18 CRA No. 880 of 2017 in paras 36 and 37 respectively as under: “36. In this context we may profitably utilize the legal principle embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows: “When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 37. The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference.” (Emphasis supplied) 53. We should also look into the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Gulam Chaudhary & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 311, wherein this Court made the following observations in paragraph 24 as under: “24. Even otherwise, in our view, this is a case where Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply. Krishnanand Chaudhary was brutally assaulted and then a chhura-blow was given on the chest. Thus chhura-blow was given after Bijoy Chaudhary had said “he is still alive and should be killed”. The appellants then carried away the body. What happened thereafter to Krishnanand Chaudhary is especially within the knowledge of the appellants. The appellants have given no explanation as to what they did after they took away the body. Krishnanand Chaudhary has not been since seen alive. In the absence 19 CRA No. 880 of 2017 of an explanation, and considering the fact that the appellants were suspecting the boy to have kidnapped and killed the child of the family of the appellants, it was for the appellants to have explained what they did with him after they took him away. When the abductors withheld that information from the court, there is every justification for drawing the inference that they had murdered the boy. Even though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases like the present, where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. The appellants by virtue of their special knowledge must offer an explanation which might lead the Court to draw a different inference. We, therefore, see no substance in this submission of Mr. Mishra.” (Emphasis supplied) 54. Cases are frequently coming before the courts where the husband, due to strained marital relations and doubt as regards the character, has gone to the extent of killing his wife. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family, like in the case at hand, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. 55. If an offence takes place inside the four walls of a house and in such circumstances where the accused has all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at a time and in the circumstances of his choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead direct evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. It is to 20 CRA No. 880 of 2017 resolve such a situation that Section 106 of the Evidence Act exists in the statute book. In the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra), this Court observed that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. The Court proceeded to observe that a Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character, which is almost impossible to be led, or at any rate, extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence, which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.” 20.Coming to the facts of the present case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above stated judgments, it is quite vivid that from the statement of PW-9 Naresh Kumar Sahu, husband of the appellant, that the appellant along with him (PW-9) and the deceased Devwati used to live in the house in question, meaning thereby, except the appellant and the deceased, PW-9 was also in the house in question. PW-9 has further stated that in the intervening night of 03.11.2013 to 04.11.2013 he was in the house in question. Even otherwise, the trial Court in para 28 of its judgment has itself recorded a finding that 21 CRA No. 880 of 2017 the except the appellant and the deceased PW-9 were also residing in the house in question. Consequently, it appears from the aforesaid evidence that the on the date and time of offence except the appellant and the deceased PW-9 was also present in the house and, therefore, the trial Court at para 30 of its judgment has wrongly recorded a finding that the appellant and the deceased only two inmates were in the house in question. As such, in light of decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar 4 in which their Lordships have clearly held that the fact that other members of the family were present would show that there could be another hypothesis which cannot be altogether excluded and it can be said that the facts established do not rule out the existence of any other hypothesis and the facts established cannot be said to be consistent only with one hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant. In that view of the matter, the trial Court has wrongly invoked Section 4 (2021) 10 SCC 725 22 CRA No. 880 of 2017 106 of the IEA to base the conviction of the appellant and we hereby reject the same. 21.The next incriminating circumstance which has been found proved by the trial Court is that pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant weapon of offence was seized. However, the seized articles were sent for chemical analysis to FSL, but in the FSL report (Ex.P/22) on the weapons of offence i.e. sickle and taboret (पीढ़ा) and on the clothes of the appellant no blood much less human blood was found. As such, seizure of the weapon of offence is of no use to the prosecution in absence of forensic evidence. Furthermore, other incriminating circumstances are not much relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, they are not required to be discussed. Conclusion:- 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion and analysis, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.05.2015 passed by the trial Court convicting and 23 CRA No. 880 of 2017 sentencing the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC, is hereby set aside and the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of principle of benefit of doubt. Appellant is stated to be on bail. She need not surrender. However, her bail bond shall remain in operation for a period of six months as per provisions contained in Section 437-A of the CrPC. 23. This criminal appeal is allowed. 24. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for information and necessary action, if any. Sd/ Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Judge Ankit