APHC010056732009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY, TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: Between: 1. THE STATE OF A.P., PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD. 1. VOPPANGI RAMA RAO, S/O. LATCHAYYA MALA BY CASTE, R/O. KORLAM VILLAGE, GARA MANDAL, SRIKAKULAM DIST. 2. VOPPANGI CHAKRADHARAO CHAKRADHAR, MALA BY CASTE, R/O. KORLAM VILLAGE, GARA MANDAL, SRIKAKULAM DIST. Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to The Addl. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., begs leave of this Hon'ble Court to present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal against the order of acquittal of accused / respondents in CC No. 203 of 2006 on the file of the Hon'ble Spl. Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Prohibition & Excise, Srikakulam : Dated 11 Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused / ( Respondents ) for the offenc for the following among others. IA NO: 1 OF 2009 (CRLAMP 424 OF Petition under Section 151 CPC in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY, THE THIRTY FIRST DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1067/2009 THE STATE OF A.P., PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., ...APELLANT AND VOPPANGI RAMA RAO, S/O. LATCHAYYA MALA BY CASTE, R/O. KORLAM VILLAGE, GARA MANDAL, SRIKAKULAM DIST. VOPPANGI CHAKRADHARAO CHAKRADHAR, S/O. LATCHAYYA MALA BY CASTE, R/O. KORLAM VILLAGE, GARA MANDAL, ...RESPODENT(S): Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to The Addl. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., of this Hon'ble Court to present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal against the order of acquittal of accused / respondents in CC No. 203 of 2006 on the file of the Hon'ble Spl. Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Prohibition & Excise, Srikakulam : Dated 11th day of April 2007 and prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside the order of acquittal and convict / ( Respondents ) for the offence with which they were charged for the following among others. (CRLAMP 424 OF 2009 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [3369] THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO THE STATE OF A.P., PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., ...APELLANT VOPPANGI RAMA RAO, S/O. LATCHAYYA MALA BY CASTE, R/O. S/O. LATCHAYYA MALA BY CASTE, R/O. KORLAM VILLAGE, GARA MANDAL, ...RESPODENT(S): Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to The Addl. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., of this Hon'ble Court to present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal against the order of acquittal of accused / respondents in CC No. 203 of 2006 on the file of the Hon'ble Spl. Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Prohibition day of April 2007 and prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside the order of acquittal and convict e with which they were charged praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to 2 condone the delay of 486 days in presenting the appeal against the order of acquittal of the accused / respondents in C.C. No. 203 / 2006 on the file of the Special Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Prohibition and Excise, Srikakulam, dated 11.04.2007 and pass Counsel for the Appellant: 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. UMASANKAR LOKANADHAM The Court made the following JUDGMENT: 1. This appeal, filed under section 378(3) & (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C’) is preferred by the appellant / State against the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Prohibition and Excise, Srikakulam (for short, ‘Trial Court’) in Calendar Case No.203 of 2006. By its judgment dated 11.04.2007, the Trial Court acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under section 353 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). 2. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Trial Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence of PWs.1 to 6 and documents marked Exs.P.1 to P.4 and contradictory statements i.e., Exs.D.1 to D.4 which were elicited during the cross- examination of PWs.2 to 4. 3. The facts in a nutshell, which give rise to the appeal, are as under: On 06.12.2005 at around 02.15 PM, while the de facto complainant was discharging his official duties, A.1 and A.2 approached him in the court verandah, called him aside, and engaged in argument concerning a land dispute. During the altercation, A.1 grabbed the shift collar of the de facto complainant, while A.2 assaulted him by slapping and kicking him, thereby obstructing him from performing his duties. As 3 such, the accused committed an offence punishable under section 353 r/w 34 of IPC. 4. The Trial Court took cognizance of the offence under Section 353 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused. Upon their appearance before the Court, copies of the relevant documents were furnished to them as mandated under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After hearing the submissions made by the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel on the question of charge, the Trial Court framed charges against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 353 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. The Trial Court examined the accused as required under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to enable them to consider the evidence that had been led on the part of the prosecution and also appeared against them. But the accused denied the truth of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. After conclusion of arguments and upon perusal of the material, the Trial Court found the accused not guilty and acquitted them. 6. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, representing the appellant/State, submits that the learned Magistrate failed to properly appreciate that PWs.1 to 5 are court employees and that the incident occurred on 06.02.2005 at approximately 2:15 PM in the verandah of the court building; the Magistrate should have considered the evidence showing that A.1 caught hold the PW.1’s shirt collar, and A.2 assaulted him by striking him on the back and kicking him. The reasons provided by the Trial Court for acquitting the accused are legally and factually untenable. The Trial Court erred in disregarding the prosecution evidence, rendering the impugned judgment inconsistent and liable to be set aside. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents/accused contends that the case has been fabricated against the respondents owing to a land dispute; the PW.1’s testimony lacks corroboration from other prosecution witnesses, and 4 that the Trial Court rightly disbelieved the prosecution’s version. The learned counsel accordingly supports the findings and conclusions recorded by the Trial Court. 8. I have heard learned counsel on either side and carefully perused the material available on record, including the oral and documentary evidence produced by the prosecution before the Trial Court. 9. Point for determination is: Whether the Trial Court was justified in acquitting the accused? P O I N T: 10. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka 1, at paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows: "26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the appellate court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the judgment of acquittal of the court below if the findings so recorded by the court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the court below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that acquittal by the court below bolsters the presumption of his innocence." 11. In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr.2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the power of appellate court to interfere in an appeal against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point has concluded as under: “16.....while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal 1 (2011) 6 SCC 279 2 (2007) 3 SCC 755 5 unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged with.” 12. In Chandrappa and Others V. State of Karnataka3, while considering the similar issue, namely, appeal against acquittal and power of the appellate court to re-appreciate, review or reconsider evidence and interfere with the order of acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme court, reiterated the principles laid down in the above decisions and further held that: “42.....The following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. 3 (2007) 4 SCC 415 6 (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 13. It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this court, is not warranted. However, the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact. In that case, it is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power, and the appellate court is free to arrive at its conclusion, keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to every person, and in criminal jurisprudence, every person is presumed innocent unless proven guilty by a competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court concerning both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, the appellate court must marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. 14. With the above principles in mind, this will court analyze the reasoning and ultimate conclusion of the Trial Court in interfering with the judgment of acquittal. 15. According to the prosecution, the incident in question occurred on 06.12.2005 at around 2:15 PM in the verandah of the Court at Narasannapeta. It is not in dispute that PW.1 (V. Chinnavadu) was working as a Process 7 Server in the Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Narasannapeta, on the date of the alleged incident. As per the testimony of PW.1, while he was in the verandah of the Court, both accused approached him and questioned him as to why he had laid bunds in their fields. In response, PW.1 stated that if they wanted any information regarding the matter, they should approach the Mandal Revenue Officer. The evidence of PW.1 primarily indicates that the altercation arose due to a land dispute between the parties, which had no direct connection with his official duties. It is not the version of PW.1 that he was discharging any official duty at the time of the incident. Although the alleged incident is said to have occurred around 2:15 PM in the court verandah, neither PW.1 nor the other witnesses stated that the accused obstructed PW.1 while he was discharging his official duties. 16. Therefore, in order to reach a logical conclusion regarding the guilt of the accused under Section 353 of the IPC, it is essential to consider and analyze the necessary ingredients of this section, which addresses the offence of assault or the use of criminal force to prevent a public servant from discharging their official duties. 17. At this stage, it is profitable to refer to the provision of section 353 of IPC : 353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty.- Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 18. 18. Legally, to prove the charge under Section 353 Indian Penal Code it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the following ingredients of the offence: (i) There must be assault or use of criminal force; 8 (ii) Such assault or use of criminal force must have been made on a public servant, and (iii) It must have been on a public servant- (iv) While he was acting in the execution of his duty or, (v) With intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his discharge of duty, or (vi) In consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by him in duty. 19. In Durgacharan V. State of Orissa4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, the ingredients of assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is doing his duty as such is necessary. 20. In Manik Taneja vs. State of Karnataka5, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while analyzing the scope and applicability of section 353 of IPC, made the following observations: 12. A reading of the above provision shows that the essential ingredients of the offence Under Section 353 Indian Penal Code are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. 21. Section 353 of IPC is very categorically provides that in order to attract the offence it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that there was assault or use of criminal force restraining public servant from performing his official duties or causing any act with intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duty. Therefore, it is evident that to make out a case under section 353 of IPC, the prosecution must meet essential requirements that a public servant must be assaulted or subjected to criminal force when he was carrying out his responsibilities; or with the goal of preventing or discouraging him from doing his duties. The execution of the public duty is the sine qua non for the application of the aforesaid section. 4 AIR 1966 SC 1775 (Crl) 537 5 MANU/SC/0056/2015 9 22. The Trial Court also noted a discrepancy regarding the delay in lodging the report. As evident from the record, Ex.P1 was lodged on 08.12.2005, whereas the incident took place on 06.12.2005. During cross-examination, PW.1 stated that he had gone to the police station immediately after the incident and submitted a written report. This raises an inference that an earlier report may have been given by PW.1 but was not placed on record, thereby creating doubt about the prosecution’s version and the authenticity of Ex.P1. 23. In Apren Joseph @ Current Kunjukunju and others vs. State of Kerala6, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: "It is always better that the F.I.R. is rendered before there in time and opportunity to embellish or before the informant's memory fades. Undue or unreasonable delay in lodging the F.I.R., therefore, inevitably gives rise to suspicion which puts the court on guard to look for the possible motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of the prosecution version. Effect of delay in lodging the F.I.R., would always depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case." 24. In State of M.P. vs. Kriparan7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: "Inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R. is fatal to the case of the prosecution particularly when the facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate such an inference". 25. It is a settled proposition of law that in a criminal trial, suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution must prove its case and establish the charge by adducing convincing evidence to ward off any reasonable doubt about the accused's complicity. 26. For this, the prosecution case has to be in the category of "must be true" and not "may be true". In Rajiv Singh V. State of Bihar and another8 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that : “It is the well-entrenched principle of criminal jurisprudence that a charge can be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence to warrant 6 AIR 1973 SC 1 7 (2003) 12 SCC 675 8 (2015) 16 SCC 369 10 legal conviction and that no person can be held guilty on pure moral conviction. Howsoever grave the alleged offence may be, otherwise stirring the conscience of any court, suspicion alone cannot take the place of legal proof. The well-established cannon of criminal justice is "fouler the crime, higher the proof". In unmistakable terms, it is the mandate of law that the prosecution, in order to succeed in a criminal trial, has to prove the charge(s) beyond all reasonable doubt”. 27. The pivotal question, however, is whether, at the time of the alleged assault, PW.1 was acting in the discharge of his duties as a public servant, or whether the assault or use of criminal force was intended to prevent or deter him from performing such duties, or was in consequence of any act done or attempted to be done by him in the lawful discharge of his official functions. For the offence under Section 353 of the IPC to be made out, it must be clearly established that the public servant was, at the relevant time, engaged in performing a duty imposed upon him by virtue of his office. In the present case, the evidence indicates that, at the time of the alleged assault or use of criminal force, PW.1 was not engaged in any act so integrally connected with the functions of his office as to constitute an official duty. 28. The record reveals that PW.2 (S. Kantha Rao) was working as a Copyist, PW.3 (P. Viswanadham) as a Junior Assistant, PW.4 (D. Butchi) as a Record Assistant, and PW.5 (B. Lokanadham) as the Head Clerk of the same Court. However, their testimonies did not support the prosecution's case. According to their testimony, upon hearing some altercations, they exited their respective rooms and observed the accused and PW.1 involved in a physical altercation, pushing each other. However, none of the witnesses attributed any specific acts of obstruction or assault by the accused that would substantiate the charge under Section 353 IPC. 29. The material on record indicates that there is neither any allegation nor evidence to suggest that the accused assaulted PW.1 or used criminal force against him with the intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duties as a public servant, or that the act was in consequence of anything done or 11 attempted by PW.1 in the lawful discharge of such duties. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the alleged assault bears no real nexus, causal connection, or consequential relation to the performance of his official functions. There is not even a scintilla of evidence from which it can be reasonably inferred that the accused intended to obstruct or deter PW.1 in the discharge of his official duties. 30. It is undisputed that PW.1, a Process Server, was not engaged in the discharge of his official duties at the time of the incident. The altercation clearly arose from a private land dispute between PW.1 and the accused, and not in the context of any official function. The mere occurrence of the incident during lunch hour within the court premises does not, by itself, attract the provisions of Section 353 IPC. The Trial Court rightly observed that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused obstructed PW.1 in the performance of his duties. The testimony of PW.1, uncorroborated by other court staff (PWs.2 to 5), lacks independent support. Moreover, no explanation was offered for the delay in lodging the complaint, despite PW.1 being a court employee. Though he claims to have reported the incident immediately, the record does not reflect prompt disclosure. Given the admitted pre-existing land disputes between the parties, the unsubstantiated and inconsistent evidence of PW.1 does not inspire confidence. There is no material on record indicating that the accused assaulted PW.1 or used criminal force to deter him from performing official duties. Accordingly, the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are not made out, and the prosecution has failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt. 31. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal appeal, if another view is possible, then also the appellate court cannot substitute its view by reversing the acquittal into conviction unless the findings of the trial Court are perverse, contrary to the material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. 12 32. In Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of Karnataka9, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed the scope of section 378 of the Code as under: “Section 378 Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384 Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial Court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial Court is both a possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having seen the witnesses. 33. In State of Gujarat V. Thanabhai Ganeshbhai Rajput 10, the High Court of Gujarat held that as per the settled legal position when two views are possible, the judgment and order of the acquittal passed by the trial Court should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for special reasons. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Rajasthan V. Ram Niwas11 can be relied on in this regard. 34. So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is well defined by now by series of decisions and the same is not to be repeated time and again, however, one of the recent decision in case of Harbeer Singh V. Sheeshpal12, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that mere fact that another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of decisions in which this court is of the considered opinion that State has not 9 2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184 10 2022 Latest Caselaw 3827 Guj 11 (2010) 15 SCC 463 12 (2017) CriLJ 169 13 made out any case which would permit this court to exercise such wide powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on the part of learned judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been rightly undertaken by the court below and therefore when such eventuality is reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of the opinion not to interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of the aforesaid decision in paras: 10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein after: "10. The above principle has been reiterated by this court in a number of judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, this court will not interfere with the judgment of the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for reversing an order of acquittal. 11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the accused should be adopted. 35. It is a settled principle of law that if the Trial Court takes the view, it should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The view taken by the Trial Court is a plausible one. Therefore, taking the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, this court is not inclined to reverse the Trial Court's finding. 36. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on record, this court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out 14 no case to establish a definite guilt of the respondents / accused. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view, that the ingredients of the offence under section 353 of IPC are not made out. Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the material elements necessary to sustain a charge under section 353 of IPC. 37. The Trial Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant’s request for interference lacks merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or misinterpretation by the Trial Court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is no flaw in the findings of fact by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, the acquittal of the respondents cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal against the acquittal is dismissed, and the order of acquittal is confirmed and there is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court. Accordingly, the point is answered. 38. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal No.1067 of 2009 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Prohibition and Excise, Srikakulam, in Calendar Case No.203 of 2006, dated 11.04.2007, stands confirmed. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. _______________________ T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J Date: 31.07.2025 SAK 15 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1067/2009 Date: 31.07.2025 SAK