( 2025:HHC:25004 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 81 of 2013 Reserved on : 11.07.2025 Date of Decision: 29.07.2025 Raman Kapoor .... Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh .... Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes For the petitioner : Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present petition is directed against the judgment dated 10.01.2013 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan (learned appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 30.11.2010 and order of sentence dated 03.12.2010 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan (learned trial Court) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC’). It was asserted that the informant Bhagat Ram Kataria (PW-4) is the owner of the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-18-6400. He had parked his car on Mall Road on 11.05.2009 at about 8:00 PM. When he was going on a morning walk on 12.05.2009 at about 7:00 am, he found that his car was missing. He searched for the car in the whole town, but could not find it. He reported the matter to the police, and the police registered an FIR (Ext. PW8/A). HC Ranjeet Singh (PW-7) conducted the investigation. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW7/A). The informant produced the registration certificate and the key to the vehicle. These were seized vide seizure memo (Ext. PW1/A). Asif Rahman (PW-2) was running a shop of hair dresser at 3 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) Saharanpur. Accused Javed and Raman Kapoor came to his shop in a vehicle having a broken registration plate bearing registration No. HP-18-6. They told Asif Rahman that the vehicle had a defect, that they had parked the vehicle at Gandhi Park and would take the vehicle after a few days. However, they did not return for 3-4 days. Hence, Asif Rahman called his brother-in-law, Firoz Khan (PW-5) and told him about the visit of the accused and the parking of the car. Firoz Khan informed Bhagat Ram (PW-4), and Bhagat Ram told the police about this fact. HC Ranjeet Singh (PW-7), ASI Subhash Chand, HHC Jagdish (PW-1) went to Saharanpur with Firoz Khan. A Maruti Car bearing Registration No. HR-18-6 was found parked at Gandhi Park. The word ‘HP’ were changed to ‘HR’ with the help of a black tape. The police checked the chassis number and engine number of the car, and these matched the numbers mentioned on the Registration Certificate. The police checked the vehicle and found one purse having two photographs of accused Raman Kapoor and one PAN Card of Raman Kapoor’s father inside the car. These were put in a parcel, and the parcel was sealed with the seal impression 4 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) ‘T’. Seal impression (Ext. PW7/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Bhagat Ram after the use. The parcel was seized vide seizure memo (Ext PW4/A). The site plan (Ext. PW7/C) showing the place of recovery was prepared. The accused Raman Kapoor and Javed Ahmad were associated with the investigation. Raman Kapoor produced a key to a motorcycle, which was seized vide memo (Ext PW1/B). It was put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with seal impression ‘A’. Seal impression (Ext. PW7/D) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The police arrested the accused Raman Kapoor. Accused Raman Kapoor made a statement (Ext PW1/C) that he had concealed a stepney of the vehicle in a jungle. The accused led the police and the witnesses to this place from where he got recovered a stepney. The police seized the stepney vide seizure memo (Ext PW1/D). The site plan of the place of recovery (Ext.PW7/E) was prepared. Accused Raman Kapoor made a disclosure statement (Ext PW1/E) that he could show the place from where the theft was committed. The accused led the police to the place from where the theft was committed. The accused also showed 5 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) the place where the car was parked. A site plan (Ext. PW7/F) was prepared. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. The accused were charged with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examines 8 witnesses to prove its case. Jagdish Chand (PW-1) is the witness to the recovery and the disclosure statement. Asif Rehman (PW-2) saw the accused with the vehicle and informed his brother-in-law about the same. HC Kawar Singh (PW-3) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. Bhagat Ram (PW-4) is the informant. Firoj Khan (PW-5) intimated about the parking of the car at Saharanpur to the informant. Inspector Sant Singh (PW-6) prepared the challan. HC Ranjeet Singh (PW-7) conducted the investigation. HC Kunwar Singh (PW-8) signed the FIR. 6 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. Accused Raman Kapoor stated that the witnesses, Firoj Khan and Asif Rehman, made false statements against him because of the dispute with Firoj Khan. Firoj Khan and Asif Rehman are relatives of each other. He claimed that he was innocent. He stated that he wanted to produce defence evidence, but subsequently, no evidence was produced. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution had succeeded in proving that the car was stolen from the Mall Road and was found at Saharanpur. It was also proved that photographs of the accused Raman Kapoor and a photocopy of the PAN card of Raman Kapoor’s father were found in the car. The accused, Raman Kapoor, failed to provide any explanation for the recovery of these articles. The stepney of the stolen car was recovered at the instance of accused Raman Kapoor. He pointed out the places from which the car was stolen and the place where the car was parked. All these circumstances unerringly pointed towards the guilt of the accused. The explanation provided by him that a false case was made against him was not established 7 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) on the balance of probability. However, the prosecution's case was not proved against the accused Javed Khan because there was nothing to connect him to the commission of crime except the fact that he was present in the vehicle when it was brought to Gandhi Park. This was not sufficient to convict him. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused, Javed Khan, but convicted the accused, Raman Kapoor, for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by learned Trial Court that the prosecution had proved that the car was stolen from the Mall Road, Nahan and it was recovered at Gandhi Park, Saharanpur. It was also proved that the police found the photographs of accused Raman Kapoor and a photocopy of the PAN Card of Raman Kapoor’s father in the car. The stepney of the car was 8 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) recovered at the instance of accused Raman Kapoor. He had also identified the places from where the theft was committed and where the car was parked. These circumstances pointed to the guilt of the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced him. Consequently, the appeal filed by accused Raman Kapoor was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. It was duly established on record that the accused was falsely implicated and he had no concern with the theft of the car. The prosecution relied upon the statements of interested witnesses. They were inimical to the family of the accused. No independent witness to the recovery was associated, despite the opportunity and availability; therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) 9. I have heard Mr. Sanjiv Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr. Parshant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. It was duly proved on record that the accused Javed had enmity with Asif Rehman (PW-2). Bhagat Ram (PW-4) is also inimical to accused Raman Kapoor. The prosecution witnesses admitted that the place of the incident is located in a heavily populated area; however, no independent witness was associated during the investigation. The statements of the prosecution witnesses did not inspire confidence, and learned Courts below erred in relying upon these statements. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr. Parshant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the State, submitted that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and learned Courts below had rightly appreciated the material placed on 10 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) record. Mere enmity is not sufficient to discard the testimony of the witness. The photographs of the accused Raman Kapoor and the PAN Card of his father were found in the car, for which no explanation was provided by him. He had pointed out the place from where the stepney was recovered. He was seen with the car by Asif Rehman (PW-2), who had no enmity with accused Raman Kapoor. This Court should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. He prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submission made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional Court is not an appellate Court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the 11 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object 12 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much- advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : (Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27) “27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and 13 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: 27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. *** 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a 14 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. *** 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.” 17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge. 15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of 15 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much- advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : (Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh 16 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27) “27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: 27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. *** 17 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. *** 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.” 17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge. 16. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 18 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material or there is 19 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 14. In the above case, also conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 17. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels 20 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well- established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. Bhagat Ram (PW-4) stated that he had parked his Maruti Car bearing Registration No.HP-18-6400 on the Mall Road inside the parking line on 11.05.2009; however, it was found missing on 12.05.2009. He reported the matter to the police. Firoj Khan, his neighbour, was told by Asif Rahman that the car was parked in Gandhi Park, Saharanpur. Asif Rahman became suspicious because the accused had parked the car and had not returned; thereafter, the informant visited Saharanpur with the police. The Maruti Car was found parked at Gandhi Park. The front registration plate was broken. Registration No. HR-18-6 could be read. The letter “P” was changed to “R” with the help of black tape. The police checked the engine and the chassis number of the vehicle. These tallied with the stolen vehicle. The spare stepney was missing from the vehicle. One purse having the photographs of accused 21 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) Raman Kapoor was recovered from the car. The police put the photographs in the parcel and sealed the parcel. He identified the purse, photographs and the identity card. Accused Raman Kapoor produced a key which was seized by the police. He stated in his cross-examination that his house was located near Hathi ki Kabar, where the people park their vehicles. He used to park his car inside the parking lot of the Mall Road. He admitted that the police post in Gunnu Ghat is located on Mall Road. He was not aware that the people used to walk frequently on the Mall Road till 1:00-1:30 AM. He admitted that people used to walk during the summers, but volunteered to say that the people do not walk at night. Seema was his tenant. He was not aware that Mohit Maria used to visit her, and accused Raman had quarrelled with him. He denied that he had evicted Seema after the incident. He came to know about the theft at about 7:00 AM. He went to the police post at 8:00 AM. The police prepared various documents at different places. He denied that no recovery was effected in his presence. He denied that the photographs and identity 22 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) cards were provided by the police. He denied that he was making a false statement. 20. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he is making a false statement. It was suggested to him that accused Raman quarrelled with Mohit. However, he denied this fact. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof, and this suggestion is not sufficient to discard his testimony. 21. His testimony is duly corroborated by HHC Jagdish Chand (PW-1). He stated that accused Raman Kapoor produced one key on 16.05.2009, which was seized vide memo (Ex. PW1/B). It was put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with seal ‘A’. Accused Raman Kapoor made a disclosure statement in his presence and in presence of Chaman Lal that he had concealed the stepney of the vehicle at Judda Ka Johar, which could be got recovered by him. Statement (Ex.PW1/C) was reduced to writing. The police party went to Judda Ka Johar, where one stepney concealed in the bushes was got recovered. The police seized the stepney vide memo (Ext. PW1/D). Accused Raman Kapoor made a statement that he could show the 23 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) place from where the theft was committed and the place where the vehicle was parked. The accused led the police to Mall Road from where the theft was committed and to Gandhi Park where the vehicle was parked. The memo (Ex.PW1/A) was prepared at about 1:00-1:15 PM. There are many shops and houses near the police post. Memo (Ex. PW1/B) was prepared in the police station. He did not remember whether any person was called while preparing this memo. Memo (Ext.PW1/D) was prepared at Judda Ka Johar. No independent witness was associated from the Nahan. Many heavily populated mohallas fall on the way to Judda Ka Johar. Many people have their houses around Gandhi Park. He denied that the false case was made against the accused. 22. The cross-examination of this witness was directed towards establishing that the houses of many people are located near the police post, the place of incident, and the place of recovery, and no independent witness was associated. This kind of cross-examination will not help the accused. Learned Courts below had rightly pointed out that the prosecution's case cannot be doubted 24 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) because no independent witness was associated with the disclosure statements and the consequent recoveries. In State Versus Sunil 2001 (1) SCC 652, the recovery was discarded by the High Court on the ground that no independent witness had signed the memo, and it was signed only by the highly interested person. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that there is no requirement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act or Section 161 of Cr.P.C. to obtain the signatures of independent witnesses. The requirement of independent witnesses is when the recovery is effected under Section 100(4) of the Cr.PC and not when the recovery is effected pursuant to the disclosure statement. It was further observed that statements of police officials cannot be doubted because they are official witnesses. It was observed: - “17. Recovery of the nicker is evidenced by the seizure memo, Ext. PW-10/G. It was signed by PWlO-Sharda beside its author, PW17- Investigating Officer. The Division Bench of the High Court declined to place any weight on the said circumstance purely on the ground that no other independent witness had signed the memo, but it was signed only by "highly interested persons". The observation of the Division Bench in that regard is extracted below: 25 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) "It need hardly be said that in order to lend assurance that the investigation has been proceeding in a fair and honest manner, it would be necessary for the Investigating Officer to take independent witnesses to the discovery under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act; and without taking independent witnesses and taking highly interested persons and the police officers as the witnesses to the discovery would render the discovery, at least, not free from doubt." 18. In this context, we may point out that there is no requirement either under Section 27 of the Evidence Act or under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to obtain the signature of independent witnesses on the record in which the statement of an accused is written. The legal obligation to call Independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality to attend and witness the exercise made by the police is cast on the police officer when searches are made under Chapter VII of the Code. Section 100(5) of the Code requires that such a search shall be made in their presence and a list of all things seized in the course of such search and of the places in which they are respectively found shall be prepared by such officer or another person, and signed by such witnesses. It must be remembered that a search is made to find out a thing or document which the searching officer has no prior idea where the thing or document is kept. He prowls for it either on reasonable suspicion or some guesswork that it could possibly be ferreted out in such prowling. It is a stark reality that during searches, the team which conducts the search would have to meddle with lots of other articles and documents also, and in such a process, many such articles or documents are likely to be displaced or even strewn helter-skelter. The legislative idea in insisting on such searches to be 26 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) made in the presence of two independent inhabitants of the locality is to ensure the safety of all such articles meddled with and to protect the rights of the persons entitled thereto. But the recovery of an object pursuant to the information supplied by an accused in custody is different from the searching endeavour envisaged in Chapter VII of the Code. This Court has indicated the difference between the two processes in the Transport Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad & Anr. v. S. Sardar Ali & Ors 1. Following observations of Chinnappa Reddy, J. can be used to support the said legal proposition: "Section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to which reference was made by the counsel, deals with searches and not seizures. In the very nature of things, when the property is seized and not recovered during a search, it is not possible to comply with the provisions of subsections (4) and (5) of Section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the case of a seizure (under the Motor Vehicles Act), there is no provision for preparing a list of the things seized in the course of the seizure for the obvious reason that all those things are seized not separately but as part of the vehicle itself." 19. Hence, it is a fallacious impression that when recovery is effected pursuant to any statement made by the accused, the document prepared by the Investigating Officer contemporaneous with such recovery must necessarily be attested by independent witnesses. Of course, if any such statement leads to the recovery of any article, it is open to the Investigating Officer to take the signature of any person present at that time on the document prepared for such recovery. But if no witness was present or if no person had agreed to affix his signature on the document, it is 27 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) difficult to lay down, as a proposition of law, that the document so prepared by the police officer must be treated as tainted and the recovery evidence unreliable. The court has to consider the evidence of the Investigating Officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth. 20. We feel that it is an archaic notion that the actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. We are aware that such a notion was lavishly entertained during the British period, and policemen also knew about it. Its hangover persisted during post-independent years, but it is time now to start placing at least initial trust in the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature. Hence, when a police officer gives evidence in court that a certain article was recovered by him on the strength of the statement made by the accused, it is open to the court to believe the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. It is for the accused, through cross-examination of witnesses or through any other materials, to show that the evidence of the police officer is either unreliable or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a particular case. If the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police, the court could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in 28 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) the documents made contemporaneous with such actions.” 23. This question was also considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Praveen Kumar Versus State of Karnataka (2003) 12 SCC 199, in which a contention was raised that the statement recorded by the police under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act was not witnessed by any independent witness and the same should be rejected. It was held that there is no requirement to associate independent witnesses at the time of the disclosure statement. It was observed: - “20. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, contended that the alleged statement, Ext. P-35 was made to PW 33, not in the presence of any independent witness; hence, the same should be rejected. He also contended that the said statement was made on 2-3-1994, but the recovery was made only on 3-3-1994; therefore, the said recovery cannot be correlated to the statement, if any, made by the accused on 2-3- 1994. He also challenged the fact of recovery, stating that the panch witnesses to the said recovery cannot be believed. 21. Section 27 does not lay down that the statement made to a police officer should always be in the presence of independent witnesses. Normally, in cases where the evidence led by the prosecution as to a fact depends solely on the police witnesses, the courts seek corroboration as a matter of caution and not as a matter of rule. Thus, it is only a rule of prudence which makes 29 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) the court seek corroboration from an independent source, in such cases, while assessing the evidence of the police. But in cases where the court is satisfied that the evidence of the police can be independently relied upon, then in such cases, there is no prohibition in law that the same cannot be accepted without independent corroboration. In the instant case, nothing is brought on record to show why the evidence of PW 33 10 should be disbelieved in regard to the statement made by the accused as per Ext. P-35. Therefore, the argument that the statement of the appellant as per Ext. P-35 should be rejected because the same is not made in the presence of an independent witness has to be rejected.” 24. The Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has also considered this question in State of Rajasthan vs. Mangal Singh, AIR 2017 Raj. 68 and gave the following reasons for not insisting upon the presence of independent witnesses during the disclosure statements: 22. We are of the firm opinion that the insistence to keep attesting witnesses present when the Investigating Officer records the information supplied by the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is absolutely unwarranted and rather amounts to a direct infringement of the confidentiality of the investigation. There are strong reasons behind this conclusion. We summarise a few illustrations to fortify the same: (a) Investigation commences the moment an F.I.R. is registered for a cognizable offence. An Investigating Officer, having custody of the accused, cannot predict in advance the precise moment when the accused would decide to reveal the information, which could lead to 30 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) the discovery of an incriminating fact. Thus, if attestation of the information by an independent witness is insisted upon, as a direct corollary thereto, the Investigating Officer would be required to keep the witnesses in attendance right from the moment the accused is arrested till the information is elicited. This would lead to an absolutely absurd situation and is likely to frustrate the investigation. The very sanctity of investigation and the privilege available to the Investigating Officer to keep the investigation secluded from prying eyes would be compromised. (b) Another possible situation may be that the accused might divulge the information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act to the Investigating Officer at a particular point in time when independent witnesses are not available. For adhering to the procedure of seeking attestation by independent witnesses, the Investigating Officer would then be required to summon independent witnesses and request the accused to repeat the information in their presence. At this point in time, the accused may either refuse to divulge the information given earlier or may oblige the Investigating Officer with the information, which would then be taken down in writing in the presence of the independent attesting witnesses. However, there is a fundamental glitch in adopting this procedure, which would certainly make the information, if any, received the second time around in the presence of the witnesses, inadmissible in evidence. Law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, including the judgment in the case of Aher Raja Khima v. The State of Saurashtra, reported in AIR 1956 SC 217, that 31 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) information of a fact already known to the Investigating Officer is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, in case the Investigating Officer, while making an investigation of the accused in his custody, is provided information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and soon thereafter, calls the Panchas and records the same in their presence, then he would be recording the memorandum of information already known to him. Such information would be inadmissible at the outset, and thus, the entire endeavour would become nothing short of an exercise in futility. (c) There is yet another risk involved, which could severely prejudice the accused if the information provided by the accused under Section 27 is recorded in the presence of independent witnesses. The information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act often comprises two parts: one being confessional, which has to be excluded, and the other, which leads to the discovery of an incriminating fact and is admissible in evidence to the extent of the discovery made in pursuance thereof. In case independent witnesses are kept present when the information is given by the accused, the prosecution may make an endeavour to prove even the confessional part of the information as being an extra-judicial confession made in the presence of independent witnesses. There may even arise a situation where the independent witness present to attest to the memorandum prepared under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is a Magistrate. In such a case, the confessional part of the information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act would almost assume the character of a confession under Section 26 of the Evidence Act, thereby 32 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) condemning the accused to face severe consequences. There is a high probability of this situation arising in cases involving the recovery of narcotics where the Investigating Officer gives an option to the accused that be searched in the presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. Contemplating that option to be searched in the presence of a Magistrate is given, and a search of the accused is conducted, and during the process, he is also questioned in the presence of the Magistrate. At this time, the accused may provide information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act to the Investigating Officer, which is partly confessional in nature and is taken down in writing and witnessed by the Magistrate by adhering to the requirement of attestation. In such a situation, the accused would be faced with severe consequences because the prosecution would then, by lifting the prohibition contained in Section 26 of the Evidence Act, insist to prove the whole of the information as amounting to a confession made in the presence of a Magistrate. Thus, the requirement seeking attestation of the memorandum prepared under Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not have any logic or rationale behind it.” 25. Therefore, the disclosure statement cannot be discarded on the ground that independent witnesses were not associated. 26. Asif Rehman (PW-2) stated that accused Javed and Raman Kapoor came to his shop during the summers of 2009 in a Maruti Car bearing Registration No. HP-18-6, 33 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) which had a damaged registration plate. They told him (Asif Rehman) that the vehicle was defective and they did not have the money to repair it. They parked the vehicle at Gandhi Park and assured to return the next day. However, no one came for 3-4 days. He informed his brother-in-law, who told him that the car of his neighbour Bhagat Ram was stolen and the accused did not have any vehicle with them. The police came with Bhagat Ram and Firoze Khan. The police checked the vehicle and found a purse containing the photographs. The police seized the vehicle and took it with them. He stated in his cross-examination that people bring the vehicle to Saharanpur for repairs. He admitted that the defective vehicles are abandoned on the road. He denied that he was making a false statement regarding the accused Raman Kapoor driving the vehicle. He admitted the litigation between him and the family of accused Javed during the cross-examination by learned counsel for Javed. 27. It was submitted that he had enmity with the family of Javed, and his testimony is not reliable. This submission cannot be accepted. He had enmity with the accused Javed but none with accused Raman Kapoor. 34 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) Therefore, his testimony cannot be discarded because of enmity with accused Javed Khan. 28. Firoze Khan (PW-5) stated that he received a call from his brother-in-law, Asif Khan, on 15.05.2009, informing him that a car registered at Nahan was abandoned at Gandhi Park, Saharanpur. He also informed that the front registration plate of the car was damaged. He informed Bhagat Ram about this fact. He and Bhagat Ram went to Saharanpur with the police, where the vehicle was recovered at Gandhi Park. The police checked the engine and chassis number of the vehicle with the registration certificate and seized it vide memo (Ext PW4/A). He stated in his cross-examination that he and accused Raman Kapoor are residents of the same mohalla. He admitted that the younger brother of accused Raman Kapoor used to park his motorcycle in the house of accused Raman Kapoor. He admitted that accused Raman Kapoor quarrelled with his elder brother. He admitted that his sister-in-law was a witness in that case. He voluntarily said that she had sustained injury to her head. He admitted that Hathi Ki Kabar is located near the house of Bhagat Ram, where 35 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) people park their vehicles. He admitted that the people continue to move on Mall Road till 12:00-1:00 AM. He admitted that the police carry out patrolling duty during the night. He stated that the police had obtained his signatures on two documents, one at Nahan and one at Saharanpur. They returned to Nahan at 1:30-2:00 pm. People were moving at Saharanpur when the vehicle was seized. They went to the house of Asif, who led them to the place of recovery. He was not literate and could not state where the memo (Ext.PW4/A) was prepared. He denied that he was making a false statement. 29. It was submitted that he had enmity with the accused Raman Kapoor and had a reason to depose falsely against him (the accused). The mere enmity will not result in the rejection of his statement. The Court has to see his testimony with utmost care and caution. Even if his testimony is seen with due care and caution, there is nothing to doubt his testimony. His testimony is duly corroborated by the informant, his brother-in-law and HHC Jagdish; therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly relied upon the testimony of this witness. 36 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) 30. HC Ranjeet Singh (PW7) stated that he accompanied the informant and Firoze Khan to Saharanpur, where a Maruti car with a damaged front registration plate was found parked at Gandhi Park. Registration number HR-18-6 was readable. It was identified by the informant. The police checked the chassis number and engine number, and they matched with those recorded in the registration certificate. One purse having two photographs of accused Raman Kapoor and one identity Card of Raman Kapoor’s father was found in the car. These were put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed. Asif Rehman revealed that accused Raman Kapoor and Javed Ahmad had visited his shop in a car, and the police found accused Raman Kapoor and Javed Ahmad at Nahan. Accused Raman produced a key which was used for opening the car. He seized the key. Accused Raman Kapoor made a disclosure statement that he had concealed a car stepney in the jungle, which could be got recovered by him. The accused led the police and the witnesses to the place from where the stepney was recovered. Accused Raman made a statement that he could show the place from where 37 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) the theft was committed and the place where the vehicle was parked. He led the police to Mall Road and Gandhi Park. He prepared the memos of these places. He admitted in his cross-examination that memos (Ext. PW1/C and Ext. PW1/E) were prepared at the Police Station, Nahan. He did not make any effort to call an independent witness. The memo (Ext PW1/D) was prepared at Judda Ka Johar. No witness was associated while going towards Judda ka Johar. No witness was also associated at Saharanpur. He admitted that the houses and shops are located on the Mall Road, and many people move on the Mall Road. He denied that the car had not been stolen and that the false case was made against the accused. 31. This witness was also cross-examined regarding the non-association of independent witnesses. It has also been found that the prosecution's case cannot be doubted because of the non-association of independent witnesses. The accused did not suggest anything in the cross-examination that he had any motive to depose against the accused, and his testimony cannot be doubted simply because he is a police official. 38 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) 32. Thus, it was duly placed on record that the theft of the informant’s car had taken place from the Mall Road, Nahan. The accused Raman Kapoor was seen driving a car by the witness Asif Khan (PW3) immediately after the theft. The police recovered the car and found a purse containing the photographs of the accused, Raman, and the identity card of Raman’s father. Accused Raman Kapoor made a disclosure statement, and the stepney of the car was recovered. The accused failed to provide any explanation in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. or during the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses regarding these circumstances. He simply denied the prosecution’s case and claimed false implication. Section 114 Illustrations (a) provides that a person found in possession of the stolen goods soon after the theft is presumed to be a thief or the receiver of the stolen property. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dakkata Balaram Reddy v. State of A.P., (2023) 19 SCC 461: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 474 that where the accused was found in possession of the stolen goods, a presumption would arise under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act and the 39 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) burden to rebut the presumption is upon the accused. It was observed at page 471: “27. In this regard, it may also be noted that A-2 was found in possession of a bag carrying some of the stolen ornaments and, therefore, such possession itself speaks against him, in terms of Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act, 1872. Being a fact especially within his knowledge, it was for A-2 to explain as to how he came to be in possession of those stolen ornaments, under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872. However, no explanation was offered by him. As regards A-1, it is the prosecution's case that he confessed to the commission of the crime and upon being questioned as to the stolen gold ornaments, he himself went into the other room in his house and brought out a bag containing the gold ornaments. This part of his confession would, therefore, be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, as it led to the recovery of the stolen gold ornaments.” 33. Therefore, the learned Courts below were justified in holding that the accused had committed the theft of the car, and there is no infirmity in the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. 34. Therefore, the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below are sustainable, and no interference is required with them. 35. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 40 ( 2025:HHC:25004 ) 36. Registry is directed to transmit the records of th learned Courts below forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 29th July 2025 (Ritu)