( 2025:HHC:28893 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Civil Revision No.76 of 2009 Reserved on: 15th May, 2025 Date of decision: 27th August, 2025 Savitri Puri (deceased) & others …Petitioners Versus Surinder Kumar & others …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes For the Petitioners: Mr. K.D. Sood, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Rahul Gathania, Advocate for petitioners No.2 to 5. Petitioner No.1 stands deleted on account of death vide order dated 11.10.2023. For the Respondents: Mr. Lalit Sehgal and Mr.Bhim Raj, Advocates, for respondent No.1. Respondent No.9 Kamla Chona stands deleted vider Court order dated 11.10.2023. None for other respondents. Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge Petitioners have filed this Revision Petition under Section 24(5) of Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (herein-after referred to as ‘Rent Act’) against the judgment dated 31.3.2009 passed by the Appellate Authority, Chamba, District Chamba in Rent Appeal No.14 of 2008 titled as Savitri Puri and others vs. Surinder Kumar 2 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) and others, whereby order dated 30.9.2008 passed by the Rent Controller, Chamba, District Chamba in Rent Control Act No.5 of 2004 titled as Surinder Kumar Chona vs. Savitri Puri and others has been affirmed. 2 Present petition has been preferred on the ground that landlord did not require the premises bonafide nor the building was required to be reconstructed and, in any event, repair could be carried out in business premises without premises being evicted. The building was in good condition and did not require reconstruction. Further that the ground of rebuilding/reconstruction was not specifically pleaded and, therefore, no evidence was permissible to be led on the issue. No plan of building, sought to be constructed, had been sanctioned, whereas it was essential requirement of law to plead and prove that plan of proposed construction had been sanctioned and building requires reconstruction which could not be carried out without building being vacated. Further that Authority below did not decide the challenge laid by petitioners on issues No.5 to 8. In alternative, it has been claimed that in case Court finds no favour to interfere in impugned eviction order, petitioners are entitled for entry in premises after re-construction/rebuilding. 3 The Rent Controller after completion of pleadings had framed following issues:- 1. Whether respondents No. 1 to 5 have ceased to be the tenants of the disputed premises, as alleged? OPP 3 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) 2. Whether respondents No.1 to 5 have sublet the disputed premises to respondents No.5A namely Shri Dheeraj Gautam, as alleged?OPP 3. Whether the petitioner requires the disputed premises for his personal use as alleged? OPP 4 Whether the respondents are liable to be ejected as the petitioner wants to reconstruct the premises in dispute being the dilapidated construction as alleged? OPP 5. Whether the petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? OPR 6. Whether the petitioner is estopped by his act and conduct to file the present petition? OPR 7. Whether the petitioner has got no cause of action to file the present petition? OPR 8. Whether the petitioner has got no locus standi to file the present petition? OPR 9 Relief. 4 After framing of issues, evidence was led by both parties and on the basis of material placed on record by parties, it was concluded by the Rent Controller that subletting of disputed premises to respondent No.5A namely Dheeraj Gautam was not proved, however it was proved 4 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) that premises in reference was rented to Karam Chand, predecessor-in- interest of petitioners who was father of Hans Raj Puri. After death of Karam Chand, Hans Raj remained tenant and after death of Hans Raj, petitioners are in possession of premises in reference and Dheeraj Gautam was proved to be a helper of Hans Raj instead of tenant on account of subletting the premises. 5 Issue No.1 that petitioners had ceased to be tenants of disputed premises was decided against the landlord for the concession extended by learned counsel appearing for them by making statement that he was not pressing the said issue. Claim of landlord that disputed premises was required for his personal use was also negated. However, petitioners were held to be liable to be ejected for reconstruction of premises in dispute for its dilapidated condition. 6 Issues No. 5 to 8, alleging that petition was not maintainable in present form, landlord was estopped from his act and conduct to file the petition, he was not having any cause of action and locus standi to file the petition, were decided against the petitioners on the ground that earlier eviction petition preferred by landlord was not adjudicated on merits but was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file afresh and as there was no adjudication on merit of earlier petition, therefore, principle of resjudicata was not applicable and landlord was not estopped from filing a fresh petition for continuation of cause of action and further that 5 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) petitioners have admitted the status of respondents as landlord in their pleadings and evidence. 7 Supreme Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana and others, reported in (1993) 1 SCC 499, referring its earlier pronouncement in Rai Chand Jain vs. Chandra Kanta Khosla, (1991) 1 SCC 422, with respect to scope of revisional power under Section 20 of Kerala Rent Control Act, which is similar to H.P. Rent Act, has observed that notwithstanding the fact that Section 20 of the Act conferring revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is widely worded, such a jurisdiction cannot be converted into an appellate jurisdiction. 8 With respect to scope of jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction and the extent of power which High Court can exercise in a Revision filed under Section 24(5) of the Rent Act, Five Judges’ Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, has observed as under:- “28. Before we consider the matter further to find out the scope and extent of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Acts, a quick observation about the 'appellate jurisdiction' and 'revisional jurisdiction' is necessary. Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice-versa. Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves re-hearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a full- 6 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid of revisional court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided in the statute. It goes without saying that if a revision is provided against an order passed by the tribunal/appellate authority, the decision of the revisional court is the operative decision in law. In our view, as regards the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, much would, however, depend on the language employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction. 29. With the above general observations, we shall now endeavour to determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms "legality or propriety", "regularity, correctness, legality or propriety" and "legality, regularity or propriety" which are used in three Rent Control Acts under consideration. 29.1. The ordinary meaning of the word 'legality' is lawfulness. It refers to strict adherence to law, prescription, or doctrine; the quality of being legal. 29.2. The term 'propriety' means fitness; appropriateness, aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or condition conformity with requirement; rules or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy. 29.3. The terms 'correctness' and 'propriety' ordinarily convey the same meaning, that is, something which is legal and proper. In its ordinary meaning and substance, 'correctness' is compounded of 'legality' and 'propriety' and that which is legal and proper is 'correct'. 29.4. The expression "regularity" with reference to an order ordinarily relates to the procedure being followed in accord with the principles of natural justice and fair play. 30. We have already noted in the earlier part of the judgment that although there is some difference in the language employed by the three Rent Control Acts under consideration which provide for revisional jurisdiction but, in our view, the revisional power of the High Court under these Acts is substantially similar and broadly such power has the same scope save and except the power to invoke revisional jurisdiction suo motu unless so provided expressly. None of these statutes confers on revisional authority the power as wide as that of appellate court or appellate authority despite such power being wider than that provided in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision under consideration does not permit the High Court to invoke the revisional 7 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) jurisdiction as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. Revision does not lie under these provisions to bring the orders of the Trial Court/Rent Controller and Appellate Court/Appellate Authority for re-hearing of the issues raised in the original proceedings. 43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re- appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity. 9 Present Revision Petition is to be decided keeping in view the aforesaid exposition of law with respect to scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 10 It is settled law that landlord has a right to put their property for better use and to obtain higher income and for that purpose 8 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) reconstruction/rebuilding of the property is covered under bonafide requirement of the landlord and in such eventuality location of the property, possible potential for utilization of the property and capacity of landlords to rebuild the premises and financial resources etc. may be relevant, but in case other parameters required to prove bonafide requirement of the landlord are established on record then dilapidated condition of the building may not be necessary to be proved, and, in such eventuality, condition of the building, availability of necessary funds and sanction of Plan by the local authority may be relevant factors, but even if, building is not in dilapidated condition and Map has not been sanctioned yet, but the building is situated in a commercial location having possible potential to fetch higher income after reconstruction/rebuilding and to yield more revenue by its commercial or other use, tenants may be evicted for such bonafide requirement of the landlord. 11 As referred supra, the Rent Controller, on the basis of evidence on record, has rightly decided issues No. 5 to 8 with plausible reasoning and therefore, no interference in this revision petition on this ground is warranted. 12 Plea of petitioners that no evidence could have been led on a issue, not raised, is also not tenable, as on perusal of record, it is apparent that such plea was taken in rent petition and further issues were framed by Rent Controller on the basis of pleadings of parties, and 9 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) except raising this point in present revision petition, no such objection was ever raised after framing of issues by the Rent Controller or even thereafter when evidence was led by parties to prove and to rebut their rival contentions before the Rent Controller including issue No. 4 framed by Rent Controller regarding the requirement of premises for reconstruction being dilapidated construction. Otherwise also, evidence in this regard has been rightly appreciated by the Rent Controller, which needs no interference in Revision Petition as evidence has not to be reappreciated like appeal in Revision Petition. 13 So far as right of re-induction or re-entry shall be subject to and adherence to all provisions of law applicable and prevailing at relevant point of time for such re-entry including determination of fair rent or rent mutually agreed between the parties as well as proposed user and utilization of the property by the landlords. 14 The following para of judgment dated 21.3.2023 passed in Civil Revision No. 155 of 2019 titled Rattan Chand vs. Madhu Bharat Chadha is also relevant in this regard, which reads as under:- “17. Right to re-entry of the tenant has been granted in the Act itself. However, such right shall definitely is not to be an absolute right, as the Courts have to determine the same keeping in view the given facts and circumstances of the case including the purpose for which reconstruction/rebuilding of the premises has been proposed and permitted, and also keeping in view the bonafide requirement of the landlord. In case premises after rebuilding/reconstruction is to be rented, then definitely tenants shall have right to re-entry/re-induction in the premises, in accordance with law, as recorded hereinabove. For example, if premises is ordered to be vacated for banafide requirement of the owner to utilize the premises in better way by converting the 10 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) residential building into a commercial complex, in such eventuality tenant living in residential premises may not claim re-entry or re-induction in the newly constructed commercial complex for residential accommodation. Similarly, there may be a case where landlord intends to expand his business and shall have requirement of more space for commercial activity by rebuilding/reconstructing the premises. In such eventuality also, it may not be justified to impose a tenant upon him causing curtailment of his plan of extension of his business. In a given case, a building may be proposed to be reconstructed or rebuilt for own residential purpose with no proposal to let it out. in such eventuality, a tenant cannot be thrusted upon the owner of the premises by way of re-induction or re-entry in a house particularly designed and constructed in a manner that there is no scope for letting out portion thereof as existence of any other family in such premises may cause interference in privacy. Such re-entry/re-induction shall amount to depriving a person from his right of full enjoyment of his property for no fault on his part, but for the only reason that he or his predecessor had provided rented accommodation to someone in the past, as per circumstances prevailing at that time.” 15 It is also apt to record that Section 2(j) of Rent Act in Explanation I and II provides that after death of original tenant, the tenancy shall be inherited by his legal heirs ordinarily residing/doing business with him and first right shall be of spouse and in case spouse is not in business then other legal heirs including the son. However, after death of successor tenant, there shall be no succession of tenancy in favour of next surviving successor-in-interest of original tenant or tenant continued in succession of original tenant. The relevant provisions read as under:- “2(j) “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a residential or non-residential building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy, a deserted wife of a tenant who has been or is entitled to be in occupation of the matrimonial home or tenanted premises of husband, a divorced wife of a tenant who has a 11 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) decree of divorce in which the right of residence in the matrimonial home or tenanted premises has been incorporated as one of the conditions of the decree of divorce and in the event of the death of such person such of his heirs as are mentioned in Schedule-I to this Act and who were ordinarily residing with him or carrying on business in the premises at the time of his death, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively in Explanation-I and Explanation-II to this clause, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, except with the written consent of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council or a Nagar Panchayat or a Cantonment Board; Explanation-I.- The order of succession in the event of death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows:— (a) firstly, his surviving spouse; (b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased persons as a member of his family upto the date of his death; (c) thirdly, his parent(s), if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death; and (d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-deceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s) of the deceased person or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s), or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death: Provided that the successor has ordinarily been living or carrying on business in the premises with the deceased tenant as a member of his family upto the date of his death and was dependent on the deceased tenant: Provided further that a right to tenancy shall not devolve upon a successor in case he or his spouse or any of his dependent son or daughter is owning or occupying a premises in the urban area in relation to the premises let. Explanation-II—The right of every successor, referred to in Explanation-I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve on any of his heirs” 12 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) 16 Though it is a fact that learned counsel for landlord did not press issue with respect to succession of tenancy at the time of adjudication of rent petition before the Rent Controller, however for adjudicating the plea of petitioners for re-induction/re-entry as tenant in premises in reference after rebuilding, their entitlement for right to re- enter as tenant has to be considered by taking into consideration their present status or the capacity in which they are holding the possession of suit premises. Therefore, irrespective of the fact that issue in this regard was not pressed by learned Advocate representing the landlord before the Rent Controller, the status of petitioners as on date to possess the premises in question deserves to be determined. 17 As noticed supra, after death of Hans Raj the tenancy was not to be devolved by way of succession upon the petitioners because, after death of Hans Raj, their possession on the property is not as a tenant but as unauthorized occupants. Right to re-entry has been provided for the tenant but not to a person, who has not acquired the status of tenant or has lost the status of tenant. Therefore, claim of petitioners for re-entry even in alternative is not sustainable. 18. I have gone through the impugned order and judgment, wherein all issues have been considered by referring relevant case laws, and I have also gone through the record of the Rent Controller, including evidence led by the parties which has been duly and properly appreciated 13 ( 2025:HHC:28893 ) by the Courts below. Therefore, I do not find any illegality, irregularity or perversity in the impugned order/judgment. 19. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, for aforesaid discussion, petition is dismissed and order passed by the Rent Controller, affirmed by the Appellate Authority, is upheld. Petition is dismissed in aforesaid terms alongwith pending application(s), if any. (Vivek Singh Thakur), Judge. 27th August, 2025(MS)