JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, J. 1. The matter is listed for hearing on admission, but with the consent of parties, the matter is heard finally. 2. Invoking the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the appellant herein-husband/ defendant has preferred this appeal calling in question legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment & decree dated 10-5-2024 passed by the Judge, Family Court, Manendragarh, District Korea in Civil Suit No.111A/2022, by which the Family Court has allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent herein and dissolved the marriage between the parties. 3. The aforesaid challenge has been made by the appellant herein/defendant on the following factual backdrop : - [Parties will hereinafter be referred as per their status shown and ranking given in the suit before the Family Court.] Facts 4. Marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant was solemnized as per Muslim law on 30-9-2015 at Manendragarh, District Korea and after marriage, the plaintiff/wife started residing with the defendant/ husband at Islampur, Jharkhand. The plaintiff had resided with the defendant only for 15 days and thereafter, family dispute started arising between them and thereafter, on 9-5-2016, the plaintiff went back to her father’s place at Manendragarh. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant came to the house of her father at Manendragarh after 15 days and asked about encashment of the fixed deposit of Rs. 10 lakhs which is in the name of the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff lodged a report against the defendant and his family members for offences punishable under Sections 498A & 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC on 29-1-2017 and also proceeding under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was initiated on 17-3-2017 and thereafter, the plaintiff filed application for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. It was lastly pleaded that from the year 2016, the plaintiff is residing separately i.e. for more than two years, therefore, she is entitled for dissolution of marriage solemnized on 30-9-2015. 5. It was lastly pleaded that from the year 2016, the plaintiff is residing separately i.e. for more than two years, therefore, she is entitled for dissolution of marriage solemnized on 30-9-2015. 5. The defendant filed written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint and pleaded that all the members of the family including the defendant have been acquitted by the trial Court on 11-9-2023 of the charges under Sections 498A & 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC and other charges levelled against them and the plaintiff filed application for maintenance on 20-12-2021 in which she has not filed affidavit in prescribed format in respect of her income and property. It has been further stated that the plaintiff belongs to a well to do, happy and prosperous family, she is financially sound and she does not need any amount for maintenance, as such, the application deserves to be rejected. 6. The Family Court by its impugned judgment dated 10-5-2024, framed three issues and answered the same as under: - 7. In sum and substance, the Family Court has held that the ground under Section 2(ii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (for short, ‘the Act of 1939’), that the defendant/husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years and secondly, Section 2(viii)(d) of the Act of 1939, that the defendant/husband has disposed of her property or prevented her from exercising her legal rights over it, are made out and, therefore, the plaintiff/wife is entitled for dissolution of her marriage with the defendant/husband on the aforesaid two grounds, which is sought to be challenged by the defendant/husband in this appeal. 8. Mr. D.N. Prajapati, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein/defendant/husband, would submit that the plaintiff/wife is financially well-off and running a boutique and also a fashion designing course, and she on her own had left the matrimonial home and residing with her father, therefore, she would not be entitled for divorce on the grounds enumerated under Sections 2(ii) & 2(viii)(d) of the Act of 1939, as both the grounds are not made out and as such, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment deserves to be set-aside. 9. Mr. 9. Mr. Adil Minhaj, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent herein/plaintiff/wife, would support the impugned judgment & decree and oppose the appeal and submit that the Family Court is absolutely justified in granting decree for dissolution of marriage and as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the record with utmost circumspection. 11. The question for determination would be, whether the Family Court is justified in granting the decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds enumerated under Sections 2(ii) & 2(viii)(d) of the Act of 1939? 12. In order to judge the correctness of the findings recorded by the Family Court in this regard, we will consider the findings on both the two issues separately. Negligence or failure to provide maintenance 13. The ground envisaged under Section 2(ii) of the Act of 1939 provides as under: - “ 2. Grounds for decree for dissolution of marriage .—A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the following grounds, namely:— (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) that the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years;” 14. A careful perusal of Section 2(ii) of the Act of 1939 would reveal that a woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on the ground that the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years. 15. In the instant case, the plaintiff/wife has pleaded in paragraph 13 of her plaint that on account of cruel behaviour meted out by the husband, she is residing in her parental house since 2016 till the date of institution of application for divorce on 18-8-2022 which has been replied by the defendant/husband stating that the plaintiff is financially sound and she has filed application for maintenance on 20-12-2021 and the plaintiff/wife being financially sound and running a course of Fashion Designing and also a boutique, only in order to harass him, has filed such application which deserves to be rejected. The Family Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence has also recorded a finding that since May, 2016 up to the date of passing of the judgment, no amount of maintenance has been paid to the plaintiff/wife for a period of around eight years and thus, decreed the suit for dissolution of marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant, filed on behalf of the plaintiff/wife. 16. Admittedly, in this case, the plaintiff/wife left her matrimonial home along with her father on 9-5-2016 & 27-7-2016 and started residing with her father. However, it is the case of the defendant/husband that the plaintiff/wife on her own has left the matrimonial home and residing in her parental home, therefore, she is not entitled for maintenance. 17. In that view of the matter, the question would be, whether a Muslim wife residing away from her husband on her own, is entitled to claim divorce on the ground under Section 2(ii) of the Act of 1939, that her husband “has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years”. 18. This question has been considered by the Kerala High Court in the matter of Veeran Sayvu Ravuthar v. Beevathumma , AIR 2002 Kerala 370 and the Kerala High Court has held that excuse, if any, put forth by husband cannot be a relevant consideration while considering application by wife and wife is entitled to dissolution of marriage even if she had contributed for not to maintain her or she was not entitled for maintenance. It has been observed by the Kerala High Court as under: - “18. An attempt was earlier made before this Court after Yusuf Rawther ( AIR 1971 Ker 261 ) for reconsideration of the view taken therein, before Balakrishna Menon, J. as he then was. In the meantime this Court had again accepted the position in Yousuf Rawther in Aboobacker Haji v. Mamu Koya, 1971 Ker LT 663. That judgment was also rendered by Krishna Iyer, J. as he then was. In Moosa v. Fathima, 1983 Ker LT 787: ( AIR 1983 Ker 283 ) this Court did not accept the request for reconsideration of the view taken in Yousuf Rawther and Aboobacker Haji. Considering the entire contention including the decision rendered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, AIR 1978 Andh Pra 417 and Calcutta High Court (Mst. In Moosa v. Fathima, 1983 Ker LT 787: ( AIR 1983 Ker 283 ) this Court did not accept the request for reconsideration of the view taken in Yousuf Rawther and Aboobacker Haji. Considering the entire contention including the decision rendered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, AIR 1978 Andh Pra 417 and Calcutta High Court (Mst. Mabiya Khatun Bivi v. Shaikh Anwar Ali, 1971 Cal 218. Justice Balakrishna Menon, J., as he then was, held as follows : “Clause (ii) of S. 2 should be read in contradistinction with clause (iv) as per which the wife is entitled to a decree for dissolution of her marriage on the ground that the husband has failed to perform “without reasonable cause” his marital obligations for a period of three years. The words “without reasonable cause” are significantly absent in Clause (ii). As earlier stated, the dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 is an enactment to consolidate and clarify the Muslim law relating to a woman's right to obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage. The husband has a absolute power to liquidate the marriage by pronouncement of “talak”. The wife's right for dissolution of marriage is confined to those grounds enumerated in Clause (i) to (ix) of S. 2. If the husband wants the marriage relationship to continue, he should see that the wife does not get a ground under Clause (ii) of Sec. 2 to approach the Court for a decree dissolving the marriage. If the wife is of immoral character or she deliberately and against the wishes of her husband lives away from him without giving him her company, it is open to the husband on his own accord to pronounce “talak” and divorce her. If however he wants to retain the relationship between the parties, he may have to provide for the wife's maintenance whether she deserves it or not. The duty to provide maintenance to the wife under those circumstances is only self-imposed to keep the relationship intact and it is not a duty corresponding to the right of the wife to claim maintenance against the husband. As against the arbitrary power of the husband to liquidate the marriage, the wife gets a right for dissolution of marriage on the husband's neglect or failure to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years. As against the arbitrary power of the husband to liquidate the marriage, the wife gets a right for dissolution of marriage on the husband's neglect or failure to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years. This construction of Clause (ii) of S. 2 is in consonance with the Islamic law on the subject discussed above. There is, therefore, no justification in introducing the words “without reasonable cause” into Clause (ii). The legislative in its wisdom, by providing those words in Clause (iv), has not thought it necessary to provide this restriction in Clause (ii). I therefore respectfully agree with the reasoning and conclusion of Krishna Iyer J. in the decision in Yusuf Rather v. Sowramma, 1970 Ker LT 477: ( AIR 1971 Ker 261 ). On the concurrent finding that the husband has filed to provide for the maintenance of the wife for a period over two years prior to the institution of the suit, the decision of the Courts below granting a decree for dissolution of marriage between the parties is perfectly correct and does not call for interference in this second appeal. In view of the decree for dissolution of marriage, there cannot be a decry in favour of husband for restitution of conjugal rights. The result therefore is both the second appeals fail and are dismissed, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.” 19. Thus the consistent view taken by this Court is that “the construction of Clause (ii) of Sec. 2 is in consonance with the Islamic law on the subject ………. There is therefore no justification in introducing the words ‘without reasonable cause’ into Clause (ii). The legislature in its wisdom by providing those words in Clause (iv) has not thought it necessary to provide this restricting in Clause (ii). “Accordingly this Court held that a wife under such circumstances, even if she had contributed for not to maintain her or even if she was not entitled for maintenance, could have applied for dissolution of marriage under Section 2(ii) on the ground that the husband had neglected or failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years. “Accordingly this Court held that a wife under such circumstances, even if she had contributed for not to maintain her or even if she was not entitled for maintenance, could have applied for dissolution of marriage under Section 2(ii) on the ground that the husband had neglected or failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years. When the consistent view followed by this Court in these three decisions, accepting the view taken by Tyabji C.J. in Noorbibi's case ( AIR 1950 Sind 8 ), is so clear, there is no reason at all for reconsideration, taking into account the phraseology used in Sec. 2(ii) as compared to Sec. 2(iv). The excuse if any put forth by the husband in maintaining the wife is not at all relevant consideration while considering the ground for dissolution of marriage by the wife under Sec. 2(ii) of the Act. So we are in respectful agreement with the view taken by this Court in the earlier decisions in Yosuf Rawther, Aboobacker Haji and Mossa's cases.” 19. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that though the plaintiff/wife, on her own, is residing separately in her parental house since July, 2016 and she might have contributed for not to maintain her and maintenance has not been provided, however, ultimately, the jurisdictional court has granted maintenance to her and therefore the case put forth by the defendant/husband that the plaintiff/wife on her own is residing in her parents’ house and as such she is not entitled for divorce, would not be a relevant consideration while considering the application for divorce filed by the wife. Therefore, the finding recorded by the Family Court that the plaintiff/wife is entitled for dissolution of marriage, as the defendant/husband has failed to provide her maintenance for a period of two years, is the correct finding of fact based on the evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. Treating the wife with cruelty i.e. disposing of her property or preventing her exercising her legal rights over it 20.Now, this would bring us to the next ground under Section 2(viii)(d) of the Act of 1939, which states as under: - “ 2. Treating the wife with cruelty i.e. disposing of her property or preventing her exercising her legal rights over it 20.Now, this would bring us to the next ground under Section 2(viii)(d) of the Act of 1939, which states as under: - “ 2. Grounds for decree for dissolution of marriage .—A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the following grounds, namely:— (viii) that the husband treats her with cruelty, that is to say, — (a) to (c) xxx xxx xxx (d) disposes of her property or prevents her exercising her legal rights over it, or” 21. A careful perusal of the aforesaid ground would show that the disposal of property which would attract the provisions of clause (viii)(d) is a disposal by a husband, without the wife’s consent, of a substantial portion of her property, not for her benefit but for his own selfish ends, and in a wasteful manner, with the intention of depriving her of her property. 22.Here, the only allegation made by the plaintiff/wife in paragraph 5 of the plaint is that the defendant/husband wanted to encash the fixed deposit of Rs. 10 lakhs, which is in the name of the plaintiff, but neither there is any evidence nor pleading that at any point of time the defendant/husband has encashed the said fixed deposit of Rs. 10 lakhs which stood in the name of the plaintiff/wife and thus, deprived her of her property. Similarly, there is no evidence and pleading that the defendant/husband has prevented the plaintiff/ wife from exercising her legal rights over the property or that he wanted to encash the fixed deposit which could not be encashed on account of interference made by the plaintiff/wife. As such, the ground under Section 2(viii)(d) of the Act of 1939 is not made out. 23.Consequently, the impugned decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 2(ii) of the Act of 1939 is upheld/affirmed while the decree under Section 2(viii)(d) is set aside. 24.The appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. No order as to cost(s). 25.A decree be drawn accordingly.