- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,AT DHARWAD DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ WRIT PETITION NO. 101644 OF 2025 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: CANARA BANK, MASUR BRANCH AK PATIL COMPLEX, NEAR OLD BUS STAND, MASUR-581210, RATTIHALLI TALUK, HAVERI DISTRICT, REPRESENTED BY ITS SENIOR MANAGER. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. SURESH S. GUNDI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE WAREHOUSING DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY, 4TH FLOOR, NCUI BUILDING, 3, SIRI INSTITUTIONAL AREA, AUGUST KRANTI MARG, HAUZ KHAS, NEW DELHI-110016, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN. 2. SMT. BHAGYAMMA W/O. NAGARAJ CHALAGERI, PROPRIETOR OF M/S. SHREE KOLLUR MOOKAMBIKA WAREHOUSE, KODAMAGGI VILLAGE, MASUR POST-581210, SHIKARIPUR ROAD, HIREKERUR, RATTIHALLI-TALUK, HAVERI DISTRICT. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. SHASHANK MANISH, ADVOCATE APPEARED FOR R Digitally signed by SAROJA HANGARAKI Location: High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench, Dharwad - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 SRI. SIDDAPPA S. SAJJAN, ADVOCATE FOR R1; SRI. MRUTYUNJAYA TATA BANGI, ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO (1) ALLOW THE BANK AND ITS DULY AUTHORIZED AGENTS TO VERIFY THE PLEDGED GOODS STORED IN THE WAREHOUSE IMMEDIATELY. (2) DIRECT THE RESPONDENT NO.1 TO TAKE THE CONTROL OF THE WAREHOUSE AND PLEDGED GOODS BY ENFORCING THEIR RIGHT AND DUTIES AS PER THE WDRA ACT AND RULES. (3) TO PRESERVE THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF THE PLEDGED STOCKS AND TAKE SUFFICIENT AND APPROPRIATE STEPS TO SAFEGUARD THE INTEREST OF THE PETITIONER BANK. (4) SEGREGATE THE PLEDGED GOODS STORED IN THE WAREHOUSE E-NWR WISE TO IDENTIFY THE GOODS OF EACH DEBTOR. (5) FACILITATE THE BANK IN CONDUCTING AN AUCTION OF THE PLEDGED GOODS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW AND THE TERMS OF THE LOAN AGREEMENT. THIS PETITION, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 21.08.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: CAV ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) 1. The Petitioner/Canara Bank is before this Court seeking the following reliefs: “(1) Allow the Bank and its duly authorized agents to verify the pledged goods stored in the warehouse immediately. (2) Direct the Respondent no.1 to take the control of the warehouse and pledged goods by enforcing their right and duties as per the WDRA Act and Rules. - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 (3) To preserve the quality and quantity of the pledged stocks and take sufficient and appropriate steps to safeguard the interest of the petitioner bank. (4) Segregate the pledged goods stored in the warehouse e-NWR wise to identify the goods of each debtor. (5) Facilitate the Bank in conducting an auction of the pledged goods in accordance with the law and the terms of the loan agreement.” 2. Brief facts of the case are as under: 2.1. The Petitioner Bank claims that it has sanctioned a total of 54 credit facilities by way of loans to 53 borrowers/farmers on the security of pledges of Electronic Negotiable Warehouse Receipts (E- NWRs). These receipts are issued by M/s. National E-Repository Limited (NERL), which is sponsored by M/s. National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Limited (NCDEL) and CCRL, which is sponsored by M/s. Central Depository Services Limited (CDSL), and functioning under the purview of the Warehousing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as ‘WDRA’ Act). - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 2.2. It is contended that the underlying stocks for the said E-NWRs are areca nuts/betel nuts stored by the farmers/borrowers in the registered warehouse of Respondent No. 2, in compliance with the provisions of the WDRA Act and the rules made thereunder. As security for the loans sanctioned by the bank in their favour, it is alleged that the borrowers have created a pledge of the E-NWRs in favour of the Petitioner Bank as per the provisions of the WDRA Act. Respondent No. 2, a warehouseman under the WDRA Act, had also entered into an agreement with the Petitioner Bank in respect of the pledged goods. 2.3. The loan accounts having become irregular and the borrowers having failed to regularise/close the loan accounts, the Bank was constrained to classify the accounts of 30 such borrowers as Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) as on 11.02.2025, in terms of the directives/guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The remaining 23 accounts of the borrowers - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 have been classified as Special Mention Accounts (SMAs), again in terms of the directives/guidelines issued by the RBI. 2.4. To recover the dues, the Bank invoked the pledge in terms of the E-NWRs and accordingly, it is claimed that the title to all the E-NWRs was required to be transferred in favour of the Bank. Respondent No. 2/warehouseman, holding the goods underlying the E-NWRs as a trustee on behalf of the bank, was duty-bound to protect the interest of the bank. The Bank had called upon Respondent No. 2 to permit, assist, and cooperate with the bank officials for the inspection and identification of the goods. Despite such a request being made, the warehouseman failed to comply. 2.5. The warehouseman instead of segregating the goods had mixed up several of the goods, and whenever inquiries were made, showed the same goods as belonging to each of the borrowers. In that background, the Petitioner had several - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 correspondences with Respondent No. 2 to segregate the goods and allow the bank officers to identify and demarcate the goods, with which Respondent No. 2 did not cooperate. 2.6. Meanwhile, one of the borrowers had approached this Court in W.P. No. 100064 of 2025, for a direction to the bank to release one of the warehouse bills. In the said petition, this Court had, vide interim order on 07.01.2025, directed the borrower’s guarantor to cooperate with the bank in segregating the goods held by Respondent No. 2. Despite the said order, when the Bank had approached the warehouseman, he did not take the necessary action. When the officer of the Bank visited on 12.01.2025, the officer was requested to visit the premises on 15.01.2025. On 15.01.2025, though some goods were shown, they were not segregated, and no tags were attached, as required by the WDRA Act. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 2.7. On account of the warehouseman, Respondent No. 2 not complying with the requirements of the WDRA Act, the Petitioner Bank took up the matter with Respondent No.1 Authority and called upon it to take steps in terms of the WDRA Act. Though it is contended by Respondent No.1 Authority that it had taken action, the same did not yield any result, and as such, the Petitioner Bank continued to correspond with Respondent No.1, providing all available documents (Annexure-K series). 2.8. Apprehending misappropriation of the underlying goods of the NWRs and collusion between Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2, the Petitioner is before this Court seeking the aforesaid reliefs. 3. Shri Suresh S Gundi, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner/Bank submits that : 3.1. The WDRA Act has been promulgated to provide security to fiduciaries and creditors, so as to enable - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 the trading of and in negotiable receipts, and to provide confidence to such bankers and creditors. It is on account of the WDRA Act that warehouses have been established across the country, and banks have started trusting the receipts issued by warehousemen under the said statute. The warehousemen are essentially discharging a public duty, inasmuch as the State is not in a position to establish warehouses. Private participation is being permitted to establish such warehouses, which function within the ambit and scope of the WDRA Act and the Warehousing Development and Regulation (Registration of Warehouses) Rules, 2017 (for short the Rules, 2017). 3.2. "Authority” means the Warehousing Development and Regulatory Authority established under sub- section (1) of Section 24 of the WDRA Act. The said Section 24 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 “24. Establishment and incorporation of Authority.— (1) With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf, there shall be constituted an authority to be called the Warehousing Development and Regulatory Authority to exercise the powers conferred on, and to perform the functions assigned to it by or under this Act. (2) The Authority shall be a body corporate by the name aforesaid having perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both movable and immovable, and to contract and shall, by the said name, sue or be sued. (3) The head office of the Authority shall be at New Delhi and the Authority may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, establish offices at other places in India.” 3.3. By referring to Clause (v) of Section 2 of the WDRA Act, he submits that "warehouseman" means any person who is granted a certificate of registration in respect of any warehouse or warehouses by the authority for carrying on the business of warehousing. The said clause is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 “(v) "warehouseman" means any person who is granted a certificate of registration in respect of any warehouse or warehouses by the Authority for carrying on the business of warehousing.” 3.4. By relying on sub-section (t), he submits that "warehousing business" means the business of maintaining warehouses in the storage of goods and issuing negotiable warehouse receipts. Thus, he submits that the warehousing business does not only mean maintaining warehouses but also includes issuing negotiable warehouse receipts. 3.5. By relying on sub-section (n) of Section 2 of the WDRA Act, he submits that a "non-negotiable warehouse receipt" means a warehouse receipt other than a negotiable warehouse receipt. 3.6. By relying on clause (m) of Section 2 of the WDRA Act, he submits that a "negotiable warehouse receipt" means a warehouse receipt under which the goods represented therein are deliverable to the depositor or order, the endorsement of which has the effect of transfer of goods represented - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 thereby and the endorsee for which takes a good title. 3.7. He submits that it is on the basis of this negotiable warehouse receipt, which has been issued in terms of "fungible goods" as defined under clause (h) of Section 2 of the WDRA Act and "goods" which are defined under clause (i) of Section 2 of the WDRA Act, that the Petitioner Bank had advanced the amounts to the borrowers. Respondent No. 2 has registered himself as a warehouse in terms of Section 4 of the WDRA Act. Section 4 of the WDRA Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “4. Registration of warehouses.—(1) Any person desirous of commencing or carrying on the business of maintaining a warehouse issuing negotiable warehouse receipts may make an application to the Authority for registration in respect of one or more warehouses owned or occupied by him. (2) Every application for registration under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and manner and shall be accompanied by such fees as may be prescribed. - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 (3) The Authority may, after such enquiry and subject to such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, grant a certificate of registration of the warehouse in the prescribed form and bearing a registration number to the applicant authorising him to carry on the business of maintaining a warehouse or warehouses and to issue negotiable warehouse receipts. (4) The Authority may not grant a certificate of registration under this section unless it is satisfied that the warehouse in respect of which the application has been made has adequate facilities and safeguards required to warehouse the goods of the nature specified in the application and the applicant satisfies the financial, managerial and other eligibility criteria and competence as may be prescribed: Provided that no certificate of registration shall be refused to any applicant under this section unless the applicant has been given an opportunity of being heard.” 3.8. He submits that Chapter 3 of the WDRA Act deals with warehousemen. Section 6 deals with liabilities, Section 7 deals with duties, and Section 8 deals particularly with the duty to keep records and accounts of the warehouse business. Sections 6, 7, and 8 of the WDRA Act are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 “6. Liabilities of warehousemen.—(1) A warehouseman is liable for loss of, or injury to, goods caused by his failure to exercise such care and diligence in regard to the goods as a careful and vigilant owner of the goods of the same bulk, quality and value would exercise in the custody of them in similar conditions. (2) In case the goods are damaged or lost in spite of taking all care and precautions by the warehouseman due to unavoidable circumstances, the compensation equal to the value of goods at the time of deposit of the goods shall be payable by the warehouseman. (3) In case the goods are damaged or lost due to the negligence of the warehouseman, then, the compensation shall be equal to the value of goods plus the loss of profit to the holder of the receipt. (4) The warehouseman shall not be responsible for any loss, destruction, damage or deterioration of the goods delivered to him for storage attributable to circumstances such as force majeure, act of war, act of public enemies and the like. 7. Duties of warehousemen.—(1) In the absence of a lawful excuse, a warehouseman shall deliver the goods referred to in a negotiable receipt, to the holder of the receipt on demand made by the holder and on the holder fulfilling all the following conditions, namely:— (a) satisfying the warehouse lien; - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 (b) surrendering the receipt in case of non- negotiable receipt and surrendering the receipt with endorsements in case of negotiable receipt; and (c) acknowledging in writing the receipt of the goods. (2) If a warehouseman refuses or fails to deliver the goods in compliance with the provisions of this section, the burden of proof shall lie on the warehouseman to establish the existence of a lawful excuse for the refusal or failure. 8. Duties of warehouseman to keep records and accounts of warehouse business.—(1) Every warehouseman shall keep in a place of safety a complete and accurate set of records and accounts of all transactions pertaining to the operation of a warehouse including records and accounts of all goods received in the warehouse and withdrawn therefrom, of all unissued receipts in his possession, of all receipts issued, returned to, or cancelled, by him. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), the warehouseman shall keep all the records and accounts of the warehouse business in numerical sequence separate and distinct from the records and accounts of any other business in such form and in such manner and for such period as the Authority may, by regulations, specify. (3) The warehouseman shall make available to the Authority for inspection the records and - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 accounts of the warehouse business at any time as may be desired by the Authority.” 3.9. By referring to sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the WDRA Act, he submits that in case of any endorsement on the face of a negotiable warehouse receipt by a bank or the warehouseman, such endorsement shall be evidence of a pledge and the pledgee shall have priority over the interest of the holder of the receipt. In that background, he submits that a pledge having been created in favour of the Bank, the Bank has priority over any other interest. 3.10. By referring to sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the WDRA Act, he submits that in terms of the pledge referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the WDRA Act, the warehouseman shall not deliver the goods unless the endorsement of the pledge has been duly cancelled. 3.11. By referring to Section 11 of the WDRA Act, he submits that warehouse receipts are issued in - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 terms of Section 11 of the WDRA Act, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “11. Warehouse receipts.—(1) A warehouse receipt, which may be either in writing or in electronic form, shall be a document of title to goods in writing if it contains all the following particulars, namely:— (a) receipt number; (b) warehouse registration number and date up to which it is valid; (c) name of the warehouse and its complete postal address; (d) name and address of the person by whom or on whose behalf the goods are deposited; (e) date of issue of the warehouse receipt; (f) statement that the goods received shall be delivered to the holder thereof, or that the goods shall be delivered to the order of a named person; (g) rates of storage charges and handling charges; (h) description of the goods or of the packages containing them with particulars of quantity and quality or grade; (i) market value of the goods at the time of deposit; - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 (j) private marks of depositor on the goods or packages, if any, except in the case of fungible goods; (k) name of the insurance company indemnifying for fire, flood, theft, burglary, misappropriation, riots, strikes or terrorism; (l) whether the warehouse receipt is negotiable or non-negotiable; (m) statement of the amount of any advance made and of any liability incurred for which the warehouseman claims his lien; (n) date and signature of the warehouseman or his authorised agent; (o) declared shelf-life of goods; (p) the fact that the warehouseman holds the lien on the goods deposited for his storage and handling charges; (q) that the receipt would be valid only till the date of expiry of declared shelf-life of the goods for which it is issued.” (2) In case a warehouseman willfully omits from a negotiable warehouse receipt any of the particulars set out in sub-section(1), he shall be liable for damages caused by such omission. (3) No warehouse receipt shall, by reason of the omission only of any of the particulars set- forth in sub-section(1), be deemed to be invalid for the purpose of settlement of disputes or claims. - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 (4) Authority may, with the prior approval of the Central Government, add, delete or modify any particulars as specified in sub- clause(1) for all or any commodity or class of commodities or for any class for warehouses.” 3.12. By referring to Section 21 of the WDRA Act, he submits that a negotiable warehouse receipt is conclusive evidence of the title to the goods on its production. 3.13. By referring to Chapter 5 of the WDRA Act, he submits that the Warehousing Development and Regulatory Authority (Authority or Warehousing Authority) has been established thereunder, and by referring to Section 35 of Chapter 6 of the WDRA Act, he submits that the warehousing authority, namely Respondent No. 1, has to discharge its powers and functions in such a manner that it facilitates security for any advance made on the basis of a negotiable warehouse receipt. The authority as such is vested with a duty to protect the interests of the pledger, pledgee, - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 warehouseman, and any creditor who has acted in terms of the WDRA Act. 3.14. Section 35 of Chapter 6 of the WDRA Act is reproduced for easy reference: “35. Powers and functions of Authority.— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other law for the time being in force, the Authority shall have the duty to regulate and ensure implementation of the provisions of this Act and promote orderly growth of the warehousing business. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the powers and functions of the Authority shall include the following, namely:— (a) to issue to the applicants a certificate of registration or renew, modify, withdraw, suspend or cancel such registration; (b) to regulate the registration and functioning of accreditation agencies, renew, modify, withdraw, suspend or cancel such registration and specify the code of conduct for officials of accreditation agencies for accreditation of the warehouses: (c) to specify, by regulations, the qualifications, code of conduct and practical training for warehousemen and staff engaged in warehousing business; - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 (d) to regulate the process of pledge, creation of charges and enforcement thereof in respect of goods deposited with the warehouse; (e) to promote efficiency in conduct of warehouse business; (f) to make regulations laying down the standards for approval of certifying agencies for grading of goods; (g) to promote professional organisations connected with the warehousing business; (h) to determine the rate of, and levy, the fees and other charges for carrying out the provisions of this Act; (i) to call for information from, undertaking inspection of, conducting enquiries and investigations including audit of the warehouses, accreditation agencies and other organisations connected with the warehousing business; (j) to regulate the rates, advantages, terms and conditions that may be offered by warehousemen in respect of warehousing business; (k) to specify, by regulations, the form and manner in which books of account shall be maintained and statement of accounts shall be rendered by warehousemen; (l) to maintain a panel of arbitrators and to nominate arbitrators from such panel in disputes between warehouses and warehouse receipt holders; - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 (m) to regulate and develop electronic system of holding and transfer of credit balances of fungible goods deposited in the warehouses; (n) to determine the minimum percentage of space to be kept reserved for storage of agricultural commodities in a registered warehouse; (o) to specify the duties and responsibilities of the warehouseman; (p) to exercise such other powers and perform such other functions as may be prescribed.” 3.15. In that background, he submits that Respondent No. 1 is an authority of the State, coming within the parameters of Article 12 of the Constitution. Insofar as Respondent No. 2 is concerned, he submits that Respondent No. 2 discharges a public function. Respondent No. 2, being permitted to discharge such functions under the WDRA Act, is also amenable to writ jurisdiction. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Marwari Balika Vidyalaya V/s Asha - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 Srivastava and others1 more particularly paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof. “15. Writ application was clearly maintainable in view of aforesaid discussion and more so in view of the decision of this Court in Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab in which this Court has considered the issue at length and has thus observed : (SCC pp. 336-37, paras 13 & 14) “13. In the aforesaid case, this Court was also considering a situation where the services of a Lecturer had been terminated who was working in the college run by the Andi Mukti Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust. In those circumstances, this Court has clearly observed as under : (V.R. Rudani case, SCC pp. 700-701, paras 20 & 22) ‘20. The term “authority” used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words “any person or authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of 1 (2020) 14 SCC 449 - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. 22. Here again, we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor de Smith states: “To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract”. We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available “to reach injustice wherever it is found”. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellant on the maintainability of the writ petition.’ The aforesaid observations have been repeated and reiterated in numerous judgments of this Court including the judgments in Unni and Zee Telefilms Ltd. - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the appellant Mr Parikh. 14. In view of the law laid down in the aforementioned judgment of this Court, the judgment of the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be sustained on the proposition that the writ petition would not maintainable merely because the respondent institution is a purely unaided private educational institution. The appellant had specifically taken the plea that the respondents perform public functions i.e. providing education to children in their institutions throughout India.” (emphasis supplied) 16. It is apparent from the aforesaid decisions that the writ application is maintainable in such a matter even as against the private unaided educational institutions.” 3.16. By relying on the Marwari Balika Vidyalaya’s case, he submits that the words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not confined to only a statutory authority and instrumentality of a state, but they cover any other person or body performing a public duty, and that the duty must be judged in light of the positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 3.17. So long as a positive obligation exists, a mandamus cannot be denied. By referring to the facts of that case, he submits that a writ was issued against a private, unaided educational institution. He refers to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in St. Mary's Education Society and Another V/s Rajendra Prasad Bhargava and Others2, more particularly paragraphs 40, 41, 42, and 43 thereof. “40. Para 11 of the judgment in Binny is reproduced below : (SCC pp. 665-66) “11. Judicial review is designed to prevent the cases of abuse of power and neglect of duty by public authorities. However, under our Constitution, Article 226 is couched in such a way that a writ of mandamus could be issued even against a private authority. However, such private authority must be discharging a public function and that the decision sought to be corrected or enforced must be in discharge of a public function. The role of the State expanded enormously and attempts have been made to create various agencies to perform the governmental functions. Several corporations and companies have also been formed by the Government to run industries and to carry on trading activities. These have come to be known as public sector 2 (2023) 4 SCC 498 - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 undertakings. However, in the interpretation given to Article 12 of the Constitution, this Court took the view that many of these companies and corporations could come within the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution. At the same time, there are private bodies also which may be discharging public functions. It is difficult to draw a line between public functions and private functions when it is being discharged by a purely private authority. A body is performing a “public function” when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest.” (emphasis supplied) 41. This Court considered various of its other decisions to examine the question of public law remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court observed in Binny case as under : (SCC p. 673, para 29) “29. Thus, it can be seen that a writ of mandamus or the remedy under Article 226 is pre-eminently a public law remedy and is not generally available as a remedy against private wrongs. It is used for enforcement of various rights of the public or to compel the public/statutory authorities to discharge their duties and to act within their bounds. It may be used to do justice when there is wrongful exercise of power or a refusal to perform duties. This writ is admirably equipped to serve as a judicial control over administrative actions. This writ could also be issued against any private body or person, specially in view of the words used in Article 226 of the - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 Constitution. However, the scope of mandamus is limited to enforcement of public duty. The scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be the public law element in such action. Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish between public law and private law remedies.” (emphasis supplied) 42. In the penultimate paragraph, this Court ruled as under : (Binny case SCC p. 674, para 32) “32. Applying these principles, it can very well be said that a writ of mandamus can be issued against a private body which is not “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and such body is amenable to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can exercise judicial review of the action challenged by a party. But there must be a public law element and it cannot be exercised to enforce purely private contracts entered into between the parties.” (emphasis supplied) 43. In the background of the above legal position, it can be safely concluded that power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised by the High Court even if the body against which an action is sought is not State or an authority or - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 an instrumentality of the State but there must be a public element in the action complained of.” 3.18. By referring to St. By referring to St. Mary's Education Society’s case, he again submits that judicial review is designed to prevent abuse of power. If a private authority is discharging a public function and there is an abuse of power, the same would be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. One of the tests for ascertaining a public function is whether a body is performing a public function when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public. In that background, he submits that a warehouseman is discharging a public duty and a public function and as such would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. He therefore submits that this Court ought to intercede and allow the writ petition by granting the reliefs which have been sought. - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 4. Shri Shashank Manish, instructed by Shri Siddhappa S. Sajjan, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that 4.1. Though Respondent No. 1 wishes to act in terms of the WDRA Act and the Rules, Respondent No. 1 has not been permitted to carry out an inspection of the warehouse premises and prepare an inventory of the goods. The innumerable correspondences which have been made by Respondent No. 1 to Respondent No. 2 have not yielded any results. 4.2. Despite the orders passed by this Court earlier in W.P. No. 100064/2025, when the officers of Respondent No. 1, along with the officers of the Petitioner, had visited the premises of the warehouse, no such inspection was permitted, and they were asked to come back on another day. When they went back on that day, they were told that the keys were not available, and it is thereafter that this Court had directed respondent No. 1 to - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 deposit the keys with this Court, which are held in safe custody by the Registry. 4.3. His submission is that, on account of the defaults on the part of the warehouseman, the license issued to the warehouseman has been cancelled; however, the possession of the goods could not be taken since a joint inspection and joint inventory have not been prepared. This, he submits, is for the reason that without such joint inspection and inventory, there could be allegations made against the Authority, and it is for that reason that possession has not been taken. 4.4. As regards the maintainability of the writ petition, he supports the contention of the counsel for the Petitioner, and in that regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.K. Saksena V/s International Commission on Irrigation & Drainage and Others3 more particularly 3 (2015) 4 SCC 670 - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 paragraphs 37, 41, 43, 45 and 51 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “37. Further, the Court explained in para 20 in Andi Mukta Sadguru that the term “authority” used in Article 226, in the context, would receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12, inasmuch as Article 12 was relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 31, whereas Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs not only for enforcement of fundamental rights but also non- fundamental rights. What is relevant is the dicta of the Court that the term “authority” appearing in Article 226 of the Constitution would cover any other person or body performing public duty. The guiding factor, therefore, is the nature of duty imposed on such a body, namely, public duty to make it exigible to Article 226. 41. In Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan the Court clarified that though writ can be issued against any private body or person, the scope of mandamus is limited to enforcement of public duty. It is the nature of duty performed by such person/body which is the determinative factor as the Court is to enforce the said duty and the identity of authority against whom the right is sought is not relevant. Such duty, the Court clarified, can either be statutory or even otherwise, but, there has to be public law element in the action of that body. - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 43. What follows from a minute and careful reading of the aforesaid judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, admittedly a writ petition under Article 226 would lie against such a person or body. However, we may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law rights. There are a catena of judgments on this aspect and it is not necessary to refer to those judgments as that is the basic principle of judicial review of an action under the administrative law. The reason is obvious. A private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of common law that involves relationships between individuals, such as law of contract or torts. Therefore, even if writ petition would be maintainable against an authority, which is “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law. 45. On the other hand, even if a person or authority does not come within the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution, but is performing public duty, writ petition can lie and writ of mandamus or appropriate writ can be issued. However, as noted in Federal Bank Ltd. such a private body should either run substantially on State funding or discharge public duty/positive obligation of public nature or is under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function. 51. Even in Andi Mukta Sadguru, which took a revolutionary turn and departure from the - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 earlier views, this Court held that “any other authority” mentioned in Article 226 is not confined to statutory authorities or instrumentalities of the State defined under Article 12 of the Constitution, it also emphasised that if the rights are purely of a private character, no mandamus could issue.” 4.5. By relying on the K.K. Saksena’s case, he submits that even if a person or authority does not come within the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution but is performing a public duty, a writ petition can lie, and a writ of mandamus or an appropriate writ can be issued. On that basis, he submits that Respondent No. 1 is ready to perform any duty that may be called upon it to be performed by this Court. Respondent No. 1, having already cancelled the license of the warehouseman in terms of Rule 34 of the Rules, it is only in the presence of the warehouseman that an inspection and inventory could be made. 5. Shri Mrutyunjaya Tatabangi, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 2/Warehouseman, submits that - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 5.1. Respondent No. 2 is a private entity engaged in business activities. Even according to the Petitioner, there is a contract between the Petitioner and Respondent No.2. As such, it is the contractual remedies that the Petitioner would be entitled to enforce. 5.2. Insofar as the warehouse receipts are concerned, his submission is that the said receipts, having been issued by borrowers, form the security for the loans advanced by the Petitioner Bank. The Petitioner Bank would be required to initiate necessary proceedings for recovery of money before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and/or for enforcing its security interest under the SARFAESI Act. In that background, he submits that no direction can be issued against Respondent No. 2 in a writ petition. The only remedy available to the Bank is to initiate necessary proceedings as aforesaid. - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 5.3. The borrowers have not been made parties to these proceedings, and without the borrowers being parties, no order can be passed against Respondent No. 2, who is only storing the goods of the borrowers. If any inspection of the goods and inventory has to be made, the same would have to be done in the presence of such borrowers, who are not parties to this petition, and no order in that regard can be issued by this Court. 5.4. Respondent No. 2 has also not been paid for the services rendered by it, and as such, Respondent No. 2 has a lien on the goods. Until such payment is made, the Petitioner cannot remove or auction such goods. 5.5. In this regard, he relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India V/s Cricket Association of Bihar and Others4 more particularly paragraph 4 (2015) 3 SCC 251 - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 Nos. 29, 33, 35, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “29. In Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, this Court had an occasion to consider the role and the nature of functions being discharged by BCCI. This Court held that the Board's control over the sport of cricket was deep and pervasive and that it exercised enormous public functions, which made it obligatory for the Board to follow the doctrine of “fairness and good faith”. This Court said : (SCC pp. 762-63, paras 80-81) “80. The Board is a society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. It enjoys a monopoly status as regards regulation of the sport of cricket in terms of its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association. It controls the sport of cricket and lays down the law therefor. It inter alia enjoys benefits by way of tax exemption and right to use stadia at nominal annual rent. It earns a huge revenue not only by selling tickets to viewers but also selling right to exhibit films live on TV and broadcasting the same. Ordinarily, its full members are the State associations except Association of Indian Universities, Railway Sports Control Board and Services Sports Control Board. As a member of ICC, it represents the country in the international fora. It exercises enormous public functions. It has the authority to select players, umpires and officials to represent the country in the international fora. It exercises total control over the players, umpires and other officers. The Rules of the Board clearly demonstrate that without its recognition no competitive cricket can be hosted either within or outside the country. Its control over the - 37 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 sport of competitive cricket is deeply pervasive and complete. 81. In law, there cannot be any dispute that having regard to the enormity of power exercised by it, the Board is bound to follow the doctrine of ‘fairness’ and ‘good faith’ in all its activities. Having regard to the fact that it has to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of millions, it has a duty to act reasonably. It cannot act arbitrarily, whimsically or capriciously. As the Board controls the profession of cricketers, its actions are required to be judged and viewed by higher standards.” 33. The majority view thus favours the view that BCCI is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 even when it is not “State” within the meaning of Article 12. The rationale underlying that view if we may say with utmost respect lies in the “nature of duties and functions” which BCCI performs. It is common ground that the respondent Board has a complete sway over the game of cricket in this country. It regulates and controls the game to the exclusion of all others. It formulates rules, regulations, norms and standards covering all aspects of the game. It enjoys the power of choosing the members of the national team and the umpires. It exercises the power of disqualifying players which may at times put an end to the sporting career of a person. It spends crores of rupees on building and maintaining infrastructure like stadia, running of cricket academies and supporting State associations. It frames pension schemes and incurs expenditure on coaches, trainers, etc. It sells broadcast and telecast rights and collects admission fee to venues where the matches are played. All these activities are undertaken with the tacit concurrence of the State Government and the Government of India who - 38 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 are not only fully aware but supportive of the activities of the Board. The State has not chosen to bring any law or taken any other step that would either deprive or dilute the Board's monopoly in the field of cricket. On the contrary, the Government of India has allowed the Board to select the national team which is then recognised by all concerned and applauded by the entire nation including at times by the highest of the dignitaries when they win tournaments and bring laurels home. Those distinguishing themselves in the international arena are conferred highest civilian awards like the Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan and Padma Shri apart from sporting awards instituted by the Government. Such is the passion for this game in this country that cricketers are seen as icons by youngsters, middle aged and the old alike. Any organisation or entity that has such pervasive control over the game and its affairs and such powers as can make dreams end up in smoke or come true cannot be said to be undertaking any private activity. 35. Our answer to Question (i), therefore, is in the negative, qua, the first part and affirmative qua the second. BCCI may not be “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution but is certainly amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 5.6. By relying on BCCI’s case he submits that the Board, being a society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, is not an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, he submits that Respondent No. 2, being a private entity, would not be a State under Article - 39 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 12 and would not be amenable to jurisdiction under Article 12. 5.7. He relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jatya Pal Singh & Others V/s Union of India & others5 more particularly paragraph Nos.44, 47, 52, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “44. It is a matter of record that with effect from 13-2-2002, the shareholding of the Government of India is 26.97%. Soon thereafter, the total shareholding of the Tata Group in VSNL increased to 44.99% of the paid-up share capital in 2002. It is also an accepted fact that shareholding of the Tata Group in VSNL is 15.11%. It is also noteworthy that since 2002, VSNL was a Tata Group company and accordingly on 28-1-2008 its name was changed to “Tata Communication Ltd.” In our opinion, the aforesaid facts make it abundantly clear that the Government of India did not have sufficient interest in the control of either management or policy-making functions of Tata Communication Ltd. 47. The learned counsel for the appellants had placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in Air India Statutory Corpn. [Air India Statutory Corpn. v. United Labour Union, (1997) 9 SCC 377 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1344] However, the aforesaid judgment is of no assistance to the appellants as it was 5 (2013) 6 SCC 452 - 40 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 subsequently overruled by a Constitution Bench in SAIL v. National Union Waterfront Workers [(2001) 7 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1121] . 52. These observations make it abundantly clear that in order for it to be held that the body is performing a public function, the appellant would have to prove that the body seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of public and accepted by the public as having authority to do so.” 5.8. By relying on Jatya Pal Singh’s case he submits that a limited company which is not under the control of the Government of India, and where the Government of India does not control the management or policy making functions, would not be an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. 5.9. He relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramkrishna Mission and another V/s Kago Kunya & Others6 paragraph Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 6 AIR 2020 SC(CIV) 627 - 41 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 “29. More recently in K. K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, another two judge Bench of this Court held that a writ would not lie to enforce purely private law rights. Consequently, even if a body is performing a public duty and is amenable to the exercise of writ jurisdiction, all its decisions would not be subject to judicial review. The Court held thus: "43. What follows from a minute and careful reading of the aforesaid judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, admittedly a writ petition under Article 226 would lie against such a person or body. However, we may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law rights. There are a catena of judgments on this aspect and it is not necessary to refer to those judgments as that is the basic principle of judicial review of an action under the administrative law. The reason is obvious. A private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of common law that involves relationships between individuals, such as law of contract or torts. Therefore, even if writ petition would be maintainable against an authority, which is "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law." Thus, even if the body discharges a public function in a wider sense, there is no public law element involved in the enforcement of a private contract of service. 30. Having analysed the circumstances which were relied upon by the State of Arunachal Pradesh, we are of the view that in running the hospital, Ramakrishna Mission does not - 42 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 discharge a public function. Undoubtedly, the hospital is in receipt of some element of grant. The grants which are received by the hospital cover only a part of the expenditure. The terms of the grant do not indicate any form of governmental control in the management or day to day functioning of the hospital. The nature of the work which is rendered by Ramakrishna Mission, in general, including in relation to its activities concerning the hospital in question is purely voluntary. 31. Before an organisation can be held to discharge a public function, the function must be of a character that is closely related to functions which are performed by the State in its sovereign capacity. There is nothing on record to indicate that the hospital performs functions which are akin to those solely performed by State authorities. Medical services are provided by private as well as State entities. The character of the organisation as a public authority is dependent on the circumstances of the case. In setting up the hospital, the Mission cannot be construed as having assumed a public function. The hospital has no monopoly status conferred or mandated by law. That it was the first in the State to provide service of a particular dispensation does not make it an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 226. State governments provide concessional terms to a variety of organisations in order to attract them to set up establishments within the territorial jurisdiction of the State. The State may encourage them as an adjunct of its social policy or the imperatives of economic development. The mere fact that land had been provided on a concessional basis to the hospital would not by itself result in the conclusion that the hospital performs a public function. In the present case, the absence of state control in the management of the hospital has a significant bearing on our - 43 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 coming to the conclusion that the hospital does not come within the ambit of a public authority. 32. It has been submitted before us that the hospital is subject to regulation by the Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act 2010. Does the regulation of hospitals and nursing homes by law render the hospital a statutory body? Private individuals and organizations are subject to diverse obligations under the law. The law is a ubiquitous phenomenon. From the registration of birth to the reporting of death, law imposes obligations on diverse aspects of individual lives. From incorporation to dissolution, business has to act in compliance with law. But that does not make every entity or activity an authority under Article 226. Regulation by a statute does not constitute the hospital as a body which is constituted under the statute. Individuals and organisations are subject to statutory requirements in a whole host of activities today. That by itself cannot be conclusive of whether such an individual SC5580 or organisation discharges a public function. In Federal Bank (AIR 2003 SC 4325, Para 32) (supra), while deciding whether a private bank that is regulated by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 discharges any public function, the court held thus: "33 in our view, a private company carrying on banking business as a scheduled bank, cannot be termed as an institution or a company carrying on any statutory or public duty. A private body or a person may be amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. We don't find such conditions are fulfilled in respect of a private company carrying on a commercial activity of - 44 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 banking.Merely regulatory provisions to ensure such activity carried on by private bodies work within a discipline, do not confer any such status upon the company nor put any such obligation upon it which may be enforced through issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Present is a case of disciplinary action being taken against its employee by the appellant Bank. The respondent's service with the Bank stands terminated. The action of the Bank was challenged by the respondent by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The respondent is not trying to enforce any statutory duty on the part of the Bank" (emphasis supplied) 33. Thus, contracts of a purely private nature would not be subject to writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the fact that they are structured by statutory provisions. The only exception to this principle arises in a situation where the contract of service is governed or regulated by a statutory provision. Hence, for instance, in K K Saksena (supra) this Court held that when an employee is a workman governed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it constitutes an exception to the general principle that a contract of personal service is not capable of being specifically enforced or performed. 34. It is of relevance to note that the Act was enacted to provide for the regulation and registration of clinical establishments with a view to prescribe minimum standards of facilities and services. The Act, inter alia, stipulates conditions to be satisfied by clinical establishments for registration. However, the Act does not govern contracts of service entered into by the Hospital with respect to its employees. These fall within the ambit of purely private contracts, against which writ - 45 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 jurisdiction cannot lie. The sanctity of this distinction must be preserved. 35.For the above reasons, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellants are amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution as an authority within the meaning of the Article.” 5.10. By relying on Ramkrishna Mission’s case he submits that even for an organization to be able to discharge a public function, the function must be of a character that is closely related to the functions that are performed by the State in its sovereign capacity. In that case, he submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court was of the opinion that the hospital run by Ramakrishna Mission was not performing a sovereign function. Similarly, he submitted that the activities of the respondent do not conform to the requirement of a sovereign function as laid down in the Ramakrishna Mission’s case. 5.11. He places reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini - 46 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 Mills Ltd., Sultanpur, U.P V/s Satrughan Nishad and others7. Particularily paragraph No.8, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “8. From the decisions referred to above, it would be clear that the form in which the body is constituted, namely, whether it is a society or a cooperative society or a company, is not decisive. The real status of the body with respect to the control of Government would have to be looked into. The various tests, as indicated above, would have to be applied and considered cumulatively. There can be no hard-and-fast formula and in different facts/situations, different factors may be found to be overwhelming and indicating that the body is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. In this context, bye-laws of the Mill would have to be seen. In the instant case, in one of the writ applications filed before the High Court, it was asserted that the Government of Uttar Pradesh held 50% shares in the Mill which fact was denied in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State and it was averred that majority of the shares were held by canegrowers. Of course, it was not said that the Government of Uttar Pradesh did not hold any share. Before this Court, it was stated on behalf of the contesting respondents in the counter-affidavit that the Government of Uttar Pradesh held 50% shares in the Mill which was not denied on behalf of the Mill. Therefore, even if it is taken to be admitted due to non-traverse, the share of the State Government would be only 50% and not entire. Thus, the first test laid down is not fulfilled by the Mill. It has been stated on behalf of the contesting respondents that the 7 (2003) 8 SCC 639 - 47 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 Mill used to receive some financial assistance from the Government. According to the Mill, the Government had advanced some loans to the Mill. It has nowhere been stated that the State used to meet any expenditure of the Mill much less almost the entire one, but, as a matter of fact, it operates on the basis of self- generated finances. There is nothing to show that the Mill enjoys monopoly status in the matter of production of sugar. A perusal of the bye-laws of the Mill would show that its membership is open to canegrowers, other societies, Gram Sabha, State Government etc. and under Bye-law 52, a Committee of Management consisting of fifteen members is constituted, out of whom, five members are required to be elected by the representatives of individual members, three out of the cooperative society and other institutions and two representatives of financial institutions besides five members who are required to be nominated by the State Government which shall be inclusive of the Chairman and Administrator. Thus, the ratio of the nominees of the State Government in the Committee is only 1/3rd and the management of the Committee is dominated by 2/3rd non- government members. Under the bye-laws, the State Government can neither issue any direction to the Mill nor determine its policy as it is an autonomous body. The State has no control at all in the functioning of the Mill much less a deep and pervasive one. The role of the Federation, which is the apex body and whose ex officio Chairman-cum-Managing Director is the Secretary, Department of Sugar Industry and Cane, Government of Uttar Pradesh, is only advisory and to guide its members. The letter sent by the Managing Director of the Federation on 22-11-1999 was merely by way of an advice and was in the nature of a suggestion to the Mill in view of its deteriorating financial condition. From the said letter, which is in the advisory capacity, it - 48 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 cannot be inferred that the State had any deep and pervasive control over the Mill. Thus, we find none of the indicia exists in the case of the Mill, as such the same being neither an instrumentality nor an agency of the Government cannot be said to be an authority and, therefore, it is not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.” 5.12. By relying on Satrughan Nishad’s case he submits that an entity over which the State exercises no control with respect to its management or functioning cannot be considered an 'instrumentality' or 'agency' of the State. Consequently, such an entity would not fall within the ambit of 'State' as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution. He further submitted that respondent No. 2, being a private entity administered and controlled by private individuals, is not subject to governmental control in policy- making or administration. Therefore, in light of the principles laid down in Satrughan Nishad’s case, respondent No. 2 would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. - 49 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 5.13. He relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in G. Bassi Reddy V/s International Crops Research Institute & another8 more particularly paragraph Nos. 27, 28 and 29, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “26. The facts which have been narrated earlier clearly show that ICRISAT does not fulfil any of these tests. It was not set up by the Government and it gives its services voluntarily to a large number of countries besides India. It is not controlled by nor is it accountable to the Government. The Indian Government's financial contribution to ICRISAT is minimal. Its participation in ICRISAT's administration is limited to 3 out of 15 members. It cannot therefore be said that ICRISAT is a State or other authority as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution. 27. It is true that a writ under Article 226 also lies against a “person” for “any other purpose”. The power of the High Court to issue such a writ to “any person” can only mean the power to issue such a writ to any person to whom, according to the well-established principles, a writ lay. That a writ may issue to an appropriate person for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III is clear enough from the language used. But the words “and for any other purpose” must mean “for any other purpose for which any of the writs mentioned would, according to well- established principles issue”. 8 (2003) 4 SCC 225 - 50 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 28. A writ under Article 226 can lie against a “person” if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty (Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual [(1969) 1 SCC 585 : AIR 1969 SC 1306] , Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Trust v. V.R. Rudani [(1989) 2 SCC 691] SCC at p. 698 and VST Industries Ltd. v. Workers' Union [(2001) 1 SCC 298 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 227] ). ICRISAT has not been set up by a statute nor are its activities statutorily controlled. Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. The primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct research and training programmes in the sphere of agriculture purely on a voluntary basis. A service voluntarily undertaken cannot be said to be a public duty. Besides ICRISAT has a role which extends beyond the territorial boundaries of India and its activities are designed to benefit people from all over the world. While the Indian public may be the beneficiary of the activities of the Institute, it certainly cannot be said that ICRISAT owes a duty to the Indian public to provide research and training facilities. In Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.V. Imanual [(1969) 1 SCC 585 : AIR 1969 SC 1306] this Court construed Article 226 to hold that the High Court could issue a writ of mandamus “to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal interest”. The Court also held that : (SCC p. 589, para 6) “[A]n application for mandamus will not lie for an order of reinstatement to an office which is essentially of a private character nor can such an application be maintained to secure performance of obligations owed by a company - 51 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 towards its workmen or to resolve any private dispute. (See Sohan Lal v. Union of India.) 29. We are therefore of the view that the High Court was right in its conclusion that the writ petition of the appellant was not maintainable against ICRISAT.” 5.14. By relying on G. Bassi Reddy’s case he submits that if an entity is not established by a statute, nor are its activities regulated or controlled by any statutory provisions, it would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction. Mere engagement in activities intended to benefit the general public would not, by itself, render such an entity subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution 5.15. He relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar West Bengal V/s Dunlop India Ltd. & Others9 more particularly paragraph No. 3, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “ 3. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [(1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131 : 1983 Tax LR 2905 : (1983) 142 ITR 663 9 (1985) 1 SCC 260 - 52 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 : (1983) 53 STC 315] A.P. Sen, E.S. Venkataramiah and R.B. Misra, JJ. held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged.” 5.16. By relying on Dunlop India Ltd.’s he submits that Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not meant to circumvent or short-circuit the statutory procedure. Where an alternative remedy is provided - 53 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 under the statute, the parties are expected to exhaust such remedy. In the present case, since respondent no. 1 has already cancelled the license of respondent no.2, it is for respondent no. 1 to take appropriate action in accordance with law, and not for the petitioner to seek the relief as prayed for in the present writ petition. Writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass or circumvent a statutory remedy. Where the statute provides an alternative remedy, parties must first exhaust that remedy. 5.17. He relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Carl Still G.m.b.H. & Another V/s State of Bihar & Others10 more particularly paragraph No.20 which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “ 20. As I have already observed, the investigation of facts on the question of the liability to pay tax has to be made by the 10 AIR 1961 SC 1615 - 54 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 taxing authorities in whom that jurisdiction is vested. Before the facts on which the liability to tax depends are ascertained, the High Court could not be asked to assume that the transaction was in the nature of a pure works contract and to decide the question as to the liability of the appellants on that footing. There is no ground for assuming that the taxing authorities will not give effect to the decision of this court in Gannon Dunkerley's case (1) after the true nature of the transaction is ascertained.” 5.18. By relying on Carl Still’s case he submits that when disputed facts arise, as in the present case, it is for the concerned authority to decide the matter after examining the facts, and this Court ought not to exercise its writ jurisdiction. 5.19. He relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Phoenix Arc Private Limited V/s Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir and Others11 more particularly paragraph Nos. 15, 16, 21 which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “ 15. It is required to be noted that it is the case on behalf of the appellant that as such the communication dated 13-8-2015 cannot be 11 (2022) 5 SCC 345 - 55 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 said to be a notice under Section 13(4) of the Sarfaesi Act at all. According to the appellant, after the notice under Section 13(2) of the Sarfaesi Act was issued in the year 2013 and thereafter despite the letter of acceptance dated 27-2-2015, no further amount was paid, the appellant called upon the borrowers to make the payment within two weeks failing which a further proceeding under Section 13(4) of the Sarfaesi Act was proposed. Thus, according to the appellant, it was a proposed action. Therefore, the writ petitions filed against the proposed action under Section 13(4) of the Sarfaesi Act was not maintainable and/or entertainable at all. 16. Assuming that the communication dated 13-8-2015 can be said to be a notice under Section 13(4) of the Sarfaesi Act, in that case also, in view of the statutory remedy available under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act and in view of the law laid down by this Court in the cases referred to hereinabove, the writ petitions against the notice under Section 13(4) of the Sarfaesi Act was not required to be entertained by the High Court. Therefore, the High Court has erred in entertaining the writ petitions against the communication dated 13-8-2015 and also passing the ex parte ad interim orders directing to maintain the status quo with respect to possession of secured properties on the condition directing the borrowers to pay Rs 1 crore only (in all Rs 3 crores in view of the subsequent orders passed by the High Court extending the ex parte ad interim order dated 26-8-2015 [Vishwa Bharathi Vidya Mandir v. Authorized Officer, WP No. 35564 of 2015, order dated 26-8-2015 (Kar)] ) against the total dues of approximate Rs 117 crores. Even the High Court ought to have considered and disposed of the application for vacating the ex parte ad interim relief, which was filed in the year 2016 at the - 56 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 earliest considering the fact that a large sum of Rs 117 crores was involved. 21. Applying the law laid down by this Court in Mathew K.C. [State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 41] to the facts on hand, we are of the opinion that filing of the writ petitions by the borrowers before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is an abuse of process of the court. The writ petitions have been filed against the proposed action to be taken under Section 13(4). As observed hereinabove, even assuming that the communication dated 13-8-2015 was a notice under Section 13(4), in that case also, in view of the statutory, efficacious remedy available by way of appeal under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions. Even the impugned orders passed by the High Court directing to maintain the status quo with respect to the possession of the secured properties on payment of Rs 1 crore only (in all Rs 3 crores) is absolutely unjustifiable. The dues are to the extent of approximately Rs 117 crores. The ad interim relief has been continued since 2015 and the secured creditor is deprived of proceeding further with the action under the Sarfaesi Act. Filing of the writ petition by the borrowers before the High Court is nothing but an abuse of process of court. It appears that the High Court has initially granted an ex parte ad interim order mechanically and without assigning any reasons. The High Court ought to have appreciated that by passing such an interim order, the rights of the secured creditor to recover the amount due and payable have been seriously prejudiced. The secured creditor and/or its assignor have a right to recover the amount due and payable to it from the borrowers. The stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the - 57 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 financial health of the secured creditor/assignor. Therefore, the High Court should have been extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion while granting stay in such matters. In these circumstances, the proceedings before the High Court deserve to be dismissed.” 5.20. By relying on the Bharati Vidya Mandir’s case, he submits that when there is an efficacious alternate statutory remedy, writ jurisdiction ought not to be exercised. 5.21. He relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another V/s Mathew K.C.12 more particularly paragraph No. 5 which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. Normally this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is loath to interfere with an interim order passed in a pending proceeding before the High Court, except in special circumstances, to prevent manifest injustice or abuse of the process of the court. In the present case, the facts are not in dispute. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised 12 (2018) 3 SCC 85 - 58 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603] , as follows: (SCC p. 611, para 15) Ikbal [Sri Siddeshwara Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal, (2013) 10 SCC 83 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 638] it was observed that the action of the bank under Section 13(4) of the Sarfaesi Act available to challenge by the aggrieved under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the institution directly under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] observing: (Ikbal case [Sri Siddeshwara Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal, (2013) 10 SCC 83 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 638] , SCC pp. 94-95, paras 27- 28) “27. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented. 28. … In our view, there was no justification whatsoever for the learned Single Judge [Ikbal v. Registrar of Coop. Societies, 2011 SCC OnLine Kar 4456] to allow the borrower to bypass the efficacious remedy provided to him under Section 17 and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction in his favour when he had disentitled himself for such relief by his conduct. The Single Judge was clearly in error - 59 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 in invoking his extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 in light of the peculiar facts indicated above. The Division Bench [Sri Siddeshwara Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal, 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 8816] also erred in affirming the erroneous order of the Single Judge.” 5.22. By relying on Mathew K.C.’s case, he again submits that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be entertained if alternative statutory remedies are available. 6. Heard Shri Suresh S Gundi learned counsel for petitioner, Shri Shashank Manish, instructed by Shri Siddhappa S. Sajjan, learned counsel for Respondent No. 1, and Shri Mrutyunjaya Tatabangi, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 and perused the papers. 7. The points that would arise for consideration are: i. Whether a writ petition is maintainable against Respondent No. 2, the Warehouseman? ii. Whether the present writ petition is not maintainable on account of an alternative statutory remedy being available to the petitioner? - 60 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 iii. Whether any direction could be issued by this Court to Respondent No. 2 as sought for in the prayer column of the present writ petition? iv. Whether Respondent No. 2 can deny inspection and/or the process of inventorization of the goods stored with it on a request made by Respondent No. 1? If so, is Respondent No. 1 powerless to carry out inventorization in the absence of cooperation from the warehouseman? v. What order? 8. I answer the above points as under: 9. Answer to Point No. (i): Whether a writ petition is maintainable against Respondent No. 2, the Warehouseman? 9.1. It is not in dispute that Respondent No. 1 is an authority set up under the WDRA Act. It is further not in dispute that it is only in terms of a license issued by Respondent No. 1 that Respondent No. 2 is functioning as a warehouse under the WDRA Act. - 61 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 9.2. Though the contention of Shri Mrutyunjaya Tata Bangi, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2, is that it carries on a private business of warehousing and acts in terms of contracts between the parties for which it charges a fee, the same, in my considered opinion, will not divest this Court of its jurisdiction over Respondent No. 2. This is for the simple reason that warehousing under the WDRA Act is different from warehousing in general. Any person can carry on the business of warehousing for storing the goods of another person or entity. In such cases, the transaction is solely between the person running the warehouse and the person availing its services. 9.3. However, under the WDRA Act, a "warehouseman" is one who is granted a certificate of registration by the Authority for carrying on the business of warehousing. A "warehouse," in terms of Section 2(s), is a premises conforming to all requirements specified - 62 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 by the Authority and regulations, wherein the warehouseman takes custody of goods deposited by a depositor. The "warehousing business," under Section 2(t), means the business of maintaining warehouses, storing goods, and issuing negotiable warehouse receipts. A person who normally carries on the business of warehousing would not be issuing negotiable warehouse receipts. It is only a registered warehouseman carrying on warehousing business in a registered warehouse that can issue negotiable warehouse receipts, which, in terms of Section 2(m) of the WDRA Act, are freely transferable and negotiable. This is the very reason why the WDRA Act was established. 9.4. The statement of objects and reasons of the WDRA Act reads as under: “At present, the warehousing receipts issued by the warehouses in the country do not enjoy the fiduciary trust of depositors and banks as there is a fear that it is not possible to recover the loans in case of fraud, mis-management, etc., by the warehousemen or insolvency of the depositor. The available legal remedies are - 63 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 also time consuming and inadequate. Further, the format of warehouse receipts issued by the various warehouses in the country is not uniform. Hence, there are considerable impediments in the negotiability of warehouse receipts creating difficulties to the farmers and other depositors of goods. Having regard to the above, it is proposed to establish a negotiable warehouse receipt system for all commodities including agricultural commodities. On the one hand, it will make warehouse receipts a prime tool of trade and facilitate finance against it throughout the country, on the other, it will allow banks to improve the quality of their lending portfolio and enhance their interest in lending in respect of goods deposited in warehouses. It is, therefore, proposed to lay down the requirements for warehouse receipts to become valid negotiable instruments. 2. It is expected that the system of negotiable warehouse receipts would result in providing considerable benefits, both at the macro as well as micro levels and increase the liquidity in the rural areas, encourage scientific warehousing of goods, lower cost of financing, improve supply chains, enhance rewards for grading and quality and better price risk management. This would, in turn, result in higher returns to farmers and better services to consumers. It is also proposed to provide necessary administrative mechanism and legislative backup for regulating and streamlining the warehousing sector issuing negotiable warehouse receipts. 3. The proposed legislation, inter alia, seeks to provide for- (i) the regulation of warehousing business by registering warehouses issuing negotiable warehouse receipts; - 64 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 (ii) the registration of accreditation agencies for warehouses which would issue accreditation certificates to the warehouses following certain required norms; (iii) the liabilities, duties and lien of warehousemen; (iv) the contents of negotiable warehouse receipts; (v) the conditions for negotiability of warehouse receipts by delivery and endorsement; (vi) the transfer of negotiable warehouse receipts without endorsement and warranties on sale of warehouse receipts; (vii) the issue of duplicate receipts in case of loss or destruction; (viii) the establishment and incorporation of an Authority to be called the Warehousing Development and Regulatory Authority to regulate and ensure implementation of the provisions of the proposed legislation and to promote orderly growth of the warehouse business in the country; (ix) the empowerment of the Central Government to issue directions on questions of policy to the Authority and to supersede the Authority in certain circumstances; (x) the appeal to the appellate authority; and (xi) defining the offences and penalties in respect of such offences. 4. The Notes on clauses explain in detail the various provisions contained in the Bill. 5. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.” - 65 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 9.5. A perusal of the above objects and reasons categorically indicates that the need for establishing a warehousing authority and for promulgating such an enactment arose from a lack of trust in securing goods stored in warehouses and in enabling banks or financial institutions to advance money on the security of such goods. It is for that reason that Respondent No. 1, the warehousing authority, was created and vested with powers and duties. The warehousing business is required to be carried out in terms of the WDRA Act and its regulations to bring about transparency and to enable financial institutions, banks, and creditors to have trust and faith in warehouses that issue negotiable warehouse receipts, thereby securing the loans advanced. 9.6. It is therefore clear that the warehouseman must act under the WDRA Act, which has been enacted to instill confidence in financial institutions and creditors regarding the business of warehousing. - 66 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 This is particularly true when a warehouse registered under the WDRA Act is required to carry on its business in accordance with the provisions of the WDRA Act. As indicated supra, the very purpose of the establishment of the warehousing authority to issue licenses to warehouses is in the larger public good to enable the securitization of goods stored in the warehouse and the advancement of loans on the basis of such security. Thus, in my considered opinion, a warehouseman is discharging public duties and, in terms of the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya, St. Mary's Education Society and K.K. Saksena, would be a private body discharging public functions amenable to writ jurisdiction. 9.7. The decision relied upon by Shri Mrutyunjaya Tatabangi in Board of Control for Cricket in India’s (for short BCCI) case would not benefit Respondent No. 2, inasmuch as the Hon’ble Apex Court in that case, after exhaustively dealing with - 67 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 the matter, came to a final conclusion that though the BCCI may not be a "State" under Article 12, it is certainly amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Thus, even as per the decision relied upon by the counsel for Respondent No. 2, if public functions are discharged by a private body, it would be amenable to this Court's writ jurisdiction. 9.8. The decision in Jatya Pal Singh’s case would also not be applicable in the present matter, inasmuch as that case pertained to a company engaged in commercial activities wherein Tata Communications Limited was held not be amenable to writ jurisdiction solely on the ground that the Government did not hold a majority shareholding in the company. However, in the present case, Respondent No. 2 is required to act in conformity with the requirements of the WDRA Act. It issues certificates under the said Act, which are relied upon by pledgees, banks, and other stakeholders. Therefore, Respondent No. 2 is performing a public - 68 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 duty, and in such circumstances, the decision in Jatya Pal Singh’s case would not be applicable. 9.9. As regards the decision in Ramakrishna Mission’s case, it pertained to a hospital run by the Ramakrishna Mission, where medical services were being rendered. While it could be argued that such medical services are to be provided in accordance with applicable laws, the mere rendering of medical services does not, in itself, render the activities of the hospital as constituting a public act. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in that context, also applied the additional test of whether sovereign functions were being performed. It was held that operating a hospital does not amount to performing a sovereign function. In contrast, in the present case, Respondent No. 2 issues certificates under the WDRA Act. These certificates can be endorsed and acted upon by the holder, who in turn may further endorse them to third parties. Consequently, the certification issued by Respondent No. 2 has legal - 69 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 consequences that extend beyond the original certificate holder. Such endorsements and transactions by third parties are based on the guarantees and warranties provided under the WDRA. Therefore, the certification issued by Respondent No. 2 can result in benefit, loss, or injury to parties other than the one to whom the certificate was originally issued. These third parties rely on the certificate solely due to the statutory backing and guarantees extended by the State under the WDRA which specifically includes the performance of obligations on part of the warehouseman. In this context, Respondent No. 2 is not merely performing a private or commercial activity, but a public function governed by statute. As such, the ratio in Ramakrishna Mission’s case would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 9.10. The decision in Satrughan Nishad’s case pertained to an entity operating a sugar mill, and - 70 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 the only aspect that was considered was with regard to the ownership of the Mill being a purely commercial enterprise, and the Court held that the actions of such a commercial enterprise could not be considered public acts. As such, there is no dispute in terms of the decision in Satrughan Nishad’s case. However, the same would not be applicable to the present matter. 9.11. The decision in Bassi Reddy’s case pertained to ICRISAT, which was neither governed by any specific enactment nor under the control of the Government in the said organization. Thus, that decision would also not be applicable to the present facts. 9.12. All the above decisions having been found to be inapplicable, and having come to the conclusion that Respondent No. 2 is discharging a public duty, I am of the considered opinion that Respondent No. 2 would be amenable to writ jurisdiction. - 71 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 9.13. Hence, I answer Point No. (i) by holding that a warehouse registered under Section 4 of the WDRA Act is one that discharges public duties and as such, though not a "State" within the definition of Article 12, would be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. Answer to Point No. (ii): Whether the present writ petition is not maintainable on account of an alternative statutory remedy being available to the petitioner? 10.1. It cannot be disputed that whenever a statute provides for an alternative remedy, it is incumbent upon the party to first approach the authority before whom such statutory remedy is available, so long as the reliefs required falls within the scope of that remedy. 10.2. The decision in Dunlop India Limited’s case related to the availability of an alternative remedy provided under the statute. However, the non- discharge of obligations on the part of Respondent No. 2 in the present case cannot be said to be a - 72 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 matter in respect of which the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy. Therefore, that decision would also not be applicable to the present case. 10.3. The decision in Carl Still's case pertained to the liability to pay tax. In that case, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the High Court cannot adjudicate upon the nature, extent, or quantum of tax liability, as such matters are to be determined in the manner prescribed under the relevant statutory framework. Accordingly, the Court concluded that such issues must be decided through the statutory remedy available. Therefore, that decision would also not be applicable to the present facts. 10.4. The decision in Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir’s case also dealt with the issue of alternative statutory remedy under the SARFAESI Act, in the context of a private transaction. There can be no dispute regarding the fact that the Act provides for appellate remedies under the statute. However, - 73 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 such remedies are specific to the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. In the present case, no such appellate remedy is available or provided under the WDRA with respect to the actions of Respondent No. 2. Therefore, the said decision would also not be applicable to the present facts. 10.5. In the present case, the WDRA Act does not provide for any alternative statutory remedy to the petitioner. It was for Respondent No. 1 to initiate appropriate action against Respondent No. 2. The petitioner has already approached Respondent No. 1, requesting such action; however, no steps have been taken in this regard. The petitioner, by himself, has no independent remedy under the WDRA, and Respondent No. 1, having failed to completely and effectively discharge his obligations, leaves the petitioner with no other option but to approach this Court seeking a writ of mandamus. 10.6. Respondent No. 1 is admittedly a public authority, and Respondent No. 2, in the present matter, is - 74 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 engaged in the discharge of public functions, as already discussed and concluded in Point No. 1. 10.7. Hence, I answer Point No. 2 by holding that no alternative statutory remedy is available to the petitioner, and accordingly, the present writ petition is maintainable. 11. Answer to Point No. (iii): Whether any direction could be issued by this Court to Respondent No. 2 as sought for in the prayer column of the present writ petition? 11.1. Having come to the conclusion that the writ petition is maintainable both against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, what would have to be considered is the directions which could be issued to Respondent No. 2 in a writ petition. The relevant provisions have been reproduced hereinabove, it being clear that: 11.2. A warehouseman can conduct his business only upon registration under the WDRA Act. Without such registration, the business under WDRA Act cannot be conducted by any warehouseman. - 75 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 11.3. Section 6 of the WDRA Act deals with the liability of a warehouseman, whether the warehouseman is liable for loss of or injury to goods caused by his failure to exercise such care and diligence in regard to the goods as a careful and vigilant owner of goods of the same bulk, quality, and value would exercise in the custody of them in similar conditions. 11.4. In terms of Section 7 of the WDRA Act, a warehouseman is required to deliver the goods referred to in the negotiable receipt to the holder of the receipt on demand made by the holder. 11.5. In terms of Section 8 of the WDRA Act, every warehouseman shall keep in a place of safety a complete and accurate set of records and accounts of all unissued receipts in his possession and all receipts issued, returned to, or cancelled. The set of records and accounts is required to be kept in normal condition, numerical sequence, separate and distinct from the records and accounts of any - 76 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 other business, and the warehouseman, in terms of subsection 3 of Section 8 of the WDRA Act, shall make available to the authority for inspection the records and accounts of the warehouse business at any time as may be desired by the authority. 11.6. Section 43 of the WDRA Act deals with offences and penalties in warehousing. Some of the offences relate to the issuance of receipts and/or duplicate receipts. 11.7. In terms of the Rules of 2010, there are various ancillary rules which have been brought into force, like the Warehousing (Development and Regulation) Registration of Accreditation Agencies Rules, 2010, the Warehousing (Development and Regulation) Appellate Authority Procedure Rules 2010, the Warehousing Development and Regulatory Authority (Registration of Accredited Agency) Regulations 2011, the Warehousing Development and Regulatory Authority (Warehouse Accreditation) Regulations 2011, and the - 77 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 Warehousing Development and Regulatory Authority (Negotiable Warehouse Receipts) Regulations 2011. 11.8. The Warehousing Development and Regulatory (Registration of Warehouse) Rules 2017 (for short the Rules 2017) deal with the manner in which the authority has superintendence over the warehouse and the manner in which the warehouseman is required to conduct its business. Rule 25 of the Rules 2017 speaks of the general obligation of a warehouseman, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference. “25. General obligations of a warehouseman. - In the conduct of its warehousing business, a warehouseman shall- (a) issue a negotiable warehouse receipt only in respect of such goods that have been [notified] by the Authority from time to time; (b) deliver the goods referred to in a negotiable warehouse receipt, holder of the negotiable warehouse receipt on demand made by the holder after satisfying the warehousing lien; (c) ensure that the negotiable warehouse receipt holder, on receiving the goods from the - 78 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 warehouseman, acknowledges the receipt of the goods in a form and manner required by the Authority; (d) take necessary actions to maintain the quality and quantity of goods stored in the warehouse; (e) maintain and record a complete and accurate set of records and accounts of all transactions pertaining to the operation of a registered warehouse as per the requirements that the Authority may specify from time to time; (f) ensure that the physical inventory tallies exactly with the record; (g) maintain effective control of all registered warehouse storage space: (h) provide necessary assistance in the execution of inspections and audits by the Authority; (i) resolve grievances efficaciously; (j) not differentiate among depositors regarding use of and access to a warehouse; (k) not store goods belonging to itself in a registered warehouse, and (l) not sell, remove or dispose of the goods deposited in a registered warehouse except as permitted under the Act.” 11.9. In terms of Rule 25 of the Rules 2017, it is an obligation of the warehouseman to ensure that the physical inventory tallies exactly with the record, - 79 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 and to provide necessary assistance in the execution of inspection orders by the authority. Among several other obligations, in terms of Rule 29 of the Rules 2017, the warehouseman is required to submit information regarding warehouse receipts. 11.10.The authority, in terms of Rule 30 of the Rules 2017, has the power to suspend the registration of a warehouseman in the event of any default committed as regards the obligation of the warehouseman, as also to cancel the registration in terms of Rule 33 of the Rules 2017. 11.11.Respondent No.1 in the present matter, having called upon the warehouseman, Respondent No. 2, to provide inspection on several occasions, and Respondent No. 2 not having so provided inspection, has led to the license of Respondent No. 2 being cancelled by Respondent No. 1 authority. However, it is on account of the non-cooperation of - 80 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 the warehouseman that inspection or inventorization could not be conducted. 11.12.The submission of Shri Shashank Manish, learned counsel, being that even the Superintendent of Police could not get Respondent No. 2 to open the warehouse for the purpose of such inspection. In this background, though it is clear that there are several obligations on the part of the warehouseman as indicated, it is on account of non-cooperation by the warehouseman that the authority has not taken any further steps beyond cancellation. It is rather strange that an authority who is vested with an obligation to safeguard the interests of all depositors, banks, etc., like the petitioner herein, Respondent No. 1, has not been able to carry out an inspection and/or inventorization. 11.13.In my considered opinion, there would be no requirement for Respondent No. 2 to co-operate with Respondent No. 1 in that regard, and also for - 81 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 Respondent No. 1 to wait for Respondent No. 2 to co-operate for the purpose of carrying out an inspection. Once a demand was made by Respondent No.1, which was not answered adequately by Respondent No.2, Respondent No.1 was duty bound to act as per the applicable law and carry out such inspection or the like as required under law. 11.14.Any and all obligations on the part of Respondent No. 2 under the Act and the various rules indicated supra would be amenable to writ jurisdiction on account of Respondent No. 2 discharging a public duty, as is clear from a reading of the statement of objects and reasons of the WDRA Act. 11.15.A reading of various obligations on the part of the authority and the warehouseman in terms of the WDRA Act and the relief which are sought for by the petitioner in the present matter could also be granted to a large extent. - 82 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 11.16.Thus, I answer Point No. 2 by holding that Respondent No. 2 is discharging a public duty. This court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226, can issue any direction to Respondent No. 2 for compliance with the WDRA Act and the various rules framed thereunder. 12. Answer to Point No. (iv): Whether Respondent No. 2 can deny inspection and/or the process of inventorization of the goods stored with it on a request made by Respondent No. 1? If so, is Respondent No. 1 powerless to carry out inventorization in the absence of cooperation from the warehouseman? 12.1. In the present matter, as indicated supra, Respondent No. 2 has denied inspection to the authority/Respondent No. 1, as well as to the Petitioner Bank. Even though Respondent No. 2 is obligated to make available all the records, documents, and goods that are the subject matter of the negotiable receipts issued by Respondent No. 2, on which basis the Petitioner has advanced loans to the borrowers, one of the basic requirements is - 83 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 to permit inspection of the goods stored in the warehouse by the concerned borrower. Furthermore, while doing so, an inventory must be prepared in respect of the said goods. 12.2. In this regard, when the authority has called upon the warehouseman to permit inspection and carry out inventory, Respondent No. 2 has denied the same. The contention of the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 is that due to non-cooperation, inspection and inventory could not be conducted, despite the Superintendent of Police being directed to assist in the same. Even then, Respondent No. 2 did not open the warehouse for such inspection. 12.3. The learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 submitted that cooperation is required to prevent situations where a warehouseman might later claim that certain goods have been damaged, stolen, or pilfered. It is for this reason, to avoid such allegations, that the Respondent No. 1 authority - 84 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 has been unable to carry out the inspection and inventory by itself. 12.4. In my considered opinion, the law is clear that there is an obligation imposed upon the authority, which has been set up to protect the interests of depositors and creditors, like banks. The very system of issuing warehousing receipts would be rendered redundant if the authority were not in a position to protect the interests of such depositors and banks. More importantly, if those interests are not protected, the very purpose of issuing warehousing receipts and the state’s encouragement of warehousing in the country would become entirely useless. 12.5. In that view of the matter, the right of the authority to call upon a warehouseman to permit inspection would carry with it the power and authority to inspect the premises, regardless of whether the warehouseman cooperates or not. This is particularly true when a cancellation, suspension, or - 85 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 revocation of a license would not protect the interests of the depositor, creditor, or banker. 12.6. In such circumstances, if there is any apprehension on the part of Respondent No. 1 authority regarding allegations from a warehouseman, it could always be the responsibility of the authority to videograph the entire process, have independent witnesses present during the inspection and inventorization, and involve such other authorities as are available, including revenue and police authorities, during the inspection and inventorization. 12.7. Hence, I answer Point No. (iii) by holding that a warehouseman/Respondent No. 2 cannot deny inspection or inventorization of the goods. In the event of such denial, Respondent No. 1 authority could exercise its powers to carry out the inspection and inventorization with the assistance of revenue and police authorities. 13. Answer to Point No. (v): what order? - 86 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 13.1. In view of my findings in respect of all the above points, I pass the following: ORDER i) Writ petition is allowed. ii) A mandamus is issued to Respondent No. 1 and 2 to permit the petitioner/bank to verify the pledged goods stored in the warehouse of Respondent No. 2 in terms of warehouse receipts issued by Respondent No. 2 and pledged with the petitioner/bank. iii) Since the keys of the Warehouse are deposited with this court, registry is directed to release the keys to the authorised representative of Respondent No.1 who shall carry out such inspection as is required in accordance with he observations made herein above within 10 days of the receipt of this order. iv) Respondent No. 1 is directed to take possession and control of the warehouse, carry out a reconciliation of the said goods with the receipts issued by Respondent No. 2. v) Respondent No. 1 is also directed to take such steps as are necessary to preserve the quality and quantity of the pledged stock by segregating the pledged goods, as per each date, and make - 87 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12326 WP No. 101644 of 2025 available the same to any creditor under the E- NWRs issued by Respondent No. 2. vi) Insofar as recovery of money and/or auction of the pledged goods are concerned, the said pledged goods being a security within the definition of the Securitization Act, liberty is reserved to the bank to initiate proceedings under the said Act, in accordance with the prescribed procedure. vii) All the actions on the part of Respondent No. 1 in carrying out the inspection, preparing the inventorization, and segregation of pledged goods as directed above are to be completed within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. viii) Needless to say, if there is any shortfall or violation on the part of Respondent No.2/warehouseman in carrying out his obligation under the WDRA Act and/or the other rules, Respondent No.1/authority, as also the bank, would be entitled to initiate such action against Respondent No.2/warehouseman, as permissible under law. Sd/- (SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE VB/ct:pa/List No.: 1 Sl No.: 184