Judgment : Sanjay K. Agrawal J. 1. Since common question of law and facts is available in all these three appeals, therefore, they have been clubbed together, heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. On 20/05/2016, a road accident occurred in which three persons died namely Rita, Birbahadur and Durga Prasad. For the death of Rita, her parents namely Biranchi Bai and Dilbharan filed claim case No. 221/2016 before the 3 rd Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ambikapur under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter, the Act of 1988) wherein by impugned award dated 19/05/2017, the Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 50,000/- and fastened the liability of payment of compensation upon the Insurance Company against which MAC/958/2017 has been preferred by the appellants/claimants seeking enhancement of compensation and cross-appeal under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC read with Section 242(3) of Chhattisgarh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1994 has been filed by the Insurance Company. For the death of Birbahadur, his parents namely Premsai and Mundi bai filed claim case No. 123/2016 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Surajpur under Section 166 of the Act of 1988 wherein by impugned award dated 07/04/2018, the Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 6,78,000/- in favour of the claimants and after finding the breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy, proceeded to exonerate the Insurance Company and fastened the liability of payment of compensation upon the owner of the vehicle namely Gangeshwar Ram. For the death of Durga Prasad, his wife, son and parents namely Sanira Bai, Harish, Basanti and Ramnath filed claim case No. 122/2016 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Surajpur wherein by impugned award dated 07/04/2018, the Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 7,18,000/- in favour of the claimants and fastened the payment of liability of compensation upon the owner of the vehicle namely Gangeshwar Ram and the Insurance Company has been exonerated. We shall discuss and decide each of these three appeals one by one. Submission of the parties :- 3. Mr. 7,18,000/- in favour of the claimants and fastened the payment of liability of compensation upon the owner of the vehicle namely Gangeshwar Ram and the Insurance Company has been exonerated. We shall discuss and decide each of these three appeals one by one. Submission of the parties :- 3. Mr. C. Jayant K. Rao, learned counsel for the appellants/claimants in MAC/958/2017, would submit that the Claims Tribunal, Ambikapur is absolutely unjustified in holding that claimants, being parents of deceased married daughter, would not be entitled for compensation under loss of dependency as there are not her dependents after marriage, as such, the impugned award may be modified and the compensation amount may suitably be enhanced. Moreover, the cross-objection filed by the Insurance Company against co-respondent – owner of the vehicle namely Gangeshwar Ram would not be maintainable. 4. Mr. H.P. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondent –Insurance Company, would submit that it is a case where the vehicle was being plied in breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy, therefore, the Insurance Company would not be liable for compensation to the claimants and further the cross-objection preferred by the Insurance Company in MAC/958/2017 would be maintainable in light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Urmila Devi and Others v. Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited and Another (2020) 11 SCC 316 5. Mr. Jai Prakash Shukla, learned counsel for the owner/appellant in MAC/946/2018 and MAC/945/2018, would submit that the Claims Tribunal, Surajpur has erred in exonerating the Insurance Company from liability of payment of compensation to the claimants and since the Insurance Company has already satisfied the award in MAC/958/2017, therefore, they would be liable for payment of compensation in the present cases as well. MAC/958/2017 :- 6. The questions for consideration involved in this appeal are two-fold :- (i) Whether the claimants, being parents of the deceased who was their married daughter, can be treated as her legal representatives and would be entitled for compensation under loss of dependency under Section 166 of the Act of 1988 ? (ii) Whether the cross-appeal filed by the Insurance Company, being respondent No. 2, is maintainable against co-respondent i.e. respondent No. 1 ? Answer to Question No. (i) :- 7. (ii) Whether the cross-appeal filed by the Insurance Company, being respondent No. 2, is maintainable against co-respondent i.e. respondent No. 1 ? Answer to Question No. (i) :- 7. The Claims Tribunal, Ambikapur, solely relying on the ground that the marriage of deceased Rita had already been performed and after ‘vidai’, she was going to her matrimonial house when the accident happened, therefore, the claimants/her parents, would not be entitled for compensation under loss of dependency and proceeded to award compensation amount of Rs. 50,000/- under mental agony/ loss of love and affection and fastened the liability of payment of compensation upon the Insurance Company, which has also been satisfied by the Insurance Company. 8. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the provision contained under Section 166(1) of the Act of 1988, which states as under :- “ 168. Application for compensation. - (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made - (a) XXX XXX XXX (b) XXX XXX XXX (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be.” 9. Further, Section 168 of the Act of 1988 mandates that the Claims Tribunal shall determine the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specify the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid. 10. It is to be noticed that the Act of 1988 does not define ‘legal representative’. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai (1987) 3 SCC 234 have held that the expression in Section 110-A of the Act of 1939 (pari materia with Section 166 of the Act of 1988) is deliberately wider than the narrow ‘wife, husband, parent and child’ enumeration in Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, and that every person who in law represents the estate of the deceased, or suffers on account of death, can qualify as a legal representative. Paragraphs 11 and 13 of the report, being relevant, are reproduced hereinbelow :- “ 11. Paragraphs 11 and 13 of the report, being relevant, are reproduced hereinbelow :- “ 11. Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The expression “legal representative” has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines “legal representative” as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act authorises all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal for the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and clause (c) of that sub-section authorises any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 110-A(1) of the Act thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent, and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such application can be made are thus indicated in Section 110-A of the Act. This section in a way is a substitute to the extent indicated above for the provisions of Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that “every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased”. While the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides that such suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased. Section 110-A(1) of the Act says that the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of the legal representatives of the deceased. A legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. It is further seen from Section 110-B of the Act that the Claims Tribunal is authorised to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. This provision takes the place of the third para of Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that in every such action, the court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought. This provision takes the place of the third para of Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that in every such action, the court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought. Persons for whose benefit such an application can be made and the manner in which the compensation awarded may be distributed amongst the persons for whose benefit the application is made are dealt with by Section 110-A and Section 110-B of the Act and to that extent the provisions of the Act do supersede the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 insofar as motor vehicle accidents are concerned. These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was “new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new” the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 13. We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' children and some times foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents. 11. Furthermore, in the matter of Manjuri Bera v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2007) 10 SCC 643 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between the right to apply (which belongs to any legal representative) and the extent of entitlement based on dependency. It has been observed in paragraphs 12 and 13 as under :- “ 12. As observed by this Court in Custodian of Branches of BANCO National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique [1989 Supp (2) SCC 275 : AIR 1989 SC 1589 ] the definition contained in Section 2(11) CPC is inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only. Instead it stipulates that a person who may or may not be legal heir competent to inherit the property of the deceased can represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even without title either as executors or administrators in possession of the estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by the expression “legal representative”. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even without title either as executors or administrators in possession of the estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by the expression “legal representative”. As observed in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [ (1987) 3 SCC 234 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 482 : AIR 1987 SC 1690 ] a legal representative is one who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. 13. There are several factors which have to be noted. The liability under Section 140 of the Act does not cease because there is absence of dependency. The right to file a claim application has to be considered in the background of right to entitlement. While assessing the quantum, the multiplier system is applied because of deprivation of dependency. In other words, multiplier is a measure. There are three stages while assessing the question of entitlement. Firstly, the liability of the person who is liable and the person who is to indemnify the liability, if any. Next is the quantification and Section 166 is primarily in the nature of recovery proceedings. As noted above, liability in terms of Section 140 of the Act does not cease because of absence of dependency.” 12. The Kerala High Court, in the matter of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shalumol 2021 SCC Online Ker 3209 , traced out how the Motor Vehicles Act deliberately uses the expression ‘legal representative’ instead of ‘dependent’ and noted that ‘dependent’ is not defined in either the Acts of 1939 or 1988 and relying upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai (supra) held that the category of legal representatives is wider than the spouse-parent-child formula under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. It has further been held that dependency is only a criteria or assessing loss of dependency and is not the sole gateway for claiming other pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads, so long as the claimant is a legal representative in law. It has further been held that dependency is only a criteria or assessing loss of dependency and is not the sole gateway for claiming other pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads, so long as the claimant is a legal representative in law. In that case, the Kerala High Court dealt specifically with a married daughter and aged parents and held that married daughter as well as the septuagenarian parents are dependents of the deceased and entitled to full multiplier-based loss of dependency, also linking parental dependency to the statutory duty of maintenance under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. 13. The Madras High Court, in the matter of Glory Bai v. S.K.A. Noorjakan Beevi 2011 SCC Online Mad 319 , has dealt with the question as to whether the parents of a deceased married daughter could be treated as her dependents for the purpose of awarding compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act and answered the question emphatically in the affirmative, grounding its reasoning in constitutional principles, statutory obligations under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the welfare oriented nature of the Motor Vehicles Act and relying upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai (supra), held that parents of a deceased married daughter are legal representatives within the meaning of Section 166(1)(c) of the Act of 1988. On the core issue of dependency, the Madras High Court held that dependency of parents does not cease on the marriage of their daughter and to treat parents of a deceased son as dependents but not parents of a deceased married daughter would offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court concluded that parents are statutorily recognised as dependents of married daughters, and therefore, not mere legal representatives and consequently, they are entitled to full compensation as dependents and not limited to no-fault compensation under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 14. The Supreme Court, in the matter of Deep Shikha v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2025 SCC Online SC 1090 , has held that the mother of the deceased, though the deceased was a married daughter, was entitled to compensation as a dependent. 14. The Supreme Court, in the matter of Deep Shikha v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2025 SCC Online SC 1090 , has held that the mother of the deceased, though the deceased was a married daughter, was entitled to compensation as a dependent. Their Lordships have categorically observed that an elderly parent, especially one lacking independent means of livelihood, is to be treated as a dependent for the purposes of Section 166 of the Act of 1988 and the High Court had erred in denying compensation merely on the ground of non-dependency. It has been observed in paragraph 16 as under :- “16. The obligation of a child to maintain their parent in old age is as much of a duty as the obligation of a parent to maintain their child during minority. The deceased, being the only provider, would be assumed to be fulfilling this obligation, further reinforcing Appellant No. 2’s status as a dependent. Therefore, the untimely demise of the deceased may create difficulties for Appellant No. 2 going forward, resulting in hardship. Even if it is assumed that Appellant No. 2 was not dependent on the deceased at the time of the accident, the possibility of future dependency cannot be disregarded.” 15. In view of the aforesaid legal discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the Claims Tribunal, Ambikapur has erred in holding that the appellants/claimants are not the legal representatives or dependents of the deceased, being their married daughter, and would not be entitled for compensation under loss of dependency. The appellants/claimants are entitled to the same compensation as can be awarded to the parents of a deceased son. Answer to Question No. (ii) :- 16. Respondent No. 2/Insurance Company has filed cross-appeal under Order 41 Rule 22 of the CPC read with Section 242(3) of the Chhattisgarh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1994 claiming the relief of exoneration from the liability of payment of compensation to the claimants and for recovery of deposit amount along with interest i.e. Rs. 53,030/- from the owner of the vehicle namely Gangeshwar Ram. However, objection has been raised by the appellants/claimants that cross-appeal filed by respondent No. 2/Insurance Company against co-respondent i.e. respondent No. 1/owner of the vehicle, would not be maintainable. 17. 53,030/- from the owner of the vehicle namely Gangeshwar Ram. However, objection has been raised by the appellants/claimants that cross-appeal filed by respondent No. 2/Insurance Company against co-respondent i.e. respondent No. 1/owner of the vehicle, would not be maintainable. 17. At this stage, it would be relevant to notice the provision contained under Section 272(3) of the Chhattisgarh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 (hereinafter, the Rules of 1994), which states as under :- “ 242. Form of appeal and contents of memorandum. - (1) XXX XXX (2) XXX XXX XXX (3) Save as provided in sub-rule (1) and (2) of the provisions of Order XXI and Order XLI of the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) shall mutatis mutandis apply to appeals preferred to the High Court under Section 173.” 18. By virtue of Rule 242(3) of the Rules of 1994, unless expressly excluded by sub-rules (1) and (2), the procedural architecture of Order 41 relating to filing, maintainability, hearing, adjudication and powers of the appellate court, applies to full force to appeals filed under Section 173 of the Act of 1988. 19. The question as to whether a respondent can file cross-objection or cross-appeal against the co-respondent is no longer res integra and it stands adjudicated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Panna Lal v. State of Bombay AIR 1963 SC 1516 wherein it has been held that it is only in exceptional cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being re-opened between the objecting respondent and other respondents, that an objection under Order 41 Rule 22 can be directed against the other respondents. Paragraph 18 of the report states as under :- “ 18. Paragraph 18 of the report states as under :- “ 18. In our opinion the view that has now been accepted by all the High Courts that Order 41 Rule 22 permits as a general rule, a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant and it is only in exceptional cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being re-opened between the objecting respondent and other respondents, that an objection under Order 41 Rule 22 can be directed against the other respondents, is correct. Whatever may have been the position under the old Section 561, the use of the word “cross-objection” in O. 41 Rule 22 expressess unmistakably the intention of the legislature that the objection has to be directed against the appellant. As Rajammannar, C.J. said Venkateswarlu v. Ramanma [ILR (1950) Mad, 874] . “The legislature by describing the objection which could be taken by the respondent as a “cross-objection” must have deliberately adopted the view of the other High Courts. One cannot treat an objection by a respondent in which the appellant has no interest as a cross-objection. The appeal is by the appellant against a respondent. The cross-objection must be an objection by a respondent against the appellant”. We think, with respect, that these observations put the matter clearly and correctly. That the legislature also wanted to give effect to the views held by the different High Courts that in exceptional cases as mentioned above an objection can be preferred by a respondent against a co-respondent is indicated by the substitution of the word “appellant” in the third paragraph by the words “the party who may be affected by such objection.” 20. Thereafter, the Supreme Court in the matter of Mahant Dhangir and Another v. Madan Mohan and Others 1987 (Supp) SCC 528 has held that cross-objection by one respondent against other co-respondent is maintainable when the appeal by some of the parties cannot be effectively disposed of without opening of the matter as between the respondents inter se or in a case where the objections are common as against the appellant and co-respondent. It has been observed as under :- “ 12. Generally, the cross-objection could be urged against the appellant. It has been observed as under :- “ 12. Generally, the cross-objection could be urged against the appellant. It is only by way of exception to this general rule that one respondent may urge objection as against the other respondent. The type of such exceptional cases are also very much limited. We may just think of one or two such cases. For instance, when the appeal by some of the parties cannot effectively be disposed of without opening of the matter as between the respondents inter se. Or in a case where the objections are common as against the appellant and correspondent. The court in such cases would entertain cross-objection against the co- respondent. The law in this regard has been laid down by this Court as far back in 1964 in Pannalal v. State of Bombay [ (1964) 1 SCR 980 at 991-92 : AIR 1963 SC 1516 ] .” 21. In the instant case, respondent No. 2 – Insurance Company has filed cross-objection against respondent No. 1 – owner of the vehicle namely Gangeshwar Ram and it is not their case that the objections are common as against the appellant and the co-respondent – owner of the vehicle. It is also not the case where the appeal cannot be disposed of without opening the of the matter as between the respondents inter se. The Insurance Company did not prefer an appeal questioning their liability and only when the appellants/claimants preferred an appeal seeking enhancement of compensation, the Insurance Company has filed this cross-objection, which in my considered opinion, is not an exceptional case as culled out by the Supreme Court in the matter of Panna Lal (supra) and Mahant Dhangir (supra), therefore, I hereby hold that the cross-objection filed by the respondent – Insurance Company against co-respondent – owner of the vehicle is not maintainable as it is directed against the co- respondent i.e. owner of the vehicle and it is hereby dismissed. Furthermore, since the Insurance Company has already satisfied the liability of the award amount, they are liable to pay the compensation amount to the claimants, which is being enhanced by this Court. Quantum of Compensation :- 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of National Insurance Company Ltd. V. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 Sarla Verma & Ors. Vs. Quantum of Compensation :- 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of National Insurance Company Ltd. V. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 Sarla Verma & Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation & Ors (2009) 6 SCC 121 and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram & Ors (2018) 18 SCC 130 , this Court is computing the compensation as below:- 23. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the amount of compensation of Rs. 50,000/- awarded by the Claims Tribunal is enhanced to Rs. 13,41,600/-. Hence, the appellants/claimants are held entitled for an additional amount of Rs. 12,91,600/- . Respondent No. 2/Insurance Company is directed to deposit the amount of compensation as enhanced by this Court within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The additional amount of compensation shall carry interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of claim application before the Tribunal i.e. 28/09/2016 till its realization. MAC/946/2018 and MAC/945/2018 :- 24. In both of these cases, the Claims Tribunal, Surajpur held that vehicle was being plied in breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy and fastened the liability of payment of compensation upon the owner of the vehicle namely Gangeshwar Ram. However, it is the case of the owner/appellant herein that since Insurance Company was fastened with the liability of payment of compensation to the claimants Biranchi Bai and Dilbharan in MAC/958/2017 and as they have already made payment of compensation amount and satisfied the award, therefore, in both of these cases as well, the Insurance Company would be liable for payment of compensation to the claimants. 25. In this regard, the decision rendered by the Karnataka High Court in the matter of B.U. Chaitanya v. Managing Director, Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation and Another 2011 SCC Online Kar 4366 may be noticed herein whereby it has been held as under :- “10. As has been noticed above the claimants as also Rachana, the daughter of the deceased, had filed three claim petitions in M.V.C. Nos. 3005, 3006 and 3160 of 1999. All the claim petitions were allowed by a common judgment and award dated 31.7.2002. The Corporation has not challenged the judgment and award in M.V.C. No. 3160 of 1999 filed by Rachana. 3005, 3006 and 3160 of 1999. All the claim petitions were allowed by a common judgment and award dated 31.7.2002. The Corporation has not challenged the judgment and award in M.V.C. No. 3160 of 1999 filed by Rachana. It is not in dispute that the Corporation has satisfied the said award. If that is, so, the Corporation is estopped from contending that it is not liable to pay compensation in the other two claim petitions. It is well settled that once the Corporation has admitted the accident and paid the compensation in respect of a claim petition, it cannot raise a different stand insofar as its liability is concerned in the other claim petitions arising out of the same accident. They are estopped from doing so.” 26. In the present case, since the Insurance Company has satisfied the award in one case i.e. MAC/958/2017, they are liable to pay compensation to the claimants in both of these cases i.e. MAC/946/2018 and MAC/945/2018, which have also arisen out of the same accident (MAC/958/2017). As such, the impugned award passed by the Claims Tribunal, Surajpur is modified and instead of the owner, Insurance Company is made liable for payment of compensation to the claimants. Conclusion :- 27. In view of the aforesaid discussion and analysis, MAC/958/2017 filed by the claimants Biranchi Bai and Dilbharan is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above whereas the cross-objection filed by the Insurance Company is dismissed as non-maintainable. The appeals preferred by the owner i.e. MAC/946/2018 and MAC/945/2018 are allowed and Insurance Company is fastened with the liability of payment of compensation to the claimants. 28. While parting with the record, we appreciate the assistance rendered by Mr. Pankaj Singh, Mr. Akash Shrivastava, Ms. Harneet Kaur and Mr. Saurabh Gupta, learned amicus curiae, who not only argued the case at length on short notice but have also brought relevant legal position to my notice.