ORDER : 1. This is an appeal by the insurance company against the award dated 07.05.2018 passed by the 6 th Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Durg (C.G.) in Claim Case No.107 of 2016, in which compensation of Rs.7,10,400/- has been granted in favour of the claimants fastening liability upon the appellant insurance company and owner-Respondent No.4 of the offending machine in ratio of Rs.5,75,000/- and rest of the amount Rs.1,35,400/- to the Respondent No.4 i.e. owner herein to pay the compensation as above. 2. Facts of the present case, in brief, are that the appellant herein is the insurer of the machine bearing registration number 210 Kobelco Poklen (hereinafter referred to as the “offending machine”). The respondents No. 1 and 2, being the legal heirs and representatives of the deceased Tarun Kachlame, filed a claim application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) seeking compensation amounting to Rs. 31,91,396/- for the death of Tarun Kachlame. The accident occurred on 13.06.2016 at approximately 10:00 a.m. at Boria Tibbu Godawri Mines, Khadgoan, District Rajnandgaon, when the offending machine, driven in a rash and negligent manner by respondent No. 3, struck a tree during excavation work. The tree subsequently fell upon the deceased, who was a laborer working at the site, causing fatal injuries. It was averred in the claim application that the deceased was employed at the said mines earning a monthly salary of Rs. 6,649/- and was aged 25 years at the time of the accident. The incident was reported to Police Station Khadgoan, leading to the registration of Crime No. 34/2016 against respondent No. 3. 3. Notices were issued to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as well as the appellant insurer. The respondents No. 3 and 4 appeared and filed their written statements denying all allegations and contending that the deceased was unmarried and that the claimants were not dependent on him. The appellant insurer also appeared and denied the claim, asserting that the accident did not occur in a public place and that the insured machine was not involved in the accident. The appellant further contended that the insured equipment was a construction machine not falling within the definition of a “motor vehicle” under the Act, thus rendering the claim application non-maintainable. The appellant further contended that the insured equipment was a construction machine not falling within the definition of a “motor vehicle” under the Act, thus rendering the claim application non-maintainable. It was also submitted that the insurance policy did not cover risks to employees of the insured, and hence the deceased did not qualify as a third party under the policy. The learned Tribunal framed issues based on the pleadings, heard evidence from all parties, and concluded that the deceased was indeed traveling in the offending vehicle at the time of the accident. An application under Section 170 of the Act was filed and allowed on 09.01.2018. The appellant has deposited Rs. 25,000/- towards the appeal filing fees. The appellant challenges the findings of the learned Tribunal as arbitrary and legally unsustainable, necessitating the present appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company respectfully submits that the claim petition was not maintainable before the Tribunal as the offending machine, being a Poklen construction vehicle, does not fall within the ambit of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act and therefore cannot be classified as a “motor vehicle” for the purposes of the Act; consequently, no liability to pay compensation can be fastened upon the appellant. It is contended that although the offending machine was insured with the appellant, the policy did not cover risks arising under the Motor Vehicles Act since the vehicle is a chain-mounted caterpillar construction machine, which by its very nature is not designed or suitable for use on public roads and hence excluded from the statutory definition of “motor vehicle.” Reliance is placed on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa and the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Future Generali India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Santoshi & Ors., which affirm that vehicles not meant for road use fall outside the purview of the Act and claims arising therefrom cannot be entertained. Further, the Tribunal erred in failing to appreciate that the deceased was neither a third party under the insurance policy nor covered by it, and that the accident occurred within a private mining area, not a public place, thus rendering the claim application under Sections 165 and 166 of the Act untenable. The learned Tribunal also failed to conduct the proper inquiries mandated under Sections 168 and 169 of the Act. The learned Tribunal also failed to conduct the proper inquiries mandated under Sections 168 and 169 of the Act. In light of these facts and established legal principles, the appellant has successfully demonstrated the inapplicability of the Motor Vehicles Act to the present case and therefore ought to be absolved of any liability to pay compensation. The impugned award is thus liable to be set aside and this appeal allowed. 5. Learned counsel for claimants submits that the impugned Award passed by the learned Claims Tribunal is contrary to the law, facts, and circumstances of the case. He goes on to submit that the learned Tribunal has failed to award just, fair, and adequate compensation under various heads and has instead granted a grossly inadequate amount, thereby causing serious prejudice to the appellants. The Tribunal erred in assessing the monthly income of the deceased at a mere. In light of the above, the appeal filed by the Owner is liable to be dismissed to ensure justice is done to the appellants/claimants. He further submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has categorically held that the Poklen/Dumper and likewise other vehicle fall under the purview of motor vehicle. As such, claim petition filed under the Motor Vehicles Act is maintainable and compensation can be granted in such type of cases, therefore, the appeal filed by the insurance company is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and peruse the documents available on record. 7. Upon perusal of the record and consideration of the submissions made by the respective parties, it is evident that the core issue in the present case revolves around the applicability of the definition of "motor vehicle" under the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly in relation to a Poklen machine . To address this issue, the primary aspect to be examined is the use of the vehicle at the time of the incident. From the evidence adduced by the parties, it is clearly established that at the time of the accident, the Poklen machine was actively engaged in road construction work and was being plied on a public road , being a vehicle capable of being driven on the road. 8. On behalf of the insurance company, one Praveen [Surname], Assistant Manager (Claims) , was examined. 8. On behalf of the insurance company, one Praveen [Surname], Assistant Manager (Claims) , was examined. In his deposition, he categorically stated that the Poklen vehicle was duly insured by the insurance company. However, he further submitted that the third-party risk was covered only up to Rs. 5,75,000/- , and that since the Poklen does not fall within the purview of a "motor vehicle" as defined under the Motor Vehicles Act, the company is not liable to pay compensation. Notably, in his cross-examination, the said witness admitted that: the vehicle was insured by the insurance company; it is to be operated by a person holding a valid and effective driving licence issued by the Regional Transport Officer (RTO) and licences are issued by the RTO under the Motor Vehicles Act. He further admitted that the deceased was a third party in relation to the insured vehicle. 9. Based on the evidence brought on record, there is no doubt that the vehicle in question was being used on a public road for the purpose of road construction . It is also an admitted fact that the vehicle is operated under the regulatory framework of the Motor Vehicles Act , thereby bringing it within the ambit of a "motor vehicle" as defined under Section 2(28) of the Act. 10. It is pertinent to refer to Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act which is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference: “Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— (1) xxxxx (28) “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle having less than four wheels fitted with engine capacity of not exceeding [twenty-five cubic centimetres].” (29) xxxxx 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, on several occasions, has dealt with the aforesaid provisions. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision in Bolani Ores Ltd. (supra) , wherein the relevant observations made in paragraphs 15, 16, 22, and 23 are reproduced hereinbelow: “15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, on several occasions, has dealt with the aforesaid provisions. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision in Bolani Ores Ltd. (supra) , wherein the relevant observations made in paragraphs 15, 16, 22, and 23 are reproduced hereinbelow: “15. In all these cases the common question would be whether the definition of a ‘motor vehicle’ as it existed before the Amendment Act of 1956 is the same as in Section 2(c) of the Taxation Act or does the definition in Section 2(c) of the Taxation Act mean that the motor vehicle as defined in the Act from time to time is to be adopted for the purpose of Section 2(c) of the Taxation Act. Insofar as the larger question is concerned, as to whether dumpers, rockers and tractors are motor vehicles at all within the meaning of the first part of the definition of “motor vehicle” in Section 2(18) of the Act, which is the same before and after the amendment, it is contended that these vehicles are not suitably adapted for use upon roads, which according to the learned Advocates mean the public roads or roads to which the public has a right of access. The Motor Vehicles Taxation Acts are enacted in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Legislatures under Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, while the Motor Vehicles Act is enacted by the Parliament in exercise of the concurrent legislative power in Entry 35 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Entry 57 of List II empowers legislation in respect of taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use on roads, including tramcars subject to the provisions of Entry 35 of List III. The power exercisable under Entry 57 is the power to impose taxes which are in the nature of regulatory and compensatory measures. The regulatory and compensatory nature of the tax is that the taxing power should be exercised to impose taxes on motor vehicles which use the roads in the State or are kept for use thereon either throughout the whole area or parts thereof and are sufficient to make and maintain such roads: See Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 SC 1406 : (1963) 1 SCR 491 . In this case, the earlier decision in Atiabari Tea Company Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 232 : (1961) 1 SCR 809 was considered. Since the taxing statute is a regulatory or compensatory statute, it is contended that the provisions of Sections 6-B, 7, 9-A of the Taxation Act relate only to the actual use of the public road. It is pointed out that Section 6 of the Taxation Act does not place the burden of taxation on the registered owners of the motor vehicles, but only on the persons who keep the motor vehicles for use which would mean their use on the public roads. If no such use of public roads is made or the vehicles are not as which can be used on the public roads, then no tax could be levied under the Taxation Act. Reference in the Taxation Act to the registered owners is, it is submitted, meant only for the purpose of enabling refund of tax paid but not payable in terms of the Act, or Section 7 of the Taxation Act. Under Entry 35 of the Concurrent List, the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures can legislate in respect of only mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied. It has no power to deal with vehicles which are not mechanically propelled though under the Taxation Act these non-mechanically propelled vehicles which are suitable for use on roads can also be taxed even without their being registered under the Act. It will thus be seen that while Entry 57 of List II is solely concerned with taxes on vehicles whether mechanically propelled or not, Entry 35 deals with also the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied. Taxes on vehicles connote the liability to pay taxes at the rates at which the taxes are to be levied. On the other hand, the expression ‘principles of taxation’ denotes rules of guidance in the matter of taxation. Taxes on vehicles connote the liability to pay taxes at the rates at which the taxes are to be levied. On the other hand, the expression ‘principles of taxation’ denotes rules of guidance in the matter of taxation. The ambit and amplitude of these two legislative entries in the respective Lists was dealt with in State of Assam v. Labenya Probha Debi, AIR 1967 SC 1575 : (1967) 3 SCR 611 : (1968) 1 SCJ 718 where Subba Rao, C.J. speaking for the Constitution Bench of this Court observed at p. 614: “The two entries deal with two different matters though allied ones — one deals with taxes on vehicles and the other with the principles on which such taxes are to be levied. When two entries in the Constitution, whether in the same List or different Lists, deal with two subjects, if possible, an attempt shall be made to harmonize them rather than to bring them into conflict. Taxes on vehicles in their ordinary meaning connote the liability to pay taxes at the rates at which the taxes are to be levied. On the other hand, the expression ‘principles of taxation’ denotes rules of guidance in the matter of taxation. We, therefore, hold that the amending Acts do not come into conflict with the existing law in respect of any principles of taxation, but only deal with a subject-matter which is exclusively within the legislative competence of the State Legislature.” It is contended that having regard to the nature of the vehicles in question they are particularly suitable for the functions they are performing and unsuitable for the roads on which they would be only a source of damage, inconvenience, danger and uneconomical compared with the other vehicles usually utilised for transport of goods. Accordingly it is submitted that: (1) the present case should be determined with reference to the definition of ‘motor vehicle’ read without the amendment in the Act, as such vehicles operating solely within the appellants' premises should not be liable to tax; (2) the vehicles not being suitable for public roads would not be either registered or taxed whether before or after 1956. Both for the purposes of registration and taxation the common question arises viz. whether the vehicles in question are adapted for use upon roads, which, it is submitted, are public roads or roads to which public have a right of access. Both for the purposes of registration and taxation the common question arises viz. whether the vehicles in question are adapted for use upon roads, which, it is submitted, are public roads or roads to which public have a right of access. If they are not, then they are not ‘motor vehicles’ within the meaning of either the Act or the Taxation Act; (3) the concept ‘adapted for use on roads’ must lie within the ambit of the expression used by the Constitution; otherwise it would be unconstitutional. It must, therefore, follow that the definition can only refer to vehicles which are reasonably suitable for the road in the sense that an average man could think that plying of the vehicles on the road would be one of the normal uses of the vehicles. That alone would be a test of suitability; and (4) for the interpretation of Section 22 of the Act it would be permissible and even obligatory to examine the section not in isolation but in the light of the object and scheme of the Act and the regulatory provisions regarding the licencing of drivers, issuing of permits, provisions for compulsory registration and other regulatory provisions are confined to the vehicles on the public roads. The provisions of Section 22 are definitely to advance the objects of the Act and to effectuate the regulatory provisions. By the very language the principal purpose is to insist upon registration in respect of vehicles plying in public places. Further, the expression must be interpreted to advance the object of the Act exactly as the other para of Section 22 does. In this view the expression “purpose of carrying passengers or goods” cannot mean the personal use of the owner. A person himself cannot be the passenger and goods, and as such it must not be interpreted disjunctively. It is a single expression “passenger or goods”. It is conceivable that this alternative part of the section is only to ensure that in connection with the journey on a public road even if a motor vehicle goes into a place which will not be strictly a public place like hotel or inside a railway, such as in a Railway Station, or even inside the premises of a bus depot, hospitals, etc. provisions for compulsory registration should be applicable. provisions for compulsory registration should be applicable. The judgment of the High Court is assailed on the ground that while formulating the test to determine whether a vehicle is adapted for use on the roads it has evidently equated compatibility with suitability, because at certain places it has laid down the test in terms of compatibility and at other places in terms of suitability. This is clearly illustrated by its decision regarding “tractor”. A tractor without a trailer can neither carry passengers nor goods. In the instant case, it is said that the tractor cannot ply in a public place, nor does it ply in any other place for carrying passengers or goods. It could not evidently fall within Section 22 of the Act. Though this is so, the High Court says that because it can be adapted by attaching a trailor, it comes within Section 2(18), forgetting that what we are concerned with is a tractars without a trailor which is actually used to supply compressed air to certain plants or machines, which clearly shows that the High Court did not have a correct concept of “adapted for use on road.” 16. Shri Soli Sorabji on behalf of the interveners has more or less adopted a similar line of argument and has referred us to the several dictionary meanings of the word ‘adapted’. He has also referred to the English cases on this question and submitted that no vehicle can be taxed unless it possesses the attribute of being “suitable for use on roads”. The expression “adapted for use on roads” must be construed as suitable for use on roads in the light of Entry 57; otherwise, the legislation would be ultra vires the said entry, and consequently such a construction should be avoided by courts. He further submitted that the Orissa High Court has misconstrued the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. Syed Ibrahim, where the observations were made with reference to the definition of “a public service vehicle” as defined in Section 2(25) of the Act, under which user by itself was sufficient to bring the vehicle within its purview. He further submitted that the Orissa High Court has misconstrued the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. Syed Ibrahim, where the observations were made with reference to the definition of “a public service vehicle” as defined in Section 2(25) of the Act, under which user by itself was sufficient to bring the vehicle within its purview. He has referred us to Sections 47(f) 55(f), 71(2), 74, 75(1) and (3) and 77 of the Act in support of his proposition that having regard to the general object, purpose and the policy underlying the Act the expression “roads” must mean public roads and not private roads. If so, the dumpers, rockers and tractors etc. which do not ply or are not suitable for plying on public roads cannot be either registered under the Act or taxed under the Taxation Act. 22. As usual references have been made to the Dictionaries but quite often it is not possible to hold a dictionary in one hand and the statute to be interpreted in the other for ascertaining the import and intent of the word or expression used by Legislature. The shade of meaning of a word, its different connotations and collocations which one finds in a dictionary does not relieve us of the responsibility of having to make the ultimate choice of selecting the right meaning. We choose that meaning which is most apt in the context, colour and diction in which the word is used. The use of a dictionary ad lib without an analysis of the entire Act, its purpose and its intent, for ascertaining the meaning in which the Legislature could have used the word or expression may not lead us to the right conclusion. With this caution before us for avoiding any of the aforesaid methods which might lead to a possible incongruity, we will examine the different facets to which our attention has been drawn. 23. The meaning of the word “adapted” in Section 2(18) of the Act is itself indicated in Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which confers a power on the State to tax vehicles whether propelled mechanically or not and uses the word “suitable” in relation to its use on the roads. The words “adapted for use” must therefore be construed as “suitable for use”. The words “adapted for use” must therefore be construed as “suitable for use”. At any rate, words “adapted for use” cannot be larger in their import by including vehicles which are not “suitable for use” on roads. In this sense, the words “is adapted” for use have the same connotation as “is suitable” or “is fit” for use on the roads.” 12. Further in the matter of Bose Abraham Vs. State of Kerala & Anr. (2001) 3 SCC 157 in which it has been categorically held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 6 & 7 which are as under :- “6. Section 2(j) of the Act defines “motor vehicle” to mean a motor vehicle as defined in Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Central Act 59 of 1988). Subject to the provisions of the Act, Section 3 of the Act enables the levy and collection of tax on the entry of any motor vehicle into local area for use or sale therein which is liable for registration in the State under the Motor Vehicles Act at such rate as may be fixed by the Government. Therefore, in order to attract tax under the provision of Section 3 of the Act, a motor vehicle must have entered into a local area for use or sale therein, and secondly, which is liable for registration under the Motor Vehicles Act. 7. We hold that the excavators and roadrollers are motor vehicles for the purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act and they are registered under that Act. The High Court has noticed the admission of the appellants that the excavators and roadrollers are suitable for use on roads. However, the contention put forth now is that they are intended for use in the enclosed premises. Merely because a motor vehicle is put to a specific use such as being confined to enclosed premises, will not render the same to be a different kind of vehicle. Hence, in our view, the High Court has correctly decided the matter and the impugned order does not call for any interference by us. However, the question whether any motor vehicle has entered into a local area to attract tax under the Entry Tax Act or any concession given under the local Sales Tax Act will have to be dealt with in the course of assessment arising under the Entry Tax Act.” 13. However, the question whether any motor vehicle has entered into a local area to attract tax under the Entry Tax Act or any concession given under the local Sales Tax Act will have to be dealt with in the course of assessment arising under the Entry Tax Act.” 13. The Division Bench of this Court has also dealt with the similar issue in the matter of SECL Bishrampur and Others Vs. Smt. Bharti Devi and others , (2011) 3 SCC CGLJ 204 DB relevant paragraphs 7 & 8: 7. The question as to whether a dumper (haulpak) is a motor vehicle or not has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bolani Orcs Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 17 . In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 24 thus: "24. The question would then arise, are dumpers, rockers and tractairs suitable or fit for use on roads? It is not denied, that these vehicles are not pneumatic wheels and can be moved about from place to place with mechanical power. The word "vehicle" itself connotes that it is a contrivance which moves. A vehicle which merely moves from one place to another need not necessarily be a motor vehicle within the meaning of S. 2(18) of the Act. It may move on iron flats made into a chain such as a caterpillar vehicle or a military tank. Both move from one place toanother but are not suitable for use on roads. It is not that they cannot move on the roads but that they are not adapted, made fit or suitable for use on roads. They would, if used, dig and damage the roads. It is contended that the dumpers or rockers are very heavy and though they can move on roads they would damage the roads and, therefore, they are not suitable for use on roads. To substantiate this proposition the appellants have produced before us certain notifications issued by the State of Orissa under which vehicles beyond a certain laden weight are prohibited from plying on the roads. It was rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate for the State of Orissa that there are only some of the roads on which vehicles heavier than what is indicated in the notificationthan what is indicated in the notification cannot be permitted. It was rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate for the State of Orissa that there are only some of the roads on which vehicles heavier than what is indicated in the notificationthan what is indicated in the notification cannot be permitted. But that is not to say that all vehicles which exceed a particular weight are not adapted for use upon roads and are, therefore, not motor vehicles. A dumper in the Mysore case according to the manufacturer's own specifications is suitable for roads and is described thus: "The dumper will carry: bulk goods, building materials, mining products, agricultural and forestry products, earth, stones, bricks, concrete, mortar, etc. The structure is of simple design and easy to handle. Tipping is performed by releasing the locking device retaining the tipping body. xxxx The dumper requires no more than a few seconds for the emptying of its tipping body and gives no trouble to the driver when being operated on uphill or downhill roads, with its load unbalanced, or when the load refuses to slide out easily. xxxx Quickness and ease characterize the operation of the dumper and the clumsy A manoeurving can be dispensed with. In narrow lanes or rough roads where turning would be impossible or undesirable, the seat is turned and will face driving direction." 8. Before making the above observation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered several English decisions, wherein definition of motor vehicle in the Road Traffic Act (English Act) has been distinguished and having regard to the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, it was ultimately held that dumpers and rockers are motor vehicles. This decision in Bolani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (supra) was relied and explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its later decision in M/s Central Coal Fields Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1992 SC 1371 and Union of India and others, vs. Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1992 SC 1376 . The following has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 8 of the judgment in M/s Central Coal Fields Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and others (supra): "8. It would be appropriate now to mention that some documentary material was sent to us by the appellants by means of an affidavit after we had reserved judgment. The following has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 8 of the judgment in M/s Central Coal Fields Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and others (supra): "8. It would be appropriate now to mention that some documentary material was sent to us by the appellants by means of an affidavit after we had reserved judgment. That material is suggestive of the fact that Dumpers in some States are granted permission to run on pubic roads at a speed not exceeding 16 Kms. per hour and on bridges and culverts at a speed not exceeding 8 kms. per hour. From this it is suggested that they have a minimum weight and safe laden weight fixed on some principles. Pictures of various types of Dumpers have also been sent to us which indicate prominently one factor that these Dumpers run on tyres, in marked contrast to chain plates like cater pillers or military tanks. By the use of rubber tyres it is evident that they have been adapted for use on roads, which means they are suitable for being used on public roads. The mere fact that they are required at places to run at a particular speed is not to detract from the position otherwise clear that they are adapted for use on roads. The very nature of these vehicles make it clear that they are not manufactured or adapted for use only in factories or enclosed premises. The mere fact that the Dumpers or Rockers as suggested are heavy and cannot more on the roads without damaging themis not to say that they are not suitable for use on roads. The word 'adapted' in the provision was read as 'suitable' in Bolani Ores case ( AIR 1975 SC 17 ) by interpretation on the strength of the language in Entry 57, List II of the Constitution. Thus on that basis it was idle to contend on behalf of the appellants that Dumpers and Rockers were neither adaptable nor suitable for use on public roads. Thus on that basis it was idle to contend on behalf of the appellants that Dumpers and Rockers were neither adaptable nor suitable for use on public roads. Thus on the fact situation, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court was right in concluding that Dumpers and Rockers are vehicles adapted or suitable for use on roads and being motor vehicles per se, as held in Bolani Ores case, were liable to taxation on the footing of their use or kept for use on public roads; the network of which, the State spreads, maintains it and keeps available for use of motor vehicles and hence entitled to a regulatory and compensatory tax (Exemptions claimable apart). The appellants, therefore, in our view, have no case for grant of any relief in these appeals." 14. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is amply clear that the offending machine, i.e., the Poklen, was being operated on a public road and was being used for road construction purposes. This fact has been categorically admitted by the insurance company. It is also not in dispute that the said vehicle was duly insured and the insurance policy covered third-party risk. The deceased, who died as a result of the accident involving the said vehicle, was a third party. Therefore, the core issue to be determined by this Court is whether the said vehicle falls within the definition of a "motor vehicle" under the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly in light of the pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Applying the settled principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Poklen, being used on a public road and involved in an accident causing the death of a third party, falls within the ambit of a "motor vehicle" as defined under the Act. Since the vehicle was duly insured and the risk of third-party liability was covered, the learned Claims Tribunal has rightly held the insurance company liable for payment of compensation. This Court finds no infirmity in the said finding. 15. With respect to the apportionment of compensation, considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the entire amount of compensation should be paid by the insurance company in the first instance. This Court finds no infirmity in the said finding. 15. With respect to the apportionment of compensation, considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the entire amount of compensation should be paid by the insurance company in the first instance. Thereafter, the insurance company shall be at liberty to recover from the owner the portion for which he has been held liable, in accordance with law. It is further noted that the claimants have not received any part of the compensation till date. Accordingly, this Court directs the insurance company to deposit the entire awarded compensation amount along with interest, as directed by the Tribunal, within a period of three months from the date of this order. 16. The appeal as filed by the insurance company fails and is hereby Dismissed with the aforesaid modification regarding payment of entire compensation while recovering the portion of award passed against the owner and driver. No order as to costs.