- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.VISHWAJITH SHETTY CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 102025 OF 2024 (482(CR.PC)/528(BNSS)) BETWEEN: MR. ASHOKA BANTA S/O. BOMMAYYA, AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS, RESIDING AT: 119, BELA BANDAR ROAD, NEAR AGRICULTURE OFFICE, ANKOLA, UTTARA KANNADA-581 314. … PETITIONER (BY SRI. VIVEKANANDA N., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, KARWAR LOKAYUKTA P.S., REPRESENTED BY THE SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD. 2. MR. SUNIL S/O SATHISHACHANDRA, AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS, RESIDING AT: BHOOTHANAGUDI, BHADRAVATHI-577 301. … RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. SANTOSH B. MALLAGOUDAR, SPL. P.P. FOR R1; RESPONDENT NO.2 – SERVED) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR REGISTERED IN CRIME NO.02/2021 OF ACB POLICE KARWAR DATED 06.09.2021 AS FAR AS PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.1 IS CONCERNED FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 7(A) OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE. THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 19.08.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY, ORDER IS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: RAKESH S HARIHAR Digitally signed by RAKESH S HARIHAR Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 CAV ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.VISHWAJITH SHETTY) 1. Accused No.1 is before this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. with a prayer to quash the entire proceedings in Crime No.2/2021 registered by the respondent–Police for the offence punishable under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, “the Act, 1988”). 2. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 3. FIR in Crime No.2/2021 was registered for the aforesaid offence against the petitioner and two others based on the first information dated 06.09.2021 received from the defacto complainant Sunil S/o Satishchandra. Assailing the same, the petitioner who is arrayed as accused No.1 in the FIR, is before this Court. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that, for the purpose of invoking the offence punishable under Section 7(a) of the Act, 1988, there should be a demand - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 and acceptance of the bribe. In the case on hand, the petitioner has neither demanded the bribe amount nor has collected the same from the de facto complainant. He submits that, as on the date of trap, the petitioner was on duty as a Nodal Officer for providing basic facilities for Inter-Ministerial Central Team, which had visited Karwar to assess the damage caused as a result of flooding. He submits that the first informant has filed similar complaints as against the other Government Servants also and he is in the habit of filing false complaints. He submits that the alleged recording of conversation by the first informant is on 02.09.2021 and the first information was submitted on 06.09.2021, which is after a delay of four days. The petitioner was not even present at the spot on the date of trap. He accordingly has prayed to allow the petition. In support of his arguments, he has placed reliance on the following judgments: (i) Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)1 1 2023 (4) SCC 731 - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 (ii) Soundarajan Vs. State rep. by the Inspector of Police vigilance Anticorruption Dindigul2 (iii) Ramesh K.T. Vs. State of Karnataka3 (iv) Sri. Thippeswamy B.M. Vs. State and anr.4 (v) Beeralinga Vs. The State of Karnataka and ors.5 (vi) B.N. John Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.6 (vii) P. Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. The Dist. Inspector of Police and Anr.7 (viii) Mamta Shailesh Chanddra Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Ors.8 (ix) Sri Nagesha S/o Nanjundaiah Vs. Sri Kanakaraju S/o Beerappa and another9 (x) Sri P.Manjunath Vs. The State By Karnataka and Ors.10 (xi) Mr. N. Thejas Kumar Vs. The State of Karnataka and Ors.11 (xii) Sri. N C Shivakumar Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.12 (xiii) Dileepbhai Nanubhai Sanghani Vs. State of Gujarat and Anr.13 2 Crl. A. No.1592 of 2022, D/d. 17.04.2023 3 2024 (2) KCCR 1218 4 W.P. No.15644 of 2022, D/d. 13.01.2023 5 W.P. No.105067 of 2023, D/d. 07.06.2024 6 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 7 2015 (10) SCC 152 8 2024 SCC OnLine SC136 9 Crl. P. No.2088 of 2022, D/d. 30.08.2023 10 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 1834 11 W.P. No.915 of 2022, D/d. 21.03.2022 12 Crl.P. No.4380 of 2022, D/d. 29.02.2024 13 2025 SCC OnLine SC 441 - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 5. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent who has filed the statement of objections submits that the charge sheet is yet to be filed in the present case. In the conversation recorded by the first informant, along with accused Nos.2 and 3 the voice of the petitioner is also heard. The first informant has recorded his conversation with all the accused including the petitioner herein. It is the specific case of the prosecution that accused nos.2 & 3 had collected the bribe amount from the first informant at the instance of the petitioner, who is their higher officer. Therefore, merely for the reason that the petitioner was not present at the spot at the time of trap or that there is no recovery of the bribe amount from him, it cannot be said that he cannot be prosecuted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeraj Dutta (Supra) has held that even placing reliance on circumstantial evidence, accused can be held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act, 1988. He accordingly prays to dismiss the petition. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 6. In the first information which is submitted by the de facto complainant, he has stated that he is a class-I Contractor and he had approached accused No.2 – Yadunandan, who was the Case Worker for the purpose of sanctioning the bills in the Office of Zilla Panchayath, Uttara Kannada District and in turn, accused No.2 had asked the de facto complainant to meet the petitioner, who was working as Executive Engineer in Zilla Panchayath. The petitioner in turn had asked the first informant to approach accused No.3, who was then working on contract basis in the Zilla Panchayath. Accused No.3 had demanded the bribe amount at the rate of 3% of the bill amount and when the first informant negotiated for relaxation, accused No.3 allegedly asked the petitioner to contact accused No.1 - petitioner. When the first informant asked accused No.3 to provide his mobile phone number for the purpose of making Google Pay to his account, he allegedly refused to give his mobile number, and therefore, the first informant had met accused No.1, who instructed accused No.3 - Subramanya - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 to give his phone number to the first informant and accordingly, first informant had collected the mobile phone number of accused No.3. 7. Subsequently, he had met accused No.2 near the canteen within the Zilla Panchayat premises and accused No.2 had placed demand for a separate bribe amount of ₹2,500/- and after negotiation, the demand was reduced to ₹2,000/-. The first informant, who had recorded his conversation with the accused Nos.1 to 3 had thereafter approached the respondent – Police, since he was not willing to pay the bribe amount as demanded by the accused persons. In the trap that was held subsequently on 06.09.2021, accused Nos.2 and 3 were caught red handed after they had collected the bribe amount from him. The said bribe amount was recovered from the possession of accused Nos.2 and 3 under a trap panchanama and accused Nos.2 and 3 were subsequently arrested and produced before the Jurisdictional Court and remanded to judicial custody. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 8. The material on record would go to show that the first informant had approached the accused persons on 02.09.2021 for the purpose of clearing his pending bills in respect of the work done by him. According to the first informant, his bill for a sum of ₹4,20,000/- was pending and a demand for a sum of ₹12,050/- as bribe amount, at the rate of 3% of the bill amount was made by the accused and in addition to the same, a separate demand for bribe amount of ₹2,000/- was made by accused No.2. The conversation of first informant with accused Nos.1 to 3 has been recorded in his mobile phone and the transcription of the said conversation is available on record. Perusal of the same, which is part of the trap panchanama would go to show that accused had negotiated with the first informant for payment of the bribe. 9. The first informant, who was not willing to pay the bribe amount had approached the respondent – Police after a period of four days from the date of he recording his conversation with accused Nos.1 to 3. Merely for the - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 reason that he had approached the Police after four days from the date of recording his conversation with accused Nos. 1 to 3, it cannot be said that there is inordinate delay in registering the FIR. In the trap that was held immediately after the FIR was registered against accused Ns.1 to 3, accused Nos.2 and 3 were caught red handed after they had received the bribe amount from the de facto complainant. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no demand. In the conversation, which is recorded in the present case, even the participation of the petitioner is found and his voice recorded by the first informant is required to be identified in the manner known to law. Therefore, at this stage, it cannot be said that there is no demand by the petitioner for payment of the bribe amount. 10. According to the prosecution, accused Nos.2 and 3 had collected the bribe amount from the first informant at the instance of accused No.1, who is their higher officer. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the contention of the petitioner that there is no acceptance of the bribe amount - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 by the petitioner. Merely for the reason that the petitioner was not present at the spot at the time of the trap, it cannot be said that there is no demand and acceptance of the bribe amount by him. It is not in dispute that the bills which were submitted by first informant for the work done by him, were pending consideration and therefore, at this stage, it cannot be said that, there was no work pending before the petitioner as on the date of the alleged demand made by the accused for payment of the bribe amount. 11. Therefore, merely for the reason that the petitioner was on duty as a Nodal Officer on 06.09.2021 would not make any difference and it is not the case of the prosecution that on 06.09.2021 he was present at the spot when the trap was held. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeraj Dutta (Supra) has held that in the absence of direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence, it is permissible to draw inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of Public - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 Servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 132 of the Act, 1988, based on the evidence adduced by the prosecution. 13. In the case of State of Chhattisgarh and another Vs. Aman Kumar Singh and others14, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.65 and 80, has observed as follows: 65. Thus, it being the settled principle of law that when an investigation is yet to start, there should be no scrutiny to what extent the allegations in a first information report are probable, reliable or genuine and also that a first information report can be registered merely on suspicion, the High Court ought to have realised that the FIR which, according to it, was based on "probabilities" ought not to have been interdicted. Viewed through the prism of gravity of allegations, a first information report based on "probability" of a crime having been committed would obviously be of a higher degree as compared to a first information report lodged on a "mere suspicion" that a crime has been committed. The High Court failed to bear in mind these principles and precisely did what it was not supposed to do at this stage. We are, thus, unhesitatingly of the view that the High Court was not justified in its interference on the ground it did. 14 (2023) 6 SCC 559 - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 80. Having regard to what we have observed above in paras 47 to 50 (supra) and to maintain probity in the system of governance as well as to ensure that societal pollutants are weeded out at the earliest, it would be eminently desirable if the High Courts maintain a hands-off approach and not quash a first information report pertaining to "corruption" cases, specially at the stage of investigation, even though certain elements of strong-arm tactics of the ruling dispensation might be discernible. The considerations that could apply to quashing of first information reports pertaining to offences punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a PC Act offence. Majorly, the proper course for the High Courts to follow, in cases under the PC Act, would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage. If at all interference in any case is considered necessary, the same should rest on the very special features of the case. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Vs. State of Maharashtra & others15 in paragraph No.57, has observed as under: "57. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (supra), the following principles of law emerge: i) Police has the statutory right and duty 15 2021 SCC OnLine 315 - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the ‘rarest of rare cases’. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court); v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482 Cr.P.C. ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 x) Save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; and xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR. 15. In the case of Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others16, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.41 and 42, has observed as follows: "41. As cautioned by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the power of quashing should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. While examining a complaint, the quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or in the complaint. 42. In S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat, this Court again cautioned that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage. Quashing of a complaint should rather be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule. In S.M. Datta, this Court held that if a perusal of the first information report leads to disclosure of an offence even broadly, law courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere." 16 (2021) 5 SCC 795 - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11068 CRL.P No. 102025 of 2024 16. The judgments on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner are all passed after the charge was filed or in cases where there is absolutely no material which would prima facie show that there is demand and acceptance of bribe by Public Servant. In the present case, there is certain material which would prima facie show the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged crime. Therefore, the judgments on which reliance has been placed by the petitioner’s counsel cannot be made applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case at this stage. 17. Under the circumstances, I do not find any good ground to entertain this Criminal Petition. Accordingly, the following: ORDER The Criminal Petition is dismissed. Sd/- (S.VISHWAJITH SHETTY) JUDGE VNP/CT:BCK LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 101