Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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2025:CGHC:60508
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 3770 of 2025 Kamlesh Prasad Mishra S/o Shri Shivbhola Mishra Aged About 47 Years R/o Ward No. 16, Badan Singh Mohalla, Manendragarh, District M.C.B. (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, City Kotwali, Manendragarh, District M.C.B. (C.G.) 2 - Mohan Lal Goyan S/o Manbahoran Ram Aged About 52 Years R/o Lecturer, Govt. Higher Secondary School, Mansukh, P.S. Baikunthpur, District Koriya C.G. (Details As Derived From Impugned Order Annexure P/1)(Present Respondent No. 2 Was The Respondent No. 1 Before Learned Revisional Court And Accused No. 1 Before The Trial Court) 3 - Vijay Tandiya Aged About 34 Years Husband Of Sarpanch, Village Pasauri, P.S. Kelhari, District M.C.B. (C.G.) (Details As Derived From Impugned Order Annexure P/1) (Present Respondent No. 3 Was The Respondent No. 2 Before Learned Revisional Court And Accused No. 2 Before The Trial Court) ... Respondent For Petitioner : Mr. Hemant Kumar Agrawal, Advocate For State/Respondent : Ms. Pragya Shrivastava, Dy. GA
Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma
Order on Board 12/12/2025
1. Heard finally. 2
2. This petition has been preferred by the petitioner under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for setting aside the impugned Revisional Order dated 18.09.2025 passed by the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge. Manendragarh in Revision, affirming the Order dated 04.08.2025 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC). Manendragarh. 3. Brief facts of this case are that the Petitioner is a resident of Manendragarh and works as a Lecturer at Govt. Higher Secondary School, Kelhari. The Respondent No. 2 is also a Lecturer at Govt. Higher Secondary School, Mansukh. About two years prior to the complaint, the Petitioner met Respondent No. 2 during answer sheet evaluation at Baikunthpur. Respondent No. 2 claimed to have high connections and assured the Petitioner that he could secure a government job for the Petitioner's daughter in exchange for money. Trusting Respondent No. 2 due to his position as a government lecturer. Respondent No. 2 demanded Rs. 5,00,000/-and asked for an advance. In late 2021, the Petitioner gave Rs. 1,00,000/- in cash to Respondent No. 2. 4. Subsequently, when the job was not arranged, the Petitioner asked for his money back. Respondent No. 2 returned Rs. 50,000/- cash and Rs. 22,000/- via PhonePe through Respondent No. 3 (Vijay Tandiya). However, later, Respondent No. 2 again induced the Petitioner to pay more money. Between 02.09.2022 and 15.04.2023, the Petitioner paid a total of Rs. 1,90,500/- via PhonePe to Respondent No. 2's SBI account
3 and in cash. When the job was not provided and the Petitioner demanded a refund, Respondent No. 2 refused and started threatening the Petitioner. He claimed to have "power" and threatened to implicate the Petitioner falsely. He explicitly threatened to kill the Petitioner on his way to Kelhari and to harm his child. The situation escalated on 31.07.2023. Respondent No. 3 called the Petitioner to Parasgarhi Tiraha. Upon arrival, the Petitioner found Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 waiting. Suddenly, an Ertiga car (CG 16 CQ 7831) and motorcycles arrived with 13-14 unknown persons (including a woman) carrying iron rods. 5. The Respondents and their accomplices intimidated the Petitioner, forcibly took him to Civil Court Manendragarh, purchased stamp papers in his name, and coerced him to sign an agreement/document without allowing him to read it. They threatened to kill him if he disclosed this to anyone.
Terrified by the incident, the Petitioner remained indoors for a day but gathered courage to file a report at Police Station Manendragarh on 01.08.2023. However, the police failed to register an FIR. 6. On 23.08.2023, the Respondent no. 2 again threatened the petitioner on his mobile phone and Respondent no. 3 also continued to threaten him demanding money. Therefore, he made another complaint cum reminder on 24.08.2023. 7. On 27.08.2024, the Petitioner subsequently filed a complaint case along with an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the JMFC, Manendragarh, seeking registration of FIR for offences under Sections
4 420, 464, 465, 467, 468, 474, 506-B IPC. The police submitted a report to the Magistrate admitting the receipt of the complaint but stated that a counter-case (Crime No. 144/2024) had been registered against the Petitioner by Respondent No. 2. 8. By the order dated 04.08.2025, the JMFC dismissed the application under Section 156(3) CrPC solely on the ground that the Petitioner had not filed a complaint to the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC before approaching the Court. The Magistrate held that since the procedure was not followed, the 156(3) application was not maintainable. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that both the Courts below have failed to appreciate the gravity of the allegations. The complaint discloses serious cognizable offences including organized fraud, abduction, and criminal intimidation by a group of armed persons. In cases of such serious nature, the Magistrate has the duty to ensure an investigation, and a hyper-technical approach regarding Section 154(3) CrPC defeats the ends of justice. The Courts below failed to appreciate the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1, wherein the Constitution Bench held that the registration of an FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the CrPC (now Section 173 BNSS) if the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
The Petitioner's complaint clearly disclosed the commission of offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 506 (Part II)
5 IPC. The failure of the police to register the FIR was a breach of statutory duty, and the Magistrate ought to have rectified this by exercising powers under Section 156(3) CrPC (Section 175(3) BNSS) instead of dismissing the plea on technical grounds. He further contended that the Revisional Court passed the order in a mechanical manner. It failed to consider that the object of the CrPC is to ensure that offenders are brought to book. By dismissing the revision on a technicality, the Court has allowed the accused persons, who have threatened the life of the Petitioner, to roam free. The "document" forced upon the Petitioner on 31.07.2023 is a crucial piece of evidence. The accused persons compelled the Petitioner to sign it under threat of death. Police investigation is required to recover this document and identify the notary and witnesses involved in that fraudulent execution. The impugned orders have occasioned a failure of justice. The Petitioner has been defrauded of his hard-earned money and is living under constant threat, yet he is being denied access to the criminal justice system on procedural grounds. Therefore, it is prayed that kindly set aside and quash the impugned Revisional Order dated 18.09.2025 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Manendragarh, and the Order dated 04.08.2025 passed by the JMFC, Manendragarh and direct the JMFC, Manendragarh to reconsider the application under Section 156(3) CrPC and pass an order directing the Police Station Manendragarh to register an FIR and investigate the matter in accordance with law. 6
10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State-respondent supports impugned order and submits that impugned order is well merited and has been passed after considering the entire material available on record therefore, it is not a case to set aside of the impugned order, hence, the same may be dismissed. 11.
I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties, the impugned orders passed by the Courts below and other material available on record with utmost circumspection. 12. Considering the facts of the case, submission made by learned counsel for the parties. After considering the submissions advanced and perusing the material available on record, this Court is of the considered view that no ground is made out to interfere with the orders passed by the Courts below. The complaint filed by the Petitioner does not, on a prima facie examination, disclose the necessity for directing an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. The allegations are predominantly civil in nature, arising out of monetary transactions and disputes relating to execution of documents. The Petitioner has not produced any supporting material to demonstrate that the alleged acts of fraud, forgery, or intimidation constituted cognizable offences warranting mandatory registration of an FIR. Mere allegations of threat or coercion, without contemporaneous evidence or independent material, cannot justify invoking the extraordinary remedy under Section 156(3). 13. Furthermore, the Petitioner has failed to comply with the mandatory
7 procedural requirements laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (2015) 6 SCC 287, including exhaustion of the remedies under Section 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC and filing the application supported by a proper affidavit. The record discloses that the Petitioner did not place before the Magistrate any cogent evidence of having approached the Superintendent of Police prior to invoking Section 156(3). Therefore, the Magistrate was justified in declining the prayer for a direction for registration of FIR. 14. Upon re-evaluation of the impugned order, this Court finds no perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error in the reasoning adopted by the learned Magistrate. The Revisional Court also rightly affirmed that the dispute between the parties is essentially contractual and monetary, and the Petitioner has adequate alternative remedies in civil law. The mere assertion that an offence is cognizable does not automatically require the Court to direct registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) unless the
facts disclose a genuine need for police investigation, which is absent in the present case.
15. In view of the above discussion, this Court concludes that the impugned orders do not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference. The petition/application is, therefore, dismissed on merits.
Sd/-
(Arvind Kumar Verma)
Judge Vasant