Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Chhattisgarh · body

2025 DAILYLAW 61472 (CHH)

Phoolbai Satnami v. Patiram Jaiswal And Ors.

SA/143/2015 · 2025-12-11

Shri Parth Prateem Sahu

Transfer Petitionbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 2025:CGHC:60628 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Reserved for Judgment On : 28.10.2025 Judgment Delivered On : 12/12/2025 Judgment Uploaded On : 12/12/2025 SA No. 143 of 2015 Phoolbai Satnami D/o Samaru Satnami Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Kharwe, P.S. And Tah. Kasdol, Distt.- Balodabazar-Bhatpara, Chhattisgarh. --- Appellant versus 1 - Patiram Jaiswal. S/o. Tribhuwan Jaiswal Aged About 47 Years 2 - Narayan Jaiswal S/o Tribhuwan Jaiswal Aged About 44 Years 3 - Bharatlal Jaiswal, S/o Tribhuwan Jaiswal Aged About 42 Years All are R/o Village- Kharwe, P.S. And Tah. Kasdol, Distt. Balodabazar- Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh 4 - Dhanbai Jaiswal D/o Tribhuwan Jaiswal Aged About 39 Years 5 - Jambai Jaiswal D/o Tribhuwan Jaiswal Aged About 37 Years Both are R/o Kasdol, P.S. And Tah. Kasdol, Distt.- Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhttisgarh 6 - Phoutbai Jaiswal D/o Tribhuwan Jaiswal Aged About 34 Years R/o Village- Shukli, P.S. And Tah. Kasdol, Distt.- Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh 7 - Brijram S/o Rupram Aged About 62 Years 8 - Hetram S/o Rupram Aged About 57 Years 9 - Brijmati D/o Rupram Aged About 52 Years 10 - Shanti D/o Rupram Aged About 47 Years BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN Digitally signed by BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN Date: 2025.12.12 17:33:23 +0530 2 11 - Indra D/o Rupram Aged About 42 Years 12 - Samme Sahu S/o Bhagwani Sahu Aged About 42 Years 13 - Syamsundar S/o Bhagwani Sahu Aged About 48 Years All are R/o Village- Kharwe, P.S. And Tah. Kasdol, Distt.- Balodabazar- Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh 14 - Milu S/o Aanand Majhi Aged About 48 Years R/o Village- Hapanda, P.S. And Tah. Kasdol, Distt.- Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh 15 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Collector, Baloda-Bazar, Distt.- Baloda Bazar- Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh --- Respondents (Cause title is taken from CIS) ____________________________________________________________ For Appellant : Mr. H.V. Sharma, Advocate For Respondents No.1 : None present. For Respondent No.14/State : Mr. Kalpesh Ruparel, P.L. Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu CAV Judgment 1. This second appeal is filed challenging the legality and sustainability of the impugned judgment and decree dated 18.02.2015, passed by the First Additional District Judge, Balodabazar in Civil Appeal No.20-A/2013, whereby learned First Additional District Judge has dismissed the appeal filed by appellant/plaintiff affirming the judgment and decree dated 23.03.2013, passed in Civil Suit No.58-A/2011, whereby learned Civil Judge Class-I, dismissed the civil suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff. 2. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that appellant/plaintiff filed a suit seeking relief of declaration that by sale deed dated 18.03.66, 12.09.66 and 28.05.1970 rights of plaintiff is not extinguished on the property as mentioned in Schedule-A of the plaint. He further sought relief of possession of suit land from defendants 3 therein as also prayed for relief of injunction on the ground that property, subject matter of suit was her father’s property, who died intestate in the year 1964. After death of her father, plaintiff became sole owner of property recorded in her father’s name and her mother was shown to be legal guardian and her name was recorded in the revenue records accordingly. When plaintiff was about 3-4 years of age, her mother left her and performed second marriage leaving her in the custody and guardianship of her uncle (elder brother of her father). Since the age of about 3 to 4 years, plaintiff was under care and guardianship of her uncle, who also managed the property recorded in her name. It is also pleaded that after her marriage, her property was looked after and taken care by her uncle including property as mentioned in Schedule -A. Her uncle Pakalu died about 11 years ago. She came to village Kharve (her birth place) to attend the last right ceremony, at that time she came to know that some persons are in possession of her property. Upon enquiry she came to know that they have purchased property from Ganesh Ram. Persons who are in possession of property has not shown documents, upon which, she approached Patwari and obtained documents upon which she further took copies of sale deed and thereafter, the suit was filed. 3. Defendants No.8 to 11 filed written statement pleading therein that defendants No.7 to 11 have purchased property bearing Kh. No.1026/1 and 1026/1B measuring 0.016 and 0.053 hectare vide registered sale deed dated 28.05.1970 and father of defendant No.12 and 14 had purchased property bearing Kh. No.477, 1149/1, 1151/3 measuring 0.035, 0.034, 0.060 hectare vide registered sale deed 4 dated 18.03.1966. It was also pleaded that lands were sold for the benefit of plaintiff and was within her knowledge. Land was purchased by Roopram, father of defendant No.8 to 11 from Ganesh Ram (guardian of plaintiff) vide registered sale deed and it was again sold to Samelal, defendant No.12. The suit is barred by limitation. 4. Defendant No.12 and 13 also submitted written statement in similar line. They have denied adverse pleadings made in plaint and further pleaded that in the plaint, age of plaintiff is mentioned as 42 years. She attend age of majority about 24 years ago. She was aware of title of defendants and their possession, however, she did not challenge transfer of property in the name of their father by filing civil suit within three years of her attaining the age of majority. Defendants No.14 had also filed written statement and have also taken plea that suit is barred by limitation. 5. Learned trial Court formulated as many as 8 issues for consideration and upon appreciating the pleadings, facts evidence brought in record by respective parties, held that plaintiff has not filed the suit for declaration of title, permanent injunction and possession within the period of limitation and further recorded that plaintiff failed to prove the possession of defendants to be illegal and accordingly dismissed the suit. 6. Learned First Appellate Court while considering the appeal filed against the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court also dismissed the appeal observing that the suit was filed beyond period of limitation taking note of Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (In short ‘the Act of 1963’). 5 7. Learned counsel for appellant/plaintiff would submit that learned both the Courts below erred in law in recording a finding that the suit filed by plaintiff was barred by limitation. He contended that uncle of plaintiff was not a natural guardian, therefore, limitation as provided under Article 60 of the Act of 1963 would not apply as the property recorded in name of plaintiff, which she succeeded from her father is transferred by a person, who is not a guardian, then to challenge such transaction and seeking relief as prayed in the plaint there will be no limitation as specified under the Act of 1963 and the suit can be filed at any point of time. 8. Notice was issued to respondent No.1. According to service report, notice is served, however, he has not caused his appearance before this Court either in person or through their Advocate. 9. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record of trial Court as well as First Appellate Court. 10. This appeal was admitted for hearing on 29.08.2023 on the following substantial question of law:- “Whether the courts below had committed an error of law in not considering the reasonable cause for delay in filing the suit and dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation?” 11. Perusal of judgment and decree would show that learned First Appellate Court has taken into consideration that Ganeshram and Pakalu were de facto guardian, therefore, they were not having any right under Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (In short ‘the Act of 1956’) to sell the land, however, taking into 6 consideration the provision under Article 60 of the Act of 1963 recorded a finding that suit was not instituted within a period of three years from the date of attaining the majority. 12. Undisputedly, plaintiff when was about one year of age when she lost her father and after 3-4 years of loosing her father, her mother also left her in the company of uncle of plaintiff (elder brother of her father). It is also not in dispute that since the age of 3-4 years of plaintiff, uncle of plaintiff took care of her and property is recorded in her name. Uncle of plaintiff also arranged marriage of plaintiff as pleaded and admitted by plaintiff in her pleadings and evidence recorded before the trial Court. 13. Section 4 (a) of the Act of 1956 defines “minor” means a person who has not completed age of eighteen years. Section 4 (b) defines “guardian” means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property or of both his person and property, and includes :- (i) a natural guardian, (ii) a guardian appointed by the will of the minor’s father or mother, (iii) a guardian appointed or declared by a court, and (iv) a person empowered to act as such by or under any enactment relating to any Court of wards. Section 4 (c) defines “natural guardian” means any of the guardians mentioned in section 6. 14. In the case at hand, pleadings in the plaint itself specifies that she was under guardianship of her uncle when her father died and plaintiff was left by her mother when she was age about 3-4 years. There is also pleadings and evidence that she was brought up and her marriage was arranged by her uncle and her uncle was taking care of property recorded in her name. 7 15. Section 11 of the Act of 1956 deals with de facto guardian not to deal with minor’s property, which reads as under :- “11. De facto guardian not to deal with minor’s property.—After the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to dispose of, or deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de facto guardian of the minor.” 16. In view of the above discussed definition of guardian as provided under the Act of 1956, relationship of plaintiff with Ganesh Ram and further pleadings made in plaint and evidence of plaintiff, status of uncle would be of a de facto guardian and to challenge the transfer of property of a minor by de facto guardian. Article 60 of the Act, 1963 reads as under :- Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 60. To set aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward (a) by the ward who has attained majority. Three years When the ward attains majority (b) by the ward’s legal representative-- (i) When the ward dies within three years from the date of attaining majority. Three years When the wards attains majority. (ii) When the ward dies before attaining majority Three years When the ward dies. 17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Madhegowda (D) by Lrs. v. Ankegowda (D) by Lrs., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 178 while considering to challenge the alienation of property of minor by sister (de facto guardian or de facto manager) has observed thus- “25. We have carefully considered the principles laid down in the aforementioned decisions so far as relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the issue arising in the 8 present case. It is to be kept in mind that this is not a case of alienation of minor's interest in a “joint family property”. As noted earlier, Ninge Gowda died leaving his two daughters, namely, Smt Sakamma and Smt Madamma. It is not the case of any of the parties that the suit property was a “joint family property” in the hands of Ninge Gowda or that the alienation by Smt Madamma, who is the sister of the minor, was a transfer of the minor's interest in the “joint family property”. Therefore, the question whether the provision in Section 11 is applicable in the case of transfer of minor's interest in a “joint family” does not arise for consideration here. Section 11 includes all types of properties of a minor. No exception is provided in the section. Undoubtedly Smt Madamma, sister of the minor, is not a “guardian” as defined in Section 4(b) of the Act. Therefore, she can only be taken to be a “de facto guardian” or more appropriately “de facto manager”. To a transfer in such a case Section 11 of the Act squarely applies. Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor's interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding. The minor, on attaining majority, can repudiate the transfer in any manner as and when occasion for it arises. After attaining majority if he/she transfers his/her interest in the property in a lawful manner asserting his/her title to the same that is sufficient to show that the minor has repudiated the transfer made by the “de facto guardian/manager”. 9 18. In the aforementioned case, minor after attaining the age of majority, sold her share to Ankegowda and thereafter purchaser Ankegowda filed civil suit seeking declaration of title and for partition of share of the seller. 19. In the aforementioned facts of the case and the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court the finding recorded by learned First Appellate Court that the case of plaintiff is hit by Article 60 of the Act of 1963 is not sustainable and accordingly it is set-aside. However, the consideration before this Court is with regard to relief as claimed by plaintiff in the civil suit of possession also and considered by the learned trial Court in its judgment and decree that suit for possession is also barred by limitation, this Court is considering wether the suit for possession can be said to be within limitation in the facts of the case. 20. In the plaint, plaintiff has specifically pleaded that Pakalu died about 11 years ago and when she came to village Kharve from village Sinodha to participate in the last rights, she came to know that some persons are in possession of her property. There is also pleading that when she inquired, she was informed that they have purchased the property from Ganesh Ram (uncle of plaintiff). The plaintiff got knowledge about possession of other person over her land and further that she became aware of the fact that those persons are in possession of property upon purchasing the land from Ganesh Ram (her uncle). 21. Plaintiff in para-17 of her cross-examination admitted that Pakalu died about 20-25 years ago and that statement was made in the month of September, 2012 from which it is appearing that Pakalu died about 1986-87. Civil suit was filed only on 30.10.2007. In para -12 of cross- 10 examination, plaintiff (P.W.-1) had stated that she married about 35-40 years ago, she further stated that she resided in her matrimonial home for about 8 years and thereafter, she is residing at village Kharve (her parental village). From her evidence it is appearing that she was residing in her parental village where the disputed property are situated for last about more than 25 years from the date of filing of the suit. In her evidence, she also admitted that defendants No.12 and 13 are in possession of part of suit land by constructing house since last about 30-40 years. 22. In view of evidence of plaintiff (P.W.-1) it is clear that she is residing in her parental home/village for more than 25 years (after her marriage) on the date of recording her evidence. Where as she pleaded that when she come to village Kharve (her parental village) to attend last rituals of her uncle, she came to know the purchasers are in possession of the property and death of uncle is about 11 years ago. This pleading is contrary to the evidence of plaintiff. In above facts of the case oral evidence made before Court will sustain being admissible. 23. Considering the aforementioned facts as pleaded in the plaint the evidence of the plaintiff and further her admission in para 17 that she became aware of the fact that defendants have constructed house on her land prior to death of Pakalu shows that she was well aware of the fact of possession of defendants prior to 20-25 years ago from the date of recording her evidence. 24. Article 65 of the Act of 1963 prescribed for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title and period of limitation 11 prescribed is 12 years, when possession of defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiff. 25. From the facts and evidence as discussed in preceding paragraph it is apparent that plaintiff got knowledge of transfer of land by her uncle and defendants came in possession when she attended the last rights ceremony of Pakalu her uncle about 20-25 years. Death of Paklu was in 1986-87 and civil suit was filed on 30.10.2007. Knowledge of other person in possession of land subject matter of the suit based on the sale deed executed in their favour by her uncle was about more than 20 years prior to the date of filing of suit. 26. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Narayan v. Babasaheb & Ors, reported in (2016) 6 SCC 725 while considering the issue of application of Article 60 of the Act of 1963 in the facts of that case has observed thus :- “25. A close analysis of the language of Article 60 would indicate that it applies to suits by a minor who has attained majority and further by his legal representatives when he dies after attaining majority or from the death of the minor. The broad spectrum of the nature of the suit is for setting aside the transfer of immovable property made by the guardian and consequently, a suit for possession by avoiding the transfer by the guardian in violation of Section 8(2) of the 1956 Act. In essence, it is nothing more than seeking to set aside the transfer and grant consequential relief of possession. 26. There cannot be any doubt that a suit by quondam minor to set aside the alienation of his property by his guardian is governed by Article 60. To impeach the 12 transfer of immovable property by the guardian, the minor must file the suit within the prescribed period of three years after attaining majority. * * * 28. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that a quondam minor plaintiff challenging the transfer of an immovable property made by his guardian in contravention of Sections 8(1) and (2) of the 1956 Act and who seeks possession of property can file the suit only within the limitation prescribed under Article 60 of the Act and Articles 109, 110 or 113 of the Act are not applicable to the facts of the case. 29. The High Court as well as the trial court erred in applying Article 109 of the Act, where Article 109 of the Act clearly speaks about alienation made by father governed by Mitakshara law and further courts below proceeded in discussing about the long rope given under Article 109 of the Act and comparatively lesser time specified under Article 60 of the Act. It is well- settled principle of interpretation that inconvenience and hardship to a person will not be the decisive factors while interpreting the provision. When bare reading of the provision makes it very clear and unequivocally gives a meaning it was to be interpreted in the same sense as the Latin maxim says dulo lex sed lex, which means the law is hard but it is law and there cannot be any departure from the words of the law.” 27. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision has laid down the principles that when the provisions makes it clear that unequivocally gives a meaning that it was to be interpreted in the same sense and there cannot be any departure from the words of the law. 13 28. Article 65 of the Act of 1963 provides counting of period of limitation of 12 years from the date when possession of defendants became adverse to the plaintiff. Though the plaintiff in the plaint has taken cause of action from the date of obtaining copy of the sale deed dated 10.09.2007, however, from her evidence has admitted that sale of the land, subject matter of suit was on 18.06.1966 and 28.05.1970. In para -17, plaintiff admitted hat her uncle Pakalu died about 20-25 years ago. She further admitted that prior to death of Pakalu, she got knowledge of the fact that defendants are in possession of her land and at that time, she was residing in her matrimonial home Sinodha. In para-12 of cross-examination, she admitted that her marriage took place about 35-40 years ago. In para-12 she also admitted that after marriage, she resided in her matrimonial home for about 7-8 years and thereafter, she came to her parental home at Kharve meaning thereby she is residing in the same village where the property in dispute is situated and other persons were in possession. It is further stated that when she attended last rituals of her uncle, she came to know that other persons are in possession of her property and on enquiry she was informed that persons in possession have purchased the property. According to evidence of plaintiff, death of her uncle was about 20-25 years ago. Knowledge of transfer of property and possession of other persons came to her knowledge about more than 20 years prior from the date of filing of suit. 29. In the above facts of the case and the evidence of plaintiff (P.W.-1), the pleadings made in the plaint that cause of action arose only in the year 14 2007 is not acceptable as it is contrary to the evidence available in record. 30. The possession of other persons on the land owned by the plaintiff will became adverse as soon as she got knowledge that some other person is in possession of her property after purchasing, being title holder of suit land, which is about more than 20-25 years ago. 31. Section 3 of the Act of 1963 talks of bar of limitation which reads as under :- “3. Bar of limitation.—(1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. (2) For the purposes of this Act,— (a) a suit is instituted,— (i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; (ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and (iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator; (b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter-claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted— (i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set-off is pleaded; (ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court; 15 (c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that court.” 32. Hon’ble Supreme court in case of Manindra Land and Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, reported in 1963 SCC OnLine SC 59 has observed thus : “9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act enjoins a court to dismiss any suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made, after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the I Schedule irrespective of the fact whether the opponent had set up the plea of limitation or not. It is the duty of the court not to proceed with the application if it is made beyond the period of limitation prescribed. The court had no choice and if in construing the necessary provision of the Limitation Act or in determining which provision of the Limitation Act applies, the subordinate court comes to an erroneous decision, it is open to the court in revision to interfere with that conclusion as that conclusion led the court to assume or not to assume the jurisdiction to proceed with the determination of that matter.” 33. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 has observed that by virtue of Section 3 of the Act of 1963, it is obligatory on the part of the court to dismiss the suit or appeal if made after the prescribed period even though the limitation is not set up as a defence and there is no plea to raise the issue of limitation even at the appellate stage because in some of the cases it may go to the root of the matter. 34. Section 5 of the Act of 1963 provides for extension of prescribed period in certain cases, which reads as under :- 16 “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. —Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.” 35. The provision in specific terms talks the appeal or any application other then the application under the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it does not mention the extension of prescribed period for filing of the suit. 36. In the above facts fo the case and the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court as discussed above in the opinion of this Court the suit filed by appellant/plaintiff for possession was barred by limitation. Accordingly, the question of law formulated in this appeal is decided in negative. 37. For the foregoing discussions made here-in-above, the appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and it is hereby dismissed. 38. Decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Balram