1 2025:CGHC:60185 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 68 of 2024 1 - Smt. Rekha Agarwal W/o Sunil Agarwal Aged About 62 Years R/o 1/45, Nehru Nagar Old, Police Station Supela, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Neha Agarwal W/o Udit Agrawal Aged About 40 Years R/o Flat No. 1001, Tower B, Db Woods, Goregaon (East), District : Mumbai, Maharashtra --- Appellants versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Supela, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent ACQA No. 68 of 2024 Smt. Ruhi Agarwal W/o Nimish Agrawal Aged About 39 Years R/o C/o Shri Vijay Agrawal, Satyam Shivam Sunderam, Street No.3, Deepak Nagar, Durg, Tehsil and District - Durg, Chhattisgarh. (Victim) (Complainant) ---Appellant Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station - Supela, Bhilai, District - Durg, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Nimish Agrawal S/o Sunil Agrawal Aged About 42 Years Resident of 01/45, Nehru Nagar Old, P.S. - Supela, District - Durg, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondents ACQA No. 113 of 2024 Smt. Ruhi Agrawal W/o Nimish Agarwal Aged About 39 Years R/o C/o Shri Vijay Agrawal, Satyam Shivam Sunderam Street No.-3, Deepak Nagar, Durg, Tehsil And District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. Complainant ---Appellant Versus 1- State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Supela, Bhilai, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 2 - Smt. Rekha Agarwal W/o Sunil Agarwal Aged About 70 Years R/o 1/45, Nehru Nagar Old, P.S. Supela, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh 3 - Smt. Neha Agrawal W/o Udit Agrawal Aged About 47 Years R/o Flat No. 1001, Tower B, Db Woods, Goregaon (East), Mumbai, Maharashtra 4 - Sunil Agarwal S/o Late Shri Laxmi Narain Agarwal Aged About 72 Years R/o 1/45, Nehru Nagar Old, P.S.- Supela, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondents CRA No. 90 of 2024 Sunil Agarwal S/o Late Shri Laxmi Narayan Agrawal Aged About 65 Years At Present Aged Avout 72 Years, R/o 1/45, Nehru Nagar Old, Police Station Supela, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh --- Appellant Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Supela, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 116 of 2024 Nimish Agarwal S/o. Sunil Agarwal, Aged About 36 Years Present Aged About 44 R/o 1/45, Nehru Nagar Old, Police Station Supela, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. --- Appellant Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Supela, District Durg Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent For accused/appellants in CRA Nos. 68/2024, 90/2024 & 116/2024 and for accused/respondents in ACQA Nos. 68/2024 & 113/2024 : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Kabeer Kalwani and Mr. Avinash K. Mishra, Advocates For Victim/Appellant in ACQA Nos. 68/2024 & 113/2024 and for Objector in CRA Nos. 68/2024, 90/2024 & 116/2024 : Mr. Rajeev Shrivastava, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Jaydeep Singh Yadav, Ms. Kajal Chandra and Mr. Neeraj Choubey, Advocates For Respondent/State : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Deputy Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma , Judge 3 Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 11 . 12 .202 5 1. Heard Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Kabeer Kalwani and Mr. Avinash K. Mishra, learned counsel for the accused/appellants in CRA Nos. 68/2024, 90/2024 & 116/2024 and for accused/respondents in ACQA Nos. 68/2024 & 113/2024. Also heard Mr. Rajeev Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Jaydeep Singh Yadav, Ms. Kajal Chandra and Mr. Neeraj Choubey, learned counsel, appearing for the Victim/Appellant in ACQA Nos. 68/2024 & 113/2024 and for Objector in CRA Nos. 68/2024, 90/2024 & 116/2024 as well as Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondent. 2. Since the above captioned Criminal Appeals filed on behalf of the accused/appellants as well as Acquittal Appeal filed on behalf of the Victim/Objector arise out of same judgment, they are clubbed and heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 3. CRA No. 68 of 2024 has been filed on behalf of the accused/appellants – Smt. Rekha Agrawal and Smt. Neha Agrawal, who are mother-in-law and sister-in-law of the victim Smt. Ruhi Agrawal challenging the legality, validity and propriety of impugned judgment dated 23.12.2023 passed by the learned 4 Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), District – Durg (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 108/2017, whereby the learned trial Court has convicted them under Section 323 of IPC and sentenced the accused/appellant - Smt. Rekha Agrawal to undergo RI for 10 months & fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional SI for 2 months however, sentenced the accused/appellant – Smt. Neha Agrawal to undergo RI for 06 months & fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional SI for 2 months. 4. CRA No. 90 of 2024 has been filed on behalf of the accused/appellant – Sunil Agrawal, who is father-in-law of the victim Smt. Ruhi Agrawal challenging the legality, validity and propriety of same impugned judgment dated 23.12.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), District – Durg (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 108/2017, whereby the learned trial Court has convicted him under Section 323 of IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 10 months & fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional SI for 2 months. 5. CRA No. 116 of 2024 has been filed on behalf of the accused/appellant – Nimish Agrawal, who is husband of the victim Smt. Ruhi Agrawal challenging the legality, validity and propriety of the very same impugned judgment dated 23.12.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), District – Durg (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 108/2017, whereby the learned trial Court has convicted him under Section 377 and 323 5 of IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 9 years & fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for 1 year and RI for 1 year & fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for 2 months. 6. ACQA No. 68 of 2024 has been filed on behalf of the Victim – Smt. Ruhi Agrawal, challenging the legality, validity and propriety of the very same impugned judgment dated 23.12.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), District – Durg (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 108/2017, whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent No.2/husband – Nimish Agrawal under Section 376, Section 498-A of IPC and also under Section 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 7. ACQA No. 113 of 2024 has been filed on behalf of the Victim – Smt. Ruhi Agrawal, challenging the legality, validity and propriety of the very same impugned judgment dated 23.12.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), District – Durg (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 108/2017, whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (in-laws) under Section 498-A of IPC and also under Section 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 8. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 07.05.2016, the victim submitted a written application (Ex.P-1) to the Station House Officer, Supela Police Station, stating that she was married to the accused, Nimish Agarwal, on 16.01.2007. Prior to 6 the marriage, her mother-in-law, Rekha Agarwal, and father-in- law, Sunil Agarwal, pressured her parents to make the best arrangements for the wedding, stating that her in-laws were associated with prominent figures. Due to this pressure, her father made elaborate arrangements beyond his means. After the marriage, her in-laws and husband began demanding her share from her father, and she was constantly taunted by her father-in- law in this regard, causing her severe distress. When her in-laws began harassing her about bringing more money from her parents after the marriage, she by asking her father transferred approximately 2.5 crore rupees in the bank account of her in- laws' company, LNS. Match Bhilai. Even after this, her in-laws, driven by dowry, forced her to ask her father to buy them a BMW car. They abused her in this regard with vulgar language, and her husband, Nimish Agarwal, subjected her to unnatural acts (anal sex). 9. The victim further stated in her application (Ex.P-1) that when she told her mother-in-law, Rekha Agarwal, about the unnatural acts committed by accused Nimish Agarwal, she was told, with the consent of accused Sunil Agarwal, that her father had a lot of money and that such unnatural acts would continue until she bought a BMW car and 10 crore rupees. Her husband repeatedly committed these crimes, but she remained shy and kept her father from telling him. Later, approximately 60 lakh rupees were transferred from her father's account to her father-in-law's 7 account through a bank. She was taken to Dubai on a job visa. There, her in-laws continued to harass her for dowry. When she became pregnant in 2011, her in-laws forcibly took her to a doctor for a sonography to determine whether she was carrying a girl or a boy. When the sonography revealed that she was carrying a girl, her in-laws asked her to have an abortion, but she refused. She gave birth to a daughter on 12.01.2012. 10. In her application (Ex.P-1), the victim further stated that in June 2014, her in-laws assaulted her severely, resulting in significant injuries for which she received treatment at Chandu Lal Chandrakar Hospital. Her husband then advised her not to report the assault. She did not report the incident, fearing for her daughter's future. In December 2014, instigated by her in-laws, her husband hit her with a badminton player so hard that her leg was fractured. Her daughter was four years old at the time. In front of her, her husband would assault her in the name of dowry and threaten divorce if she did not bring the dowry money. Her husband also recorded a creepy video of her. 11. In her application (Ex.P-1), the victim further stated that when her in-laws returned from Dubai a week ago, she suspected they had planned the incident. Her husband, mother-in-law, and father-in- law would often converse in a closed room. Today, at 8:00 a.m., her husband, mother-in-law, and father-in-law came to her room and called her. All three of them grabbed her and choked her. They slapped her on both cheeks. Her husband hit her on the 8 back with a belt. She has scratches on both hands from a sharp object. Her neck and head still hurt. She grabbed the stair railing to protect herself. She shielded herself from the pushes from the men. She had told her father, her father's acquaintances, Khemraj Madhyani, Prakash Parihar, and others about the previous incident. She continued to tell her friend, Abhilasha Bhatt, about the unnatural acts being done by her husband. 12. On the basis of the above application form Ex.P-1, Police Station Supela has registered an FIR (Ex.P-3) under Crime No. 415/2016, against accused Nimish Agarwal, Sunil Agarwal and Rekha Agarwal, for the commission of offenses punishable under Sections 498A, 377, 323, and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. A copy of the First Information Report (Ex.P-3A) regarding the registration of the crime was sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Durg. The victim's consent (Ex.P-4) was obtained for a physical and genital examination. The victim was sent to Lal Bahadur Shastri Hospital, Supela, accompanied by Head Constable Mamta Mandavi No. 1695, alongwith an application (Ex.P-10A). The victim's physical and genital examination was conducted by Dr. Rachna Dave (PW-6) on 07.05.2016 at 10:55 a.m., and the examination report, Ex.P-10 was prepared. After examination, when two sealed packets were produced before the Investigating Officer Kamla Yadav (PW-11) by lady constable Mamta Mandavi, she made a seizure of the same and in this regard seizure memo Ex.P-16 was prepared. 9 13. On 07.05.2016 at about 11.50 am Dr. Madhu Srivastava (PW-8) conducted a genital examination of the victim and prepared a report vide Ex.P-12. On the same date 07.05.2016 at about 05.00 pm, when the victim was examined by Dr. Babita Saxena (PW-9), her condition was found to be normal. On the same date 07.05.2016 at about 05.00 pm, the victim was discharged from Lal Bahadur Shastri Government Hospital, Supella, Bhilai, District Durg. In this regard, a discharge ticket (Ex.P-13) was prepared. On 07.05.2016, the statement of the victim (Ex.D-1), the statement of the victim's father (Ex.P-7), the statement of Mrs. Abhilasha Bhatt (Ex.P-15) were recorded by the Investigating Officer of the case, Kamla Yadav. 14. On finding evidence of crime against the accused Nimish Agrawal, Sunil Agarwal and Rekha Agarwal, they were arrested and in this regard arrest papers Ex.P-17, Ex.P-18, Ex.P-19 were prepared. On 08.05.2016 at about 11.30 am, the Investigating Officer of the case, Kamla Yadav (PW-11), went to the scene of the incident and prepared a site map (Ex.P-5) of the incident as per the information given by the complainant/victim. 15. The statement of witness Mala Ahuja was recorded by Investigating Officer Kamla Yadav on 03.08.2016. The statement of witness Prakash Parihar was recorded as per Ex.P-9 on 06.08.2016. On being produced by the victim on 06.08.2016, Investigating Officer Kamla Yadav at Supela Police Station seized an original medical prescription, an MLC slip, a replica of a penis, 10 a black bottle with Gun Oil written on it in English, and a white plastic container containing cockrub and prepared a seizure memo (Ex.P-6) in this regard. On 07.08.2016, a complaint (Ex.P. 23) was sent to the Revenue Inspector, Municipal Corporation, Bhilai for preparing a spot map of the incident site. 16. On 06.08.2016 itself, the Investigating Officer Kamla Yadav sent a complaint (Ex.P-22) for recording the statement of the victim under the provisions of Section 164 of Cr.P.C. 1973. On 06.08.2016, the statement of the victim (Ex.D-3) was recorded by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, Chhattisgarh. On 17.07.2016, an application (Ex.P-21) was sent to the Manager Chandu Lal Chandrakar Hospital, Supela for providing information regarding treatment of the victim. On 30.07.2016, the victim's supplementary statement (Ex.D-1A) was recorded. On 30.05.2016, the slides presented after the victim's genital examination were sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, through the Superintendent of Police, Durg, for chemical testing. 17. After completion of investigation of the case, Assistant Sub Inspector Rampal Singh Thakur posted at Supela Police Station got it forwarded by the Station House Officer Supela and presented the final report (Ex.P-30) before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Durg on 16.03.2017. On 29.06.2017, Judicial Magistrate First Class Durg passed the surrender order for trial of this case and handed it over to the court of Sessions Judge Durg. 11 On 11.07.2017, Sessions Judge Durg passed the order and transferred it to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) Durg for proper hearing and disposal. 18. On 18.10.2019, on being charged against accused Nimish Agrawal with committing an offence punishable Section 376 alternatively Section 377, Section 498A, Section 323 of IPC and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, against accused Sunil Agarwal and Rekha Agarwal for committing an offence punishable under Section 498A, Section 323 of the IPC and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 and on accused Neha Agarwal for committing an offence punishable under Section 498A, Section 323 of the IPC, all the accused denied having committed the offence and desired trial. 19. To prove its case on behalf of the prosecution, the statements of the victim (PW-1), the victim's father (PW-2), Khemamal Madhyani (PW-3), Prakash Parihar (PW-4), Dr. S.S. Verma (PW- 5), Dr. Rachna Dave (PW-6), Dr. B.L. Markam (PW-7), Dr. Madhu Srivastava (PW-8), Dr. Babita Saxena (PW-9), Mrs. Abhilasha Bhatt (PW-10), Investigating Officer Kamla Yadav (PW- 11) and Rampal Singh (PW-12) were recorded before the trial Court and various documents were also produced, which were marked as Exs.P-1 to P-30. 20. The learned trial Court after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment 12 dated 23.12.2023 convicted and sentenced the accused / appellants as mentioned in preceding paragraphs of this judgment, however, acquitted accused Nimish Agrawal (husband) under Section 376, Section 498-A of IPC and also under Section 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and further acquitted the accused – Smt. Rekha Agrawal (mother-in-law), Smt. Neha Agrawal (sister-in-law) and Sunil Agrawal (father-in-law) under Section 498-A of IPC and also under Section 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, against which, aforementioned Criminal Appeals and Acquittal Appeal have been filed by the respective parties. 21. With regard to the conviction of the Appellant Nimish Agrawal in CRA/116/2024 under Section 377 of the IPC, Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the very first handwritten complaint dated 07.05.2016 (Ex.P-2) made by the victim does not mention any allegations pertaining to unnatural sexual intercourse. At a later stage, subsequent to the first complaint (Ex.P-2), the victim made a typed complaint (Ex.P-1), which is an exaggerated version of the prior complaint, wherein for the first time an allegation pertaining to unnatural sexual intercourse was made. He further argued that even the F.I.R. lodged by the victim (Ex.P-3) neither reflects any specific incident of forcible sexual intercourse nor contains any description or allegation regarding the use of the articles produced by the victim after three months of lodging the complaint. The said allegations 13 of forcible unnatural sexual intercourse are not even mentioned in her 161 CrPC statement (Ex.D-1). He also argued that based on the complaint and F.I.R., the M.L.C. was conducted vide Ex.P-10 & P-11) by Dr.Rachna Dave (PW-6) and Dr. Madhu Shrivastava (PW-8), and they have categorically recorded in their reports that no tear or laceration was found with regard to unnatural sexual intercourse. This fact was also supported in their court depositions in Para 3 of both Dr. Rachna Dave (PW-6) and Dr. Madhu Shrivastava (PW-8). 22. Mr. Paranjpe submitted that the allegations of forcible unnatural sexual intercourse were leveled by the victim for the first time after a lapse of three months in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and it was further alleged that certain articles were used for commission of the mentioned acts, only after the seizure of articles (Ex.P-6) on the production of the victim herself, that too after three months of the complaint. He further submitted that the victim (PW-1), in Para 29 of her court deposition, has specifically stated that she left her matrimonial house on 07.05.2016, which clearly stipulates that on the date of lodging of the F.I.R., i.e., 07.05.2016, the articles were neither produced nor seized from the appellant. He also submitted that relying on the admissions made by the victim in her cross-examination, it can be categorically concluded that the allegations of forcible unnatural sexual intercourse are wholly unsupported by the record. The victim, in Para 10 (Page 117), has not made any allegation of 14 forcible or non-consensual use of articles in her examination-in- chief. The victim has further admitted in Paras 136 and 138 that the allegations regarding insertion of articles are missing from Ex.P-1, P-2, P-3 and D-1. In Para 137, the victim admitted that even in her 164 Cr.P.C. statement (D-3, Page 435), the allegations of unnatural/anal sexual intercourse are absent. In Paras 139 and 140, the victim has accepted the contradictions put to her. It is also admitted by the victim in Para 141 that the articles allegedly used for unnatural sexual intercourse were produced only after three months from the lodging of the F.I.R., and that these articles were taken from her home. In Para 142, the victim further admitted that in her examination-in-chief no statement was made that the articles were taken from the accused’s house and that the said narration was being made for the first time in Court. He submitted that Paras 148 and 149 of the victim’s statement clearly reflect that no allegations of forceful unnatural sexual intercourse were made in the written complaints Ex. P-1, P-2 or in the F.I.R. Ex. P-3. 23. With regard to the definition of rape under Section 375 of the IPC, it is submitted by Mr. Paranjpe that clauses (a) and (b), which were inserted pursuant to the amendment of 2013, have also brought corresponding changes under Explanation 2 to Section 375 IPC, and on perusal of the said provision, no offence against the appellant is made out. He contended that as per the impugned judgment of conviction there are no findings with 15 regard to forcible sexual intercourse and only on the allegations of unnatural sexual intercourse, the husband/appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under section 377. He further contended that from the perusal of the records and the statement of the victim, it appears that the allegations under Section 377 is an afterthought, and there are no specific dates or incidents mentioned by the victim either in the record or in her deposition. The allegations with regard to Section 377 of the IPC are generalized, not specific, and are not supported by any corroborating or cogent evidence. In support of aforesaid arguments, Mr. Paranjpe relied upon the following judgments passed by various Hon’ble Supreme Court and Various High Courts :- A] Siddaruda alias Karna vs State of Karnataka reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 585 (Para 10,11,12 & 13) B] Sunny Kant VS State NCT of Delhi reported in 2025 SCC Online Del 3493 (Para 8 to 26) C] Judgment passed by this Court in the matter of Gorakhnath Sharma vs State of Chhattisgarh bearing CRA No. 891/2019 vide judgment dated 10.02.2025 (Para 14, 15,16). D] Dr. Kirti Bhushan Mishra vs State of Uttarakhand reported in 2024 SCC Online Utt 2023 (Para 12,13,16,18) 16 E] Bratati vs State of Karnataka reported in 2022 SCC Online Kar 371 (Para Para 21, 22, 27). This judgment is under challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl) No. 4063/2022. 24. For conviction under Section 323 of IPC against the accused/ appellants Smt. Rekha Agrawal (mother-in-law), Sunil Agrawal (father-in-law), Smt. Neha Agrawal (sister-in-law), and Nimish Agrawal (husband), it has been submitted by Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate that upon a careful perusal of the charge framed by the learned Trial Court, it is evident that the allegations against the mother-in-law, father-in-law and sister-in- law pertain solely to the incident dated 16.06.2014 (Pages 462, 464, 467), whereas the charge against the husband spans the period from 16.01.2007 to 07.05.2016 (Page 465). The learned Trial Court in Para 44 has itself recorded a categorical finding that the incident dated 16.06.2014 has not been proved by the prosecution through medical evidence. Despite this, in Para 45, the Court has proceeded to hold that the prosecution has proved the allegations of assault for the entire period from 16.01.2007 to 07.05.2016 relying upon the statements of Dr. S.S. Verma (PW-5) and Dr. Rachna Dave (PW-6), even though no medical document other than those of 16.06.2014 and 07.05.2016 has been brought on record. For 07.05.2016 as well, the medical evidence suffers from inherent contradictions, as Ex. P-11 (OPD slip) reflects the time as 11:30 AM, whereas the MLC (Ex.P-10) was prepared 17 earlier at 10:55 AM, which inconsistency stands admitted by Dr. Rachna Dave (PW-6) in Para 17 and 18 of her statement. The said doctor in Para 13 has further deposed that no MLC number is mentioned in Ex.P-10, and several other inconsistencies appear in her deposition in Paras 22, 24, 25, 27, 28 and 29. 25. Mr. Paranjpe further submitted that in addition to the discrepancies in medical evidence, the testimony of the victim (PW-1) herself contains several material contradictions. The victim (PW-1), in Paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 15 (Page 115), has made statements which do not find support in the contemporaneous record. He also submitted that PW-8 Dr.Madhu Shrivastava (Page 294), in Para 5, admitted that she examined the victim on 08.05.2016, although Ex.P-12 records the MLC timing as 12:30 PM on 07.05.2016. PW-9 Dr. Babita Saxena has admitted in Para 3 that the victim was discharged on 07.05.2016 at 05:00 PM. Further, the Rojnamcha Sanha (Ex.D-82A, Page 592) records that the statement of the victim was taken at 03:40 PM on 07.05.2016, thereby showing that she was present at the Police Station at a time when the hospital discharge slip (Pages 375–376) reflects that she remained admitted from 12:30 PM to 05:00 PM on the same day. These contradictions significantly impair the reliability of the prosecution case. 26. Mr. Paranjpe submitted that the compromise dated 12.05.2016 (Ex.D/14-C, Page 468), duly signed by the complainant, her father and the accused persons, clearly demonstrates that the 18 parties had amicably resolved their disputes. The said compromise was executed when the accused persons, except Neha Agrawal, were in judicial custody, and their signatures were obtained inside the jail premises with due permission of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, as reflected from Ex.D/17 (Page 477). In pursuance of the settlement, an amount of Rs.3 Crore and Rs.5 Lakhs was paid through cheques, and security cheques were also handed over by the sister’s father-in-law, which stands corroborated from Para 2 and Ex.D/77. Further, the complainant herself filed an affidavit dated 12.05.2016 before the learned Sessions Judge (Ex.D/16, Page 475) affirming the terms of compromise. He further submitted that on the very same date, the learned Sessions Judge, considering the said settlement between the parties, was pleased to grant regular bail to the accused persons, as recorded in Ex.D/17 (Page 477). The sequence of these events clearly reflects the bona fide nature of the compromise and the conscious participation of the complainant and her family therein. The said facts are also considered by the trial court for acquittal of the appellants under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Others Vs. State of Telangana & Others, reported in (2025) 3 SCC 735. 19 27. Mr. Paranjpe contended that the appellant Smt. Neha Agrawal (sister-in-law) of the victim has got married in the year 2000 and is residing with her in-laws in her matrimonial home in Mumbai and there is no possibility of any kind of offence to be instituted or conducted by her. He further contended that the inconsistencies in the victim’s statements further weaken the prosecution version. In Para 57, the victim has stated that her sister-in-law and mother-in-law assaulted her; however, no such allegation is contained either in the written report (Ex.P-1) or in the F.I.R. (Ex.P-3). On the contrary, in Para 63 (Page 137), the victim has alleged assault by her parents. He lastly submitted that the lack of consistency in her allegations, the absence of supporting medical documentation, and the contradictions in the depositions of PW-6, PW-8 and PW-9 cumulatively demonstrate that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are not borne out from the evidence on record and that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. 28. On the other hand, Mr. Rajeev Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the Objector as well as the appellant/victim in both the Acquittal Appeals, opposed the aforesaid submission and submitted that the learned trail Court has erred by acquitting the accused/respondents from the offence charged under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act by discarding the evidence of prosecution witnesses without there being any strong reason to discard their 20 evidences. He further submitted that the learned Trial Court has simply relied on the exception 2 of the section 375 of the IPC to acquit the accused/respondent – Nimish Agrawal (husband) from the offence of rape. He also submitted that the exception to the Section 375 which states that "sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape” is not applicable in the present case, the act complained of by the complainant is found covered by these provisions. The exception to section 375 of IPC only exempts the sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man and not permit the husband to use his wife's body like an animal and do filthy acts. He also submitted that the provision under Explanation-2 of Section 375 of IPC implies the normal physical relation between husband and wife in case the wife is not below the age of 18 years. But in the instant case, the victim has specifically deposed in her examination-in-chief as well as in her cross-examination against the husband that he used to compel her for unnatural sexual intercourse forcibly, which is an offence punishable under Section 376 as well as 377 of IPC after the 2013 amendment. 29. Mr. Shrivastava submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to take into consideration the fact that penetration of any object by the accused (husband) into the sex organ with an intention to derive sexual pleasure is sufficient to constitute the sexual connection to constitute the offence under section 376 of the I.P.C and it will not come within the exception purview of sexual 21 intercourse or sexual acts with wife. He further submitted that the abusing of sex organ with an intention to derive sexual pleasure apart from establishing sexual connection would not only be a carnal intercourse against the 'order of nature' but by virtue of the amended definition of rape postulated in section 375 of IPC, it will be punishable as rape as well. He also submitted that recently the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Hrishikesh Sahoo V State of Karnataka 2022 Livelaw (Kar) 89 has categorically held that the institution of marriage does not confer any special male privilege or a license for unleashing of a brutal beast and if it is punishable to a man, it should be punishable to a man albeit, the man being a husband. The Hon'ble Court further stated that the exemption of the husband on committal of such assault/rape, cannot be absolute, as no exemption in law can be so absolute that it becomes a license for commission of crime against society. It has been also submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to take into consideration that in Sakshi vs. Union of India AIR 2004 SC 3566, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has defined "Sexual Intercourse" as heterosexual intercourse involving natural intercourse between a man and a woman, adopting the dictionary meaning, thus the expression of immunity used in Exception 2 has to be given a restrictive meaning and is not to be applied across the board to the entire definition of rape in Section 375 IPC. In any case an exception is always subservient to the main provision and a proviso does not travel 22 beyond the provision to which it is a proviso as laid down in by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji vs. State of Gujarat and Another AIR 2004 SC 3946. 30. Mr. Shrivastava contended that the learned Trial Court failed to take into account the ingredients of section 498-A of IPC stands satisfied in the instant case wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically laid down in U. Suvetha vs. State by Inspector of Police and Anr AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1451 that for commission of an offence under Section 498-A, following necessary ingredients require to be satisfied: (a) The woman must be married; (b) She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment; and (c) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by the relative of her husband. It is submitted that the term "cruelty" enumerated in the section 498-A of the IPC mandates any act that causes physical, mental, or emotional harm or harassment to a woman and in the instant case, the appellant/victim has categorically deposed that her husband and her in-laws (father-in-law and mother-in-law) used to continuously harass her for the demand of dowry and to ask for her share from her father's property. The continuous demand of dowry was clubbed with the harassment and beating that were inflicted on the appellant/victim by the husband on the behest of the remaining accused(s) as well as by all the accused(s). It is noteworthy to mention that the examination-in- 23 chief of the appellant/victim is specific as to how the continuous torture resulted in the appellant/victim being beaten severely by her in-laws which is not only backed by the medical evidence but also Dr. Rachna Dave (PW-6) has categorically elaborated before the learned Trial Court about the injuries sustained by the appellant/victim as a result of beating by the accused/husband and his parents on 07.05.2016. 31. Mr. Shrivastava further argued that the learned Trial Court while convicting the accused/husband and other co-accused(s) for the offence punishable under section 323 of the IPC has specifically taken note of the deposition of the appellant/victim with regard to the injuries, beating and torture committed by the accused/husband on 26/04/2014 and then subsequently in the year 2014 and in year 2015 wherein the in-laws of the appellant/victim also assaulted her which led to the treatment of the appellant/victim in Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Hospital. The appellant/victim in para 9 and 12 of her examination-in-chief has further deposed as to how in December 2014, she was beaten by the accused/husband and subsequently on 07.05.2016, the last assault on her took place which led to the filing of the FIR against her in-laws. He also argued that though the learned Trial Court, Durg has convicted the accused/appellants under Section 323 of IPC, but has acquitted them from the charge under Section 498-A of IPC, wherein the deposition of the appellant/victim is specific and the offence 24 under section 323 and section 498-A of IPC is intrinsically connected with each other and it cannot be read in separation when the very offence of section 323 of IPC was based on the foundation of cruelty and continuous torture as postulated in Section 498-A of the IPC backed by the unimpeached testimony about the specific instances of torture, assault or harassment by the complainant, her father (PW-2), and Smt. Abhilasha Bhatt (PW-10). 32. Mr. Shrivastava contended that the learned Trial Court ought to have examined the fact that the very demand of dowry and taking of dowry stands satisfied in the instant case and the acquittal of the accused / appellants from the offences under section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is not in conformity with the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. It is submitted that the victim (PW-1) has categorically deposed that she was subjected to torture for the non-fulfillment of dowry demand of 10 crore rupees and a BMW car. The victim (PW-1) has unimpeachable manner deposed about the demand of her share in her father's property and the demand by the in-laws which were even met by the deposit of huge amount of money in the company of the co- accused. It is also submitted that for the commission of the offence of demand of dowry as postulated in section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, actual giving of dowry is not a sine qua non and in the instant case, not only the demand of dowry has been proved by the appellant/victim but the very demand of 25 dowry is also backed by the evidence of the PW-2 father of the victim, PW-4 Prakash Parihar, PW-3 Khemamal Madhyani, but the learned Trial Court has not given any finding on the said deposition and has not dealt with the evidence of the said witnesses to acquit the accused/appellants from the charges of Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 33. Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/respondent submitted that the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the accused Nimish Agrawal under Sections 323 and 377 of IPC and other accused, who are in-laws of the victim, under Section 323 of IPC, based on the evidence available on record, in which no interference is warranted. He further submitted that though the scope of interference with the order of acquittal is very limited but on the other hand the appellate Court is vested with wide powers of re-appreciation of the evidence in the matter. It is settled position of law that, if reappraisal of the evidence goes to show that the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court is unjust and perverse then the appellate Court is empowered to set aside the same and reverse the order of acquittal and convict the accused appropriately. 34. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 26 35. From the above submissions made by the parties and the record of the trial Court, the points for determination for this Court are:- (i) Whether offence under Sections 376 and 377 of the IPC is attracted against the accused/appellant Nimish Agrawal looking to the present facts and circumstances of the case when the accused and the victim are the husband and wife ? (ii) Whether in the present facts and circumstances of the case offence under Section 323 IPC is attracted and the finding of conviction by the trial Court for convicting the accused/appellants for offence under Section 323 is sustainable or not ? (iii) Whether the learned trial Court has committed any illegality or infirmity by acquitting the accused/appellants for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC and Section 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 36. To appreciate the point No.1 it is expedient for this Court to attract Sections 375, 376 and 377 of the IPC which read as under:- “375. Rape.-- A man is said to commit "rape" if he-- (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the 27 urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions: First. Against her will. Secondly. Without her consent. Thirdly. With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly. With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly. With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly. With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. 28 Seventhly. When she is unable to communicate consent. Explanation 1. For the purposes of this section, "vagina" shall also include labia majora. Explanation 2. Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. Exception 1. A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. Exception 2. Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.” 376 – Punishment for rape. (1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which 1 [shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine]. (2) Whoever— (a) being a police officer, commits rape, (i) within the limits of the police station to which such police officer is appointed; or (ii) in the premises of any station house; or (iii) on a woman in such police officer’s 29 custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to such police officer; or (b) being a public servant, commits rape on a woman in such public servant's custody or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to such public servant; or (c) being a member of the armed forces deployed in an area by the Central or a State Government commits rape in such area; or (d) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a women's or children's institution, commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or (e) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or (f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the woman, commits rape on such woman; or (g) commits rape during communal or sectarian violence; or (h) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or (j) commits rape, on a woman incapable of giving consent; or (k) being in a position of control or dominance over a woman, commits rape on such woman; or (l) commits rape on a woman suffering from 30 mental or physical disability; or (m) while committing rape causes grievous bodily harm or maims or disfigures or endangers the life of a woman; or (n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— For the purposes of this sub- section,— (a) "armed forces" means the naval, military and air forces and includes any member of the Armed Forces constituted under any law for the time being in force, including the paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces that are under the control of the Central Government or the State Government; (b) "hospital" means the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts of any institution for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation; (c) "police officer" shall have the same meaning as assigned to the expression "police" under the Police Act, 1861 (5 of 1861); (d) "women's or children's institution" means an institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected women or children or a widow's home or an institution called by any other name, which is established and 31 maintained for the reception and care of women or children. [(3) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim: Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim. Section 377. Unnatural offences. - Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section. 37. From perusal of Section 375, 376 and 377 IPC it is quite vivid that in view of amended definition of Section 375 IPC, offence under Section 377 IPC between husband and wife has no place and, as such rape cannot be made out. It is pertinent to mention here that in the amendment in Section 375 IPC in the year 2013, Exception- 2 has been provided which speaks that sexual 32 intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife is not a rape and therefore if any unnatural sex as defined under section 377 is committed by the husband with his wife, then it can also not be treated to be an offence. It is quite vivid that Section 377 i.e. unnatural sex is not well- equipped and offender is not defined therein but body parts are well defined, which are also included in Section 375 i.e. carnal intercourse against the order of nature. while considering the constitutionality of Section 377 IPC criminalizes 'carnal intercourse against the order of nature' which among other things has been interpreted to include oral and anal sex. Obviously, Section 377 of IPC is not well-equipped as unnatural offence has also not been defined anywhere. The five- judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Navtej Singh Johar while testing the constitutionality of said provision has held that some parts of Section 377 are unconstitutional and finally held that if unnatural offence is done with consent then offence of Section 377 IPC is not made out. 38. Considering the said legal position and in the light of amended definition of Section 375 and the relationship for which exception provided for not taking consent i.e. between husband & wife and not making offence of Section 376, it is quite vivid that the definition of rape as provided under Section 375 includes penetration of penis in the parts of the body i.e. vagina, urethra or anus of a woman for which consent is not required then unnatural sex cannot be made as unnatural offence between husband and 33 wife, as such apparently, there is repugnancy in these two situations in the light of definition of Section 375 and unnatural offence of Section 377. It is also well settled principle of law that if the provisions of latter enactment are so inconsistent or repugnant to the provisions of an earlier one then the two cannot stand together and earlier is abrogated by the latter. Thus, it is quite clear that at the same time, as per the definition of Section 375 of IPC, the offender is classified as a 'man'. Here in the present case, the appellant is a 'husband' and victim is a 'woman' and here she is a 'wife' and parts of the body which are used for carnal intercourse are also common, therefore, the offence between husband and wife cannot be made out under Section 375 IPC as per the repeal made by way of amendment and in view of repugnancy between both the sections. It is quite vivid that when everything is repealed under Section 375 of IPC then how offence under Section 377 of IPC would be attracted if it is committed between husband and wife. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Navtej Singh Johar and others vs. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of law and justice 2018(10) SCC 1 has considered the provisions of Section 375, 376 and 377 and held as under: “268.11. A cursory reading of both Section 375 and 377 IPC reveals that although the former section gives due recognition to the absence of "wilful and informed consent" for an act to be termed as rape, per contra, Section 377 does not contain any such qualification embodying in itself the absence of "wilful and informed consent" to criminalise carnal 34 intercourse which consequently results in criminalising even voluntary carnal intercourse between homosexuals, heterosexuals, bisexuals and transgenders. Section 375 IPC, after the coming into force of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 has not used the words "subject to any other provision of the IPC". This indicates that Section 375 IPC is not subject to Section 377 IPC. 268.12. The expression "against the order of nature" has neither been defined in Section 377 IPC nor in any other provision of the IPC. The connotation given to the expression by various judicial pronouncements includes all sexual acts which are not intended for the purpose of procreation. Therefore, if coitus is not performed for procreation only, it does not per se make it "against the order of nature." 39. Thus, it is quite vivid, that if the age of wife is not below age of 15 years then any sexual intercourse or sexual act by the husband with her wife cannot be termed as rape under the circumstances, as such absence of consent of wife for unnatural act loses its importance, therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the offence under Section 376 and 377 of the IPC against the appellant is not made out. 40. From the perusal of the impugned order and material available on records, it transpires that the very first handwritten complaint dated 07.05.2016 (Ex.P-2) made by the victim does not mention any allegations pertaining to unnatural sexual intercourse. At a later stage, subsequent to the first complaint (Ex.P-2), the victim made a typed complaint (Ex.P-1), which is an exaggerated version of the prior complaint, wherein for the first time an allegation pertaining to unnatural sexual intercourse was made. Even the FIR lodged by the victim (Ex.P-3) neither reflects any 35 specific incident of forcible sexual intercourse nor contains any description or allegation regarding the use of the articles produced by the victim after three months of lodging the complaint. The said allegations of forcible unnatural sexual intercourse are not even mentioned in her 161 CrPC statement (Ex.D-1). It further transpires that based on the complaint and F.I.R., the M.L.C. was conducted vide Ex.P-10 & Ex.P-11 by Dr.Rachna Dave (PW-6) and Dr. Madhu Shrivastava (PW-8), and they have categorically recorded in their reports that no tear or laceration was found with regard to unnatural sexual intercourse. This fact was also supported in their Court depositions in Para 3 of both Dr. Rachna Dave (PW-6) and Dr. Madhu Shrivastava (PW-8). 41. It also transpires that the allegations of forcible unnatural sexual intercourse were leveled by the victim for the first time after a lapse of three months in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and it was further alleged that certain articles were used for commission of the mentioned acts, only after the seizure of articles (Ex.P-6) on the production of the victim herself, that too from her maternal house and after three months of the complaint. The victim (PW-1), in Para 29 of her court deposition, has specifically stated that she left her matrimonial house on 07.05.2016, which clearly stipulates that on the date of lodging of the F.I.R., i.e., 07.05.2016, the articles were neither produced nor seized from the appellant. Relying on the admissions made by 36 the victim in her cross-examination, it can be categorically concluded that the allegations of forcible unnatural sexual intercourse are wholly unsupported by the record. The victim, in Para 10 (Page 117), has not made any allegation of forcible or non-consensual use of articles in her examination-in-chief. The victim has further admitted in Paras 136 and 138 that the allegations regarding insertion of articles are missing from Ex.P- 1, P-2, P-3 and D-1. In Para 137, the victim admitted that even in her 164 Cr.P.C. statement (D-3, Page 435), the allegations of unnatural/anal sexual intercourse are absent. In Paras 139 and 140, the victim has accepted the contradictions put to her. It is also admitted by the victim in Para 141 that the articles allegedly used for unnatural sexual intercourse were produced only after three months from the lodging of the F.I.R., and that these articles were taken from her home. In Para 142, the victim further admitted that in her examination-in-chief no statement was made that the articles were taken from the accused’s house and that the said narration was being made for the first time in Court. Paras 148 and 149 of the victim’s statement clearly reflect that no allegations of forceful unnatural sexual intercourse were made in the written complaints Ex. P-1, P-2 or in the F.I.R. Ex. P-3. 42. From perusal of the records and the statement of the victim, it further appears that the allegations under Section 377 is an afterthought, and there are no specific dates or incidents mentioned by the victim either in the record or in her deposition. 37 The allegations with regard to Section 377 of the IPC are generalized, not specific, and are not supported by any corroborating or cogent evidence. Thus, offence under Sections 377 of the IPC is not attracted against the accused/ appellant Nimish Agrawal looking to the present facts and circumstances of the case. 43. So far as Section 323 IPC is concerned, it is evident that the allegations against the mother-in-law, father-in-law and sister-in- law pertain solely to the incident dated 16.06.2014 (Pages 462, 464, 467), whereas the charge against the husband spans the period from 16.01.2007 to 07.05.2016 (Page 465). The learned Trial Court in Para 44 has itself recorded a categorical finding that the incident dated 16.06.2014 has not been proved by the prosecution through medical evidence. Despite this, in Para 45, the Court has proceeded to hold that the prosecution has proved the allegations of assault for the entire period from 16.01.2007 to 07.05.2016 relying upon the statements of Dr. S.S. Verma (PW-5) and Dr. Rachna Dave (PW-6), even though no medical document other than those of 16.06.2014 and 07.05.2016 has been brought on record. 44. From perusal of the impugned order, it transpires that the learned Trial Court while convicting the accused/husband and other co- accused(s) for the offence punishable under section 323 of the IPC has specifically taken note of the deposition of the appellant/victim with regard to the injuries, beating and torture 38 committed by the accused/husband on 26/04/2014 and then subsequently in the year 2014 and in year 2015 wherein the in- laws of the appellant/victim also assaulted her which led to the treatment of the appellant/victim in Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Hospital. The appellant/victim in para 9 and 12 of her examination-in-chief has further deposed as to how in December 2014, she was beaten by the accused/husband and subsequently on 07.05.2016, the last assault on her took place which led to the filing of the FIR against her in-laws. The appellant Smt. Neha Agrawal (sister-in-law) of the victim has got married in the year 2000 and is residing with her in-laws in her matrimonial home in Mumbai and there is no possibility of any kind of offence to be instituted or conducted by her. The inconsistencies in the victim’s statements further weaken the prosecution version. In Para 57, the victim has stated that her sister-in-law and mother-in-law assaulted her; however, no such allegation is contained either in the written report (Ex.P-1) or in the F.I.R. (Ex.P-3). On the contrary, in Para 63 (Page 137), the victim has alleged assault by her parents. 45. Thus, considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the offence under Section 323 IPC is attracted only against the accused/appellant Nimish Agrawal (husband), Smt. Rekha Agrawal (mother-in-law) and Sunil Agrawal (father-in-law) and not against Smt. Neha Agrawal (sister-in-law) and as such, the finding of conviction by the trial Court for convicting the 39 accused/appellants Nimish Agrawal (husband), Smt. Rekha Agrawal (mother-in-law) and Sunil Agrawal (father-in-law) for offence under Section 323 is sustainable. However, the finding of conviction by the trial Court for convicting the accused/appellant Smt. Neha Agrawal (sister-in-law) is not sustainable. 46. So far as point No.3 is concerned, in the present case, the allegations in FIR No.415 of 2016 dated 07.052016 pertain to offences punishable under Sections 498A and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act. Section 498A of the IPC relates to cruelty by the husband or his relatives, including the father-in-law, against the wife. Section 34 concerns acts done by several person in furtherance of common intention. The provisions read as under: “34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.— When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. XXX 498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— 40 (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 47. Further, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act talk about the penalty for giving or taking or demanding a dowry. “Section 3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation to— (a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride without any demand having been made in that behalf: Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act; 41 (b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom without any demand having been made in that behalf: Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act: Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given. Section 4. Penalty for demanding dowry.—If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.” 48. Section 498A of the IPC prescribes punishment where a woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives. The offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and also provides for fine. The Page 11 of 23 Explanation appended to the provision defines "cruelty" in two parts. Clause (a) refers to wilful conduct which is of such a nature 42 as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health, whether mental or physical. Clause (b) expands the scope of the term to include harassment with a view to coercing the woman or her relatives to meet any unlawful demand for property or valuable security, or on account of failure to meet such demand. 49. Section 3 of the Dowry Act pertains to punishment for giving or taking dowry. It prescribes a minimum sentence of five years and imposes a fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever is higher. 50. Section 4 of the Dowry Act penalises the act of demanding dowry. It provides that any person who, directly or indirectly, demands dowry from the parents, relatives, or guardians of either party to a marriage, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees. 51. Very recently, the Apex Court, in Dara Lakshmi Narayan & Others v. State of Telangana & Another {Cr.A. No. 5199 of 2024, decided on 10.12.2024}, has observed as under: “25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well- recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that 43 there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them. 26. In fact, in the instant case, the first appellant and his wife i.e. the second respondent herein resided at Jollarpeta, Tamil Nadu where he was working in Southern Railways. They were married in the year 2015 and soon thereafter in the years 2016 and 2017, the second respondent gave birth to two children. Therefore, it cannot be believed that there was any harassment for dowry during the said period or that there was any matrimonial discord. Further, the second respondent in response to the missing complaint filed by the first appellant herein on 05.10.2021 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting for closure of the said complaint as she had stated that she had left the matrimonial home on her own accord owing to a quarrel with the appellant No.1 because of one Govindan with 44 whom the second respondent was in contact over telephone for a period of ten days. She had also admitted that she would not repeat such acts in future. In the above conspectus of facts, we find that the allegations of the second respondent against the appellants herein are too far-fetched and are not believable. 27. xxx xxx xxx 28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them. 29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should 45 remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case. 30. In the above context, this Court in G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as follows: “12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude 46 and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.” 31. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by the husband’s close relatives who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection. 32. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned FIR No.82 of 2022 filed by respondent No.2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and grudges against appellant No.1 and his family members i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal. Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not exercising the powers available to it under Section 482 CrPC and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court’s process by continuing the criminal prosecution against the appellants.” Observing the aforesaid, the Apex Court quashed the FIR, the charge sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings pending before the learned trial Court. 52. In the present case, the victim (PW-1) has stated in paragraphs 4 to 8 of her examination-in-chief that in 2011, when she became 47 pregnant, her in-laws and husband took her for a sonography. On learning that she was carrying a girl child, all three asked her to abort, but she refused, and her daughter was born on 12.01.2012. She further stated that in July 2012, she was sent to Dubai with her mother-in-law on the pretext of being appointed as a Manager in her company. However, she was made to perform all household chores, such as washing clothes and utensils, sweeping, and cleaning toilets. She lived there with her mother- in-law; her father-in-law visited often, and her husband came occasionally. When she asked her father-in-law about her husband, he threatened to keep her away from him for ten years and to whip her if she asked again. She returned to Bhilai in January 2014. 53. PW-1, the victim further stated that on 26.04.2014, her husband beat her repeatedly over a trivial matter. Hearing the commotion, her father-in-law came upstairs and snatched her mobile phone. When she said she would go to the police, her husband and father-in-law took her to her parental home, where her father then came to know about the assaults. She also stated that her husband beat her on Rakshabandhan in 2014 and 2015. In June 2014, her sister-in-law Neha urged the mother-in-law to take the victim along whenever they went out, which led the mother-in-law to abuse her parents. Neha allegedly twisted her wrist and beat her. The victim went to Chandulal Chandrakar Hospital with the husband’s driver, where a doctor told her she was facing 48 domestic violence. Her husband and father-in-law, who were in Dubai at the time, instructed her not to complain. On her return home, her mother-in-law and sister-in-law summoned neighbours Ahuja uncle and aunty, who, on seeing her injuries, advised them not to repeat such acts and told the victim not to lodge a complaint. 54. PW-2, the victim’s father, stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 that although he had been assisting the accused from time to time, their behaviour towards his daughter was unfavourable. After his daughter gave birth to a girl, the accused began to torture her. They soon took her to Dubai on the pretext of involving her in a cigarette business. The victim lived there with her mother-in-law, who made her do all household chores and taunted her for not bearing a son. When the father-in-law visited Dubai, he threatened to keep her away from her husband for ten years if she raised the issue again. The victim returned to Bhilai on 28.01.2014. Thereafter, her husband allegedly resumed harassing her, saying they no longer needed her and insisting that she bring money from her parents. 55. PW-3 Khemamal Madhyani stated in paragraph 2 that he was a close friend of the victim’s father and frequently visited their home. He said that the victim’s father had told him that his daughter was unhappy in her marriage, was being beaten regularly, and that Rekha, Sunil, and Nimish Agarwal assaulted her. He also stated that the father informed him that the accused 49 often demanded money and that he had fulfilled these demands to keep them satisfied. 56. PW-4 Prakash Parihar stated in paragraph 3 that after the victim gave birth to a daughter, her in-laws began harassing her, saying their lineage would not continue with a girl child. They allegedly demanded 10–12 crore for their business and a BMW car. The ₹ victim’s father repeatedly visited her in-laws and requested them not to harass her, but their behaviour did not change. 57. From a holistic evaluation of the testimonies of PW-1, PW-2, PW- 3 and PW-4, it becomes clear that the prosecution evidence does not satisfy the statutory requirements of “cruelty” as defined under Section 498-A IPC. Although PW-1 has levelled multiple allegations regarding ill-treatment, demand of money, and physical assault, these statements suffer from significant contradictions, improvements, and lack of corroboration on material particulars. The incidents narrated by PW-1 particularly those alleged to have occurred in Dubai remain unsubstantiated by independent evidence. No documentary evidence, medical record, or contemporaneous complaint has been produced to support the allegations of continuous physical cruelty or dowry- related harassment. The testimonies of PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4 are largely based on what they were told by the victim and therefore amount to hearsay. None of these witnesses claim to have personally witnessed any acts of cruelty. Their depositions do not provide corroborative support of the specific allegations 50 made by PW-1. The alleged monetary demands and threats remain unproved in absence of independent evidence, contemporaneous complaints, or financial records. 58. The compromise dated 12.05.2016 (Ex.D/14-C, Page 468), duly signed by the complainant, her father and the accused persons, clearly demonstrates that the parties had amicably resolved their disputes. The said compromise was executed when the accused persons, except Neha Agrawal, were in judicial custody, and their signatures were obtained inside the jail premises with due permission of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, as reflected from Ex.D/17 (Page 477). In pursuance of the settlement, an amount of Rs.3 Crore and Rs.5 Lakhs was paid through cheques, and security cheques were also handed over by father-in-law of Smt. Neha Agrawal, which stands corroborated from Para 2 and Ex.D/77. Further, the complainant herself filed an affidavit dated 12.05.2016 before the learned Sessions Judge (Ex.D/16, Page 475) affirming the terms of compromise and on the very same date, the learned Sessions Judge, considering the said settlement between the parties, was pleased to grant regular bail to the accused persons, as recorded in Ex.D/17 (Page 477). The sequence of these events clearly reflects the bona fide nature of the compromise and the conscious participation of the complainant and her family therein, moreover, the victim time and again changed her stand for ulterior motive just to bring out case against the appellants with 51 bald allegations without there being any clinching evidence. The said facts are also considered by the trial Court for acquittal of the appellants under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 59. The prosecution also failed to establish any proximate nexus between the alleged acts and a wilful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the victim to grave injury, danger to life, limb, or health, as contemplated under Section 498-A IPC. The broad, omnibus allegations made over a long span of years, unaccompanied by specific dates, consistency, or supporting material, do not satisfy the strict standard of proof required in criminal prosecution. 60. In view of these deficiencies, the trial Court correctly concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the charge under Section 498A IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The appreciation of evidence by the trial Court is neither perverse nor contrary to record. Its finding that the accused were entitled to benefit of doubt is fully justified. Thus, the acquittal of all the accused/appellants of the offence punishable under Section 498A IPC does not warrant interference and is accordingly affirmed. 61. With respect to the charges under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the victim stated that Sunil Agrawal is her father- in-law, Nimish Agrawal her husband, Rekha Agrawal her mother- 52 in-law, and Neha Agrawal her sister-in-law. Her matrimonial home is at 1/45, Nehru Nagar, Bhilai. She was married to Nimish on 16.01.2007 as per social customs. Before the marriage, Rekha and Sunil Agrawal pressured her family, saying they mingled with affluent people and the marriage should be arranged accordingly. Because of this pressure, her father spent beyond his financial capacity. 62. The victim further stated that after the marriage, her husband and in-laws repeatedly asked her to demand her share of her father’s property and continuously sought money from her parental home. She informed her father, who thereafter deposited 2.5 crores ₹ into her husband’s company, L.N.S. Mech., apart from additional amounts later. 63. PW-2, the victim’s father, confirmed that Nimish is his son-in-law, and Sunil and Rekha are his daughter’s parents-in-law. He stated that the marriage was held on 16.01.2007 after a six-month engagement period. During this time, the accused visited their home and showcased their affluence. They insisted that the marriage be held in a grand manner. Accordingly, 150 guests were taken to Delhi, accommodated in a luxury hotel, and the marriage was performed lavishly. 64. PW-2 further stated that after the marriage, the accused’s monetary demands gradually increased. First, he transferred 60 ₹ lakhs to Sunil Agrawal’s bank account. Later, Sunil and Nimish 53 claimed business losses and requested further financial help. He then transferred ₹2.45 crores from his daughter’s savings account to Nimish Agrawal’s account. 65. PW-4, Prakash Parihar, stated that the marriage in 2007 was performed in a grand and royal manner in Delhi. For two to three years thereafter, relations remained cordial. After this period, the victim’s in-laws began demanding large sums of money and assaulted her when she failed to meet the demands. Her father subsequently provided money, although PW-4 did not know the exact amount. 66. On a careful assessment of the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4, it is evident that the prosecution has not proved the essential ingredients of offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The allegations primarily relate to monetary transactions and financial assistance provided by the victim’s father after the marriage. The amounts stated to have been transferred whether 60 lakhs, 2.45 crores, or 2.5 crores ₹ ₹ ₹ are admitted by the prosecution witnesses themselves to have been given towards business requirements or financial losses of the accused, and not as consideration for the marriage. There is no cogent evidence showing that any money, property, or valuable security was demanded or given as dowry at, before, or in connection with the marriage. The alleged demands before marriage regarding arranging a grand ceremony relate only to the manner of celebration and do not constitute a dowry demand 54 within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. Further, the prosecution has not produced any independent evidence to show that unlawful demands were made as a condition for the marriage or that any threat or coercion accompanied such demands. The testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 reveal general allegations of financial pressure after the marriage, but these do not satisfy the strict statutory requirements for proving offences under Sections 3 and 4. The monetary help extended by PW-2 appears voluntary and in response to claimed business losses, which falls outside the ambit of dowry. PW-4’s evidence is merely hearsay and does not advance the prosecution case. 67. In view of these material deficiencies, the trial Court correctly held that the prosecution failed to establish dowry demand beyond reasonable doubt. The finding of acquittal is based on a proper appreciation of evidence and warrants no interference. Thus, the acquittal of the accused/appellants under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is also affirmed. 68. From perusal of the record it transpires that accused Sunil Agrawal (father-in-law) and Smt. Rekha Agrawal are aged about 75 and 72 years old persons and have already undergone a total period of 6 days incarceration and accused Nimish Agrawal has already undergone total period of 136 days i.e. 4 months and 16 days of incarceration. 69. As a fallout and consequences of the aforesaid legal analysis, 55 CRA No. 68 of 2024 so far as it relates to Smt. Neha Agrawal (sister-in-law) of the victim Smt. Ruhi Agrawal is concerned, the same is hereby allowed and she is acquitted of the charge under Section 323 of IPC and so far as it relates to Smt. Rekha Agrawal (mother-in-law) is concerned, the same is partly allowed. Her conviction under Section 323 of IPC is hereby affirmed, however, considering her age and the period of incarceration undergone by her, the sentence awarded to her by the trial Court is altered to the period already undergone by her. 70. CRA No. 90 of 2024 filed of behalf Sunil Agrawal, father-in-law of the victim Smt. Ruhi Agrawal is also partly allowed. His conviction under Section 323 of IPC is hereby affirmed, however, considering his age and the period of incarceration undergone by him, the sentence awarded to him by the trial Court is altered to the period already undergone by him. 71. CRA No. 116 of 2024 filed of behalf Nimish Agrawal, husband of the victim Smt. Ruhi Agrawal is also partly allowed. His conviction and sentence under Section 377 of IPC is hereby set aside, however his conviction under Section 323 of IPC is hereby affirmed and considering the period of incarceration undergone by him, the sentence awarded to him by the trial Court under Section 323 of IPC is altered to the period already undergone by him. 72. The appellants/accused are reported to be on bail. They need not 56 surrender, however, keeping in view the provision of Section 437- A of the Cr.P.C. {Section 481 of the BNSS}, their bail bonds shall remain effective for a period of six months from today. 73. Consequently, ACQA No.68 of 2024 and ACQA No.113 of 2024 filed on behalf of victim Smt. Ruhi Agrawal are hereby dismissed. 74. Registry is directed to transmit the record of the trial Court along with a copy of this order to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra