Page No.# 1/11 GAHC010012042013 2025:GAU-AS:12966 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Crl.Rev.P./411/2013 BIRGURAM PANGING S/O SHRI DEVA KT. PANGING R/O VILL- NO.2, ROYENG BALIJAN, P.S. JONAI, DIST. DHEMAJI, ASSAM. VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM Advocate for the Petitioner : MR.P D NAIR, MR G ALAM,MR.H ROHMAN,MS.S GOGOI Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM, ,, Page No.# 2/11 BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR ORDER Date : 17.09.2025 Heard Mr. G. Alam, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. B. Sharma, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 2. The petitioner by way of instituting the present revision petition has assailed the Judgment dated 24.07.2013, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dhemaji, in Criminal Appeal No.6(1)/2013, upholding the Judgment dated 19-01-2013, passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate(M), Jonai, in G.R. Case No.164/2010, convicting the petitioner, herein, under provisions of Section 279 IPC and Section 304-A IPC, along with the sentencing so ordered by the learned Trial Court. 3. The prosecution case in brief is that one, Lakhi Taye, on 31-12- 2010, lodged an FIR with the Jonai P.S, inter alia, alleging therein, that on 30.12.2010, at about 7.30 p.m near Nepali Basti Tini Ali, when the informant’s eldest son Magharsing Taye, was coming along the NH-52, an Ambulance Vehicle bearing Registration No.AS-01-AD-7114, belonging to the Health Department, Government of Assam, which was driven rashly and negligently, had knocked the informant’s son as a result of which he succumbed to injuries. It was also alleged in the FIR, that the driver of the offending vehicle had fled away from the scene with the offended vehicle after the accident had occasioned. On receipt of the said FIR, police registered Jonai P.S. Case No.164/2010 under Section 279/304-A IPC. On conclusion of the investigation, the police laid a charge-sheet against the petitioner, herein, under Section 279/304-A IPC. Page No.# 3/11 4. The Trial Court thereafter framed a charge against the petitioner, herein, under Section 279/304A of IPC and the same being read over and explained to him, the petitioner however, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried, accordingly a Trial ensued in the matter. 5. The prosecution during the Trial examined 7(seven) witnesses and thereafter, the statement of the petitioner, herein, was recorded under Section 313 CrPC. On conclusion of the Trial, the learned Trial Court on appreciation of the evidence coming on record proceeded vide Judgment dated 19.01.2013, to convict the petitioner, herein, under Section 279/304-A IPC. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court sentenced the petitioner, herein, under Section 279 IPC to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for 6(six) months along with payment of fine of Rs.1000/-(Rupees One Thousand) only in default to suffer further Rigorous Imprisonment for 1(one) month and with regard to the offence under Section 304-A IPC, the petitioner was sentenced to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for 2(two) years along with payment of fine of Rs.5000/-(Rupees Five Thousand) in default to suffer further Rigorous Imprisonment for 3(three) months. Being aggrieved by his conviction by the learned Trial Court, the petitioner assailed the Judgment dated 19.01.2013, passed by the learned Trial Court before the Court of Sessions Judge, Dhemaji, by way of instituting an appeal being Criminal Appeal No.6(1)/2013. The Appellate Court upon appreciating the evidences coming on record was pleased by Judgment dated 24.07.2013, to uphold the conviction of the appellant, herein, and the appeal came to be dismissed on contest. Being aggrieved, the petitioner had instituted the present proceedings. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the materials available on record. 7. This Court for appreciating the submissions made by the learned Page No.# 4/11 counsel for the parties has minutely perused the depositions of the witnesses during the Trial of the matter. This Court finds that the PW-2 who is an witness had deposed that the offending vehicle i.e a medical ambulance had come from the opposite direction and hit the victim and had dragged him for a far distance. It is also on record that the offending vehicle was coming on the wrong side and was at high speed. PW-2 also deposed that the vehicle was being driven in a high speed and the driver of the vehicle had fled from the place along with the vehicle after the accident. He further deposed that the offending vehicle was found at the hospital when they had taken the victim therein, and name of the driver of the vehicle was known at that point of time. The damage found in the offending vehicle was also brought on record by the said witness. He also deposed that the vehicle was being driven at high speed, rashly and negligently, by the driver of the same. The learned Trial Court basing on the said evidences as well as evidences of the other witnesses proceeded to draw the following conclusions ; “22. Now, having perused the entire evidence on record, it appears that P.W. 1, who is father of the deceased, Magharsing Taye, deposed in his evidence that his son died in vehicular accident which is supported and proved by Medical evidence. From the evidence of P.W.2, it appears that when he, the deceased and other was proceeding towards their respective house after taking heat of fire near the place of occurrence, a Medical Ambulance coming from the opposite direction of the deceased, who was going along with his bicycle, hit/knocked him and dragged him to a far distance. He also deposed that when the offended vehicle hit the Page No.# 5/11 cyclist, a big sound was heard. He also deposed that they picked up the injured and took him to hospital and in hospital, he saw the offended vehicle and then he noticed that the head light of the vehicle was found broken. It means the evidence of P.W.2 is found believable because when a vehicle hit a man or an object by its front side then naturally some damage is/are noticed in its front side, viz, breaking of head light, damage of bonnet, etc. Moreover, official witness, that is, P.W.5, who examined the said offended vehicle clearly stated in his report and evidence that after examining the vehicle, he found that the Bonnet, Front grill and Front bumper of the offended vehicle were damaged. So, it is proved that the Medical Ambulance (Tata Sumo) of Jonai C.H.C. bearing registration no. AS-01- AD-7114 is the vehicle who hit the deceased, Magharsing Taye. It is relevant to note that it is not in dispute that the offended vehicle is not the Ambulance of Jonai of Jonai C.H.C. Be it also noted that P.W.5 in his report (Ext.-5) also in filling up the particulars in Ext.-5 stated that the name of driver is Sri Birguram Panging, that is, the present accused person whose Driving license was seized by the 1.0. which are not disputed or challenged in the case. Be it further noted that P.W.2 clearly stated that after causing the accident, the offended vehicle did not stop at the place of occurrence and the same escaped from the scene. But when the deceased was taken to Jonai C.H.C., just after the occurrence, P.W.2 found the said offerided vehicle which was parked in the garage of the Jonai C.H.C. So, it is clearly proved that the accused person being the driver of the said offended vehicle having caused the accident escaped from the scene and soon after that placed/parked Page No.# 6/11 the vehicle in the Jonai C.H.C. It is worth relevant to note here that P.W.3 has identified the accused person in the dock. Hence, from the attending facts and admitted position, I am constrained to hold that it clearly appears that the accused/driver at the relevant time of occurrence drove the offended vehicle. In view of my such findings, I am with respectful disagreement with the learned defence counsel in respect of his citation of 2001 Crl. L.J. 3762 (CHH) wherein it was inter alia held that the identity of the accused/wrong doer/driver of the vehicle is not established. But in the present case, it is established that it is the accused person who drove the offended vehicle at the relevant time of occurrence. And hence, the case law cited is found not befitted in the present facts and circumstances of the case… 26. Now, what I find it appropriate to say that in the present case, P.W5 opined in his report (Ext.-2) that the cause of accident is due to brake fail. Be it noted that an expert may be true in many points but not in all points and even his opinion may not be sustainable under law. Let me clear the point which is noticed in the present case. In the present case, it is admitted fact of both the parties that soon after the accident, the offended vehicle escaped from the scene and after some time, that is, soon after the accident, when the deceased was taken to the Jonai C.H.C. without any delay to save his life, P.W.2 saw the offended vehicle in the garage of Jonai C.H.C. Now, if it be so, then it can safely be said that if the brake of a vehicle is failed, then it can never be driven to its destination, and the question of parking the vehicle in its garage does not arise. Page No.# 7/11 And it would be possible if the condition of the engine and the brake of the said vehicle is/are in good condition. So, it is crystal-clear that the opinion of P.W.5 that the cause of accident is due to brake fail of the vehicle is found not believable. Moreover, there is no evidence of defence side that soon after the accident, the offended vehicle was attended by a mechanic to remove the defect of the vehicle. Hence, I do not believe that the cause of accident was due to brake fail of the vehicle. Accordingly, I am of the firm opinion that the plea taken by the defence, that if the accident takes place due to mechanical defect of the vehicle thert the accused/driver can not be convicted u/s 279 and 304(A) of 1.P.C., is found not legally tenable in the present case. 27. From the above discussions coupled with my reasons, it clearly appears that the fact of prosecution and the evidence in record and the admitted position in the case clearly go to show that the case of prosecution is true. It clearly appears that the evidence of P.Ws. are corroborative and supportive to one another and I found no lacuna to disbelieve the sworn testimony of the P.Ws., further I have found that the evidence and materials on record have clearly created the chain of prosecution version which clearly shows the guilt of the accused person to convict him u/s 279/304(A) of I.P.C. Because the accused person at the relevant time failed to exercise due care and caution and took the high risk in passing along the road ignoring the deceased who was coming from his opposite direction, in spite of good condition of the light, steering, engine, brake, etc. of the vehicle and in spite of Page No.# 8/11 the scene that there was other object or man or passer present at the place of occurrence. Now, so far negligence is concerned, I would like to add that- Negligence in common parlance means and implies "failure to exercise due care, expected of a reasonable and prudent person." I am, therefore, constrained to hold that I have no hesitation to hold that the death of Maharsing Taye was caused out of the vehicular accident which was rash and negligent act of the accused person as stated by the prosecution. In the present case, the accused person having seen the deceased on the road, neither reduced its speed, nor control its driving nor exercise its prudence to save the life of the deceased, which was dangerous and opposed to deliberate act, as a result of which the deceased was knocked down and was dragged on the road almost 25 feet away. It means the accused person failed to exercise due care and caution in order to avoid fateful injury to Magharsing Taye, who subsequently succumbed to injuries. So, from the circumstances and the clear evidence of P.Ws. and the admitted position in the case, I am constrained to hold that it can safely be said that driving of the offended Ambulance (Tata Sumo) by the accused person on the very road was rash and negligent which caused the death of Magharsing Taye. I, therefore, agree with the learned Asstt. P.P. and hold that the accused person committed the offence u/s 279/304(A) of I.P.C.” 8. Basing on the said conclusions the learned Trial Court proceeded to convict the petitioner under Section 279/304-A IPC. 9. I have perused the evidences coming on record as well as the Page No.# 9/11 conclusions drawn thereon, by the learned Trial Court and find that the conclusion so drawn are supported by the evidences coming on record. The rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by the petitioner, herein, is brought on record and the same is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the conviction of the petitioner, herein, under Section 279/304-A IPC would not mandate any interference. 10. This Court having drawn the said conclusion, has then perused the Judgment dated 24.07.2013, passed by the Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No.6(1)/2013. On perusal of the conclusion drawn by the learned Appellate Court, this Court finds that the same to have been so drawn on a due and proper appreciation on the evidences coming on record. Accordingly, this Court finds no infirmity with the conclusion drawn by the Appellate Court in the matter and accordingly, is of the considered view that the Judgment dated 24.07.2013, would also not mandate any interference. This Court also notices that the petitioner, herein, during his examination under Section 313 CrPC had admitted to the fact that at the time of occurrence of the accident he was driving the offending vehicle i.e the medical ambulance. 11. Having drawn the said conclusions, this Court notices that the incident had occasioned on 30.12.2010. More than about 15(fifteen) years have elapsed, since the occurrence of the said incident. The material brought on record does not disclose that the petitioner, herein, was involved in a commission of similar offence prior to 30.12.2010 and/or committed a similar offence, thereafter. The learned Trial Court considering the nature of the offence committed by the petitioner, herein, had refused to extend to him benefits under the provision of Probation of Offenders Acts, 1958. 12. It is a settled position of law that while exercising the discretionary Page No.# 10/11 power under the Act, 1958, the Courts are to consider the circumstances of the case, nature of the offence and the character of offender. It is also settled that while considering the nature of the offence, the Court is to take a realistic view of the gravity of the offence, the impact which the offence had on the victim. It is also to be noted that the discretionary power under the provision of the Act of 1958, is also permissible to be exercised by the Court even at the appellate or the revisional stage and also by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while hearing an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 13. In the backdrop of the above settled position of law, this Court finds that the offence in the matter was committed on 30.12.2010. Long 15(fifteen) years have lapsed since the date of commission of offence by the petitioner, herein. The materials brought on record does not reveal that the petitioner was involved in commission of a similar offence prior to the one so committed by him on 30.12.2010, and/or that he had, thereafter, committed an offence of a similar nature. 14. The petitioner is found to have been litigating the matter since the last 15(fifteen) years initially before the Trial Court, thereafter before the Appellate Court and presently in the proceedings of the instant revision petition before this Court. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the present is a fit case, wherein, the petitioner is entitled to be extended with the benefit of the provision of the Act of 1958. 15. Accordingly, for the reasons noticed, hereinabove, it is directed that the petitioner be given the benefits of provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and accordingly, the sentence is modified to that effect, and it is provided that instead of sending the petitioner to jail, he be extended the benefit under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. However, the fine as imposed upon the petitioner by the learned Trial Court and in default of payment of the same, the direction to Page No.# 11/11 undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 1(one) month for the commission of offence under Section 279 IPC and to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for 3(three) months for the offence committed under Section 304-A, is not however, interfered with. 16. In view of the above discussions, it is directed that the petitioner, herein, will file 2(two) sureties to the tune of Rs.20,000/-(Rupees Twenty Thousand)each, along with a personal bond before the learned Trial Court i.e. the Court of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate(M), Jonai, and undertake, to the effect that the petitioner shall maintain peace and good behavior during the period of 1(one) year from today. The aforesaid bond be filed by the petitioner within a period of 1(one) month from today, along with the deposit of the fine amount as imposed by the learned Trial Court vide the Judgment and Order dated 19.01.2013. 17. With the above observations and directions, the present Criminal Revision Petition stands disposed of. 18. Send down the records of the case to the Trial Court along with a copy of this order for information and necessary action. JUDGE Comparing Assistant