ORDER : 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant-wife, being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 27.07.2022 (Annexure A/1), passed by the Learned Principal Judge, Family Court, District Durg (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 720/2016, whereby the Trial Court granted a decree of divorce in favor of the respondent, pursuant to the application filed under Section 13(1)(i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 2. In this case, it is an admitted fact that after the marriage was solemnized as per Hindu customs on 20.04.1978 in village Manjan, Tehsil Manuganj, District Rewa, Madhya Pradesh, the parties lived their marital life by staying at the non-applicant's workplace, village Kapsi, District Kanker. The children of the applicant and the non-applicant are Manoj Kumar, Preeti and Roshni. On 05.12.1995, when the non-applicant got a job in Bhilai Steel Plant, both the parties started living together in Bhilai. 3. It is also an admitted fact that the applicant receives a maintenance amount of Rs. 4,500 deducted from the non-applicant's salary. The non-applicant married his daughter, Preeti, on 1 December 2014. The applicant's son, Manoj, married an intercaste woman in 2015 and is living separately from his wife. The non-applicant and her daughter, Roshni, have filed a MJC No. 890/2016 for maintenance against the applicant. 4. Facts of the present case, in brevity, is that the The non-applicant filed an application under Section 13(1)(i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, seeking a decree of divorce from the appellant-wife. It is averred that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 20.04.1978 at Village Manjan, Tahsil Mauganj, District Rewa (M.P.), according to Hindu rites and rituals. Following the marriage, the appellant joined the respondent at his workplace in Village Kapsi, District Kanker (C.G.), where she fulfilled her matrimonial obligations. 5. The parties were blessed with three children: two daughters and one son, namely Manoj, Preeti, and Roshni. Subsequently, on 05.12.1995, when the respondent secured employment at Bhilai Steel Plant, the family shifted residence to Sector-5, Bhilai. It is an admitted fact that the elder daughter was duly married and moved to her matrimonial home, and the son also solemnized his marriage in 2015. At present, the younger daughter, Roshni, resides with the appellant. 6. The appellant alleges that the non-applicant subjected her to physical cruelty and habitual verbal abuse. It is an admitted fact that the elder daughter was duly married and moved to her matrimonial home, and the son also solemnized his marriage in 2015. At present, the younger daughter, Roshni, resides with the appellant. 6. The appellant alleges that the non-applicant subjected her to physical cruelty and habitual verbal abuse. She contends that, as a result of ongoing ill-treatment and denial of basic necessities including food and other essential household items, she approached the mediation center at Bhilai Steel Plant for relief. 7. Consequent thereto, the department directed the respondent to pay maintenance to the appellant at the rate of Rs. 4,500/- per month. Despite this, after the house was allotted in the name of the non-applicant, he constructed an additional room and confined the appellant therein, further withholding maintenance and proper sustenance. Aggrieved, the appellant initiated a maintenance proceeding against the respondent, which was eventually withdrawn upon compromise. 8. Additionally, the respondent filed a false complaint against the appellant at Police Station Bhilai Bhatti, registered as Crime No. 626/2016, which is prima facie a bailable offense. Despite these hardships, the appellant attempted to sustain the matrimonial relationship. The Family Court, upon framing two issues—whether cruelty was inflicted by the respondent and whether the period of desertion had elapsed—heard both parties and subsequently passed the judgment and decree granting divorce in favor of the respondent. Hence, the present appeal has been filed by the appellant-wife challenging the said judgment and decree. 9. Learned Family Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence, the application for divorce filed by the present appellant- wife under Section 13 (1) (i-a) (i-b) of Hindu Marriage Act, and the said application was allowed by the trial Court. 10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the Learned Family Court framed the issue whether cruelty was inflicted upon the non-applicant/respondent and proceeded to grant the decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. This is erroneous, as it is an admitted fact that the non-applicant himself filed an FIR, exhibited as Document No.1 dated 04.03.2016, which clearly states that the complaint was lodged under Section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that he was advised to approach the competent civil court. Furthermore, the non- applicant instituted a false complaint against the appellant and her daughter. Furthermore, the non- applicant instituted a false complaint against the appellant and her daughter. The complaint clearly records that the appellant’s daughter, following a domestic dispute, allegedly bit the non-applicant, and the appellant’s name was included in the FIR without any credible evidence implicating her in the alleged assault. The Learned Family Court failed to consider these material facts in its judgment. 11. Additionally, the non-applicant admitted in his evidence that the marriage was solemnized on 20.04.1978 and that three children were born from the wedlock. He further conceded that he was paying the appellant a sum of Rs. 9,000/- per month, not out of obligation but because he did not wish to cohabit with her. It is also an undisputed fact that the non-applicant’s son left the matrimonial home due to the respondent’s ill-treatment. Despite these admissions, the Court granted a decree of divorce in favor of the non-applicant, which is unjust. 12. Further avers that the non-applicant himself admitted that since 2010 he had not made any complaint against the appellant, and it was only upon police advice that separation was suggested. Moreover, the sole witness produced by the non-applicant, namely Kedarnath, deposed that the appellant subjected the non- applicant to ill-treatment and used filthy language. However, the witness failed to substantiate these allegations during cross- examination. The Learned Family Court erred in overlooking this lacuna and in passing the decree of divorce against the appellant. 13. He goes on to submit that the appellant adduced detailed evidence before the Learned Family Court, providing comprehensive replies to each allegation made by the non- applicant. During the course of deposition, the Amicus Curiae focused exclusively on the issue of maintenance, without raising any question regarding cruelty or desertion. This indicates that the appellant had sufficiently established her defense on these grounds, which the Learned Family Court unjustly disregarded. 14. Granting a decree of divorce to the non-applicant would be oppressive and harsh to the appellant. The non-applicant, having had the house allotted to him by the Bhilai Steel Plant in his name, is likely to evict the appellant, rendering her homeless with no alternative residence. 15. The non-applicant voluntarily left the matrimonial home, as described in the cause title, thereby subjecting the appellant to cruelty. He vacated the house on 28.02.2017 and took possession of a new residence in his name at Sector-1, Bhilai. 15. The non-applicant voluntarily left the matrimonial home, as described in the cause title, thereby subjecting the appellant to cruelty. He vacated the house on 28.02.2017 and took possession of a new residence in his name at Sector-1, Bhilai. These facts clearly demonstrate that the non-applicant is not entitled to a decree of divorce on the grounds alleged. 16. Lastly, he continues to aver that the Learned Family Court also failed to appreciate that under Hindu rites and customs, it is the husband’s solemn duty to maintain his wife. Despite this, the Court did not grant any alimony or maintenance to the appellant, which is manifestly harsh and unjust, especially considering the appellant’s vulnerable position with no one to care for her. In view of the foregoing, the impugned order passed by the Learned Family Court, whereby the application for divorce filed by the non- applicant has been allowed, is bad in law, illegal, arbitrary, perverse, and contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case and applicable legal principles, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the Learned Family Court be set aside, and the appeal be allowed with costs. 17. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent-husband respectfully denies all allegations leveled against him by the appellant-wife and it is respectfully submitted that the applicant has, since the year 1987, continuously subjected the non- applicant to mental cruelty by engaging in frequent quarrels over trivial matters, refusing to perform basic household duties such as cooking, and using abusive language. Despite this conduct, the non-applicant remained hopeful that the applicant would amend her behavior and continued to cohabit with her in the interest of maintaining the matrimonial bond. However, the situation deteriorated to the extent that, in June 2009, the non-applicant was compelled to seek intervention from the Counseling Department of Bhilai Steel Plant. A settlement was reached whereby the non-applicant agreed to provide a maintenance allowance of Rs. 4,500/- per month to the applicant through salary deductions and also undertook full responsibility for the children's education. Despite these efforts, the applicant persisted in her hostile conduct, and since July 2010, the non-applicant has been compelled to live in a separate room within the same house due to the applicant’s incessant quarrels, verbal abuse, and public humiliation, including summoning relatives and outsiders to the matrimonial home to insult the non-applicant. 18. Despite these efforts, the applicant persisted in her hostile conduct, and since July 2010, the non-applicant has been compelled to live in a separate room within the same house due to the applicant’s incessant quarrels, verbal abuse, and public humiliation, including summoning relatives and outsiders to the matrimonial home to insult the non-applicant. 18. Furthermore, it is submitted that the applicant, along with her children Manoj and Roshni, physically assaulted the non-applicant on multiple occasions. The non-applicant lodged repeated complaints—three at the Bhilai Bhatti Police Station and four at the Bhilai Nagar Police Station—culminating in registration of Crime No. 626/2016 under Sections 323, 506B, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the applicant and daughter Roshni. Despite several attempts made by the non-applicant to reconcile and resume cohabitation, the applicant categorically refused to live with him without any valid justification since 09.07.2009. The parties have since ceased all conjugal relations and have been residing separately within the same premises. On 28.02.2017, the applicant, along with daughter Roshni and son Manoj, forcibly evicted the non-applicant from the house after a violent altercation and retained possession of his personal belongings. Since then, the non-applicant has been residing alone and continues to face threats to his life from the applicant and her children. In light of the continued cruelty, physical violence, desertion, and apprehension of danger to his life, the decree of divorce granted by the Learned Family Court is just, proper, and in accordance with law. The present petition is thus founded on false and frivolous grounds. In view of the above, the respondent prays that this Court dismiss the appeal and uphold the judgment passed by the learned Family Court. 19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 20. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the marriage between the applicant and the non-applicant was solemnized on 20.04.1978 at Village Manjan, Tehsil Mauganj, District Rewa, Madhya Pradesh, according to Hindu rites and customs. After the marriage, the couple resided at the non-applicant’s place of work in Village Kapsi, District Kanker, Chhattisgarh, where they cohabited and led a marital life. Out of the said wedlock, three children were born, namely, Manoj Kumar, Preeti, and Roshni. Subsequently, on 05.12.1995, upon the non-applicant’s employment with the Bhilai Steel Plant, both parties began residing together in Bhilai. After the marriage, the couple resided at the non-applicant’s place of work in Village Kapsi, District Kanker, Chhattisgarh, where they cohabited and led a marital life. Out of the said wedlock, three children were born, namely, Manoj Kumar, Preeti, and Roshni. Subsequently, on 05.12.1995, upon the non-applicant’s employment with the Bhilai Steel Plant, both parties began residing together in Bhilai. It is also undisputed that the applicant currently receives a monthly maintenance of Rs. 4,500, which is deducted directly from the non-applicant’s salary pursuant to an internal arrangement following marital discord. Furthermore, it is on record that the non-applicant solemnized the marriage of their daughter Preeti on 01.12.2014, while their son Manoj entered into an inter-caste marriage in 2015 and is now residing separately from his wife. Additionally, the non-applicant and daughter Roshni have filed Maintenance Case No. MJC 890/2016 against the applicant, further reflecting the extent of familial discord between the parties. 21. It is evident from the record that the wife and daughter are receiving maintenance of Rs. 9,000/- per month. The evidence further establishes that the plaintiff wife is residing in the quarter allotted to the respondent husband, namely Quarter No. 4/C, Sector 5, Bhilai, Chhattisgarh. From the testimonies of the parties, it appears that the wife and husband have been living separately since July 2010. 22. In reference to the cruelty the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of V. Bhagat Vs. D. Bhagat , (1994) 1 SCC 337 , Suman Kapur Vs. Sudhir Kapur , (2009) 1 SCC 422 and lastly in the matter of Joydeep Majumdar Vs. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar , (2021) 3 SCC 742 and relevant paragraphs as under :- V. Bhagat (supra) “12. Clause (i-a) of Section 13 specifies cruelty as one of the grounds of divorce. Insofar as relevant, Section 13 reads: “13. Divorce.— (1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party— * * * (i-a) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty.” 14. The change of law brought about by the Hindu Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 deserves notice. Prior to the said Amendment Act, cruelty was not a ground for claiming divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. The change of law brought about by the Hindu Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 deserves notice. Prior to the said Amendment Act, cruelty was not a ground for claiming divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. It was a ground only for claiming judicial separation under Section 10. By the said Amendment Act, cruelty was made a ground for divorce as well — evidently in recognition of the changing mores of the society. While doing so, it is significant, the words “as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party,” qualifying the expression “cruelty” in Section 10(1)(b), were omitted by Parliament. It is, therefore, not necessary for the party claiming divorce to prove that the cruel treatment is of such a nature as to cause an apprehension — a reasonable apprehension — in his/her mind that it will be harmful or injurious for him/her to live with the other party. Now what does this change mean? Surely, the deletion of the said words could not have been without a purpose. The cruelty of the nature described in Section 10(1)(b) has been explained in this Court's decision in N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326 : AIR 1975 SC 1534 . Chandrachud, J. speaking for the Bench, held that where an allegation of cruelty is made, the enquiry has to be — “… whether the conduct charged as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent”. The learned Judge held further: (SCC pp. 337-38, paras 30-31) “It is not necessary, as under the English law, that the cruelty must be of such a character as to cause ‘danger’ to life, limb or health or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. Clearly, danger to life, limb or health or a reasonable apprehension of it is a higher requirement than a reasonable apprehension that it is harmful or injurious for one spouse to live with the other. … But under Section 10(1)(b), harm or injury to health, reputation, the working-career or the like, would be an important consideration in determining whether the conduct of the respondent amounts to cruelty. … But under Section 10(1)(b), harm or injury to health, reputation, the working-career or the like, would be an important consideration in determining whether the conduct of the respondent amounts to cruelty. Plainly, what we must determine is not whether the petitioner has proved the charge of cruelty having regard to the principles of English law, but whether the petitioner proves that the respondent has treated him with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent.” This requirement is no longer present in Section 13(1)(i-a). 15. If so, the question arises what kind of cruel treatment does clause (i-a) contemplate? In particular, what is the kind of mental cruelty that is required to be established? While answering these questions, it must be kept in mind that the cruelty mentioned in clause (i-a) is a ground now for divorce as well as for judicial separation under Section 10. Another circumstance to be kept in mind is that even where the marriage has irretrievably broken down, the Act, even after the 1976 (Amendment) Act, does not permit dissolution of marriage on that ground. This circumstance may have to be kept in mind while ascertaining the type of cruelty contemplated by Section 13(1)(i-a). 16. Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(i-a) can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made. 17. At this stage, we may refer to a few decisions of this Court rendered under Section 13(1)(i-a). In Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 60, Justice K. Jagannatha Shetty, speaking for the Division Bench, held: (SCC pp. 108-09, paras 4 and 5) “Section 13(1)(i-a) uses the words ‘treated the petitioner with cruelty’. The word ‘cruelty’ has not been defined. Indeed it could not have been defined. It has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical the court will have no problem to determine it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental the problem presents difficulty. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment. Second, the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties. It would be better if we keep aside our customs and manners. It would be also better if we less depend upon precedents. Because as Lord Denning said in Sheldon v. Sheldon, (1966) 2 All ER 257, 259 : (1966) 2 WLR 993 ‘the categories of cruelty are not closed’. Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon the human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty.” It was a case where the wife was a postgraduate in biological sciences while the husband was a doctor. The wife moved the court for divorce on the ground of cruelty. According to her, she had an amount of Rupees two lakhs in fixed deposit in a bank apart from a house property, that her mother-in-law used to make constant demands of money, and that the respondent-husband supported his mother therein. She did not report the same to her parents because she was afraid that if she informed her parents, something may be done to her. She did not report the same to her parents because she was afraid that if she informed her parents, something may be done to her. The respondent-husband himself admitted in a letter written to the wife that the demand for dowry by his parents was nothing wrong. On the above facts, it was held that the ground of cruelty was established and divorce was granted. The following further observations of Shetty, J. appear to us relevant: (SCC pp. 114-15, para 18) “Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that the party has after solemnization of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty. What do these words mean? What should be the nature of cruelty? Should it be only intentional, wilful or deliberate? Is it necessary to prove the intention in matrimonial offence? We think not. We have earlier said that cruelty may be of any kind and any variety. It may be different in different cases. It is in relation to the conduct of parties to a marriage. That conduct which is complained of as cruelty by one spouse may not be so for the other spouse. There may be instances of cruelty by the unintentional but inexcusable conduct of any party. The cruel treatment may also result by the cultural conflict of the spouse. In such cases, even if the act of cruelty is established, the intention to commit suicide cannot be established. The aggrieved party may not get relief. We do not think that that was the intention with which the Parliament enacted Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The context and the set up in which the word ‘cruelty’ has been used in the section, seems to us, that intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. That word has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in matrimonial affairs. If the intention to harm, harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained of, cruelty could be easily established. But the absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment.” 18. But the absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment.” 18. In Chanderkala Trivedi v. Dr S.P. Trivedi, (1993) 4 SCC 232 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 1154 : (1993) 3 Scale 541 the husband sued for divorce on the ground of cruelty by wife. The wife filed a written statement wherein she attributed adultery to the husband. In reply thereto the husband put forward another allegation against the wife that she was having undesirable association with young boys. Considering the mutual allegations, R.M. Sahai, J. speaking for Division Bench, observed: (SCC p. 233, para 2) “Whether the allegation of the husband that she was in the habit of associating with young boys and the findings recorded by the three courts are correct or not but what is certain is that once such allegations are made by the husband and wife as have been made in this case then it is obvious that the marriage of the two cannot in any circumstance be continued any further. The marriage appears to be practically dead as from cruelty alleged by the husband it has turned out to be at least intimacy of the husband with a lady doctor and unbecoming conduct of a Hindu wife.” 19. It was argued on behalf of the husband that the wife has failed to establish the charge of adultery levelled against him and that the charge of adultery must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dealing with the argument, the learned Judge observed: (SCC pp. 233-34, para 3) “But we do not propose to examine it as we are satisfied that the marriage is dead and the findings of fact cannot be set aside by this Court except that the appeal can be sent back to the Division Bench to decide it again which would mean another exercise in futility leading to tortuous litigation and continued agony of the parties.” In Suman Kapur (supra) 28. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides for grant of divorce in certain cases. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides for grant of divorce in certain cases. It enacts that any marriage solemnised whether before or after the commencement of the Act may be dissolved on a petition presented either by the husband or by the wife on any of the grounds specified therein. Clause (i-a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 declares that a decree of divorce may be passed by a court on the ground that after the solemnisation of marriage, the opposite party has treated the petitioner with cruelty. 29. Now, it is well settled that the expression “cruelty” includes both (i) physical cruelty; and (ii) mental cruelty. The parties in this connection, invited our attention to English as well as Indian authorities. We will refer to some of them. 30. The concept of cruelty has been dealt with in Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. 13, 4th Edn., Para 1269) as under: “1269. … The general rule in all cases of cruelty is that the entire matrimonial relationship must be considered, and that rule is of special value when the cruelty consists not of violent acts but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations or taunts. In cases where no violence is averred, it is undesirable to consider judicial pronouncements with a view to creating certain categories of acts or conduct as having or lacking the nature or quality which renders them capable or incapable in all circumstances of amounting to cruelty; for it is the effect of the conduct rather than its nature which is of paramount importance in assessing a complaint of cruelty. Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact and previously decided cases have little, if any, value. The court should bear in mind the physical and mental condition of the parties as well as their social status, and should consider the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other, weighing all incidents and quarrels between the spouses from that point of view; further, the conduct alleged must be examined in the light of the complainant's capacity for endurance and the extent to which that capacity is known to the other spouse.” 32. Lord Pearce also made similar observations: (All ER p. 992 B-C) “… It is impossible to give a comprehensive definition of cruelty, but when reprehensible conduct or departure from the normal standards of conjugal kindness causes injury to health or an apprehension of it, it is, I think, cruelty if a reasonable person, after taking due account of the temperament and all the other particular circumstances would consider that the conduct complained of is such that this spouse should not be called on to endure it.” [See also Russell v. Russell, 1897 AC 395 : (1895-99) All ER Rep 1 (HL)] 33. The test of cruelty has been laid down by this Court in the leading case of N.G. Dastane (Dr.) v. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326 thus: (SCC p. 337, para 30) “30. … The inquiry therefore has to be whether the conduct charged as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent.” 34. In Sirajmohmedkhan Janmohamadkhan v. Hafizunnisa Yasinkhan, (1981) 4 SCC 250 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 829 this Court stated that the concept of legal cruelty changes according to the changes and advancement of social concept and standards of living. It was further stated that to establish legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. Continuous cessation of marital intercourse or total indifference on the part of the husband towards marital obligations would lead to legal cruelty. 35. In Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 60 this Court examined the concept of cruelty. It was observed that the term “cruelty” has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act. It has been used in Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act in the context of human conduct and behaviour in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties or obligations. It is a course of conduct of one spouse which adversely affects the other spouse. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, it is a question of degree which is relevant. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment and then as to the impact of such treatment on the mind of the other spouse. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, it is a question of degree which is relevant. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment and then as to the impact of such treatment on the mind of the other spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other, ultimately, is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. 36. There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. The absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. Mens rea is not a necessary element in cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment. 38. This Court in Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devi, (2001) 4 SCC 250 stated: (SCC pp. 258-59, para 14) “14. Matrimonial matters are matters of delicate human and emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect, love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable adjustments with the spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. The matrimonial conduct has now come to be governed by statute framed, keeping in view such norms and changed social order. It is sought to be controlled in the interest of the individuals as well as in broader perspective, for regulating matrimonial norms for making of a well-knit, healthy and not a disturbed and porous society. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and role to play in the society, in general. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply any submission of ‘irretrievably broken marriage’ as a straitjacket formula for grant of relief of divorce. This aspect has to be considered in the background of the other facts and circumstances of the case.” 39. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and role to play in the society, in general. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply any submission of ‘irretrievably broken marriage’ as a straitjacket formula for grant of relief of divorce. This aspect has to be considered in the background of the other facts and circumstances of the case.” 39. Mental cruelty has also been examined by this Court in Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, (2002) 5 SCC 706 thus: (SCC pp. 716-17, para 21) “21. Cruelty for the purpose of Section 13(1)(i-a) is to be taken as a behaviour by one spouse towards the other, which causes reasonable apprehension in the mind of the latter that it is not safe for him or her to continue the matrimonial relationship with the other. Mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to the behaviour or behavioural pattern by the other. Unlike the case of physical cruelty, mental cruelty is difficult to establish by direct evidence. It is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. A feeling of anguish, disappointment and frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated on assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partners of matrimonial life have been living. The inference has to be drawn from the attending facts and circumstances taken cumulatively. In case of mental cruelty it will not be a correct approach to take an instance of misbehaviour in isolation and then pose the question whether such behaviour is sufficient by itself to cause mental cruelty. The approach should be to take the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record and then draw a fair inference whether the petitioner in the divorce petition has been subjected to mental cruelty due to conduct of the other.” 40. In A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22 the Court observed as under: (SCC p. 29, para 10) “10. The expression ‘cruelty’ has not been defined in the Act. Cruelty can be physical or mental. In A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22 the Court observed as under: (SCC p. 29, para 10) “10. The expression ‘cruelty’ has not been defined in the Act. Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of marital ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, status, environment in which they live. Cruelty, as noted above, includes mental cruelty, which falls within the purview of a matrimonial wrong. Cruelty need not be physical. If from the conduct of the spouse same is established and/or an inference can be legitimately drawn that the treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind of the other spouse, about his or her mental welfare then this conduct amounts to cruelty. In a delicate human relationship like matrimony, one has to see the probabilities of the case. The concept, proof beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those of husband and wife. Therefore, one has to see what are the probabilities in a case and legal cruelty has to be found out, not merely as a matter of fact, but as the effect on the mind of the complainant spouse because of the acts or omissions of the other. Cruelty may be physical or corporeal or may be mental. In physical cruelty, there can be tangible and direct evidence, but in the case of mental cruelty there may not at the same time be direct evidence. In cases where there is no direct evidence, courts are required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence. It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes.” 41. In Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 SCC 778 the Court said: (SCC pp. 796-97, paras 31-32) “31. It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes.” 41. In Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 SCC 778 the Court said: (SCC pp. 796-97, paras 31-32) “31. It is settled by a catena of decisions that mental cruelty can cause even more serious injury than the physical harm and create in the mind of the injured appellant such apprehension as is contemplated in the section. It is to be determined on whole facts of the case and the matrimonial relations between the spouses. To amount to cruelty, there must be such wilful treatment of the party which caused suffering in body or mind either as an actual fact or by way of apprehension in such a manner as to render the continued living together of spouses harmful or injurious having regard to the circumstances of the case. 32. The word ‘cruelty’ has not been defined and it has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted.” 42. It was further stated: (Vinita Saxena case [ (2006) 3 SCC 778 ] , SCC pp. 797-98, paras 35-36) “35. Each case depends on its own facts and must be judged on these facts. The concept of cruelty has varied from time to time, from place to place and from individual to individual in its application according to social status of the persons involved and their economic conditions and other matters. The question whether the act complained of was a cruel act is to be determined from the whole facts and the matrimonial relations between the parties. In this connection, the culture, temperament and status in life and many other things are the factors which have to be considered. 36. The question whether the act complained of was a cruel act is to be determined from the whole facts and the matrimonial relations between the parties. In this connection, the culture, temperament and status in life and many other things are the factors which have to be considered. 36. The legal concept of cruelty which is not defined by the statute is generally described as conduct of such character as to have caused danger to life, limb or health (bodily and mental) or to give rise to reasonable apprehension of such danger. The general rule in all questions of cruelty is that the whole matrimonial relation must be considered, that rule is of a special value when the cruelty consists not of violent act but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations or taunts. It may be mental such as indifference and frigidity towards the wife, denial of a company to her, hatred and abhorrence for wife, or physical, like acts of violence and abstinence from sexual intercourse without reasonable cause. It must be proved that one partner in the marriage however mindless of the consequences has behaved in a way which the other spouse could not in the circumstances be called upon to endure, and that misconduct has caused injury to health or a reasonable apprehension of such injury. There are two sides to be considered in case of apprehension of such injury. There are two sides to be considered in case of cruelty. From the appellant's side, ought this appellant to be called on to endure the conduct? From the respondent's side, was this conduct excusable? The court has then to decide whether the sum total of the reprehensible conduct was cruel. That depends on whether the cumulative conduct was sufficiently serious to say that from a reasonable person's point of view after a consideration of any excuse which the respondent might have in the circumstances, the conduct is such that the petitioner ought not be called upon to endure.” 43. Recently, in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 this Court held: (SCC pp. 546-47, para 101) “101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of ‘mental cruelty’. Recently, in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 this Court held: (SCC pp. 546-47, para 101) “101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of ‘mental cruelty’. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive: (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. (vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty. (viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. (xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilisation without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.” 44. Now, coming to the facts of the case, from the evidence of Smt Vimal Kapur (mother-in-law of the appellant wife and mother of the respondent husband) who is examined as PW 1 and Sudhir Kapur, husband, PW 2, the trial court held that the wife was interested in her career only and she had neglected towards matrimonial obligations and exercise of conjugal rights by the husband. The trial court also held that termination of pregnancy by wife was without consent or even knowledge of the husband which was in the nature of mental cruelty. The trial court also held that termination of pregnancy by wife was without consent or even knowledge of the husband which was in the nature of mental cruelty. But keeping the said element of mental cruelty aside, the High Court was convinced that the allegation of mental cruelty towards the husband by the wife was clearly established from the evidence on record adduced by the respondent husband. In Joydeep Majumdar (supra) 12. When the appellant has suffered adverse consequences in his life and career on account of the allegations made by the respondent, the legal consequences must follow and those cannot be prevented only because, no court has determined that the allegations were false. The High Court, however, felt that without any definite finding on the credibility of the wife's allegation, the wronged spouse would be disentitled to relief. This is not found to be the correct way to deal with the issue. 13. Proceeding with the above understanding, the question which requires to be answered here is whether the conduct of the respondent would fall within the realm of mental cruelty. Here the allegations are levelled by a highly educated spouse and they do have the propensity to irreparably damage the character and reputation of the appellant. When the reputation of the spouse is sullied amongst his colleagues, his superiors and the society at large, it would be difficult to expect condonation of such conduct by the affected party. 14. The explanation of the wife that she made those complaints in order to protect the matrimonial ties would not in our view, justify the persistent effort made by her to undermine the dignity and reputation of the appellant. In circumstances like this, the wronged party cannot be expected to continue with the matrimonial relationship and there is enough justification for him to seek separation. 23. The husband has categorically stated that the wife has committed cruelty by filing complaints against him in his office. The respondent has adduced evidence, from which it emerges that she has been living separately from the husband for a considerable period. She has also applied for maintenance and is currently receiving Rs. 9,000/- per month. However, according to the wife, the maintenance payments are irregular. She admits that they have been living separately since 2017, whereas the husband contends that their separation commenced in 2009 – 2010. She has also applied for maintenance and is currently receiving Rs. 9,000/- per month. However, according to the wife, the maintenance payments are irregular. She admits that they have been living separately since 2017, whereas the husband contends that their separation commenced in 2009 – 2010. It also appears from the record that both the son and daughter of the parties have married, with one daughter residing with the wife. A perusal of the evidence on record indicates that the wife has lodged multiple complaints against the husband and has committed acts of cruelty by frequently quarrelling with him. 24. It has also come to light that the wife and daughter have assaulted the appellant, for which offences under Sections 323 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 have been registered against them. The evidence further reveals that the wife has failed to perform her matrimonial obligations and has not assisted the husband in family affairs. Due to the ongoing quarrels, the husband has been living separately since 22.08.2017 in a rented house, while the wife continues to reside in the quarter allotted to the husband, as noted above. In her testimony, the wife has categorically admitted that they have been living separately since 2017. She has also admitted to filing complaints against the husband at the Bhilai Police Station, District Durg, with a case pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg. Based on the admitted and corroborated evidence, it clearly appears that the wife has committed cruelty, which has been found to be proved by the trial court. There is nothing on record to suggest that the cruelty alleged by the husband remains unproven. 25. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Sanat Kumar Agarwal Vs. Smt. Nandini Agarwal , AIR 1990 SC 594 held in para 7 as under:- “7. It is further important to note that the petition for divorce was filed on 6-2-1982 i.e. more than three years of leaving the matrimonial home by the respondent w.e.f. 9-12-1978. There is not an iota of evidence placed on record by the respondent nor any averment to show that any effort was made by her to go and join the matrimonial home with the appellant at Bhopal. Now it is more than ten years that the parties are living separately. Admittedly the respondent after passing B.Ed. There is not an iota of evidence placed on record by the respondent nor any averment to show that any effort was made by her to go and join the matrimonial home with the appellant at Bhopal. Now it is more than ten years that the parties are living separately. Admittedly the respondent after passing B.Ed. examination has joined an employment as a school teacher and has an independent income and both the parties have now adjusted to their new mode of life for more than a decade.” 26. On the other hand, from the wife’s evidence, it appears that the husband is residing separately due to her alleged cruel behavior, and that he is facing criminal cases. The husband has further lodged complaints regarding the assault by the wife and daughter. However, the cruelty alleged by the wife has not been found to be sufficiently established, and no interference with the trial court’s findings is warranted. 27. In the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sivasankaran v. Santhimeenal , (2022) 15 SCC 742 has specifically held in paragraph 22.1 as under: “21.1. The respondent has resorted to filing multiple cases in courts against the appellant. It may be noticed that such repeated filing of cases itself has been held in judicial pronouncements to amount to mental cruelty.” 28. Regarding the issue of desertion, the evidence of the parties conclusively establishes that the wife has deserted the husband since 2009, and they have been living separately since that time. It is an admitted fact that the wife is residing in the quarter allotted to the husband by Bhilai Steel Plant. It is also noted that there has been neither any matrimonial cohabitation nor any marital relations between the parties since 2017. The husband resides in a separate rented accommodation. These facts clearly indicate that the wife has deserted the husband. 29. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter Debananda Tamuli Vs. Kakumoni Kataky , (2022) 5 SCC 549 relevant paras are reflected as under :- “7. We have given careful consideration to her submissions. Firstly, we deal with the issue of desertion. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, (1964) 4 SCR 331 : AIR 1964 SC 40 ] which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. We have given careful consideration to her submissions. Firstly, we deal with the issue of desertion. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, (1964) 4 SCR 331 : AIR 1964 SC 40 ] which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view taken by this Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus: “ 13. Divorce .— (1) * * * 1. Explanation.—In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.” 10. The perusal of the respondent's evidence does not disclose any effort made by her to resume the matrimonial relationship. She has not filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. As can be seen from the evidence on record, the appellant is carrying on business at Tezpur. The respondent is working as a Lecturer in University Law College at Gauhati. There is no dispute that from 1-7-2009 till date, they are staying separately. 11. Merely because on account of the death of the appellant's mother, the respondent visited her matrimonial home in December 2009 and stayed there only for one day, it cannot be said that there was a resumption of cohabitation. There is no dispute that from 1-7-2009 till date, they are staying separately. 11. Merely because on account of the death of the appellant's mother, the respondent visited her matrimonial home in December 2009 and stayed there only for one day, it cannot be said that there was a resumption of cohabitation. She has not stated that she came to her matrimonial home on 21-12-2009 with the intention to resume cohabitation. The intention on the part of the respondent to resume cohabitation is not established. Thus, in the facts of the case, the factum of separation has been proved. From the evidence on record, an inference can be drawn that there was animus deserendi on the part of the respondent. She has not pleaded and established any reasonable cause for remaining away from her matrimonial home. 12. Thus, in our considered view, the ground of desertion under clause (i-b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the HM Act has been made out as the desertion for a continuous period of more than two years before the institution of the petition was established in the facts of the case. But, after having carefully perused the evidence on record, we find that no case is made out to disturb the findings recorded by the courts on the issue of cruelty.” 30. In addition, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dr. Nirmal Singh Panesar Vs. Paramjit Kaur Panesar Alias Ajinder Kaur , (2025) 3 SCC 790 relevant paras as under :- “12. Similarly, the law is also well settled as to what could be said to be “desertion” in the divorce proceedings filed under Section 13 of the said Act. The expression “desertion” had come up under the judicial scrutiny of this Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 15 : AIR 1957 SC 176 , which was again considered in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40 . This Court collating the observations made in the earlier decisions, stated its view as under : [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40 , SCC OnLine SC para 40] “40. This Court collating the observations made in the earlier decisions, stated its view as under : [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40 , SCC OnLine SC para 40] “40. … Collating the aforesaid observations, the view of this Court may be stated thus : Heavy burden lies upon a petitioner who seeks divorce on the ground of desertion to prove four essential conditions, namely, (1) the factum of separation; (2) animus deserendi; (3) absence of his or her consent; and (4) absence of his or her conduct giving reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home.” 13. Recently, in Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 : (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 82, the Court referring the decision in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40 observed as under: [Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 : (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 82, SCC p. 462, paras 7-8] “7. We have given careful consideration to her submissions. Firstly, we deal with the issue of desertion. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40 which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view taken by this Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus: ‘ 13. The view taken by this Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus: ‘ 13. Divorce .— (1) * * * Explanation.—In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.’ 8. The reasons for a dispute between husband and wife are always very complex. Every matrimonial dispute is different from another. Whether a case of desertion is established or not will depend on the peculiar facts of each case. It is a matter of drawing an inference based on the facts brought on record by way of evidence.” 31. In view of the above, while evaluating the evidence and documents placed before it, we are of our considered opinion that the trial Court rightly concluded that the appellant wife has deserted the husband and consequently passed a decree dissolving the marriage between the parties. In our considered opinion, the decree of divorce is justified and does not warrant interference, quashing, or annulment. 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rinku Baheti Vs. Sandesh Sharda , (2025) 3 SCC 686 the paragraphs relevant are as under :- “77. The dispute with respect to the amount of alimony is generally the most contentious point between the parties in such marital proceedings, supplemented by a plethora of accusations to remove the cover from the opposite party's income and assets. The judicial dicta in this context could be discussed as under: 77.1. In the order passed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Shakti v. Anita, (2025) 3 SCC 728 , it was observed as under : (SCC paras 13-14) “13. That brings us to the aspect of permanent alimony over which the real dispute is. We looked to the offer of the appellant as also the desire of the respondent. There is undoubtedly a mismatch! 14. That brings us to the aspect of permanent alimony over which the real dispute is. We looked to the offer of the appellant as also the desire of the respondent. There is undoubtedly a mismatch! 14. As often happens the claim of the respondent is based on what is stated to be a large number of properties of the family of the appellant, though nothing is placed on record of anything in his name.” 77.2. The law with respect to deciding the amount of permanent alimony was summarised by a Bench of this Court recently in Kiran Jyot Maini v. Anish Pramod Patel, (2024) 13 SCC 66 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1724, wherein this Court speaking through Vikram Nath, J. has touched upon the question of one-time settlement and the factors that should be taken into consideration while determining fair amount of permanent alimony. It was also observed as under : (SCC para 25) “25. The status of the parties is a significant factor, encompassing their social standing, lifestyle, and financial background. The reasonable needs of the wife and dependant children must be assessed, including costs for food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical expenses. The applicant's educational and professional qualifications, as well as their employment history, play a crucial role in evaluating their potential for self-sufficiency. If the applicant has any independent source of income or owns property, this will also be taken into account to determine if it is sufficient to maintain the same standard of living experienced during the marriage. Additionally, the court considers whether the applicant had to sacrifice employment opportunities for family responsibilities, such as child-rearing or caring for elderly family members, which may have impacted their career prospects.” 77.3. In Vinny Parmvir Parmar v. Parmvir Parmar, (2011) 13 SCC 112 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 290 : (2011) 9 SCR 371 , this Court held that there cannot be a fixed formula or a straitjacket rubric for fixing the amount of permanent alimony and only broad principles can be laid down. The question of maintenance is subjective to each case and depends on various factors and circumstances as presented in individual cases. The question of maintenance is subjective to each case and depends on various factors and circumstances as presented in individual cases. This Court in the above judgment stated that the courts shall consider the following broad factors while determining permanent alimony — income and properties of both the parties, respectively, conduct of the parties, status, social and financial, of the parties, their respective personal needs, capacity and duty to maintain others dependent on them, husband's own expenses, wife's comfort considering her status and the mode of life she was used to during the subsistence of the marriage, among other supplementary factors. 77.4. This was further reiterated by this Court in Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 224 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 347, while observing that permanent alimony is to be granted after considering largely the social status, conduct of the parties, the parties' lifestyle, and other such ancillary factors. 78. Earlier, a two-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Indu Malhotra, J. in Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 : (2021) 2 SCC (Civ) 220 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 749 (“Rajnesh”), elaborated upon the broad criteria and the factors to be considered for determining the quantum of maintenance. This Court emphasises that there is no fixed formula for calculating maintenance amount; instead, it should be based on a balanced consideration of various factors. These factors include and are illustrative but are not limited or exhaustive, they are adumbrated as under: (i) Status of the parties, social and financial. (ii) Reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children. (iii) Qualifications and employment status of the parties. (iv) Independent income or assets owned by the parties. (v) Maintain standard of living as in the matrimonial home. (vi) Any employment sacrifices made for family responsibilities. (vii) Reasonable litigation costs for a non-working wife. (viii) Financial capacity of husband, his income, maintenance obligations, and liabilities.” 33. The parties have not complied with the requirement to file affidavits disclosing their assets, as directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajnish v. Neha . Despite this procedural lapse, this Court, having carefully examined the material on record and the overall circumstances of the case, notes that a sum of Rs. 9,000/- per month is currently being paid towards the maintenance of the wife and the daughter. 34. Despite this procedural lapse, this Court, having carefully examined the material on record and the overall circumstances of the case, notes that a sum of Rs. 9,000/- per month is currently being paid towards the maintenance of the wife and the daughter. 34. In view of the above and in the interest of justice, this Court hereby directs that a lump sum amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Ten Lakh Rupees) be paid to the wife as permanent alimony. The said amount is considered just, reasonable, and sufficient for her maintenance. 35. Accordingly The Appeal is hereby disposed of with the aforesaid observations.