JUDGMENT : Narendra Kumar Vyas, J. 1. This first appeal under Section 96 CPC has been filed by plaintiff assailing the judgment and decree dated 29.04.2016 passed by learned 4 th Additional District Judge, Durg, (CG) in Civil Suit No. 21-A/2013, by which the trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff and allowed the counter claim filed by defendants by declaring the defendant No. 3 and 4 owner of the house bearing khasra No. 1083/8 area 0.005 hectare situated at village Pachri Para near Krishna Temple Durg, further directing the plaintiff to hand over the vacant possession of the suit house within two months from the date of judgment and if the vacant possession is not handed over to the defendant No. 3 and 4 then the plaintiff is liable to pay compensation of Rs. 100/- per day to the defendants No. 3 and 4. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms of their status shown in Civil Suit No. 21-A/2013 before the trial court. 3. Brief facts as mentioned in the plaint are that plaintiff filed a suit on 05.01.2004 before the learned trial Court for specific performance of contract, declaration and permanent injunction mainly contending that; (A) The plaintiff has taken the house of defendant No.1 and 2 on rent situated at Pachri Para, near Krishna Temple, Durg (Hereinafter referred to as suit property). The plaintiff along with her children were residing there. It is also case of the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 and 2 proposed to sell the suit house to the plaintiff for sale consideration of Rs. 1,05,000/- as such the plaintiff paid defendant No. 1 and 2 Rs. 18,200/- on 07.07.2003 as advance. It is also agreed by the defendant No.1 and 2 that after 2003 they will execute sale deed of the suit house after paying remaining sale consideration. (B) It is also case of the plaintiff that after receiving advance money on 07.07.2003 the defendant No. 1 and 2 had given oral instruction to the plaintiff that they have already received monthly rent from the plaintiff up to June 2003 and since the agreement to sell has already been executed between them, therefore, she is not required to pay any rent. Accordingly, the plaintiff stopped paying rent to the defendant No.2. Accordingly, the plaintiff stopped paying rent to the defendant No.2. It is also case of the plaintiff, that since the defendant No. 1 and 2 are not executing the sale deed, therefore, the plaintiff sent a notice on 28.11.2003 asking them to execute the sale deed after obtaining the remaining sale consideration from the plaintiff. She has also sent the notice to defendant No.3 to restrain her from executing the sale deed as an agreement has already been arrived at between the plaintiff and defendant No.2. The defendant No. 1,2 and 3 have submitted the reply to the notice that in the suit property the plaintiff is not residing but her daughter along with their children are living illegally and contending that they are not paying the rent. It is further contended that the plaintiff for purchase of house has directed his son to deposit Rs. 50,000/- in the Rajnandgaon Gramin Bank on 23.12.2003 and in the State Bank Durg Rs. 40,000/- on 31.12.2003, as such she has adequate fund to execute sale deed to substantiate that she is ready and willing to perform her part of contract. (C) It has also been contended that despite objection by the plaintiff the defendant No. 1 and 2 executed the sale deed on 15.12.2003 with defendant no. 3 and 4, as such the sale deed be declared as null and void and the defendant be restrained from interfering in peaceful possession of the plaintiff. 4. Defendant No. 1 has filed her written statement as well as counter claim mainly contending;- (A) That the plaintiff has taken the suit property on rent with defendant No.1 for rent of Rs 600/- per month and rest of the averments are not correct and has denied. It has also been specifically denied that Rs. 18,200/- has been received by the defendant No.1 and they were agreed to execute the sale deed and also contended that the defendant No.1 is legal owner of the suit property as she has purchased the same from her own income received from salary while working with BSP as sweeper. It has also been contended that she has purchased the suit property for Rs 5,500/- on 04.02.1980 through registered sale deed and after retirement she had gone to village Chikhalaka in her parental house. It has also been contended that she has purchased the suit property for Rs 5,500/- on 04.02.1980 through registered sale deed and after retirement she had gone to village Chikhalaka in her parental house. It has also been submitted that since is residing far away from the suit house, therefore, she has asked the friend of her son defendant No.2 to look after the suit property. It has also been submitted that due to good relationship with the plaintiff the defendant No.2 has given key of the suit house for 15 days only to keep their household, as such plaintiff’s daughter was living illegally without paying rent. It has also been contended that defendant No.1 due to necessity of fund has sold the suit house in favour of defendant No. 3 and 4 who are close relatives of defendant No. 1 and 2. The defendant No.1 has also filed the suit for eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority which is pending and has prayed for dismissal of the suit. In the counter claim, it has been prayed for declaring the oral agreement to be null and void as the suit filed by the plaintiff is false and fabricated. 5. The defendant No. 3 and 4 have filed the written statement mainly contending that it is denied that any agreement dated 07.07.2003 was executed for consideration of Rs. 18,200/- and no notice has been received by defendant No.4. It has also been contended that the plaintiff herself has given consent to defendant No. 3 to purchase suit house, thereafter maliciously she has sent the notice. It has also been contended that the defendant No. 3 and 4 are bonafide purchaser of the suit property and still if the plaintiff intends to purchase suit house she has to deposit Rs. 2,00,000/- from the date of registry @ 5% monthly rent then defendant No. 3 and 4 are ready and willing to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff through Court and has prayed for dismissal of the suit. 6. The defendant No.1 3 and 4 have also filed the counter claim reiterating the fact mentioned by defendant No. 1 in the written statement and also contended that the sale deed executed on 16.12.2003 in favour of defendant No. 3 and 4 is legal and they are owner of the suit property. 6. The defendant No.1 3 and 4 have also filed the counter claim reiterating the fact mentioned by defendant No. 1 in the written statement and also contended that the sale deed executed on 16.12.2003 in favour of defendant No. 3 and 4 is legal and they are owner of the suit property. It has also been contended that the plaintiff is living in her own house and she has illegally possessed the suit house, therefore, the plaintiff eviction is necessary and accordingly prayed for declaring that they are the title holder of the suit property and are in possession of the suit property. 7. On the pleading of the parties, learned trial court has framed as many as 11 issues, issue no. 1, 2, 5 and 8 are relevant therefore, they are extracted below:- 8. The plaintiff to substantiate her case has examined herself as (PW-1), Deepak Kumar Banotiya (PW-2) and exhibited documents namely receipt (Ex.P-1), Notice (Ex.P-2), Public information (Ex.P-3), Registered Notice (Ex.P-4), receipt (Ex.P-6), acknowledgment (Ex.P-7) ,acknowledgment (Ex.P-8), registered notice (Ex.P-9), receipt (Ex.P- 10),acknowledgment (Ex.P-11), reply of registered notice (Ex.P12) envelop (Ex.P-13), reply of notice (Ex.P-14), receipt and acknowledgment (Ex.P-15 to 16), Registered notice reply, postal receipt (Ex.P-17 to 24), advertisement (Ex.P-25), bond paper (Ex.P-26 and Ex.P-27), application (Ex.P-28). Order 12 Rule 3 CPC (Ex.P-29). Defendants examined herself as (DW-1), Shashi Yadav (DW-2), Smt. Rukmani Thakur (DW-3), Lokesh (DW-4), Bharat Singh Yadav (DW-5), Durga Prasad Yadav (DW-6), Challama (DW-7) and Santosh Binawar and exhibited documents namely copy of application (Ex. D-1 and 2), Order (Ex.D-3), Khasra Panchashala (Ex. D-4 and 5),Rin pustika (Ex.D- 6 and 7), Advertisement (Ex.D-8 and 9), certificate of postal (Ex.D-10 to Ex.D-13), legal notice (Ex.D-14), Rin pustika (Ex.D-16 and 17), Caste certificate (Ex.D-18), agreement (Ex.D-19), bond paper (Ex.D-20), agreement (Ex.D-21), caste certificate (Ex.D-22),challan (Ex.D-23), notice (Ex.D-24 and D-25),Bank sangyapan (Ex.D-26), letter dated 24.07.1980 (Ex.D-27), receipt (Ex.D-29 and 30),application (Ex.D-31 and 32). Affidavit (Ex.D-33), tax notice (Ex.D-34), finance application (Ex.D-35 and 36), agreement (Ex.D-37), paper cutting (Ex.D-38), sale deed (Ex.D-39), consent letter (Ex.D-40), affidavit submitted before Bank (Ex.D-41) and affidavit submitted before Bank (Ex.D-42). 9. Affidavit (Ex.D-33), tax notice (Ex.D-34), finance application (Ex.D-35 and 36), agreement (Ex.D-37), paper cutting (Ex.D-38), sale deed (Ex.D-39), consent letter (Ex.D-40), affidavit submitted before Bank (Ex.D-41) and affidavit submitted before Bank (Ex.D-42). 9. Learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff and allowed the counter claim by declaring that defendant No. 3 and 4 are owner of the house bearing khasra No. 1083/8 area 0.005 hectare situated at village Pachri Para near Krishna Temple Durg, also directed to hand over the vacant possession of the suit house within two months from the date of judgment and if the vacant possession is not handed over to the defendant No. 3 and 4 then the plaintiff is liable to pay compensation of Rs. 100/- per day to the defendants No. 3 and 4. The trial Court has also directed that the plaintiff shall pay rent of the house Rs. 600/- per month to the defendants. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court on 29.04.2016 the plaintiff has preferred First Appeal under Section 96 CPC before this Court. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the finding recorded by the trial Court suffers from illegality and perversity, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside by this Court. He would further submit that the learned trial Court has not considered the statement of defendant No.1 witness Smt. Gaotrain Bai who has categorically admitted in her deposition that appellant is residing in her house and a transaction of sale of dispute house with the appellant has taken place. It has also been contended that the defendant No.1 has also admitted that no notice was given to the appellant before executing the sale deed which is supported by respondent No.3 in her deposition, as such the transaction with defendant No.3 and 4 is illegal. It has also been contended that the learned trial Court without appreciating the evidence in a casual manner has decided the suit, therefore, prayed for setting a side the judgment passed by the learned trial Court. 11. He would further submit that as per Section 9 and 10 of Specific relief Act oral agreement for sale of immovable property can be very well enforceable and if it is conclude contract then relief of Specific Performance of Contract can very well begranted by the Courts. 11. He would further submit that as per Section 9 and 10 of Specific relief Act oral agreement for sale of immovable property can be very well enforceable and if it is conclude contract then relief of Specific Performance of Contract can very well begranted by the Courts. He would further submit that from the evidence brought on record it is quite vivid that an oral agreement was in existence between the plaintiff and defendant No.1, as such the trial Court should have decreed the suit by directing the defendant No.1 and 2 to execute agreement with the plaintiff. He would further submit that learned trial Court should have not directed for eviction of the plaintiff unless the ground for seeking eviction are made out as tenant is protected under the Rent Control Act, 1961. Thus, the trial Court should have not allowed the counter-claim of the defendant No. 3 and 4. He would further submit that before applying the bar contained in Order 2 Rule 2 CPC the trial Court should examine the cause of action, relief claimed, legal provisions applicable for grant reliefs and entire factual matrix of both the suits, as such the trial Court should have directed specific performance of contract between the vendor between the defendant No.1 and the plaintiff and also directed the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance, so as to pass on title which resides in him to the plaintiff. Thus he would pray for issuing direction to the defendant No. 3 and 4 to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. To substantiate his submission, he would refer to judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Rathnavathi and Another vs Kavita Ganashamdas reported in 2015 (5) SCC 223 , K. Kanjappa (dead) by legal representative vs. R.A. Hameed alias Ameersab (dead) by Legal Representative and Another 2016(1) SCC 762 and Alagu Pharmacy and others vs. N. Magudeswari reported in 2018(8) SCC 311. 12. 12. On the other hand learned counsel for respondents would submit that the appellant has not challenged the judgment and decree passed in counter-claim, therefore, the present appeal is not maintainable and the finding recorded by the learned trial Court has attained finality and the principle of res-judicata is applicable with full force as such the appellant cannot question the findings recorded by the trial Court with regard to declaration that defendant No. 3 and 4 are title holder of the suit property. He would further submit that the finding recorded by the trial Court that no agreement is executed between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 neither suffers from perversity or illegality and the learned trial Court has rightly decided the issue No.1 and 3 in favour of defendant No. 3 and 4. He would further submit that the finding of the learned trial Court that sale deed executed on 11.12.2003 between the defendant No.1 and defendant No.3 and 4 is legal, justified and would pray for dismissal of the appeal. To substantiate their case, he would refer to the judgment of High Court of Patna in the case of Kishori Devi vs. Rameshwar Prasad reported in AIR 2017 Patna 187. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the Court below with utmost satisfaction. 14. From the above submissions made by the parties, the point emerged for determination by this Court is as under:- (I) Whether the finding recorded by the trial Court is legal, justified, and does not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court. (II) Whether a decree granting relief to the defendants in the counterclaim is separately appelable or a composite appeal is maintainable against the judgment and decree of the trial Court by the plaintiff where the suit has been dismissed but counter-claim has been decreed. (III) Whether non-filing of the appeal against the decree passed in counter-claim is in accordance with the law and procedure would attract the bar of res-judicata in the appeal filed only against the judgment and decree dismissing the suit. Discussion and finding on point No.1 15. To examine point No.1 it is expedient for this Court to examine the evidence of the witnesses brought on record. Discussion and finding on point No.1 15. To examine point No.1 it is expedient for this Court to examine the evidence of the witnesses brought on record. Plaintiff Anjana Banotiya (PW-1) in her examination-in-chief has reiterated the stand taken by her in the plaint and in the cross-examination, she has admitted that in (Ex.P-1) which receipt which is alleged to have been signed by Dev Narayn Gond does not contain signature of Gautrin Bai and no signature of independent witness was there. She has also admitted that in the receipt no description of disputed property was mentioned and she has also admitted that the suit house was in the name of Gautrin Bai and this information is known to her. She has also admitted that adjacent to the suit house, her house is also there. She has also admitted that in Ex.P-1 there was no mentioned that after Diwali the sale deed will be executed. She has also admitted that on 01.12.2006 the value of suit house is Rs. 3,00,000/-. She has also admitted that Gautrin Bai has purchased the property from her own income. She has also admitted that in the Ex.P-1 after sale deed it has not been mentioned that no rent is payable. She has also stated that when the documentation of Ex.P-1 was done at that time Rs. 1,10,000/- after giving advance was kept in the house but she has not deposited the same. Deepak Kumar Banotiya (PW-2) who was examined in support of plaintiff in his cross-examination has admitted that he has raised an objection before the Registry but no stay was granted to them. 16. Gautrin Bai (DW-1) in her examination in chief has reiterated the stand taken by her in her written statement and in the cross-examination she has admitted that Shashi Yadav has told her to execute sale deed in her favour after paying the amount. She has also denied that the plaintiff was ready to execute the sale deed as she has availability of the fund. The (DW-2) Shashi Yadav has reiterated the stand taken by her in the written statement. She has admitted that no agreement was executed between plaintiff and late Gautrin Bai, as such there is no necessity to give notice to the plaintiff. 17. The (DW-2) Shashi Yadav has reiterated the stand taken by her in the written statement. She has admitted that no agreement was executed between plaintiff and late Gautrin Bai, as such there is no necessity to give notice to the plaintiff. 17. Bharat Singh Yadav (DW-5) in examination-in-chief has reiterated the averments made in the written statement and in the cross-examination, he has stated that Gautrin Bai and Dev Narayan have informed them that they have executed the agreement of sale of the suit property to the plaintiff. Despite that they have purchased the suit house. Durgaram Yadav (DW-6) in his examination-in-chief has stated that Dev Narayan Gond was his Mahaprasad/ Mitan and he has stated that Gautrin Bai has given the key of the house for day-to-day maintenance of the house and Anjana Banautiya has requested him to give the key of the house for 15 days to keep her daughter’s belongings in the house and since they are residing in the same vicinity therefore, without obtaining permission from Gautrin Bai he has given the house to Anjana Banautiya for keeping her belongings with understanding that within 15 days vacant possession will be given but they have not given the possession. He has also stated that for sale of the suit house no documentation was done between Gautrin Bai and late Dev Narayan, as such neither plaintiff nor her daughter is tenant or purchaser of the suit house and Gautrin Bai during her life time sold the house to defendant No. 3 and 4 on 11.12.2003. The witness was cross-examined and in the cross-examination, he has stated that whatever the contains made in the affidavit is hearsay and also admitted that Anjana and Deepak both are in Government service and Deepak is Sub-Engineer. 18. Lokesh Thakur (DW-4) who is son of Dev Narayan Gond in examination-in-chief has supported the case of the defendants and in the cross-examination, he has admitted that her grand-mother has purchased the suit house from her income from salary in the year 1993 and denied that his grandmother and father have executed an agreement with Anjana Bai for sale of the suit house. 19. From the evidence brought on record and particularly Ex.P-1 which is alleged receipt of money and not agreement to sale. 19. From the evidence brought on record and particularly Ex.P-1 which is alleged receipt of money and not agreement to sale. Even the plaintiff is unable to establish that before the trial Court any agreement was executed between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 for sale of the suit house. The learned trial Court on the basis of evidence has given a finding that only sale agreement has been mentioned in the receipt as well as there was no signature of Gautrin Bai. But the receipt is alleged to have been signed by Dev Narayan Gond, who was not the owner of the suit house, as such it cannot be held that an agreement was executed between them. The learned trial Court has also recorded its finding that the plaintiff has not been able to prove that Dev Narayan Gond was authorized to give receipt on behalf of Gautrin Bai. Accordingly, issue No.1 framed by the trial Court has been answered against the plaintiff. 20. Similarly, learned trial Court while deciding the issue No.2 has recorded its finding that the signature of Dev Narayan was not proved by the plaintiff as burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove the fact which is within the knowledge of the plaintiff only. Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence has recorded its finding that the plaintiff is unable to establish that an agreement was executed between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and 2 and they were ready and willing to perform their part of contract which does not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court. In view of well settled legal position of law in case of specific performance of contract not only plead but prove also that the plaintiff are ready and willing to perform her part of contract which the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove. The plaintiff has not been able to prove that he has financial capacity to establish her readiness and willingness by asking the defendant No.1 to perform his part of contract. In the present case, both the essential ingredients to get the decree specific performance of contract is missing. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Shama Naik vs. G.Srinivasiah reported in 2024 INSC 927 has examined the essential ingredients of specific performance of contract and has held in paragraph 8,9,10, 11 and 13 has held as under:- 8. In the present case, both the essential ingredients to get the decree specific performance of contract is missing. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Shama Naik vs. G.Srinivasiah reported in 2024 INSC 927 has examined the essential ingredients of specific performance of contract and has held in paragraph 8,9,10, 11 and 13 has held as under:- 8. Section 16(C) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (prior to amendment w.e.f. 1.10.2018) bars the relief of the specific performance of a contract in favour of a person who fails to aver readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. 9. There is a legion of precedents on the subject of readiness and willingness. 10. The law is well settled. The plaintiff is obliged not only to make specific statement and averments in the plaint but is also obliged to adduce necessary oral and documentary evidence to show the availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time. 11. There is a fine distinction between readiness and willingness to perform the contract. Both the ingredients are necessary for the relief of specific performance. 12. While readiness means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which would include his financial position, willingness relates to the conduct of the plaintiff. 13. The High Court in first appeal upon appreciation of the evidence on record both oral and documentary has arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 21. Even the plaintiff is unable to prove that there was oral agreement by examining the witnesses as the defendant No.1 has specifically denied the fact of execution of agreement. This fact of oral agreement was within knowledge of the plaintiff only, as such burden lies upon her only to prove the same which she has not proved by discharging her burden. Thus, it cannot be held that there was an oral agreement. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Chowdamma (D) by LR and Another vs. Venkatappa (D) by LRs and Another reported in 2025 INSC 1038 in paragraphs 41 to 46 has examined the principle of burden of proof under the Evidence Act and held as under: “41. It is a well-settled principle that the burden of proof lies upon the party who asserts a fact. It is a well-settled principle that the burden of proof lies upon the party who asserts a fact. In the present case, the plaintiffs have positively asserted that the deceased Dasabovi had a valid marital relationship with their mother. This assertion is supported by the oral testimony of P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa), the consistent conduct of the deceased Dasabovi in regularly visiting the plaintiffs’ residence, and the absence of any contrary material from defendant No.1. 42. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs have discharged the burden of proof placed upon them. They have sufficiently established that the deceased Dasabovi lived with their mother, Bheemakka @ Sathyakka, as husband and wife. BURDEN OF PROOF AND ONUS OF PROOF 43. This Court in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh7 observed thus: “19. There is another aspect of the matter which should be borne in mind. A distinction exists between burden of proof and onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus probandi. It assumes importance in the early stage of a case. The question of onus of proof has greater force, where the question is, which party is to begin. Burden of proof is used in three ways: (i) to indicate the duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition at the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a proposition as against all counter-evidence; and (iii) an indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of the others. The elementary rule in Section 101 is inflexible. In terms of Section 102 the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the same.” 44. Also, in Addagada Raghavamma and Anr. v. Addagada Chenchamma and Anr., this Court observed as follows: “12. … There is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof : burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. …Such considerations, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, may shift the onus of proof. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. …” 45. …Such considerations, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, may shift the onus of proof. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. …” 45. As it is seen that the plaintiffs have successfully discharged their burden of proof regarding the factum of marriage, the onus now shifts to the defendants to rebut the same. 46. The defendants, except for denying the marriage between the deceased Dasabovi and the plaintiffs’ mother, have not produced any oral or documentary evidence to challenge the legal sanctity of the said marriage. The contention that the plaintiffs’ mother did not belong to the same caste as the deceased Dasabovi, is wholly bereft of any proof or material. In the absence of the same, the said assertion collapses merely into speculation.” Discussion and finding on point No.2 and 3. 22. Since both the points are interconnected, therefore, they are being heard and disposed of by common findings. 23. So far as effect of non-challenge of judgment and decree passed in counter claim by the plaintiff is concerned, it is expedient for this Court to consider the provisions of Order 8 Rule 6-A CPC which reads as under. “ Order 8 Rule 6A. Counter-claim by defendant: (1) A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under rule 6, set up, by way of counter- claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not: Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. (2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross- suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim. (3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Court. (4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints.” 24. (3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Court. (4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints.” 24. From perusal of Order 8 Rule 6-A of C.P.C. extracted above, it is quite vivid that it enables a defendant in a suit to set up a set-off under Rule 6, in addition to his right of pleading, by way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not. It further says that when such a counter-claim is filed, it shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim. Sub-rule (3) says that if such a counter-claim is made, plaintiff will be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the same. So far as the counter-claim is concerned, Rule 4 says that 'The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints' - Order 8, Rule 6-C, C.P.C. enables the plaintiff in certain circumstances to seek orders of court that the counter-claim should not be tacked on with the plaint and the same may be treated as a suit. The court, on hearing such application, shall make necessary orders Order 8, Rule 6-D, C.P.C. says that in cases where defendant sets up a counter-claim, even if the plaintiff's suit is stayed, discontinued or dismissed, the counter-claim may nevertheless be proceeded with Order 8, Rule 6-E, C.P.C. which is corresponding to Order 8, Rule 10, C.P.C. It says that if the plaintiff fails to file a reply to the counter-claim, the Court may pronounce judgment on the counter- claim. Rule 6-G says that in respect of the statement to be filed by plaintiff, provisions of Order 8, C.P.C, will apply. 25. Rule 6-G says that in respect of the statement to be filed by plaintiff, provisions of Order 8, C.P.C, will apply. 25. The legal position with regard to counter claim is now settled in view of the judgment reported in Shri Jag Mohan Chawla v. Dera Radha Swami Satsang J.T. reported in 1996 (4) SCC 699 , wherein their Lordships have held thus: “5. ...The counter-claim could be treated as a cross-suit and it could be decided in the same suit without relegating the parties to a fresh suit. It is true that in money suits, decree must be conformable to Order 20, Rule 18, C.P.C. but the object of the amendments introduced by Rules 6-A to 6-G are conferment of a statutory right to the defendant to set up a counter-claim independent of the claim on the basis of which the plaintiff laid the suit, on his own cause of action. In Sub- rule (1) of Rule 6-A, the language is so couched with words of wide width as to enable the parties to bring his own independent cause of action in respect of any claim that would be the subject-matter of an independent suit. Thereby, it is not longer confined to money claim or to cause of action of the same nature as original action of the plaintiff. It need not relate to or be connected with the original cause of action or matter pleaded by the plaintiff. The words "any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing with the defendant" would show that the cause of action from which the counter-claim arises need not necessarily arise from or have any nexus with the cause of action of the plaintiff that occasioned to lay the suit. The only limitation is that the cause of action should arise before the time fixed for filing the written statement expires. The defendant may set up a cause of action which has accrued to him even after the institution of the suit. The counterclaim expressly is treated as a cross suit with all the indicia of pleadings as a plaint including the duty to aver his cause of action and also payment of the requisite court-fee thereon. The defendant may set up a cause of action which has accrued to him even after the institution of the suit. The counterclaim expressly is treated as a cross suit with all the indicia of pleadings as a plaint including the duty to aver his cause of action and also payment of the requisite court-fee thereon. Instead of relegating the defendant to an independent suit, to avoid, multiplicity of the proceeding and needless protection, the legislature intended to try both the suit and the counter-claim in the same suit as suit and cross-suit and have them disposed of in the same trial. In other words, a defendant can claim any right by way of a counter-claim in respect of any cause of action that has accrued to him even though it is independent of the cause, of action averred by the plaintiff and have the same cause of action adjudicated without relegating the defendant to file a separate suit... .” 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case reported in 2022 (17) SCC 154 in case of Satyender and Others vs. Saroj and Others has considered the provisions of Order 8 Rule 6(A) CPC and has held as under: 27. “23. A counter claim can be set up only “against the claim of the plaintiffs”. Since there was no claim of the plaintiffs regarding Killa No. 6//8 and 23, the defendants were barred to raise any counter claim on these Killa num- bers in view of Order VIII, Rule 6A of the CPC as it has nothing to do with the plaintiffs. It is true that a counter claim can be made by the defendant, even on a separate or independent cause of action (Jag Mohan Chawla & Anr. v. Dera Radha Swami Satsang & Ors.6). 24. The Legislature permits the institution of a counter claim, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation. But then it has certain limitations such as that the counter claim can- not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the court, and that such counter claim must be instituted be- fore the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limit for delivering his defence has expired. More im- portantly, such a counter claim must be against the plain- tiff! Evidently, in the present case the counter claim was not against the plaintiffs. More im- portantly, such a counter claim must be against the plain- tiff! Evidently, in the present case the counter claim was not against the plaintiffs. Moreover, as the plaintiffs had not claimed any right over the property and the Killa Nos. 6//8 and 23 are not even a part of the suit property de- scribed in the plaint by the plaintiffs. Despite the same, such a claim has been allowed against the plaintiffs. In fact, we do not find on record any reply submitted by the plaintiffs against the counter claim. To be fair, such a counter claim should have been excluded in terms of Or- der VIII, Rule 6C of the CPC. Suffice it to state here that the counter claim set up by the defendants has (1996) 4 SCC 699 been rightly rejected by the High Court.” 28. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Shivkali Bai v. Meera Devi reported in 1991 M.P.L.J. 102 held as under: “33. Counter-claim being in the nature of cross-suit, is not affected by the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit. The counter- claim has to be disposed of on merits. After the amendment of 1976, the pending suits are governed by the new provisions. Even though the counter-claim was made in the written statement, the plaintiff did not seek leave to file additional written statement in answer to the counter-claim of defendant as provided Under Rule 6-A(3) of Order 8 of the Code nor did the plaintiff apply to the Court for an order that such counter-claim may be excluded, as provided in Rule 6-C. In other words, the plaintiff discontinued her claim in the sense that she did not raise any issue to the counter claim. Therefore, the defendant No. 3 is entitled to a decree of her claim as provided Under Rule 6-E of Order 8 of the Code. See Daga Films v. Lotus Production and Ors., AIR 1977 Cal. 312 and Bhim Sain v. Laxmi Narain, AIR 1982 P. and H. 155. In view of the foregoing discussion, the defendant No. 3 is entitled to a decree for pre-emption of her right in the suit lands.” 29. From the above decisions, the following principles emerged with regard to counter claim: (a) A counter-claim is really a suit, though the same is taken in the written statement. In view of the foregoing discussion, the defendant No. 3 is entitled to a decree for pre-emption of her right in the suit lands.” 29. From the above decisions, the following principles emerged with regard to counter claim: (a) A counter-claim is really a suit, though the same is taken in the written statement. Just as a suit is filed by the plaintiff, defendant seeks a relief against the plaintiff on a cause of action which he has against the plaintiff. It is an independent cause of action which could also be agitated in a separate suit. It is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, defendant is given liberty to file a counter-claim and get adjudication. Issues are suggested in both the original claim as well as in the counter-claim, and both are disposed of by a common judgment Order 8, Rule 6-A(2), C.P.C. says that there can be a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and counter-claim. In common parlance, 'common judgment' means, 'decision arrived simultaneously in more than one suit tried together.' In view of the legal position under Order 8, Rule 6-A, C.P.C, a counter- claim or set-off can be made in many forms in a suit. But they need not be given separate numbers. (b) The counter-claim is also said to be a weapon on evidence and enables the defendant to enforce the claim against the plaintiff as effectively as an independent action. As stated earlier, it is an enabling provision which gives a right to the defendant that instead of filing an independent action, he can seek that relief in a suit filed by plaintiff against him. 30. As stated earlier, it is an enabling provision which gives a right to the defendant that instead of filing an independent action, he can seek that relief in a suit filed by plaintiff against him. 30. From the records of the trial Court, it is quite vivid that the plaintiff has not filed any appeal against the judgment and decree passed in counter claim declaring the defendant No. 3 and 4 to be the title holders of the suit property on a strength of the sale deed and since counter-claim is treated to be a suit though the same is disposed of by a common judgment, and if one of the judgments is not appealed against, the principle of res-judicata has to be applied as vivid from Explanation 1 to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that if the decision in one suit has become final in which the issue which has to be decided in appeal was heard and finally decided, the connected suit cannot be appealed against, for the same is barred by res judicata. This issue has come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Tyres Limited v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation reported in 1993 (2) SCC (Supp) 146 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 4 and 6 has held as under: “4. Although none of these decisions were concerned with the situation where no appeal was filed against the decision in connected suit but it appears that where an appeal arising out of connected suit is dismissed on merits the other cannot be heard, and has to be dismissed. The question is what happens where no appeal is filed, as in this case from the decree in connected suit. Effect of non-filing of appeal against a judgment or decree is that it becomes final. This finality can be taken away only in accordance with law. Same consequences follow when a judgment or decree in a connected suit is not appealed from. 6. Thus the finality of finding recorded in the connected suit, due to non-filing of appeal, precluded the court from proceeding with appeal in other, suit. In any view of the matter the order of the High Court is not liable to interference.” 31. Same consequences follow when a judgment or decree in a connected suit is not appealed from. 6. Thus the finality of finding recorded in the connected suit, due to non-filing of appeal, precluded the court from proceeding with appeal in other, suit. In any view of the matter the order of the High Court is not liable to interference.” 31. From the above stated position of law and considering the fact that the plaintiff has not filed appeal against the judgment and decree allowing the counter claim of defendant No. 3 and 4 declaring them title holder of the suit property on the basis of sale deed executed by defendant No.1 on 16.12.2003 in their favour which has been duly proved in accordance with law is legal and justified and does not warrant interference by this Court. Accordingly, point No. 2 and 3 framed by this Court are answered against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant No. 3 and 4. 32. Consequently, the appeal is liable to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. 33. A decree be drawn up accordingly.