1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 476 of 2018 Reserved on 21.11.2025 Pronounced on 12.12.2025 Shri Sai Agro Through Proprietor Kamlesh Singh Rajput S/o Shri B.N. Rajput Aged About 41years R/o Bypass Road Kawardha, Police Station And Tahsil Kawardha District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh., ... Appellant/Complainant versus Mandas Manikpuri S/o Shri Kartik Manikpuri Aged About 70 Years R/o Village Kunwamalgi, Police Station Kunda Tahsil, Pandariya District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh., .. Respondent/Accused For Appellant : Shri Ashwell Franklin appears on behalf of Shri Samir Singh, Advocate. For Respondent : Shri Dharmesh Shrivastava, Advocate. (HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE RADHAKISHAN AGRAWAL) CAV Judgment 1. This is acquittal appeal filed under section 378 (4) of Cr.P.C. by the complainant against the judgment dated 06.09.2018 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kabirdham in Criminal Appeal No. 59/2018 whereby the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent/accused of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of 1881”). 2. Brief facts of the case as projected by the appellant (complainant) are that the appellant is a firm dealing with selling of Holand Company Tractor and its agricultural equipments. On 19.11.2014, the respondent (accused) purchased a tractor-trolley for agricultural purposes, after paying sale consideration of Rs.9,71,000/- and while purchasing the Digitally signed by ALLENA ANJANI KUMAR Date: 2025.12.12 17:25:45 +0530 2 said vehicle, the respondent/accused also exchanged his vehicle Metador 407 and in lieu thereof, all the documents of Metador were given to the appellant, but the appellant came to know from the concerned R.T.O. that the road tax amounting to Rs.46,958/- of the Metador has not been paid by the respondent. The appellant/complainant informed the same to the accused and on the accused’s instructions, the complainant deposited the said amount in the RTO Office. Thereafter, in order to pay the said amount, the respondent issued a cheque No.232935 on 20.07.16 in favour of the appellant and when the appellant presented the said cheque in his Bank, the cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. Thereupon, the appellant sent a legal notices, but the respondent/accused did not pay the amount within stipulated time. Aggrieved therewith, the appellant filed a complaint case against the accused under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 before the J.M.F.C.Kawardha. 3. The learned J.M.F.C., after appreciating the entire evidence and material brought before it, convicted the respondent/accused under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 and sentenced him to RI for six months with fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default thereof, additional RI for 3 months. However, in appeal by the respondent/accused, vide judgment dated 06.09.2018, the appellate Court reversed the said finding and acquitted the respondent of the said charge. Hence, this revision. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant/complainant submits that the judgment impugned passed by the appellate Court in acquitting the respondent/accused without appreciating the evidence in its perspective, is erroneous. He further submits that it is proved that the 3 respondent issued a cheque in lieu of road tax and that, the said cheque also bears his signature and despite that, the appellate Court has erred in overlooking the material evidence available on record. On these premises, he urged that the judgment impugned passed by the appellate Court may be set aside and the respondent/accused may suitably be punished for the said offence. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent/accused supports the impugned judgment and submits that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment impugned passed by the appellate Court is well merited and does not call for interference. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record. 7. The main question which remains for consideration is whether the appellate Court was justified in acquitting the respondent/accused of the charge under Section 138 of the Act of 1881. 8. The appellate Court, on appreciation of the material available on record, held that the appellant/complainant has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent/accused is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act of 1881. The appellate Court has held that the appellant/complainant has failed to prove through the evidence adduced before the trial Court that on which date the respondent/accused received the registered notice dated 01.08.2016 (Ex.P.3). A perusal of section 138(c) of the Act of 1881 makes it clear that the cause of action for instituting a criminal complaint for the offence of dishonour of a cheque would accrue to the complainant on the date when the drawer of the cheque fails to pay the amount in due course within 15 days of receiving the said notice referred to in Section 138 (b) of the Act of 1881. The appellate Court was of the view that 4 merely by sending registered notice to the respondent/accused would not provide any reason for the complainant/appellant to file a complaint. In this regard, the Supreme Court in the matter of M/s Harman Electronics (P) Limited & Anr. vs. National Panasonic India Limited reported in (2009) 1 SCC 720 has held in paragraph 14 as under: “14. It is one thing to say that sending of a notice is one of the ingredients for maintaining the complaint but it is another thing to say that dishonour of a cheque by itself constitutes an offence. For the purpose of proving its case that the accused had committed an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the ingredients thereof are required to be proved. What would constitute an offence is stated in the main provision. The proviso appended thereto, however, imposes certain further conditions which are required to be fulfilled before cognizance of the offence can be taken. If the ingredients for constitution of the offence laid down in the provisos (a), (b) and (c) appended to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act intended to be applied in favour of the accused, there cannot be any doubt that receipt of a notice would ultimately give rise to the cause of action for filing a complaint. As it is only on receipt of the notice the accused at his own peril may refuse to pay the amount. Clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 138 therefore must be read together. Issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would.” 9. Since the appellant has failed to prove that, on which date, the respondent / accused received the legal notice (Ex.P.3) sent by him, therefore, in absence of such proof, it would be difficult for this Court to hold that the respondent/accused, the drawer of cheque (Ex.P.1), failed to repay the amount in due course within 15 days from the date of receipt of registered notice dated 01.08.2016. So much so, there is also no such mention in the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 before the J.M.F.C. that on which date, the respondent/accused had received the registered notice (Ex.P.3) and that, P.W.1 Kamlesh Singh also admitted in his cross-examination that he did not produce 5 any acknowledgment regarding receipt of said notices by the accused. Merely by sending legal notice (Ex.P.3) to the respondent/accused would not arise any cause of action for the complainant to file a complaint under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 against the respondent / accused. 10. The appellant / complainant has failed to prove that the amount stated in the cheque is payable by the respondent / accused under any legal liability or debt. Record would indicate that the respondent/accused is an illiterate and was aware of how to sign only. It appears that the handwriting on the cheque was not of the respondent/accused. 11. Having considered the material available on record as well as the elaborate judgment impugned passed by the appellate Court, I am of considered opinion that the judgment impugned acquitting the respondent/accused of the charge under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 is just and proper and does not call for any interference. Accordingly, this appeal by the appellant / complainant against the acquittal of the accused person/respondent herein is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Radhakishan Agrawal) JUDGE Anjani