JUDGMENT : NARENDRA KUMAR VYAS, J. (A) Relief sought:- 1. This petition has been filed by the petitioner for issuance of direction to the respondent authorities to decide the application submitted by respondent No. 2/Chhattisgarh Mineral Development Corporation Limited (for short “the Corporation”) before 27.03.2023 regarding grant of mining lease to the Corporation. The petitioner has also prayed that in the eventuality the respondent fails to decide the application for grant of mining lease in favour of the Corporation, the application submitted by them shall not be treated ineligible and their application be remained alive for consideration in view of bar contained in Section 17(A)(2a) of Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short “the MMDR Act, 1957”). The petitioner has also prayed for declaring that the area which was reserved in the year 1981 for public sector undertaking for mining of Bauxite by the State Government under the Act, 1957 remains reserved for public sector undertaking even after amendment in the MMDR Act, 1957. (B) Facts:- 2. (A) The Government of Madhya Pradesh issued a notification on 19.06.1981 (Annexure P/1) reserving the right of mining of Bauxite ore in Kanker and Narayanpur Tahsil District Bastar for M.P. State Mining Corporation Limited (for short “the MPSMC”) and along with the notification, the villages where the mining operation has to be carried out, have also been identified. Subsequently a proposal was sent by the MPSMC to allow them to carry out prospecting mining through joint prospecting mining operation which was approved by the Government vide its notification dated 18.11.1981. In pursuance of acceptance of the proposal made by the MPSMC, the Belpahar Refractories Limited conducted prospective mining and submitted report of geological investigation for Bauxite in the notified area. (B) The State Government vide order dated 22.11.1985 (Annexure P/3) has nominated the MPSMC as agent for Bauxite mining in Kanker, Kondagaon & Narayanpur of Bastar District on certain conditions. Clause 1 (A) of the order specifically provides that the MPSMC will be owner of the mines as per the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 and also to comply all the provisions of law and rules made therein. Clause 1 (A) of the order specifically provides that the MPSMC will be owner of the mines as per the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 and also to comply all the provisions of law and rules made therein. In view of reorganization of State of Madhya Pradesh as State of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh on 01.11.2000, the Chhattisgarh Minerals Development Corporation (for short “the CMDC”) has been constituted to carry out the mining operation in the State of Chhattisgarh as State Government public undertaking. (C) It is case of the petitioner that a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was executed on 17.02.2003 (Annexure P/7) between CMDC (First Party) and the petitioner [M/s K.G.N. Mineral & Metal (P) Ltd.] (Second Party) for identification, exploration, exploitation and marketing of Bauxite ore in Kanker & Bastar District to setup a calcination plant of 100 Metric Tonnes per day capacity in Kanker District of Chhattisgarh as soon as possible but not latter than two years from the date of joint venture agreement. Clause 6 of the joint venture agreement provides that the first party shall ensure with the State Government of Chhattisgarh that Bauxite ore bearing areas as earmarked above, are made available to the Second Party. The First Party will extend necessary assistance with regard to the above and in consideration of which the First Party will be given 25% of the equity of JVC without actually subscribing for it. Clause 14 of the joint venture agreement also provides that day to day working of the joint venture shall be fully under the control and management of second party and in case, the Second Party desires to bring in any corroborator either domestic and/or foreign for the said project, the same shall be finalized by the Second Party and if required, they may consult the First Party for assistance. Accordingly, the CMDC has applied for grant of mining lease for District Kanker village Budhiyamari on 20.04.2006. Thereafter, a supplementary joint venture agreement was executed on 16.10.2008 (Annexure P/6). Accordingly, the CMDC has applied for grant of mining lease for District Kanker village Budhiyamari on 20.04.2006. Thereafter, a supplementary joint venture agreement was executed on 16.10.2008 (Annexure P/6). This supplementary agreement provides that for all the prospective license/ mining license, the First Party i.e. CMDC shall apply in its name for the grant of prospecting licence (PL)/Mining Lease (ML) for Bauxite minerals ore and thereafter shall assign/transfer leasehold rights in all such PLs/MLs in favour of the JVC without any consideration whatsoever in accordance with the provisions of MMDR Act and the MC Rules. The supplementary agreement further provides that the First Party shall neither apply nor shall withdraw any PL or ML application without consent of the Second Party. (D) The Directorate of Mining, Government of Chhattisgarh vide its memo dated 06.03.2010 (Annexure P/8) has forwarded the application dated 20.04.2006 submitted by the CMDC for grant of mining lease to the Secretary, Mining Department for further proceeding and the same was also forwarded to the Secretary, Government of India Mining Department on 24.06.2010 (Annexure P/9) with a request to grant approval in favour of CMDC for mining operation. The same was rejected on 25.06.2010 by recording its finding that the area for which permission was sought, does not available for private person as it is reserved for CMDC as per the notification issued by the State Government under Rule 59 of the Mining Concession Rules, 1960. Thereafter, the department of Mines State of Chhattisgarh has again submitted the application with a request to reconsider the application of the CMDC as the State Government has already taken decision to grant mining lease to the CMDC for 30 years. (E) The Government of India, Ministry of Mines vide memo dated 01.08.2011 (Annexure P/10) has rejected the same on the count that the ratio of partnership between Joint Venture partners and M/s CMDC is 76:24 and the selection of Joint Venture partners is also not in terms of provisions of Section 11(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957 as well as it does not satisfy the requirement of the guidelines issued on 24.06.2009. Thereafter, the MMDR Act, 1957 was amended and certain new provisions have been inserted in the MMDR Act, 1957 by way of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 (for short “the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015”). Thereafter, the MMDR Act, 1957 was amended and certain new provisions have been inserted in the MMDR Act, 1957 by way of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 (for short “the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015”). (F) The Government of India, Ministry of Mines vide its memo dated 01.06.2015 (Annexure P/10) has rejected the proposal for grant of mining license of Bauxite in favour of CMDC which was granted for a period of 30 years in view of the amendment in Section 10A of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 as it has become ineligible on 12.01.2015 except those which are saved under Section 10(2A) of the MMDR Act, 1957. The Government of India has also advised to the State to consider the grant of mining license in favour of the CMDC as per the provisions of Section 17A (2A) of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. (G) Thereafter, the Secretary, Mining Department, Government of Chhattisgarh has clarified the provisions of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 to all the District Collectors and Mining Officers vide its memo dated 24.02.2015 with a direction to communicate to the applicants whose applications have become ineligible in view of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. (H) The Managing Director of the CMDC has again requested the State of Chhattisgarh to reconsider the case of CMDC in view of the judgment passed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Monet Ispat and Energy Limited Vs. Union of India & others, (2012) 11 SCC 1 . Thereafter proceedings were initiated by the Government of Chhattisgarh but the same has not reached to its logical end. Hence, this petition has been filed by the petitioner claiming the reliefs as aforestated. 3. The petitioner has filed additional documents by which the Government of Chhattisgarh has granted permission to the CMDC which is a government company for providing mining lease of Bauxite at various Villages i.e. Jamirapat, Tahsil- Kusmi, District- Balrampur, Mainpat of District- Surguja village- Sarbhanja, Village- Patharai & Nurela, Uranga and Barima, Village- Salangi, District- Kabirdham, Tahsil Bodla for 50 years as per the provisions of Section 17A (2A) of the MMDR Act, 1957 as amended to demonstrate that the CMDC has been granted mining lease by the State of Chhattisgarh, therefore, the petitioner being Joint Venture partner of CMDC should have also been considered. (C) Returns filed by the respondents :- 4. (C) Returns filed by the respondents :- 4. Respondent No. 1/State of Chhattisgarh has filed its return denying the averments made in the writ petition raising objection about maintainability of the petition mainly contending that:- (A) The writ petition on behest of the petitioner is not maintainable as the application submitted by respondent No. 2 for mining licence has been rejected, therefore, respondent No. 2 has only locus standi to challenge the same whereas respondent No. 2 has not filed the petition. (B) The Union of India vide its order dated 01.08.2011 (Annexure P/10) has rejected the application submitted by respondent No. 2 as it is in violation of guidelines dated 24.06.2009 as the petitioner has 74% share and respondent No. 2 is having 26% share, as such it does not fall within ambit of Government company though the area is reserved for the Government company only. It has been contended that the rejection order has not been challenged by the petitioner in this petition, as such also the writ petition is not maintainable. (C) The State of Chhattisgarh, Secretary Mining Department vide its memo dated 21.07.2020 has again rejected the application of the CMDC on the count that in view of Section 10 A(i) of the Amended Act, 2015, the application has become ineligible and again the same has not been challenged which has attained finality, as such the writ petition is not maintainable. (D) Submission on merit:- (A) It has been contended that the joint venture agreement was executed between the petitioner and respondent No. 2 on 17.02.2003 and respondent No. 2 has applied for grant of four mining lease for excavation of Bauxite on 30.06.2006 thereafter for another eight mining lease. The same has been rejected by respondent No. 3/Union of India on 01.08.2011 and thereafter, the State Government has not sent any final proposal to the Union of India for grant of mining lease, as such the said rejection order has become final and binding upon the petitioner. The same has been rejected by respondent No. 3/Union of India on 01.08.2011 and thereafter, the State Government has not sent any final proposal to the Union of India for grant of mining lease, as such the said rejection order has become final and binding upon the petitioner. (B) It has also been contended that again on 01.06.2015, the Central Government vide its memo dated 12.01.2015 has rejected the application as it has become ineligible in view of Section 17(A) of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 and on 22.06.2020 respondent No. 2 again sent a letter to the State Government for grant of mining lease under Section 17(2A) of the MMDR Act, 1957 which has been rejected by the State Government on 21.07.2020 but the same has also not been challenged by the petitioner in this petition. It is pertinent to mention here that the MMDR Act, 1957 has been further amended and proviso to Section 10(A)(2)(b) of the MMDR Act, 1957 has been amended on 28.03.2021 which provides that all those pending applications which are pending on the date of amendment were deemed to have been lapsed on 09.07.2021. It is pertinent to mention here that the MMDR Act, 1957 has been further amended and proviso to Section 10(A)(2)(b) of the MMDR Act, 1957 has been amended on 28.03.2021 which provides that all those pending applications which are pending on the date of amendment were deemed to have been lapsed on 09.07.2021. Section 10(A)(2)(b) is reproduced below:- “In section 10A of the principal Act, in sub-section (2),— (i) in clause (b), the following provisos shall be inserted, namely:- “Provided that for the cases covered under this clause including the pending cases, the right to obtain a prospecting licence followed by a mining lease or a mining lease, as the case may be, shall lapse on the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2021: Provided further that the holder of a reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence whose rights lapsed under the first proviso, shall be reimbursed theexpenditure incurred towards reconnaissance or prospecting operations in such manner as may be prescribed by the Central Government.” (ii) after clause (c), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:- “(d) in cases where right to obtain licence or lease has lapsed under, clauses (b) and (c), such areas shall be put up for auction as per the provisions of this Act: Provided that in respect of the minerals specified in Part B of the First Schedule where the grade of atomic mineral is equal to or greater than the threshold value, the mineral concession for such areas shall be granted in accordance with the rules made under section 11B.” On the above factual and legal position, respondent No. 1 has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Respondent No. 2 has filed its return mainly contending the main grievance of the petitioner is against State Government i.e. respondent No. 1, therefore, respondent No. 1 is main contesting party and petitioner neither pleads any specific allegation nor prays any relief against respondent No. 2, therefore, no detailed return is required to be filed by them. 6. 5. Respondent No. 2 has filed its return mainly contending the main grievance of the petitioner is against State Government i.e. respondent No. 1, therefore, respondent No. 1 is main contesting party and petitioner neither pleads any specific allegation nor prays any relief against respondent No. 2, therefore, no detailed return is required to be filed by them. 6. Respondent No. 3/ Union of India has filed counter affidavit contending that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the instant petition as the proposal recommended by the Government of Chhattisgarh for grant of mining lease of Bauxite in District Bastar was received by this Ministry in the name of M/s Chhattisgarh Mineral Development Corporation and if, but not admitting, the prior approval under Section 5(1) of the MMDR Act, 1957 was to be granted it would have been granted to respondent No. 2 and not to the petitioner. As such, the petitioner has no grievance against respondent No. 3. On this ground itself, the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine. It is further contended that the petitioner has miserably failed to establish any right to obtain a mining lease under the MMDR Act, 1957 or the Rules framed thereunder. Neither the petitioner has been able to demonstrate any right acquired by it under the erstwhile Rule 58 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 nor under Section 17A of the MMDR Act, 1957 which is reserved area for conservation. It has been further contended that any application of the petitioner for grant of mining lease has become ineligible by virtue of Section 10A(1) of the MMDR Act, 1957 with effect from 12.01.2015 and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. (E) Rejoinder:- 7. It has been further contended that any application of the petitioner for grant of mining lease has become ineligible by virtue of Section 10A(1) of the MMDR Act, 1957 with effect from 12.01.2015 and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. (E) Rejoinder:- 7. (A) The petitioner has also filed rejoinder questioning the objection raised by the respondents regarding maintainability of the writ petition in view of non-challenge of order dated 01.08.2011 (Annexure P/10) passed by the Central Government and has contended that the aforesaid letter is not in accordance with law and it is categorically submitted that the guidelines issued by the Central Government on 24.06.2009 are not applicable in the case of the petitioner as the intent of the Ministry while issuing the aforesaid guidelines clearly shows that it is to be applied prospectively and not retrospectively in view of clause 9.3 & 9.4 of the aforesaid guidelines, as such it is not required for the petitioner to challenge the same. It has been further contended that the State in its reply has also raised objection that the application for grant of mining lease was rejected by the State Government on 21.07.2020 (Annexure R/1) and the same has also not been challenged by the petitioner and the said letter dated 21.07.2020 is not in the form of an order and the State Government though mentioned that the case of the petitioner falls under the category of "ineligible". In response to the aforesaid letter dated 21.07.2020, respondent CMDC had sent its reply dated 30.12.2020, wherein the aforesaid fact was clarified that Joint Venture Company does not fall within the category of ineligible but is still eligible as per the provisions of Section 10A(1) of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. It is further contended that interpretation of Section 10A(2)(c) of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 preserves the right of the petitioner subject to fulfillment of the conditions, therefore, the cause of action arises in the petitioner's favour to bind the State. (B) It has been further contended that the State Government has sanctioned various mining leases in favour of respondent No. 2 on 27.03.2023 on the ground that the said mining areas are reserved for public sector and total 10 mining leases were granted to the CMDC for a period of 50 years under the provisions of MMDR Act, 1957. (B) It has been further contended that the State Government has sanctioned various mining leases in favour of respondent No. 2 on 27.03.2023 on the ground that the said mining areas are reserved for public sector and total 10 mining leases were granted to the CMDC for a period of 50 years under the provisions of MMDR Act, 1957. Moreover, the petitioner has already performed his part under the Joint Venture Agreement, however, the respondent State has clearly failed to perform its obligation under the agreement and now the petitioner apprehends that because of the change in law subsequent to joint venture agreement, respondent No. 1 may treat the land which is earmarked/reserved for Government company/ respondent No. 2, may be treated as unreserved by them. In such a scenario, the petitioner will suffer irreparable loss which cannot be compensated because the petitioner has already spent more than Rs.20 crores on setting up of calcination plant and over the past 20 years all the time and money of the petitioner is invested in this project, therefore, the loss caused to the petitioner by the act of the respondent authorities would fall under the category of irreparable loss that cannot be compensated in terms of money. (C) It is further contended that the Managing Director, CMDC on 30.12.2020 has clarified the position and requested the State Government to proceed with the case of the petitioner and had yet again requested the respondent to take appropriate action and grant mining lease in its favour, however, till date the aforesaid request made by the CMDC has not been considered or any order in relation to the pending applications with the State Government has been passed. On the above factual matrix, it has been prayed for allowing the writ petition. (F) Submissions made by the petitioner:- 8. (A) Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is claiming relief on the principle of application of doctrine of promissory estoppel against the State. Reiterating the fact already mentioned in the writ petition, he would submit that since the petitioner is a party of joint venture company, as such it has locus standi to file petition to protect its interest. It has been further contended that the petitioner has invested about Rs. 20 crores in view of the joint venture agreement. Reiterating the fact already mentioned in the writ petition, he would submit that since the petitioner is a party of joint venture company, as such it has locus standi to file petition to protect its interest. It has been further contended that the petitioner has invested about Rs. 20 crores in view of the joint venture agreement. Learned Senior counsel would take this Court through the manner of inception of Joint Venture Company and would submit that respondent No. 2 has issued advertisement for Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with private parties/firms for conducting the work of mining and excavation. In pursuance of the advertisement issue by CMDC, the Company, KGN Mineral & Metal Pvt. Ltd., submitted a proposal on 10.05.2002 along with the applicable processing fee and deposit money. Considering the proposal and following due procedure for selection of JV partner, CMDC entered into a Joint Venture Agreement for forming a Joint Venture Company vide agreement dated 17.02.2003. Thus, a JVC was formed in the name of Keshkal G.N.India Bauxite Mines & Minerals Ltd. (Applicant), which was duly registered on 04.03.2003 and accordingly they invested about Rs. 20 crores. He would further submit that in view of joint venture agreement dated 17.02.2003, M/s KGN Mineral and Metal Private Limited shall undertake total responsibility of organizing total capital through its own resources or from financial institution to the estimate cost of the project and the period of working of JVC shall be 30 years which may be extended on successful completion of mutually agreed period. Taking the promises made by the respondent State, the petitioner erected a calcination plant at Village Bargani Tahsil Charama District Uttar Baster Kanker completed and in the construction of the plant the petitioner had to spend about Rs. 20 crore and would highlight the clause of JVC to justify their joint venture projects. He would further submit that since the promises made by the State and complied by the petitioner was prior to 24.06.2009, therefore, guidelines dated 24.06.2009 were not applicable in case of the petitioner as when the JVC agreement was entered into there was no guideline, statutory provisions or rule with regard to percentage of party in partnership. He would further submit that various correspondences have been made between the Secretary, Mineral Resources Department and query raised by it would clearly demonstrate that the application is still pending. He would further submit that various correspondences have been made between the Secretary, Mineral Resources Department and query raised by it would clearly demonstrate that the application is still pending. He would further submit that in view of various judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, the Central Government has amended the Rule 58 of Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 on 16.11.1980 and has reserved the area for public sector undertaking. Accordingly, the same was reserved by the State of Madhya Pradesh on 19.06.1981, as such the respondents deserves direction by this Court to grant the mining licence in favour of respondent No. 2 as it has not become ineligible though subsequently amendments have been made in the MMDR Act, 1957 and would pray for allowing the writ petition. To substantiate his submission, he has referred to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of State of T.N. Vs. M/s Hind Stone & Others, (1981) 2 SCC 205 , Indian Metals & Ferro alloys Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1991) AIR 818 , State of T.N. Vs. M.P. Kaveri Chetty , (1995) 2 SCC 402, Indian Charge Chrome Vs. Union of India , (2006) 12 SCC 331, M/s Geomysore Services (l) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Hutti Goldmines Co. Ltd. & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 2538/2017, Monnet Ispat & Energy Limited Vs. Union of India & others, (2012) 11 SCC 1 , State of Orissa Vs. M.A. Tulloch & Company, AIR 1964 SC 1284 , Baijnath Kadio Vs. State of Bihar , (1969) 3 SCC 838 , India Cement Limited Vs. State of T.N. (1990) 1 SCC 12 , Orissa Cement Limited Vs. State of Orissa , (1991) Supp 1 SCC 430, Sandur Maganese and Iron Ores Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka & others, (2010) 13 SCC 1 , New Horizons Ltd. Vs. Union of India , (1995) 1 SCC 478 , M. Sudakar Vs. V. Manoharan & others, (2011) 1 SCC 484 , M/s Wonder Cement Limited Vs. State of Rajasthan & others, the judgment dated 23.08.2017 passed by Hon'ble High Court Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in case of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 126/2017 & Shree Cement Limited Vs. The State of Rajasthan & others, the judgment dated 26.09.2018 passed by Hon'ble High Court Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil Writ No. 128/2017. 9. State of Rajasthan & others, the judgment dated 23.08.2017 passed by Hon'ble High Court Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in case of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 126/2017 & Shree Cement Limited Vs. The State of Rajasthan & others, the judgment dated 26.09.2018 passed by Hon'ble High Court Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil Writ No. 128/2017. 9. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1/State would submit that the petitioner is having 74% of share and respondent No. 2/CMDC has 26% of share, therefore, in view of Section 2 (45) of the Companies Act, it cannot be said that it is a Government Company, as such, the mining area which is reserved for Government Company, cannot be given to a company which is not a Government Company. He would further submit that from bare perusal of clause 11 & 14 of the JVC executed on 17.02.2003, it is quite vivid that the entire control of the JVC with the petitioner and not with respondent No.2, as such the submission that the JVC is the Government Company, deserves to be rejected. 10. He would submit that since the petitioner has neither challenged the order dated 01.08.2011 which has been passed taking into consideration in violation of guideline dated 24.06.2009 and order dated 01.06.2015 by which the application filed by respondent No. 2 has become ineligible in view of amendment made in MMDR Act in the year 2015 nor the order dated 21.07.2020 (Annexure R/1), the same has attained finality, as such also the writ petition in absence of any challenge to it, deserves to be dismissed. He would further submit that the State Government after the order of the Central Government on 01.08.2011 has not forwarded any proposal for grant of mining lease, as such pending applications are lapsed on 28.03.2021 in view of amendment in the MMDR Act, 1957 by inserting proviso to Section 10(A)(2)(b). He would further submit that the petitioner is trying to take shelter of the certain note-sheet which has no significance in the eyes of law in view of well settled position of law that the note-sheet/ noting/ opinion recorded in the official files, are not the decision and they do not confer any right. To substantiate this submission, he would refer to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Shanti Sports Club & another Vs. To substantiate this submission, he would refer to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Shanti Sports Club & another Vs. Union of India & others, (2009) 15 SCC 705 . He would further submit that the contentions raised by the petitioner that since he has invested huge amount of Rs. 20 crores for installing the plant, therefore, he has legitimate expectation for granting mining lease in his favour, is misconceived in view of law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Monet Ispat Vs. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1 and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 11. Learned Deputy Solicitor General for the Union of India/ respondent No. 3 would adopt the submissions made by the State of Chhattisgarh and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 12. I have learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. 13. From submission made by the parties, the following points are to be determined by this Court :- Point No. 1 : Whether the guideline dated 24.06.2009 by which the ratio of shares has been prescribed for JV partners, is applicable retrospective or not? Point No. 2 : Whether the application submitted by respondent No. 2 become ineligible in view of amendment in Section 10 (A)(2) of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, subsequent amendment on 28.03.2021 and it can be saved or not? Point No. 3 : Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file this petition when the application submitted by respondent No. 2 has been rejected on 01.08.2011 after lapse of 12 years and there is alternate remedy of filing revision under the MMDR Act, 1957 is available? (G) Finding, discussion & analysis on Point No. 1 14. To appreciate Point No. 1, it is expedient for this Court to go through with the guideline dated 24.06.2009 issued regarding submission of minerals concession proposal under Section 5(1) of the MMDR Act, 1957 as well as Section 17A of the MMDR Act, 1957 which provides reservation of area for the purpose of conservation. To appreciate Point No. 1, it is expedient for this Court to go through with the guideline dated 24.06.2009 issued regarding submission of minerals concession proposal under Section 5(1) of the MMDR Act, 1957 as well as Section 17A of the MMDR Act, 1957 which provides reservation of area for the purpose of conservation. Section 17A(2) of the MMDR Act, 1957 which provides that the State Government may with the approval of the Central Government reserve any area not already held under any prospecting license or mining lease for undertaking prospecting or mining licence through a Government Company or Corporation owned or controlled by it and where it is proposed to do so, it shall by notification in the official gazette specify the boundaries of such area and the mineral and mineral in respect of which such area shall be reserved. Accordingly, the State Government vide its notification dated 19.06.1981 has reserved the area for mining operation for which respondent No. 2 which is a government company has sought lease. Section 17A of the MMDR Act, 1957 is reproduced below:- “ Section 17A. Reservation of areas for purposes of conservation .? (1) The Central Government, with a view to conserving any mineral and after consultation with the State Government, may reserve any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease and, where it proposes to do so, it shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the boundaries of such area and the mineral or minerals in respect of which such area will be reserved. (1A) The Central Government may in consultation with the State Government, reserve any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease, for undertaking prospecting or mining operations through a Government company or corporation owned or controlled by it, and where it proposes to do so, it shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the boundaries of such area and the mineral or minerals in respect of which such area will be reserved. (2) The State Government may, with the approval of the Central Government, reserve any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease, for undertaking prospecting or mining operations through a Government company or corporation owned or controlled by it and where it proposes to do so, it shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the boundaries of such area and the mineral or minerals in respect of which such areas will be reserved. (2A) Where in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1A) or sub-section (2), the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, reserves any area for undertaking prospecting or mining operations, the State Government shall grant prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may be, in respect of such area to such Government company or corporation: Provided that in respect of any mineral specified in Part A and Part B of the First Schedule, the State Government shall grant the prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may be, only after obtaining the previous approval of the Central Government. (2B) Where the Government company or corporation is desirous of carrying out the prospecting operations or mining operations in a joint venture with other persons, the joint venture partner shall be selected through a competitive process, and such Government company or corporation shall hold more than seventy-four per cent. of the paid up share capital in such joint venture. (2C) A mining lease granted to a Government company or corporation, or a joint venture, referred to in sub-sections (2A) and (2B), shall be granted on payment of such amount as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (3) Where in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1A) or sub-section (2) the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, undertakes prospecting or mining operations in any area in which the minerals vest in a private person, it shall be liable to pay prospecting fee, royalty, surface rent or dead rent, as the case may be, from time to time at the same rate at which it would have been payable under this Act if such prospecting or mining operations had been undertaken by a private person under prospecting licence or mining lease.” 15. This Section specifically provides that it should be a Government Company or a Corporation owned or controlled by it whereas from Clause 14 of the Joint Venture Agreement between the petitioner and respondent No. 2, it is quite vivid that it is controlled by the petitioner only. Clause 14 of the Joint Venture Agreement is again reproduced here:- “14. The day to day working of the Joint Venture shall be fully under the control and management of the second party and in case the second party desires to bring in any collaborator either domestic and/or foreign for the said project the same shall be finalized by the Second Party and if required they may conslut the first party for assistance. Such intention shall have to bed expressed in writing to the First party before hand.” 16. Thus, it is to be seen that who has control over the function of JVC. From perusal of Clause 14 of the Joint Venture Agreement, it is quite vivid that the entire control over the functioning of the JVC lies upon the petitioner which is violation of Section 17(2) of the MMDR Act, 1957. On this count alone, the order passed by the Union of India rejecting the proposal of the State Government to grant mining lease in favour of respondent No. 2, cannot be found faulty or suffers from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court. 17. Further submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the guideline dated 24.06.2009 cannot be given retrospective effect, is misconceived as this guidelines are issued to carry out the provisions of Section 17(2)(A) of the MMDR Act, 1957 to ascertain that who has the control over the functioning of the JVC for that a criteria has been taken into consideration to asses who is in control of the JVC. For that only the ratio has been formulated which is to carry out the provisions of the Act. Clause 9.2 of the guideline provides that the JV to whom the PL/ML is proposed to be given subsequently by transfer under Rule 37 of the Mining Concession Rules, 1960 must necessarily conform to the principles of the reservation i.e. the ownership or control of the company conducting operations lies with the State Government. Clause 9.2 of the guideline provides that the JV to whom the PL/ML is proposed to be given subsequently by transfer under Rule 37 of the Mining Concession Rules, 1960 must necessarily conform to the principles of the reservation i.e. the ownership or control of the company conducting operations lies with the State Government. Clause 9.3 of the guideline provides that if any public undertaking enters into joint venture with private sector company in order to exploit in a reserved area, the process of selection of such joint venture partners should also satisfy the norms set out in Section 11(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957. These guidelines are neither replacing the statute nor overriding but it is supplement to carry out the provisions of the MMDR Act, 1957, as such the submission of made by learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that it cannot be applicable in the case of the petitioner, is liable to be rejected, accordingly, it is rejected. The law with regard to issuance of circular and its object has been continuously subject matter of examination before Hon’ble the Supreme Court and the High Court and the Courts have held that clarificatory order can be given retrospective effect as it can throw light on substantive provision by principle of contermporanea expositio, as such the guidelines are applicable in the case of the petitioner without any reservation with full force. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & another v. Status Spinning Mills Limited & another, (2008) 7 SCC 353 in paragraph 29 has held as under:- “29. The clarification issued by the State during pendency of the appeals should have, therefore, been considered by the High Court in its proper perspective. If it is clarificatory in nature, it could be given a retrospective operation. Such a question, however, should have been posed and answered. Furthermore, the letter dated 1.08.1997 was issued as some confusion arose. When a subordinate legislation is made by the State Government, it must be done in terms of the constitutional provision. An executive order is also issued keeping in view the rules and executive business. It may not have the force of law but the same may come within the purview of the well-known principle of contemporaneous expositio. Rules of executive construction are also relevant.” 18. An executive order is also issued keeping in view the rules and executive business. It may not have the force of law but the same may come within the purview of the well-known principle of contemporaneous expositio. Rules of executive construction are also relevant.” 18. It is also well settled position of law that executive instruction cannot override the statutory provision but they are meant to supplement the law or to carry out the provisions of law and the guideline issued by respondent No. 3 is to assess whether as per Section 17(2)(A) of the MMDR Act, 1957, the petitioner falls within the category of such Government Company or Corporation, as such the guideline dated 24.06.2009 is applicable upon the petitioner. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of 19. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Accountant General, State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. S.K. Dubey and another , (2012) 4 SCC 578 has examined the power of State Government to issue executive instructions and has held in paragraphs 31 & 33 as under:- “31. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the executive power of a State extends to the matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has power to make laws. This is what is provided in Article 162 of the Constitution. In other words, the executive power of the State executive is coextensive with that of the State Legislature. 33. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Lalit Mohan Deb, (1973) 3 SCC 862 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 272 said: (SCC p. 867, para 9) “9. It is true that there are no statutory rules regulating the selection of assistants to the selection grade. But the absence of such rules is no bar to the administration giving instructions regarding promotion to the higher grade as long as such instructions are not inconsistent with any rule on the subject.” In Union of India v. Central Electrical & Mechanical Engg. Service (CE&MES) Group ‘A’ (Direct Recruits) Assn., CPWD [ (2008) 1 SCC 354 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 173] , this Court held that the executive instructions could fill in gaps not covered by the rules but such instructions cannot be in derogation of the statutory rules.” 20. Again Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Union of India and another Vs. Vs. Again Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Union of India and another Vs. Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2013) 16 SCC 147 has held paragraphs 58 to 60 as under:- “58. A Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with a similar issue in respect of executive instructions in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910 , held : (AIR p. 1914, para 7) “7. … It is true that the Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point the Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed.” 59. The law laid down above has consistently been followed and it is a settled proposition of law that an authority cannot issue orders/office memorandum/executive instructions in contravention of the statutory rules. However, instructions can be issued only to supplement the statutory rules but not to supplant it. Such instructions should be subservient to the statutory provisions. [Vide Union of India v. Majji Jangamayya, (1977) 1 SCC 606 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 191, P.D. Aggarwal v. State of U.P. (1987) 3 SCC 622 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 310 : (1987) 4 ATC 272, Paluru Ramkrishnaiah v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 541 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 375 : (1989) 10 ATC 378 : AIR 1990 SC 166 , C. Rangaswamaiah v. Karnataka Lokayukta, (1998) 6 SCC 66 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1448 and Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots' Assn. of India v. DG of Civil Aviation, (2011) 5 SCC 435 : AIR 2011 SC 2220 ]. 60. Similarly, a Constitution Bench of this Court, in Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India, (1998) 2 SCC 109 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 514 : AIR 1998 SC 431 , held that the executive instructions have binding force provided the same have been issued to fill up the gap between the statutory provisions and are not inconsistent with the said provisions.” ” 21. Thus, it is quite vivid that since the executive instructions are supplement to carry out the provisions of law, as such they are applicable in the case of the petitioner without any reservation and Point No. 1 is answered against the petitioner and in favour of respondents No. 1 & 3 . Thus, it is quite vivid that since the executive instructions are supplement to carry out the provisions of law, as such they are applicable in the case of the petitioner without any reservation and Point No. 1 is answered against the petitioner and in favour of respondents No. 1 & 3 . Accordingly, it is held that the guidelines are to carry out the provisions of the MMDR Act, 1957, therefore, theory of retrospective applicability is not applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the case. (H) Finding, discussion & analysis on Point No. 2 22. To appreciate this Point, it is expedient for this Court to briefly go through the provisions of the MMDR Act. The reconnaissance operation and reconnaissance permit have been defined in Section 3(ha) & 3(hb) respectively and Section 10A as amended on 12.01.2015 in view of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 which read as under:- “ Section 3 (ha) - reconnaissance operations” means any operations undertaken for preliminary prospecting of a mineral through regional, aerial, geophysical or geochemical surveys and geological mapping, but does not include pitting, trenching, drilling (except drilling of boreholes on a grid specified from time to time by the Central Government) or sub-surface excavation; Section 3 (hb) - reconnaissance permit” means a permit granted for the purpose of undertaking reconnaissance operations; “ Section 10A- Rights of existing concession holders and applicants .? (1) All applications received prior to the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, shall become ineligible. (2) Without prejudice to sub-section (1), the following shall remain eligible on and from the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015:? (a) applications received under section 11A of this Act; (b) where before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 a reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence has been granted in respect of any land for any mineral, the permit holder or the licensee shall have a right for obtaining a prospecting licence followed by a mining lease, or a mining lease, as the case may be, in respect of that mineral in that land, if the State Government is satisfied that the permit holder or the licensee, as the case may be,? (i) has undertaken reconnaissance operations or prospecting operations, as the case may be, to establish the existence of mineral contents in such land in accordance with such parameters as may be prescribed by the Central Government; (ii) has not committed any breach of the terms and conditions of the reconnaissance permit or the prospecting licence; (iii) has not become ineligible under the provisions of this Act; (iv) has not failed to apply for grant of prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may be, within a period of three months after the expiry of reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence, as the case may be, or within such further period not exceeding six months as may be extended by the State Government; answered (c) where the Central Government has communicated previous approval as required under sub-section (1) of section 5 for grant of a mining lease, or if a letter of intent (by whatever name called) has been issued by the State Government to grant a mining lease, before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, the mining lease shall be granted subject to fulfilment of the conditions of the previous approval or of the letter of intent within a period of two years from the date of commencement of the said Act: Provided that in respect of any mineral specified in the First Schedule, no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted under clause (b) of this subsection except with the previous approval of the Central Government.” 23. From perusal of Section 10A(2) of the MMDR Act, 1957, only the category/status of the applications which have been enumerated in this section will only be remained ineligible for consideration. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner would submit that from the report pertaining to reconnaissance survey and sampling of Bauxite (Annexure P/2), they will be eligible for grant of mining lease even after the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 & 2021 is being considered by this Court. From the report (Annexure P/2) itself, it is quite vivid that the survey sampling of Bauxite from different plateau were done from December 1981 and February 1992 and the present JVC with the petitioner has been constituted on 17.02.2003. From the report (Annexure P/2) itself, it is quite vivid that the survey sampling of Bauxite from different plateau were done from December 1981 and February 1992 and the present JVC with the petitioner has been constituted on 17.02.2003. Sub-section 4 provides that if any proposed lease holder has not applied for grant of prospecting licence or mining lease as the case may be within a period of three months after the expiry of reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence as the case may be or within such further period not exceeding six months as may be extended by the State Government, will be held eligible whereas from the report itself, it is quite vivid that the reconnaissance survey was carried out from December, 1981 to February, 1982 and within six months, respondent No. 2 has not applied for prospecting licence or mining lease, therefore, the petitioner cannot take any defence to treat respondent No. 2, is eligible for grant of mining lease or his application has not become eligible, therefore, the submission made by learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that the respondent has committed illegality in holding that respondent No. 2 has become ineligible in view of the amendment in the MMDR Act, 1957 on 12.01.2015, deserves to be rejected. 24. There is another reason for holding the petitioner to be ineligible in view of further amendment in the MMDR Act, 1857 on 28.03.2021 which provides that all those pending applications which are pending on the date of amendment were deemed to have been lapsed on 09.07.2021 in view of insertion of proviso to Section 10(A)(2)(b) of the MMDR Act, 1957. Thus, the application submitted by respondent No. 2 for all the reasons as detailed hereinabove have become ineligible or lapse as no recommendation was made to the Central Government by the State Government for considering the case of respondent No. 2 for grant of mining lease. Accordingly, Point No. 2 is also answered against the petitioner and in favour of respondents No. 1 & 3 (I) Finding, discussion & analysis on Point No. 3 25. Accordingly, Point No. 2 is also answered against the petitioner and in favour of respondents No. 1 & 3 (I) Finding, discussion & analysis on Point No. 3 25. From the averments made in the writ petition, it is quite vivid that mining lease was likely to be granted to respondent No. 2 though the petitioner may be a member of joint venture with it even from the Joint Venture Agreement dated 17.02.2003, all the lease PL/ML have to be first granted to respondent No. 2 who in terms of their Joint Venture Agreement, will be transferred to the petitioner but respondent No. 2 has not approached this Court whose interest is adversely affected by the order or inaction of respondents No. 1 & 3, therefore, the petitioner has no authority to challenge the same even if it has invested the amount as alleged by the petitioner but no right has been directly affected by action of respondents No. 1 & 3, therefore, he cannot be held to be aggrieved person. The 'aggrieved person' has been defined in legal dictionary according to which it means a person must show that he has a more particular or peculiar interest of his own beyond that of the general public in seeing that the law is properly administered and such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest. From the records of the case, it is demonstratively clear that the petitioner has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. The petitioner has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. The petitioner has not been subjected to legal wrong and has suffered no grievance and he has no legal peg for a justifiable claim to hand on, therefore, the petitioner is not a "person aggrieved" and respondent No. 2 has not approached this Court whose interest is adversely affected by the order or inaction of respondents No. 1 & 3, as such the petitioner has no authority to challenge the same even if it has invested the amount as alleged by the petitioner as no right has been directly affected by action of respondents No. 1 & 3 26. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in various decisions has considered the word ‘person aggrieved’, particularly in case of Babua Ram and others Vs. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in various decisions has considered the word ‘person aggrieved’, particularly in case of Babua Ram and others Vs. State of U.P. and another , (1995) 2 SCC 689 wherein it has been held as under:- “17. In Collins English Dictionary, the word "aggrieved" has been defined to mean "to ensure unjustly especially by infringing a person's legal rights". In Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, International Edition at page 28, aggrieved person is defined to mean "subjected to ill-treatment, feeling an injury or injustice. Injured, as by legal decision adversely infringing upon one's rights". In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Fifth Ed., Vol. 1, pages 83- 84, person aggrieved means "person injured or damaged in a legal sense". In Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed. at page 65, aggrieved has been defined to mean "having suffered loss or injury; damnified; injured", aggrieved person has been defined to mean "One whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, or whose pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected by a decree or judgment. One whose right of property may be established or divested. The word "aggrieved" refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right, or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation." 18. One whose right of property may be established or divested. The word "aggrieved" refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right, or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation." 18. The person aggrieved must, therefore, be one who has suffered a legal grievance because of a decision pronounced by Civil Court giving higher compensation for an acquired lands similar to his own while he is denied of such higher compensation for his land because of operation of Section 18 read with Section 31 of the Act resulting in affectation of his pecuniary interest in his acquired land is directly and adversely in that award of the Collector made under s. 11, he becomes as such aggrieved person and entitled to avail of the right and remedy conferred upon him under Section 28A(1) to make good his denied right to receive compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector/L.A.O. Acceptance of the contention of Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel and his companions, that person who under protest received payment of compensation for their lands but failed to avail of the right and remedy under Section 18 waiting in the wings for success of the land owners of the adjoining lands to get higher compensation under Section 28- A(1) as person aggrieved robs the poor and inarticulate who by reason of their poverty or ignorance failed to avail of the right and remedy under Section 18, and creates not only invidious discrimination between same class of person similarly situated but would be highly unjust arbitrary offending Article 14 of the Constitution, apart from flying in the face of express animation of the statute as espoused in its Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Financial Memorandum. In this context, we make it clear that we have looked into Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Financial Memorandum to know what is in that induced the introduction of the Bill but not as an aid to interpret Section 28- A(1). In this context, we make it clear that we have looked into Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Financial Memorandum to know what is in that induced the introduction of the Bill but not as an aid to interpret Section 28- A(1). Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that any interested person in the land acquired under the same Notification published under Section 4(1) who failed to avail the right and remedy under Section 18(1) read with second proviso to Section 31(2), becomes a person aggrieved under Section 28-A(1) of the Act, when the owner of the another land covered by the same notification is awarded higher compensation by the Civil Court on a reference got made by him under Section 18.” 27. Again Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Northern Plastics Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. Ltd. and others , (1997) 4 SCC 452 has held in paragraph 10 as under:- “10……….But it order to earn a locus standi as 'person aggrieved' other than the arraigned party before the Collector of Customs as an adjudicating authority it must be shown that such a person aggrieved being third party has a direct legal interest in the goods involved in the adjudication process. It cannot be a general public interest or interest of a business rival as is being projected by the contesting respondents before us. In this connection we may refer to a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, Bombay, ( 1970 (2) SCC 484 . Question before the Constitution Bench in that case was as to whether Advocate General of the High Court who was be to issued a notice in disciplinary proceedings by the Bar Council as per the provisions of Section 35(2) of the Advocate Act, 1961 had locus standi to prefer an appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority under Section 37 of the Advocates Act before Bar Council of India. A majority of the Constitution Bench took the view that the Advocate General had no such locus standi. He could not be said to be a 'person aggrieved' by the decision of the disciplinary authority exonerating the concerned delinquent advocate. A majority of the Constitution Bench took the view that the Advocate General had no such locus standi. He could not be said to be a 'person aggrieved' by the decision of the disciplinary authority exonerating the concerned delinquent advocate. Mitter, J., speaking for the majority considered the question in the light of the statutory settings of the Act and observed that to decide the question one had to look at the proceedings of this kind. We may refer to the pertinent observations in this connection made in paras 9 and 10 of the Report of the said judgment of Mitter, J.: "Generally speaking. a person can be said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other. A person who is not a party to a litigation has no right to appeal merely because the judgment or order contains some adverse remarks against him. But it has been held in a number of cases that a person who is not a party to a suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court and such leave would not be refused where the judgment would be binding on him under Explanation 6 to Section 11 of the Code of civil procedure. We find ourselves unable to take the view that because a person has been given notice of some proceedings wherein he is given a right to appear and make his submissions, he should without more have a right of appeal from an order rejecting his contentions or submission. An appeal is a creature of statute and if a statute expressly gives a person a right to appeal, the matter rests there. Innumerable statutes both in England and in India give the right of appeal to 'a person aggrieved' by an order made and the provisions of such statutes have to be construed in each case to find out whether the person prefering an appeal falls within that expression. As was observed in Robinson v. Currey [7 QBD 465] the words 'person aggrieved' are 'ordinary meaning put upon them'. As was observed in Robinson v. Currey [7 QBD 465] the words 'person aggrieved' are 'ordinary meaning put upon them'. According to Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition, Vol.25), page 293, footnote 'h': '…...the expression is nowhere defined and must be contrued by reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances.' Attempts have however from time to time been made to define the expression in various cases. In Ex parte Sidebotham In re Sidebotham [14 Ch D 458 at 465] it was observed by James.L.J.: 'But the words 'person aggrieved' do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something." 28. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Shripal Bhati & another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others, (2020) 12 SCC 87 has examined the issue relating to aggrieved person and has held that unless injury is suffered personally a person cannot be said to be aggrieved and has no locus standi. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in paragraph 25 has held as under:- “25. For the aforesaid facts and reasons the challenge made by the appellants to the appointment and absorption of respondent no. 4 is not tenable and they have no locus standi in the matter. It may be relevant to refer to the observations made by this Court in the case Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors. AIR 1976 SC 578 , relied upon by the High Court, holding that unless injury is suffered personally a person can not be said to be aggrieved and has no locus standi: “48. In the light of above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore, he is not a ‘person aggrieved’ and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of ‘No Objection Certificate”.” 29. Thus, by action of respondents No. 1 & 3, the right of the petitioner is not directly adversely affected, as such he has no locus standi to file this petition. 30. It is pertinent to mention here that neither the petitioner nor respondent No. 2 has challenged the order dated 01.08.2011 by which the application of respondent No. 2 for considering of proposal made by State Government for grant of mining lease, has been rejected and the order dated 01.06.2015 by which again the proposal of the State Government has been rejected as it has become ineligible w.e.f. 12.01.2015, is not subject matter of challenge before any forum, therefore, it became final, as such also the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 31. Further, the State Government in view of the subsequent amendment in the MMDR Act, 1957 vide its order dated 09.07.2022 (Annexure R/2) has held that all the applications are lapsed which are pending before it, has not been challenged by respondent No. 2 by filing revision under Section 30 of the MMDR Act, 1957, as such it became final and on this count also, the writ petition is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed. 32. Further submission of the petitioner that the respondent No. 3 has granted various mining leases to the respondent No. 2 for 50 years in view of Section 17A(2A) of the MMDR Act, 1957 but the petitioner is Joint Venture partner, in that case it has been denied, therefore, it is subject to hostile discrimination between the similarly situated persons, is being considered by this Court. From perusal of Annexure P/22 to P/31 which are the mining lease granted to respondent No. 2 which are reserved for Government Company only but no such material has been placed on record to demonstrate that it is a Joint Venture Company. From perusal of Annexure P/22 to P/31 which are the mining lease granted to respondent No. 2 which are reserved for Government Company only but no such material has been placed on record to demonstrate that it is a Joint Venture Company. In absence of any such material placed on record by the petitioner, it cannot be said that the petitioner is subjected to hostile discrimination. In view of the well settled position of law that the person who claims parity or claiming that he is similarly situated person, should prove by placing some material before the Court which is absolutely missing in the present case, therefore, the submission made by the petitioner that the petitioner is similarly situated person, therefore, he should be treated similarly and should have been granted lease, deserves to be rejected. The view taken by this Court is fortified by the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of State of Punjab & others Vs. Jagjit Singh & others, (2017) 1 SCC 148 wherein it has been held in paragraph 42.1 as under:- “42.1 The ‘onus of proof’, of parity in the duties and responsibilities of the subject post with the reference post, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, lies on the person who claims it. He who approaches the Court has to establish, that the subject post occupied by him, requires him to discharge equal work of equal value, as the reference post (see – the Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case, Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh v. Manju Mathur, the Steel Authority of India Limited case and the National Aluminum Company Limited case).” 33. Further submission made by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is entitled to get relief in view of promissory estoppel as he has already invested a huge amount of money. Further submission made by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is entitled to get relief in view of promissory estoppel as he has already invested a huge amount of money. This submission is vehemently objected by learned Advocate General for the State and would submit that the principle of promissory estoppel is not applicable in the present case as from very inception, the function of Joint Venture is against the provisions of law and there is no estoppel against the statute as all the applications except the categories enumerated in Clause 2 of Section 10(2)(A) of the MMDR Act, 1957, are ineligible and the petitioner is unable to establish that his case falls within the category of Section 10(2)(A) of the MMDR Act, 1957 to become eligible. The law with regard to promissory estoppel against the statute has recently come up for consideration before Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Hero Motocorp Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) & others, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 852 wherein it has been held as under:- “31. The question, therefore, that would fall for consideration is, as to whether, despite a subsequent statute specifically providing for rescinding the benefits granted under an earlier statute, the Union Government can be compelled to stand by the representation made by it through the earlier notification. In other words, the question that will have to be considered is whether doctrine of promissory estoppel could operate against a statute. 33. Heavy reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in the ase of Union of India & Ors. vs. M/s Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd. which is one of the earlier judgments of this Court considering the issue of promissory estoppel. In the said case, the Textile Commissioner published a scheme on 10th October 1962, called the Export Prmotion Scheme providing incentives to exporters of woolen goods. The scheme was extended by a Trade Notice dated 1st January 1963, to export of woolen goods to Afghanistan. In pursuance of the said scheme, the exporters were entitled to import raw materials of a total amount equal to 100% of the F.O.B. (freight on board) value of their exports. However, the competent authority issued an Import Entitlement Certificate to Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd. only in part. The Indo- Afghan Agencies Ltd., therefore, made a representation to the authorities. In pursuance of the said scheme, the exporters were entitled to import raw materials of a total amount equal to 100% of the F.O.B. (freight on board) value of their exports. However, the competent authority issued an Import Entitlement Certificate to Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd. only in part. The Indo- Afghan Agencies Ltd., therefore, made a representation to the authorities. On failure of the authorities to respond, a petition came to be filed in the High Court of Punjab. The High Court held that the Export Promotion Scheme specifically provided for granting certificates to import materials of the “value equal to 100% of the F.O.B. value of the goods exported”. It was, therefore, held by the High Court that the petitioners therein were entitled to obtain import licenses for an amount equal to 100% of the F.O.B. value. The judgment of the High Court was challenged before this Court. One of the issues before this Court was with regard to the violation of principles of natural justice. This Court also considered the issue of promissory estoppel. This Court held: “15. In these cases it was clearly ruled that where a person has acted upon representations made in an Export Promotion Scheme that import licences upto the value of the goods exported will be issued, and had exported goods, his claim for import licence for the maximum value permissible by the Scheme could not be arbitrarily rejected. Reduction in the amount of import certificate may be justified on the ground of misconduct of the exporter in relation to the goods exported, or on special considerations such as difficult foreign exchange position, or other matters which have a bearing on the general interests of the State. In the present case, the Scheme provides for grant of import entitlement of the value, and not upto the value, of the goods exported. The Textile Commissioner was, therefore, in the ordinary course required to grant import certificate for the full value of the goods exported: he could only reduce that amount after enquiry contemplated by clause 10 of the Scheme….” 34. It could thus be seen that the issue that fell for consideration in the case of M/s Indo- Afghan Agencies Ltd. (supra) was with regard to an arbitrary reduction of the claim of the writ petitioner contrary to the Export Promotion Scheme. It could thus be seen that the issue that fell for consideration in the case of M/s Indo- Afghan Agencies Ltd. (supra) was with regard to an arbitrary reduction of the claim of the writ petitioner contrary to the Export Promotion Scheme. The issue as to whether the Legislature by a subsequent enactment was entitled to withdraw the benefit granted under the earlier scheme did not fall for consideration in the said case. 35. This Court in the case of Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. and another vs. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another considered the issue wherein the Municipality had agreed to exempt the appellant therein from payment of octroi duty for 7 years from the date of levy of octroi. However, thereafter, the Municipality sought to levy octroi duty from the appellant therein. This Court observed thus: “12. If our nascent democracy is to thrive different standards of conduct for the people and the public bodies cannot ordinarily be permitted. A public body is, in our judgment, not exempt from liability to carry out its obligation arising out of representations made by it relying upon which a citizen has altered his position to his prejudice.” 36. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of M. Ramanatha Pillai vs. The State of Kerala and another considered the question as to whether estoppel could arise against a State in regard to abolition of posts. The Constitution Bench observed thus: “37. The High Court was correct in holding that no estoppel could arise against the State in regard to abolition of post. The appellant Ramanatha Pillai knew that the post was temporary. In American Jurisprudence 2d at p. 783 para 123 it is stated “Generally, a state is not subject to an estoppel to the same extent as in an individual or a private corporation. Otherwise, it might be rendered helpless to assert its powers in government. Therefore as a general rule the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied against the State in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity. An exception however arises in the application of estoppel to the State where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice”. The estoppel alleged by the appellant Ramanatha Pillai was on the ground that he entered into an agreement and thereby changed his position to his detriment. An exception however arises in the application of estoppel to the State where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice”. The estoppel alleged by the appellant Ramanatha Pillai was on the ground that he entered into an agreement and thereby changed his position to his detriment. The High Court rightly held that the Courts exclude the operation of the doctrine of estoppel, when it is found that the authority against whom estoppel is pleaded has owed a duty to the public against whom the estoppel cannot fairly operate.” [Emphasis supplied] 38. Another Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of Kerala and another vs. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (WVG). Co. Ltd. Etc. was considering an issue as to the application of promissory estoppel when a right to compensation for acquisition of forest land as provided in the earlier statute was taken away by a subsequent statute. The Constitution Bench held thus: “38. In an attempt to show that the impugned Act was a piece of colourable legislation, reference was made to the Karala Private Forests Acquisition Bill, 1968 LA Bill No. 33 of 1968 which provided for the acquisition of private forests on payment of compensation for the acquisition. That Bill, it is contended, was allowed to lapse and the present Act was enacted with the obvious intention of expropriating vast forest lands without paying compensation. We can hardly countenance such an argument. The question really is, in the first place, of the competence of the legislature to pass the impugned Act and, in the second, whether the Act is constitutional in the sense that it is protected by Section 31A(1). So far as the competence of the legislature is concerned, no objection is made before us. As to its constitutionality we have shown that the Act purports to vast the janman rights to the forests in the Government as a step in the implementation of agrarian reform. If this could be constitutionally done by the legislature, the fact that at an earlier stage the Government was toying with the idea of paying compensation to owners of private forests is of little consequence. The dominant purpose of the impugned Act, as already pointed out, is to distribute forest lands for agricultural purposes after making reservations of portions of the forests for the benefit of the agricultural community. The dominant purpose of the impugned Act, as already pointed out, is to distribute forest lands for agricultural purposes after making reservations of portions of the forests for the benefit of the agricultural community. The fear is expressed that such a course if, genuinely implemented, may lead to deforestation on a large scale leading to soil erosion and silting of rivers and streams and will actually turn out to be detrimental to the interests of the agricultural community in the long run. It is undoubtedly true that rackless deforestation might lead to very unhappy results. But we have no material before us for expressing opinion on such a matter. It is for the legislature to balance the comparative advantages of a scheme like the one envisaged in the Act against the possible disadvantages of resulting deforestation. There are many imponderables to which we have no safe guides. It is presumed that the legislature knows the needs of its people and will balance the present advantages against possible future disadvantages. If there is pressure on land and the legislature feels that forest lands in some areas can be conveniently and, without much damage to the community as a whole, utilized for settling a large proportion of the agricultural population, it is perfectly open, under the constitutional powers vested in the legislature, to make a suitable law, and if the law is constitutionally valid this Court can hardly strike it down on the ground that in the long run the legislation instead of turning out to be a boon will turn out to be a curse. 39. Mr Menon who appeared for the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1398 of 1972 put forward a plea of equitable estoppel peculiar to his client company. It appears that the Company established itself in Kerala for the production of rayon cloth pulp on an understanding that the Government would bind itself to supply the raw-material. Later Government was unable to supply the material and by an agreement undertook not to legislate for the acquisition of private forests for a period of 60 years if the Company purchased forest lands for the purpose of its supply of rawmaterials. Later Government was unable to supply the material and by an agreement undertook not to legislate for the acquisition of private forests for a period of 60 years if the Company purchased forest lands for the purpose of its supply of rawmaterials. Accordingly, the Company purchased 30,000 acres of private forests from the Nilambhuri Kovila Kannan estate for Rs 75 lakhs and, therefore, it was argued that, so far as the Company is concerned, the agreement not to legislate should operate as equitable estoppel against the State. We do not see how an agreement of the Government can preclude legislation on the subject. The High Court has rightly pointed out that the surrender by the Government of its legislative powers to be used for public good cannot avail the company or operate against the Government as equitable estoppel.” [Emphasis supplied] 40. A four judge Bench of this Court in the case of Excise Commissioner, U.P. Allahabad and others vs. Ram Kumar and others23 had considered the issue wherein, at the time of the auction, licenses sold by the Government to vend country liquor exempted the levy of sales tax. However, by a subsequent notification, the sale of country liquor was subjected to the levy of sales tax. This Court specifically rejected the contention that the State was estopped from doing so. This Court relied on the earlier Constitution Bench judgment in the cases of M. Ramanatha Pillai (supra) and The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (WVG). Co. Ltd. Etc. (supra). It held that an assurance given by or on behalf of the Crown by an officer of a government, however high or low in the hierarchy, could not bar the Crown from enforcing a statutory prohibition. It reiterated the legal position that estoppel does not operate against the Government or its assignee. 41. In the case of The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co- operative Society Ltd. vs. Sipahi Singh and others, the State Government had directed that the settlement of the Jalkar would continue with Sipahi Singh for the years 1976-77 and 1977-78. However, on the representation made by the Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd., the State Government directed that the settlement of the Jalkar would be with the said Society for the relevant years on certain conditions. Sipahi Singh filed a writ petition which was allowed by the High Court relying on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. However, on the representation made by the Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd., the State Government directed that the settlement of the Jalkar would be with the said Society for the relevant years on certain conditions. Sipahi Singh filed a writ petition which was allowed by the High Court relying on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. A three-judge Bench of this Court, while reversing the judgment of the High Court, observed thus: “13. The doctrine of promissory estoppel could also not be pressed into service in the present case, as it is well settled that there cannot be any estoppel against the Government in exercise of its sovereign legislative and executive functions. (See Excise Commissioner, U.P. Allahabad v. Ram Kumar, (1976) 3 SCC 540 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 360 : AIR 1976 SC 2237 ).” [Emphasis supplied] 43. Subsequently, a two Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others again considered the issue of estoppel. In the said case, the State Government had represented that an exemption from sales tax would be granted to new industrial units. Based on the assurance of the State Government, the appellant before this Court in the said case had established its industrial unit. However, subsequently, the Government decided to rescind the said concession. Though this Court, in the facts of the said case, held that the appellant therein, based on the promise made by the respondent therein, had altered its position to its detriment and as such, the State could not resile from the said promise, allowing the appeal observed thus: “28. …… There can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power. The Legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative function by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Vide State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1973) 2 SCC 713 , 730 (para 39) : (1974) 1 SCR 671 , 688.” [Emphasis supplied] 44. Thereafter comes the judgment of this Court in thecase of M/s Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and others vs. State of Haryana and others26. In the said case, the municipal committee established a small mandi and decided that the purchasers of the plots for sale in the mandi would not be required to pay octroi duty on goods imported within the said mandi. In the said case, the municipal committee established a small mandi and decided that the purchasers of the plots for sale in the mandi would not be required to pay octroi duty on goods imported within the said mandi. Subsequently, the municipal committee started imposing octroi duty. Challenging the said act of the municipal committee, a writ petition was filed before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the said writ petition. The two-Judge Bench of this Court in the said case, referring to judgments of courts of various other jurisdictions as well as the judgments of this Court at an earlier point of time, observed thus: “40. The scope of the plea of doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government may be summed up as follows: (1) The plea of promissory estoppel is not available against the exercise of the legislative functions of the State. (2) The doctrine cannot be invoked forpreventing the Government from discharging its functions under the law. (3) When the officer of the Government acts outside the scope of his authority, the plea of promissory estoppel is not available. The doctrine of ultra vires will come into operation and the Government cannot be held bound by the unauthorised acts of its officers. (4) When the officer acts within the scope of his authority under a scheme and enters into an agreement and makes a representation and a person acting on that representation puts himself in a disadvantageous position, the Court is entitled to require the officer to act according to the scheme and the agreement or representation. The officer cannot arbitrarily act on his mere whim and ignore his promise on some undefined and undisclosed grounds of necessity or change the conditions to the prejudice of the person who had acted upon such representation and put himself in a disadvantageous position. (5) The officer would be justified in changing the terms of the agreement to the prejudice of the other party on special considerations such as difficult foreign exchange position or other matters which have a bearing on general interest of the State.” [Emphasis supplied] 58. (5) The officer would be justified in changing the terms of the agreement to the prejudice of the other party on special considerations such as difficult foreign exchange position or other matters which have a bearing on general interest of the State.” [Emphasis supplied] 58. We are, therefore, of the considered view that even on the ground of change of policy, which is in public interest or in view of the change in the statutory regime itself on account of the GST Act being introduced as in the instant case, it will not be correct to hold the Union bound by the representation made by it, i.e. by the said O.M. of 2003. Further, this would be contrary to the statutory provisions as enacted under Section 174(2)(c) of the CGST Act. 72. Though we have held that the appellants’ claim based on promissory estoppel is without substance, we find that this is not a case wherein it can be said that the appellants’ claim is wholly without any substance.” 34. In view of the above, Point No. 3 is also answered against the petitioner and in favour of respondents No. 1 & 3. 35. In view of the above discussion, considering the facts and law on the subject, it is held that the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief as prayed for in this petition. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.