Page 1 CM no.295/2023 RP no.04/2023 HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR … CM no.295/2023 RP no.04/2023 Pronounced on: 21.08.2025 National Insurance Co. Ltd. Divisional Office Srinagar …….Petitioner(s) Through: Mr Nissar A. Dendru, Advocate Versus Mohammad Ramzan Ganaie and others ……Respondent(s) Through: Mr Muzaffar, Advocate vice Mr. B.A.Tak, Advocate for respondents 1&4 CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL, JUDGE JUDGEMENT CM no.295/2023 1. Review petitioner/insurance company has failed to take steps for effecting service upon respondents 2&3 right from day one, although innumerable opportunities were given to it. 2. Nevertheless, I have heard Mr. Nissar A. Dendru, learned counsel for review petitioner/insurance company and reserved the matter for pronouncement of judgement. 3. Delay in filing review petition is sought to be condoned. The ground in this regard taken by review petitioner/insurance company is that because of spread of COVID-19 pandemic, the normal functioning of review petitioner-insurance company got disrupted inasmuch as number of employees remained thin which affected upon functioning of affairs Page 2 CM no.295/2023 RP no.04/2023 review petitioner/insurance company. Thereafter, Administrative Officer (Legal) of review petitioner/insurance company died suddenly due to a massive heart attack. The said officer was looking after legal work in Divisional Office of review petitioner/ insurance company at Srinagar. Due to his sudden death, legal work got hampered until new official took over charge of legal work at Divisional Office Srinagar. 4. In their objections respondents 1&4 would contend that appeal was dismissed on 23rd March 2021. There is delay of about 636 days. Since COVID-19 pandemic spread in whole India and also in Kashmir, but the Courts were functioning virtually and from March 2022, the Courts were functioning physically, so were other organization functioning. However, review petition has been preferred in the year 2023, i.e., after the gape of 636 days, for which there is no explanation and the huge delay has not been explained. According to respondents, review petitioner has shown no sufficient cause by not availing remedy within prescribed period. It is being also stated by respondents that death of Administrative Officer (legal) will not hamper working of whole of the Insurance Company and that such a plea is misconceived, more particularly when there was battery of officers in Insurance company who were looking after the legal cases in Division/Administration and were fully equipped with officer(s). Death of Administrative Officer cannot be a ground muchless sufficient one to seek condonation of delay. It is being submitted that COVID-19 remained till March 2022 and after March 2022 all courts were functioning in a physical mode. Page 3 CM no.295/2023 RP no.04/2023 5. There is force in submission of Mr. B. A. Tak, learned counsel for respondents, that there is delay in filing review petition even if period upto March 2022 is excluded. 6. Review petition has been filed on 31st January 2023. There is thus inordinate delay on the part of review petitioner/insurance company to file review petition. 7. Even the Supreme Court in Miscellaneous Application no.21 of 2022 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) no.3 of 2020 titled In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, vide order dated 10th January 2022, excluded the period from 15th march 2020 till 28th February 2022 for purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and consequently balance period of limitation remaining as on 3rd October 2021, if any, had become available with effect from 1st March 2022. It was also directed by the Supreme Court that in cases where limitation would have expired during the period between 15th March 2020 till 28th February 2022, notwithstanding actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have limitation period of 90 days from 1st March 2022, and in the event actual period of limitation remaining with effect from 1st March 2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. The Supreme Court also clarified that the period from 15th March 2020 till 28th February 2022 shall stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits, within Page 4 CM no.295/2023 RP no.04/2023 which the court or tribunal can condone delay, and termination of proceedings. 8. In view of above, it has rightly been stated by Mr. B. A. Tak, learned counsel for respondents, that even if the period from the date of issuance of judgement by this Court on 23rd March 2021 is excluded for next one year i.e., up to 28th February 2022, yet respondents remained in deep slumber in drafting, preparing and filing a petition for review of judgement passed in an appeal way back in the year 2021 for next one year. Such an approach is not condonable. 9. Could it be a sufficient ground for review petitioner/insurance company to contend that death of Administrative Officer has put the whole Insurance Company at grinding halt. Such contention is a bizarre one. Review petitioner/Insurance Company cannot be heard saying that it was not having men and machinery to draft, prepare and file a review petition with respect to a judgement that was passed way back in the year 2021 in an appeal, even after March 2022. 10. That in this era of instantaneous communication, the Organisations/ Departments should act diligently in pursuing their rights in an appeal or a review, the Supreme Court has so held in Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC 563. The Supreme Court has also said that an organization/department cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation and that why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before the Court. The Supreme Court also went to say that: Page 5 CM no.295/2023 RP no.04/2023 “12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 11. The Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) Diary No(s).19846/2020 titled as Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Admin and others., decided on 04.02.2021, reported in (2021) 11 SCC 557, while dismissing it on account of delay observed as under: “We have repeatedly been counselling through our orders various Government departments, State Governments and other public authorities that they must learn to file appeals in time and set their house in order so far as the legal department is concerned, more so as technology assists them. This appears to be falling on deaf ears despite costs having been imposed in number of matters with the direction to recover it from the officers responsible for the delay as we are of the view that these officers must be made accountable. It has not had any salutary effect and that the present matter should have been brought up, really takes the cake! The aforesaid itself shows the casual manner in which the petitioner has approached this Court without any cogent or plausible ground for condonation of delay. In fact, other than the lethargy and incompetence of the petitioner, there is nothing which has been put on record. We have repeatedly discouraged State Governments and Page 6 CM no.295/2023 RP no.04/2023 public authorities in adopting an approach that they can walk in to the Supreme Court as and when they please ignoring the period of limitation prescribed by the Statutes, as if the Limitation statute does not apply to them. In this behalf, suffice to refer to our judgment in the State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Bheru Lal [SLP [C] Diary No.9217/2020 decided on 15.10.2020] and The State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sunanda Mahakuda [SLP[C] Diary No. 22605/2020 decided on 11.01.2021] ………….”. 12. In the present case, firstly, there is a delay of 649 days, in preferring review petition; secondly even if the period from the date of judgement till 28th March 2022 is excluded, yet there is a delay of 336 days’ delay in approaching this Court with review petition. It is true that a good case should not become the casualty because of the callous approach of the officials of the concerned departments/organisations, but they have to make out a case which would warrant condonation of delay. It is in such cases where meritorious case would become the casualty because of the delay, the courts would take a lenient view, but here a right has accrued to respondents in whose favour a judgement has been given by this Court way back in the year 2021. Review petitioner/insurance company in order to seek condonation of delay, has to satisfy the Court that there is merit in the review petition and this Court, while passing the judgement in the appeal, has not taken into account material facts/ evidence brought before it by review petitioner, thereby causing miscarriage of justice. Since in this case while evaluating the judgement and after going through the conclusions drawn by this Court, I do not find that this is a fit case in which one can say that there is merit in the review petition. This Court has in this case thoroughly evaluated the evidence produced before it and in view of the evaluation of evidence and proper appreciation, it cannot be said that it is a fit case in which delay is to be condoned. Therefore, review Page 7 CM no.295/2023 RP no.04/2023 petitioner/insurance company has failed to satisfy this Court about the delay. 13. Law as regards condonation of delay settled. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another, (2008) 17 SCC 448, it has been held by the Supreme Court that: “29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the land losers facilitating their rehabilitation/ resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land losers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the land losers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.” 14. The Supreme Court in Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52, has held: “Merely because the Respondent is the State, delay in filing the appeal or revision cannot and shall not be mechanically considered and in absence of ‘sufficient cause’ delay shall not be condoned.” 15. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. M.I.D.C., AIR 2013 SC 565, the Supreme Court has observed that: Page 8 CM no.295/2023 RP no.04/2023 “The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case.” 16. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, the Supreme Court made an observation as follows: “15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. Page 9 CM no.295/2023 RP no.04/2023 xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present-day scenario. They are: a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 17. Tendency of the State to file appeal, revision or SLP with huge delay without reasonable explanation has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Vishnu Aroma Pouching (P.) Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 263. Relevant paragraph of the judgment is worthwhile to be reproduced as under: “3. The aforesaid itself shows the casual manner in which the petitioner has approached this Court without any cogent or plausible ground for condonation of delay. In fact, other than the lethargy and incompetence of the petitioner, there is nothing which has been put on record. We have repeatedly discouraged State Governments and public authorities in adopting an approach that they can walk in to the Supreme Court as and when they please ignoring the period of limitation prescribed by the Statutes, as if the Limitation statute does not apply to them. In this behalf, suffice to refer to our judgment in the State of Madhya Pradesh &Ors. v. Bheru Lal [SLP [C] Diary No.9217/2020 decided on 15.10.2020] and The State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sunanda Mahakuda [SLP [C] Diary No.22605/2020 decided on 11.01.2021]. The leeway which was given to the Government / public authorities on account of innate inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this Court which came at a time when technology had not advanced and thus, greater indulgence was shown. This position is no more prevalent and the current legal position has been elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. - (2012) 3 SCC 563. Despite this, there seems to be a little change in the approach of the Government and public authorities.” Page 10 CM no.295/2023 RP no.04/2023 18. A Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary Nos. 2574/2020 titled as State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Sabha Narain and others, reported in (2022) 9 SCC 266, was filed with delay of 502 days with an explanation given in the application for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court has said that it gives only a saga of moving of file from one place to the other and that too with long interludes. The Supreme Court also said that in fact, other than lethargy and incompetence of petitioner, there was nothing plausible which had been put on record and that the Supreme Court repeatedly discouraged the State Governments and public authorities in adopting an approach that they could walk to the Court as and when they please ignoring the period of limitation prescribed by the Statutes as if the Limitation Statute did not apply to them. Looking to the period of delay and casual manner in which the application had been worded, the Supreme Court imposed costs on the petitioner for wastage of judicial time. 19. Having regard to what has been stated above and having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the reasons given in the application cannot be said to be sufficient, therefore, extension of time for filing the appeal cannot be granted by condoning the delay on the part of review petitioner/insurance company as there is an unexplained delay, therefore, this application is dismissed. 20. Resultantly, the review petition is also dismissed. (Vinod Chatterji Koul) Judge Srinagar 21.08.2025 Ajaz Ahmad, Secretary Whether approved for reporting? Yes/No.