Page No.# 1/9 GAHC010011912025 undefined THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/436/2025 JNANA RANJAN DAS SON OF LATE DAYAL CHANDRA DAS, RESIDENT OF (PRESENT ADDRESS)- HOUSE NO.4, DEHIRAM BARMAN PATH, POST OFFICE- BELTOLA, POLICE STATION- HATIGAON, GUWAHATI- 781028, ASSAM. VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS REPRESENTED BY SPECIAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM, ENVIRONMENT AND FOREST DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM, D BLOCK, 2ND FLOOR, JANATA BHAWAN, DISPUR, GUWAHATI- 781006, ASSAM. 2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006. 3:THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS AND HEAD OF FOREST ENVIRONMENT AND FOREST DEPARTMENT GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM ARANYA BHAWAN PANJABARI GUWAHATI-781037 4:THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS SOCIAL FORESTRY ASSAM ARANYA BHAWAN PANJABARI Page No.# 2/9 GUWAHATI-781037. 5:THE CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS UPPER ASSAM SOCIAL FORESTRY CIRCLE NAGAON NAGAON PIN-782003 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D S DEKA, Advocate for the Respondent : SC, FOREST, BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SAIKIA ORDER 24.07 .2025 Heard Mr. D.S. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. D. Gogoi, learned Standing Counsel, Forest Department. The petitioner before this Court is aggrieved by the order dated 01.07.2024, whereby the petitioner was placed under suspension with effect from the date of his arrest on 20.06.2024 as well as the subsequent review for extension of the continuation of suspension. The case projected before this Court is that the petitioner is employed as Forest Ranger under the Forest Department, Government of Assam. An FIR was lodged in connection with an investigation by the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Assam and the petitioner came to be arrested on 20.06.2024. Subsequently he was released on bail on 23.07.2024. Since, then the petitioner has been under suspension. It is the claim of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Rule 6 of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 as well as the law laid down by the Page No.# 3/9 Apex Court in Ajoy Kumar Choudhury vs. Union of India reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 read with other judgments of this Court the review of suspension which is required to be done prior to expiry of 90 days from the date of suspension was not under taken. It is submitted that the petitioner having been suspended from 01.07.2024 w.e.f. 20.06.2024, the review of suspension was not undertaken. The respondents however, issued a show cause under Rule 9 of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 by the communication dated 20.08.2024. The said show cause notice contained the statement of allegations, list of documents, as well as a list of witnesses. It is submitted that although the enquiry proceedings were initiated, but the same has not been completed. However, the suspension of the petitioner had lapsed by the efflux of time as the same was never extended by the concerned. Therefore, the petitioner ought to have been reinstated in his service, however, that not having been done the present writ petition has been filed. Mr. D. Gogoi, the learned Standing Counsel representing the Forest Department submits that the review of the suspensions were duly undertaken. The first review of the suspension was undertaken on 14.11.2024 and subsequently it was extended again on 27.01.2025. These orders are enclosed to the affidavit filed by the respondent authorities. Thereafter, a further review of the suspension was held on 23.04.2025 whereby it was decided to continue the suspension until further order. All these extension orders are the part of the affidavit filed by the State. Page No.# 4/9 The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is only upon filing of the affidavit in the present writ petition the petitioner came to be aware that the review of suspension was carried out in favour of the continuance of suspension order. However, none of these orders reviewing the suspension were served on the petitioner. As a consequence thereof, the petitioner being unaware of the steps taken to review the suspension, the said review orders cannot be considered to be treated as lawful in the absence of the petitioner being intimated by proper service of review of suspension orders. In support of his contentions, he has referred to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Bachhittar Singh V. The State of Punjab reported in AIR 1963 SC 395. He has also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in S.P. Singh Vs. Union of India reported in 2008 5 SCC 438 The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the orders for review of suspension therefore, are not valid and that the suspension of the petitioner had lapsed as the said suspension was not extended as per the procedure prescribed and the orders for extension of suspension was never communicated and served on the writ petitioner. Mr. D. Gogoi, in his usual fairness, submits that from the instructions received that the orders passed for review of suspension were not served on the petitioner by the Department. Upon careful consideration of the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and upon consideration of the judgments prescribed into service, Page No.# 5/9 it is seen that the suspension of the writ petitioner was effected under Rule 6(2) of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. Although these rules specifically do not mandate review or suspension, however, following the judgment of the Apex Court in Ajoy Kumar Choudhury (supra) several judgments have been passed by this Court both by the Division Bench as well as other Co-ordinate Benches, where it has been held that the review of orders of passed suspension under Rule 6(1) of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 is also equally applicable to suspensions passed under Rule 6(2) of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. Therefore, review of extension of suspension is mandatorily required to be undertaken by the authorities concerned. That apart, the State Government has issued a Office Memorandum No. ABP.13/2018/Pt/35 dated 04.02.2020, whereby a proper procedure is laid down in cases of suspension of the officers working under the Government of Assam. The said office memorandum reflects that the review is to be done within six months but each department is required to furnish to the Personnel Department in detail about the personnel or the officers under any department, who is presently under suspension and whether any review orders have been passed or the suspensions have been necessary. The State as is evident from the affidavit filed has not followed the procedure prescribed under the Office Memorandum dated 04.02.2020. As to whether the non-communication of an order of review from the petitioner can be considered fatal for the State, a reference in this case is required to be made in the celebrated judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of S.P. Singh (supra). In the said judgment the Apex Court held that an order to be effective must be communicated to the person who will be Page No.# 6/9 affected by such an order. Passing an order and keeping it in the record or the file not mean that a valid order has been passed by the authorities concerned. The question of what constitutes communication also came up for consideration in the judgment of State of Punjab Vs. Khemi Raja reported in (1969) 3 SCC 28. In this context, the Apex Court has held as under: “17. The question then is whether communicating the order means its actual receipt by the concerned government servant. The order of suspension in question was published in the Gazette though that was after the date when the respondent was to retire. But the point is whether it was communicated to him before that date. The ordinary meaning of the word “communicate” is to impart, confer or transmit information. (Cf. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1, p. 352). As already stated, telegrams, dated July 31 and August 2, 1958, were despatched to the respondent at the address given by him where communications by Government should be despatched. Both the telegrams transmitted or imparted information to the respondent that he was suspended from service with effect from August 2, 1958. It may be that he actually received them in or about the middle of August 1958, after the date of his retirement. But how can it be said that the information about his having been suspended was not imparted or transmitted to him on July 31 and August 2, 1958 i.e. before August 4, 1958, when he would have retired? It will be seen that in all the decisions cited before us it was the communication of the impugned order which was held to be essential and not its actual receipt by the officer concerned and such communication was held to be necessary because till the order is issued and actually sent out to the person concerned the authority making such order would be in a position to change its mind and modify it if it thought fit. But once such an order is sent out, it goes out of the control of such an authority, and therefore, there would be no chance whatsoever of its changing its mind or modifying it. In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned government servant, it must be Page No.# 7/9 held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the view that it is only from the date of the actual receipt by him that the order becomes effective. If that be the true meaning of communication, it would be possible for a government servant to effectively thwart an order by avoiding receipt of it by one method or the other till after the date of his retirement even though such an order is passed and despatched to him before such date. An officer against whom action is sought to be taken, thus, may go away from the address given by him for service of such orders or may deliberately give a wrong address and thus prevent or delay its receipt and be able to defeat its service on him. Such a meaning of the word “communication” ought not to be given unless the provision in question expressly so provides. Actual knowledge by him of an order where it is one of dismissal, may, perhaps, become necessary because of the consequences which the decision in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh contemplates. But such consequences would not occur in the case of an officer who has proceeded on leave and against whom an order of suspension is passed because in his case there is no question of his doing any act or passing any order and such act or order being challenged as invalid.” Referring to the said judgments discussed above what is to be noticed is that once an order is passed by competent authority, more particularly by an officer of Government the same is required to be mandatorily served on any person against whom the order has been passed, so that, the person concerned or the person affected may take recourse for ventilating his grievance in the event, the person considers this order to be adverse in nature. In the facts of the present case, while the suspension order passed on 01.07.2024 and its communication as is evident from the affidavit filed before this Court, it is seen that the review of the suspension although undertaken thrice, none of these review orders were ever communicated to the petitioner. This fact is not Page No.# 8/9 disputed by the respondents. Under such circumstances, it has to be held that the extension of continuation of suspension of the petitioner after the expiry of the initial period as reflected in the suspension order dated 01.07.2024 must be held to be without authority of law. Be that as it may, the first review of extension was carried out on 29.10.2024, the second order of review of suspension was carried out on 27.01.2025 and the final order of review was carried out on 23.04.2025. It is apparent that the review of suspension order was carried out prior to expiry of three months. If the dates on which the review of extension was carried out is to be taken note of, if the review is required to be carried within three months, then the last review of suspension having been carried out on 23.04.2025 the period of suspension expires after three months, which expires today. As discussed above, the State has also not followed the parameters laid down in the Office Memorandum by filing the periodic particulars before the personnel department with the details of the suspensions carried out against the officers and the extensions thereof. Under such circumstances, there is no material to suggest that the review of extensions of suspension carried out was communicated to the petitioner or to the personnel department or any other department. In other words, the extension of the suspension, although stated to have been passed or issued by the department was kept in the concerned files and never served upon the petitioner. This is contrary to the law laid down in Bachhittar Singh (supra) and followed in other matters. The continuance of suspension of the writ petitioner has to be held to be without any authority of law. The petitioner’s Page No.# 9/9 continued suspension therefore being unauthorized and contrary to the provisions of the law, it is ordered accordingly that the petitioner shall be reinstated in service with immediate effect. His service and other financial benefits will accordingly be worked out by the department and released without any further delay. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and disposed of. No order as to cost. JUDGE Comparing Assistant