Judgment : Rajani Dubey, J. 1. This appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26.12.2014 passed by learned 2 nd Additional Sessions Judge, District Korba (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.76/2013 whereby, the trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him as under:- 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 16.05.2013, complainant Mukesh Kumar Bairagi lodged a missing report of his child Bhupesh alisa appu aged about 6 years along with his description. On the basis of above information, a missing person Case No. 13/13 was registered by the Urga Police station and by registering Rojnamchasanha No. 22, search proceedings were initiated. On 17.05.2013, an unknown person called the minor’s grandfather, Jagdish Das Vaishnav, on his mobile number 9993585275 from mobile number 7805990913 at about 19:00 hours, demanding a ransom of Rs.10,00,000/- for the release of the kidnapped child. Upon obtaining call details, it was revealed that the SIM used for the ransom call had been issued to one Amit on the basis of forged documents, leading to registration of a separate offence under Sections 420 and 467 IPC against shopkeeper Sohan Lal Gupta. As the SIM was subsequently found to be linked to the accused, Urga Police registered FIR No. 72/13 under Sections 363 and 364 IPC. The call details of the said mobile number were collected, and the accused was arrested on 17.05.2013. During interrogation before witnesses, the accused disclosed that, due to financial constraints and with the intention of humiliating the child’s financially well-off family, he kidnapped the child, demanded ransom, strangulated him to death, and concealed the body inside a storeroom. A Panchnama was prepared, the body was recovered, post-mortem was conducted and the body was handed over to the family. A site map, further Panchnamas, and witnesses’ statements were recorded; the mobile phone used in the incident, relevant SIM cards, and another phone recovered from Jagdish were seized. The accused was remanded to judicial custody. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 364-A, 302, and 201 of the IPC before the Judicial Magistrate, who committed the case to the Sessions Court, from where it was transferred to the trial Court for trial. The accused was remanded to judicial custody. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 364-A, 302, and 201 of the IPC before the Judicial Magistrate, who committed the case to the Sessions Court, from where it was transferred to the trial Court for trial. The learned trial Court thereafter framed charges under Sections 363, 364-A, 302 and 201 of the IPC against the appellant, to which the appellant abjured his guilt and sought trial. 3. To establish the guilt of the accused/appellant, the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses. The statement of the accused/appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence and pleaded innocence and false implication. In defence, he examined one witness namely Shashikant Vaishnav as D.W.-1. 4. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial Court, by its judgment dated 26.12.2014, found the evidence adduced by the prosecution to be trustworthy and accordingly convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in paragraph 1 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is illegal, arbitrary and based on conjectures and surmises, and therefore not sustainable in the eyes of law. It is argued that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case. He further submits that the prosecution has attempted to show that the dead body was recovered at the instance of the appellant, but such a claim is highly doubtful. According to the prosecution, the memorandum statement (Ex.P/9) of the appellant was recorded, and on the basis of the disclosure made therein, the dead body of the deceased was recovered. However, no Panchanama has been produced by the prosecution to establish that the dead body was recovered at the instance of the accused from the paddy crop (Pairawat) stored in the Kothar (granary) of Ravikant Vaishnav. Thus, the prosecution story regarding the recovery of the dead body at the appellant’s instance becomes unreliable, particularly in view of the testimony of Director Das Vaishnav (P.W.-11), who stated that when the police officials were standing with the appellant in front of the said Kothar, more than 100 persons had already gathered at the spot. Thus, the prosecution story regarding the recovery of the dead body at the appellant’s instance becomes unreliable, particularly in view of the testimony of Director Das Vaishnav (P.W.-11), who stated that when the police officials were standing with the appellant in front of the said Kothar, more than 100 persons had already gathered at the spot. Although the place of recovery was the Kothar of Ravikant Vaishnav, the prosecution has not examined Ravikant Vaishnav. Therefore, the memorandum (Ex.P/9) appears to be a fabricated document. It is further submitted that the SIM allegedly used for demanding ransom was registered in the name of one Pankaj Kumar Kashyap. It is further argued that the prosecution has failed to produce any document to establish that SIM No. 9575474894, allegedly used by the appellant for speaking with various persons including Dineshwar Das (P.W.-4), was allotted in the name of the appellant. No documentary evidence has been adduced to show the ownership of the said SIM. Likewise, the prosecution has not produced any document to prove that the mobile handset bearing IMEI No. 352476054223470 was purchased by the appellant. Learned counsel further submits that even from the seizure memo, it is evident that the mobile handset allegedly seized from the appellant bears a different IMEI number, making the seizure itself doubtful. The call detail record (Ex.P/16) is inadmissible in evidence as it does not contain the signature of the issuing authority, nor is it accompanied by the certificate required under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. Although it is alleged that the accused made calls to P.W.-4 Dineshwar Das using SIM No. 9575474894, the prosecution has not collected any call detail record pertaining to communication between SIM No. 9575474894 and SIM No. 9584293286, which is stated to be the mobile number of Dineshwar Das (P.W.-4). In these circumstances, the chain of circumstantial evidence remains incomplete. Nevertheless, the learned trial Court failed to appreciate these aspects in their proper perspective and consequently recorded an erroneous finding. Hence, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Boby Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2023) 15 SCC 760 ; Daya Prasad Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine AII 6760 ; Rahil and another Vs. State (Govt. Hence, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Boby Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2023) 15 SCC 760 ; Daya Prasad Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine AII 6760 ; Rahil and another Vs. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1481 and this Court’s judgment dated 03.01.2023 passed in CRA No. 321 of 2013 in the matter of Duleshwar Verma Vs. State of Chhattisgarh . 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supporting the impugned judgment submits that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Learned trial Court having appreciated the overall oral and documentary evidence has rightly recorded a finding of guilt against the appellant which needs no interference by this Court. Therefore, the present appeal being sans merits is liable to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and thoroughly reviewed the record, including the impugned judgment. 8. The first question for consideration is whether the death of the deceased, Bhupesh alias Appu, was homicidal in nature. The trial Court has answered this in the affirmative, having held that Bhupesh Kumar @ Appu died due to strangulation. Upon considering the finding recorded by the trial Court and taking into account the testimony of Dr. O.S. Kanwar (P.W.-1), who proved the post-mortem report (Ex.P/1), we are of the considered view that the trial Court was fully justified in concluding that the death was homicidal. Dr. O.S. Kanwar (P.W.-1) clearly stated in para 10 that no person can cause death to himself by strangulation, and this stands as a correct finding of fact based on the evidence on record. Consequently, we affirm the said finding. 9. The question that arises for consideration is whether the appellant is the perpetrator of the crime in question; specifically, whether he kidnapped the deceased for ransom, caused his death by strangulation, and thereafter concealed the body in the storeroom of Ravi Shankar in order to evade detection and punishment. 10. Rajesh Kumar Bairagi (P.W.-3) stated that on 16.05.2013, a marriage function of his niece Purnima was taking place in their locality. He stated that at about 9:00–10:00 a.m., the accused Arun Kumar Bairagi had also arrived there. 10. Rajesh Kumar Bairagi (P.W.-3) stated that on 16.05.2013, a marriage function of his niece Purnima was taking place in their locality. He stated that at about 9:00–10:00 a.m., the accused Arun Kumar Bairagi had also arrived there. He further stated that in the afternoon the accused was playing cricket with the deceased Bhupesh Kumar @ Appu and other children, and thereafter he went to Korba. He deposed that in the evening his father, Jagdish Das Bairagi, informed him over phone that Bhupesh Kumar @ Appu was not available at home in the village and asked him to return immediately. He stated that upon reaching home he saw that everyone was searching for his nephew Bhupesh Kumar @ Appu. He further deposed that his father told him that an unidentified person had demanded a ransom of Rs. 10 lakhs over phone, and the call was made from mobile number 7805990913. Thereafter, they went to police station to lodge the report. 11. Jagdish Das Bairagi (P.W.-5) stated that on 16.05.2013, he stated that he had gone for his duty, and upon returning home in the evening, he came to know that his grandson, Bhupesh Kumar Bairagi alias Appu, had been missing since 2–3 p.m. and was being searched for but could not be found. He further stated that he sent his son to the Urga Police Station to report the missing person, while he himself went to search for his grandson. He stated that at about 6:58 p.m., he received a call on his mobile phone, and the caller demanded a ransom of Rs. 10 lakh, informing him that his grandson was in the caller’s custody. He also stated that the call was made from mobile number 7805990913, and the call was received on his mobile number 9993585275. He further stated that his police statement was recorded. He added that on 18.05.2013, in village Kudarmal, the police seized his black Nokia mobile phone containing SIM number 9993585275 from his possession. He admitted his signature from C to C part of Seizure Memo (Ex. P/6). 12. Satish Kumar Namdeo (P.W.-6) stated that the police recorded the memorandum statement of the accused vide Ex.P/9 in his presence. In para 2, he stated that the accused, Arun Kumar Bairagi, in his memorandum statement (Ex. He admitted his signature from C to C part of Seizure Memo (Ex. P/6). 12. Satish Kumar Namdeo (P.W.-6) stated that the police recorded the memorandum statement of the accused vide Ex.P/9 in his presence. In para 2, he stated that the accused, Arun Kumar Bairagi, in his memorandum statement (Ex. P/9, part b to b), is stated to have informed the police that the Smart Company SIM card No. 7805990913 had been thrown by him on the road and the said SIM could be recovered from that place upon search. He is further recorded to have stated that he had kept the mobile phone in a pant hanging in his house and could produce the same, and that he had concealed the body of Appu in the paravat situated behind Ravikant’s storeroom at the edge of the village. The witness further stated that on 17.05.2013, pursuant to the information furnished by accused Arun Kumar Bairagi and after he was brought from his house in village Kudurgal, the police seized a black Samsung mobile phone containing SIM No. 9575474894. The seizure memo is Ex. P/10. 13. Mukesh Kumar Bairagi (P.W.-7) stated that the deceased, Bhupesh Kumar @ Appu, was his son and that on the date of the incident the child had been playing cricket with other children. He deposed that at about 2:00–3:00 p.m., the child went missing, and despite an extensive search, he could not be found, whereafter a missing report was lodged. He further stated that after lodging the missing report and returning home, his father, Jagdish Prasad, informed him that an unknown person had made a telephone call demanding a ransom of Rs. 10 lakhs. He further stated that the police informed them that the accused, Arun Kumar Bairagi, had disclosed that he had strangulated Bhupesh Kumar Bairagi @ Appu to death and had concealed the body in a paravat located in the storeroom of Ravikant Vaishnav. He stated that the police had conducted the panchnama of the dead body of his son, Bhupesh Kumar Bairagi @ Appu, at the District Hospital, Korba, and had served upon him a notice to remain present during the said proceedings. The notice is Ex. P/3 and he admits his signature on it from C to C part, and his signature also appears on inquest report (Ex. P/4). The notice is Ex. P/3 and he admits his signature on it from C to C part, and his signature also appears on inquest report (Ex. P/4). He further stated that he had identified the dead body of his son prior to the post-mortem examination and he admitted his signature on postmortem report (Ex.P/1) from D to D part. 14. D.N.S. Raj (P.W.-9) stated that, on the basis of the information furnished by Mukesh Kumar Bairagi, a missing person report No. 13/13 was registered, and thereafter he registered the FIR, Ex. P/15 and he admitted his signature on it from A to A and B to B part. 15. Director Das Vaishnav (P.W.-11) stated that on 16.05.2013, he had gone to the Uraga Police Station, where the police were interrogating Arun Bairagi; however, no questioning of the accused took place in his presence. He further stated that the police informed him that Arun Kumar had been arrested and that the mobile phone used for making the ransom call to the deceased’s grandfather, Jagdish, had been recovered from him. The police also informed him that the accused would point out the place where he had concealed the child’s body. He stated that he was accompanying the police at that time, and Arun Kumar then led them to Ravikant’s storeroom, where he pointed out the body of the child. He further stated that the police recorded the memorandum statement of the In his cross-examination, he stated that,accused vide Ex.P/9 and he admitted his signature on memorandum statement (Ex.P/9) and seizure memo (Ex.P/10). Prosecution declared him hostile and cross-examined him then he admitted the prosecution’s suggestion that he had gone to Police Station Urga along with Satish Kumar Namdev. However, he denied the suggestion that the statements contained in portions B to B and C to C of Ex. P-9 had been made by the accused in his presence. He further admitted that the mobile phone had been seized from the pocket of the accused’s pant. 16. In the present case, the police recorded the memorandum statement of the accused vide Ex.P/9. Both attesting witnesses, Satish Kumar Namdeo (P.W.-6) and Director Das Vaishnav (P.W.- 11), admitted their signatures on the document and confirmed that the memorandum statement of the accused was recorded in their presence. As per Ex.P/9, the accused disclosed as follows:- 17. 16. In the present case, the police recorded the memorandum statement of the accused vide Ex.P/9. Both attesting witnesses, Satish Kumar Namdeo (P.W.-6) and Director Das Vaishnav (P.W.- 11), admitted their signatures on the document and confirmed that the memorandum statement of the accused was recorded in their presence. As per Ex.P/9, the accused disclosed as follows:- 17. As per Ex.P/9, the memorandum statement of the accused was recorded on 17.05.2013 at about 16:30 hours. Pursuant to this memorandum, a seizure memo (Ex.P/10) was prepared at 18:10 hours, whereby one Samsung mobile phone was seized from the possession of the accused. However, the prosecution did not prepare any recovery memo concerning the dead body. 18. Investigating Officer S.K. Pathak (P.W.–13) stated in paragraph 4 of his examination-in-chief that, on the basis of the information furnished by the accused, the dead body of Appu was recovered from near the paravat of Ravikant’s storehouse.” He next admitted that prior to the preparation of Memorandum Ex.P/9, the offence had been registered against an unknown person. Upon being asked whether, at the time of recording the memorandum Ex.P/9, he had treated Arun Kumar Vaishnav as an accused, the witness explained that when Arun Kumar confessed to having killed the kidnapped child in the present case, he then considered him to be the culprit/accused. He further admitted that he had not recorded the time at which the dead body was recovered. 19. Durgesh Rathore (P.W.-12) was the Head Constable posted in the Cyber Cell at the relevant time and he stated that on the instructions of the Superintendent of Police, he had obtained the call details of the concerned mobile number on the same date and had generated a printout consisting of 13 pages. He further clarified that in those call details, the number 7605990913, which belonged to the accused, had been indicated with an arrow drawn from the blue ink and the number 9993585275, belonging to Jagdish, father of late Premdas Vaishnav, had also been marked with arrows, showing the record of conversations between the two numbers. It was stated that an application for obtaining the call details had been submitted to the Superintendent of Police by the Station House Officer, Urga, and the said application was marked as Ex.P/17. It was stated that an application for obtaining the call details had been submitted to the Superintendent of Police by the Station House Officer, Urga, and the said application was marked as Ex.P/17. On the basis of the information furnished by Reliance Company regarding mobile number 7805990913, it was found that the SIM card had been issued in the name of Pankaj Kumar Kashyap. The relevant documents were placed on record as Ex.P-17A. A photocopy of the application and the Election Commission identity card submitted by Pankaj Kumar, the subscriber of the said number, was also received from the mobile company and was exhibited as Ex.P-17B. 21. It is evident from the record that during investigation, no document was seized by the prosecution to establish the ownership of the said mobile phone. 22. In paragraph 18 of his deposition, Shri S.K. Pathak (P.W.-13) further stated that he had not collected any documents relating to the ownership of mobile number 9579474894 mentioned in Ex.P/10. 23. A close scrutiny of the statements of all prosecution witnesses reveals that except for the testimony of Rajesh Kumar Bairagi (P.W.-3) stating that he had seen the accused and the deceased playing cricket along with other children, no clinching or legally admissible evidence has been brought on record by the prosecution. 24. The prosecution has also claimed that the dead body was recovered pursuant to the memorandum of the accused; however, no documentary evidence regarding such recovery was prepared or produced by the prosecution. 25. In the matter of Boby (supra) , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in paragraphs 31, 32 and 33 as under:- 31. It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in State of Karnataka v. David Rozarios [ (2002) 7 SCC 728 ]: (SCC p. 733, para 5) "5……. This information which is otherwise admissible becomes inadmissible under Section 27 if the information did not come from a person in the custody of a police officer or did come from a person not in the custody of a police officer. The statement which is admissible under Section 27 is the one which is the information leading to discovery. Thus, what is admissible being the information, the same has to be proved and not the opinion formed on it by the police officer. The statement which is admissible under Section 27 is the one which is the information leading to discovery. Thus, what is admissible being the information, the same has to be proved and not the opinion formed on it by the police officer. In other words, the exact information given by the accused while in custody of a police officer. The statement which is admissible under Section 27 is the one which is the information leading to discovery. Thus, what is admissible being the information, the same has to be proved and not the opinion formed on it by the police officer. In other words, the exact information given by the accused while in custody which led to recovery of the articles has to be proved. It is, therefore, necessary for the benefit of both the accused and the prosecution that information given should be recorded and proved and if not so recorded, the exact information must be adduced through evidence. The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a reliable information. It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact envisaged in the section. Decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor [ 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47] is the most-quoted authority for supporting the interpretation that the "fact discovered" envisaged in the section embraces the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect. (See State of Maharashtra v. Damu [ (2000) 6 SCC 269 ] (emphasis supplied) 32. A three-Judge Bench of this Court recently in Subramanya v. State of Karnataka 10, has observed thus: (SCC pp. 299-300, paras 76-78) "76. Keeping in mind the aforesaid evidence, we proceed to consider whether the prosecution has been able to prove and establish the discoveries in accordance with law. Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads thus: ‘27. A three-Judge Bench of this Court recently in Subramanya v. State of Karnataka 10, has observed thus: (SCC pp. 299-300, paras 76-78) "76. Keeping in mind the aforesaid evidence, we proceed to consider whether the prosecution has been able to prove and establish the discoveries in accordance with law. Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads thus: ‘27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.- Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information. whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.’ 77. The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence of all the aforesaid prosecution witnesses is that none of them have deposed the exact statement said to have been made by the appellant herein which ultimately led to the discovery of a fact relevant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 78. If, it is say of the investigating officer that the appellant- accused while in custody on his own free will and volition made a statement that he would lead to the place where he had hidden the weapon of offence, the site of burial of the dead body, clothes, etc, then the first thing that the investigating officer should have done was to call for two independent witnesses at the police station itself. Once the two independent witnesses would arrive at the police station thereafter in their presence the accused should be asked to make an appropriate statement as he may desire in regard to pointing out the place where he is said to have hidden the weapon of offence, etc. When the accused while in custody makes such statement before the two independent witnesses (panch witnesses) the exact statement or rather the exact words uttered by the accused should be incorporated in the first part of the panchnama that the investigating officer may draw in accordance with law. When the accused while in custody makes such statement before the two independent witnesses (panch witnesses) the exact statement or rather the exact words uttered by the accused should be incorporated in the first part of the panchnama that the investigating officer may draw in accordance with law. This first part of the panchnama for the purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is always drawn at the police station in the presence of the independent witnesses so as to lend credence that a particular statement was made by the accused expressing his willingness on his own free will and volition to point out the place where the weapon of offence or any other article used in the commission of the offence had been hidden. Once the first part of the panchnama is completed thereafter the police party along with the accused and the two independent witnesses (panch witnesses) would proceed to the particular place as may be led by the accused. If from that particular place anything like the weapon of offence or bloodstained clothes or any other article is discovered then that part of the entire process would form the second part of the panchnama. This is how the law expects the investigating officer to draw the discovery panchnama as contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. If we read the entire oral evidence of the investigating officer then it is clear that the same is deficient in all the aforesaid relevant aspects of the matter." This Court in Subramanya case [Subramanya v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 11 SCC 255 ], has elaborately considered as to how the law expects the IO to draw the discovery panchnama as contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 33. In the present case, leave aside the recovery panchnama being in accordance with the aforesaid requirement, there is no statement of Boby (Accused 3-appellant herein) recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the circumstance that the dead body of the deceased was recovered at the instance of Boby (Accused 3-appellant herein).” 26. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the circumstance that the dead body of the deceased was recovered at the instance of Boby (Accused 3-appellant herein).” 26. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in the present case also, no recovery memo or any other document has been prepared or produced by the prosecution to establish that the dead body of the deceased was recovered pursuant to the memorandum (Ex.P/9) allegedly made by the accused. Consequently, the memorandum (Ex.P/9) cannot be treated as admissible in evidence against the appellant. The prosecution has merely placed on record the call detail records of two mobile numbers; however, it has failed to prove that these mobile numbers belonged to the accused. Moreover, no certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act has been furnished by the prosecution to prove the electronic evidence. 27. While dealing with the case of Duleshwar Verma (supra), this Court made the following observations in paragraphs 11 and 12:- “11. In order to assail the above-stated finding holding it to be a piece of incriminating circumstance, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that it is not supported by certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, therefore, it is inadmissible in evidence and as such, no reliance can be placed upon it, as the trial Court went wrong in accepting it as a piece of incriminating evidence and reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal [ (2021) 7SCC 1] in which their Lordships resolving the dispute and the conflict raised in the matters of Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh [(2018) 2 SCC 801] and Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer [ (2014) 10 SCC 473 ] have clearly held that production of certificate under Section 658 of the Evidence Act is mandatory only in case of secondary evidence where primary evidence is not laid or original is not produced. Their Lordships further held that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is a condition precedent to the admissibility of secondary evidence by way of electronic evidence as laid down in Anvar P.V. (supra) and incorrectly clarified in Shafhi Mohammad (supra). It was held as under: - "61. Their Lordships further held that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is a condition precedent to the admissibility of secondary evidence by way of electronic evidence as laid down in Anvar P.V. (supra) and incorrectly clarified in Shafhi Mohammad (supra). It was held as under: - "61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly "clarified" in Shafhi Mohammed (supra). Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) LR 1 Ch D 426], which has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if led in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65-B(4) oliose." Their Lordships also held that the required certificate under Section 658(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced and this can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. The reference was answered in paragraphs 73.1., 73.2. and 73.3. as under - 73.1. Anvar P.V. (supra), as clarified by us hereinabove, is the law declared by this Court on Section 658 of the Evidence Act. The judgment in Tomaso Bruno [ (2015) 7 SCC 178 ], being per incuriam, does not lay down the law correctly. Also, the judgment in Shafhi Mohammad (supra) and the judgment dated 3-4-2018 reported as Shafhi Mohd. v. State of H.P. [ (2018) 5 SCC 311 ] do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore overruled. 73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65-B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the device concerned, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the device concerned, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the "computer" happens to be a part of a "computer system" or "computer network" and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the Court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65-B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65-B(4). The last sentence in para 24 in Anvar PV. (supra) which reads as "if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act" is thus clarified, it is to be read without the words "under Section 62 of the Evidence Act...". With this clarification, the law stated in para 24 of Anvar PV. (supra) does not need to be revisited. 73.3. The general directions issued in para 64 (supra) shall hereafter be followed by courts that deal with electronic evidence, to ensure their preservation, and production of certificate at the appropriate stage. These directions shall apply in all proceedings, till rules and directions under Section 67-C of the Information Technology Act and data retention conditions are formulated for compliance by telecom and internet service providers." 12. In the matter of Ravinder Singh @ Kaku v. State of Punjab [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 461] , their Lordships of the Supreme Court while following the decision of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (supra) have held that oral evidence in the place of certificate cannot be possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of law. Their Lordships held that Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of law and observed as under- "21. In light of the above, the electronic evidence produced before the High Court should have been in accordance with the statute and should have complied with the certification requirement, for it to be admissible in the court of law. As rightly stated above, oral evidence in the place of such certificate, as is the case in the present matter, cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law." 28. As rightly stated above, oral evidence in the place of such certificate, as is the case in the present matter, cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law." 28. In the present case also, having carefully examined the entire evidence on record, as discussed hereinabove, it is clear that the prosecution has failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances so as to conclusively point towards the guilt of the appellant. The solitary circumstance proved by the prosecution is that the accused was seen playing cricket with the deceased on the date of incident, as stated by Rajesh Kumar Bairagi (P.W.-3). This circumstance, even if accepted, is wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction for offences under Sections 363, 364A, 302 and 201 of the IPC. 29. The prosecution case that the dead body of the deceased was recovered pursuant to the memorandum of the accused is unsupported by any contemporaneous documentary proof. Neither a recovery memo, nor any panchnama, nor any proceedings indicating that the body was discovered in consequence of the information supplied by the accused, has been produced. On the contrary, the Investigating Officer S.K. Pathak (P.W.-13) candidly admitted in his cross-examination that no document regarding such alleged recovery exists in the case record. In the absence of any recovery memo or documentation, the alleged discovery cannot be relied upon to attract the admissibility contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, and hence the memorandum statement (Ex.P/9) loses all evidentiary value against the appellant. 30. The prosecution further relied upon call detail records to implicate the appellant; however, the said electronic evidence is inadmissible as it is not accompanied by the mandatory certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act. The witness from the Cyber Cell, Durgesh Rathore (P.W.-12) categorically admitted that no such certificate had been furnished. Additionally, no document has been placed on record to prove that the mobile numbers relied upon by the prosecution, including SIM Nos. 7805990913 and 9579474894, were ever owned or used by the appellant. Even as regards the seized Samsung mobile phone, the prosecution has not produced any document establishing ownership or possession thereof by the appellant. In the absence of proof linking the mobile phone and SIM numbers to the appellant, the call detail records are devoid of probative value. 31. 7805990913 and 9579474894, were ever owned or used by the appellant. Even as regards the seized Samsung mobile phone, the prosecution has not produced any document establishing ownership or possession thereof by the appellant. In the absence of proof linking the mobile phone and SIM numbers to the appellant, the call detail records are devoid of probative value. 31. The prosecution’s evidence regarding the place of occurrence and concealment of the body is also fraught with serious inconsistencies. The attesting witnesses to the memorandum, Satish Kumar Namdeo (P.W.-6) and Director Das Vaishnav (P.W.- 11), though admitting their signatures, did not fully support the prosecution version. Director Das Vaishnav (P.W.-11), who was declared hostile, specifically denied that the accused made the statements contained in portions B to B and C to C of Ex.P/9 in his presence. His testimony further shows that the police had already reached the place prior to his arrival, thereby rendering doubtful the voluntariness and authenticity of the alleged disclosure made by the accused. 32. The conduct of investigation, including the omission to record the time of alleged recovery of the body and failure to prepare essential documents, raises serious doubts regarding the fairness and reliability of the prosecution case. These lapses strike at the root of the prosecution’s attempt to establish the guilt of the appellant through circumstantial evidence. 33. In a case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, each link in the chain must be firmly established and must point unerringly towards the guilt of the accused, ruling out every hypothesis consistent with innocence. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution in the present case are not only incomplete but also legally inadmissible. No motive has been proved. No last-seen evidence beyond the trivial circumstance of playing cricket has been established. No recovery of the body at the instance of the accused has been proved. No admissible electronic evidence connects the accused with the alleged ransom call or the mobile phone in question. 34. In light of the above deficiencies, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant is therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt. 35. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court are hereby set aside. 34. In light of the above deficiencies, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant is therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt. 35. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court are hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges under Sections 363, 364A, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, by extending him the benefit of doubt. 36. Appellant is reported to be on bail. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. (481 of the B.N.S.S.), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 37. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.