1 2025:CGHC:58800-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1201 of 2021 Pawan Puri Goswami Firangi Puri Goswami Aged About 29 Years R/o Village Athulkapa, P.S. Bilha, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh, Present Address Village Hathmudi, P.S. Bemetara, District Bemetara Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O., P.S. Bilha, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Anand Kumar Gupta, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 04.12.2025 1. Heard Mr. Anand Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.12.05 11:23:03 +0530 2 the respondent/State. 2. This criminal appeal is preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the impugned judgment dated 07.09.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second Fast Track Special Court, Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case (POCSO) No. 96/2019, by which the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under : Conviction under Section Sentence Section 450 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) Rigorous imprisonment (for short, ‘R.I.’) for 05 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 04 months R.I. more. Section 376(3) of the IPC Life Imprisonment till natural death and fine of Rs. 2,000/-. In default, 06 months R.I. more. 5(ठ)/6 of the POCSO Act Life Imprisonment till natural death and fine of Rs. 2,000/-. In default, 06 months R.I. more. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the victim lodged a complaint on 22.01.2019 at P.S. Bilha stating that on 22.01.2019 at about 01:00 pm, when the victim was alone in her house, at that time the appellant/accused entered into the house of the victim used the criminal force against her with intent to outrage her modesty, and 3 committed sexual intercourse with her, thereafter 03-04 times he has committed sexual intercourse with her as a result she became pregnant and after 04-05 months of the incident, the family members of the victim asked about the physical condition of the victim, then for the first time she narrated the entire incident to her family members and lodged the complaint against the appellant/ accused. On the complaint of the victim/complainant, P.S. Bilha, Dist-Bilaspur registered the crime No.162/2019 for the offences punishable under Section 450, 376 (3) of I.P.C. and Section 5 (ठ)/6 of POCSO Act. 4. Thereafter, the P.S. Bilha recorded the statement of the victim and on the basis of the statement of the victim, registered the Crime No. 162/2019 (Ex.P-19) for the offenses punishable under Sections 450, 376 (3) of I.P.C. and Section 5 (ठ)/6 of POCSO Act. The P.S. Bilha, Dist. Bilaspur(C.G.) arrested the appellant/accused on 12.07.2019 and after completion of all investigations the Police filed the Charge-sheet before the trial court, against the accused/appellant for the offences punishable U/s 450, 376 (3) of I.P.C. and Section 5 (8)/6 of POCSO Act. 5. The learned trial court framed the charges for the offences punishable under Sections 450, 376 (3) of I.P.C. and Section 5 (L)/6 of the POCSO Act, the appellant/accused had denied the commission of offence and entered into defense. 6. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 13 documents in support of case of the prosecution. 4 7. On being asked to enter his defence under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code of Procedure), the accused did not produce any witness in his defence and stated that he was innocent and had been falsely implicated. The accused also stated that he was falsely implicated due to a family feud and that he was married. 8. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record and considering that it is the appellant who have committed aforesaid offence, convicted and sentenced him in the aforementioned manner, against which the appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the accused/appellant. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial Court is bad both on facts and in law. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt and has relied upon witnesses who are not independent or wholly reliable. Reliance placed by the trial Court on the statement of the medical witness (PW- 16) is questioned, particularly noting that during cross-examination she admitted to not having found any sign of recent sexual intercourse, and the report (Ex.P-3) suggests that the victim’s age is between 15 to 17 years. It is further submitted that the trial Court erroneously relied upon documents which were neither produced nor proved in the manner required by law for determination of age. The appellant contends that the charge sheet was filed by Bilha Police Station without conducting 5 proper inquiry or collecting relevant medical and scientific evidence, including FSL or DNA reports, which could prima facie demonstrate his innocence. It is further argued that the appellant has not committed any offence and that the victim, under pressure from her family members, has made a false statement implicating him. The prosecution story is further challenged on the ground of improbability, noting that other family members were present at the alleged place of incident, which would render the narrative inconsistent. Learned counsel submits that the trial Court erred in imposing the maximum punishment without due consideration of mitigating factors and the evidence on record. It is also contended that the trial Court wrongly imposed separate sentences under Section 376(3) IPC and Section 5(8)/6 POCSO Act, despite the fact that the ingredients of these offences are the same and not separable. On these grounds, it is urged that the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant are without the requisite legal proof and are liable to be set aside or, at the very least, the sentence should be reduced. 10. On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposed the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that the offences committed by the appellant were heinous in nature and thus, the trial court had rightly convicted him. He submitted that the trial Court had considered all the arguments made by the appellant and there was sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover,the victim was minor less than 15 years at the time of incident which is proved by the Dakhil Kharij register of the victim as well 6 as the ossification test. The evidence of the victim need not be required for any corroboration and on the sole testimony of the victim the conviction can be made. Therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in the findings of the learned trial Court and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence needs no interference. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the learned trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well. 12. The issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the testimony of the victim/prosecutrix deserves acceptance and whether the prosecution has established the case of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 13. It is pertinent to observe that the question whether conviction of the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the victim in cases of sexual assault/rape is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in a catena of judgments and has held that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if found reliable can be the sole ground for convicting the accused and that the creditworthy testimony of the victim in cases of such nature deserves acceptance. 14. The next issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the age of the victim on the date of commission of the offence concerned, was below 18 years of age. 7 15. A primary issue in the present case is whether the victim was a “child” within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, at the time of the alleged incident on 22/01/2019. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines a “child” as any person below the age of 18 years. To determine the age of the victim, reliance is placed on the provisions of Section 94(2)(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which provides that a birth certificate or school record is sufficient evidence of a child’s age, and the age stated therein is presumed to be correct. 16. The evidence on record establishes the age of the victim through both oral testimony and documentary records. The victim in her statement dated 26/02/2020 stated that she was 15 years old at the time of the incident, and her father corroborated this by stating that she was 15-16 years old and had not attained the age of 18 years. The investigating officer collected the Class IV progress report of the victim, and the mutation register and Tattiima (admission) form maintained by the Government Primary School, Aithulkapa, were seized and confirmed by the Headmistress and other witnesses. Both documents recorded the victim’s date of birth as 30/09/2004. Her admission to Class I on 30/07/2010, as reflected in the attested school register, corroborates this date of birth. 17. The radiologist, Dr. G.S. Kanwar, examined the victim’s X-ray on 02/07/2019 for age determination and opined that her age was between 15–17 years, and this report remained unchallenged during cross- 8 examination. The mutation register, admission form, and school records are maintained in the ordinary course by public authorities and thus constitute reliable public documents. There is no evidence to suggest any manipulation or false entry by the victim’s family. Considering the above evidence, the victim’s age on 22/01/2019 worked out to 14 years, 3 months, and 23 days, which is clearly below 18 years. Consequently, she falls within the definition of a “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. The oral and documentary evidence, supported by medical opinion, conclusively establishes that the victim was a minor at the time of the incident, and this issue is accordingly proved in favor of the prosecution. 18. The next question for consideration is whether on the date of incident, the accused committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the victim more than once? 19. In this regard, the victim (PW-4) filed a report against the accused, based on which Sub-Inspector S.L. Garhwal, on 28th June, 2019, based on the victim's oral report, registered a First Information Report (FIR) against the accused under Sections 376, 450 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4.8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, which is Ex.P. 19. As per the First Information Report (FIR), Ex.P. 19, the victim (PW-4) stated that the accused came to her house, grabbed her by the throat, gagged her, forcibly took her inside the house, forced her to lie on a cot, and raped her. He threatened to kill her and her family if she told anyone. Out of fear, she did not tell 9 anyone, and when she was alone at home, the accused continued to have sexual intercourse with her for four consecutive days. It is shown that due to wrongdoing to her, she is pregnant for five-six months. 20. Regarding the incident, the victim (PW-8) stated that she knew the accused. He is a resident of her village. According to her court statement, the incident occurred during the Cherchera festival of last year. She was at home doing household chores at the time. Her younger sister had gone to school, her younger brother had gone for a walk, and her father had gone to work at the mines. At approximately 11:00-12:00 p.m., the accused Pawanpuri Goswami, came to her house, gagged her, took her into a room, forcibly raped her, and threatened her and her family if she told anyone. He then left. The accused continued to come to her house daily and rape her. Out of fear, she did not tell anyone. She had gone to her elder sister's house in Katni and stayed there for 15 days. When her pregnancy grew, her sister asked, and she told her that the accused Pawanpuri Goswami, had intimidated her and raped her. Thereafter, she came to Aidulkapa village with her sister and told her father about the incident and later on when her other sister came, she also told her about the incident. 21. the victim's sister (PW-14), stated that her husband had come to her maternal home in Aivulkapa village and asked her to bring the victim to Chhinna Pipriya, Katni. When her husband brought the victim to Pipriya, he noticed that she looked overweight and had a distended abdomen. He asked her why her abdomen was distended. She 10 explained that the accused Pawan Puri Goswami, had sexually assaulted her. By "sexual assault," she meant rape, and that she had become pregnant as a result of the rape. Upon learning of this, she called her elder sister and told her husband about the incident. She brought her sister back to her maternal home in Aivulkapa and then told her father about the incident. The witness's statements remained unchallenged and uncontroversial during cross-examination. 22. Father of the victim (PW-7) deposed that the incident occurred during the Cherchera festival of last year, as per his court statement dated 26/02/2020. His daughter, the victim, had told him that the accused Pawan Puri Goswami had raped her, due to which she became pregnant. He used to go to work and both the children used to go to school. His daughter, the victim, used to stay alone at home. During that time, the accused Pawan Puri Goswami found his daughter, the victim alone and raped her. His daughter, the victim also told that he had raped her several times and the accused had threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident and had threatened to kill her and her son due to which her daughter victim did not tell her about the incident earlier. 23. Rajkumar Sori (PW-11), the then Inspector/Station House Officer of Bilha, stated that during the investigation, he recorded the statements of the victim, the victim's father, and the victim's sister as per their instructions. He prepared a site map of the crime scene (Ex.P. 11) as per the victim's description, which is corroborated by the statement of 11 the victim (PW-8). He arrested the accused and prepared the arrest warrant (Ex.P. 12). He obtained the victim's consent for her medical examination, which is corroborated by the victim's statement (PW-8). He completed the medical examination form and sent the victim to the Central Health Commission (CHC), Bilha, accompanied by female constable Shobha Tirki, which is corroborated by the statement of female constable Ms. Shobha Tirki (PW-3). After consultation with lady constable Shobha Tirkey, he seized two sealed vaginal slides of the victim as per seizure memo Ex.P-5, which has been supported by witness constable Omkareshwar Kashyap (PW-4) and witness constable Jodhan Sahu (PW-16) and which is confirmed by the statement of lady constable Ms. Shobha Tirkey (PW-3). 24. Ms. Shobha Tirkey (PW-3) female Constable No. 1301 stated that she received a medical certificate from the Bilha police station regarding the victim's medical examination, based on which she took the victim to the Central Health Center, Bilha, where she was examined by a doctor. The doctor provided her with two sealed packets, which she presented at the Bilha police station. These were seized from her by the Bilha police as per seizure memo Ex.P.5, which was supported by witness Constable Omkareshwar Kashyap (PW-4) and witness Constable Jodhan Sahu (PW-16). She took the victim to the District Hospital, Bilaspur, where she underwent a sonography, which is corroborated by the statement of Dr. G.S. Kanwar (PW-2) and the sonography report Ex.P.4. No challenge was raised by the accused in cross-examination. The statements of the witness remained unchallenged and unbroken in 12 cross-examination. 25. Dr. G.S. Kanwar (PW-2) stated that he performed a sonography on the victim, and found that she was pregnant at 26 weeks' gestation. The sonography report he provided regarding the victim's pregnancy is Ex.P. 4, which bears his signature on part A. The witness's statements remained unchallenged and uncontroversial during cross-examination. 26. The statement of prosecution witness, investigating officer Rajkumar Sori (PW-11) is that he had asked Dr. Geeta Pradhan, Medical Officer, Bilha, to provide the victim's X-ray and other documents along with the query report of USG. Letter Ex.P. 2-A was sent on which query report Ex.P. 2 was given by Dr. Geeta Pradhan, which is being confirmed by the statement of Dr. Mrs. Geeta Pradhan (PW-1). 27. Dr. Geeta Pradhan (PW-1) stated that the victim was brought to her for examination by female constable Shobha Tirki. Upon examining the victim, she found that her breasts were developed, heavy due to pregnancy, and that milk was flowing from them. Montegomery tubercles, typical of pregnancy, were present on her breasts. The victim was pregnant, and an abdominal examination revealed a 6-7-month gestation period. The victim's hymen was torn, and the vaginal mucosa showed increased vascularity, which is common during pregnancy. Her cervix was normal and approximately 26 to 28 weeks old. She prepared two slides from the posterior fornix of the victim's vagina, which she sealed and handed to the constable. In her opinion, the victim was pregnant and was 6-7 months pregnant. She further examined the 13 victim's age. She advised her to undergo a sonography of the fetus and referred her to the District Hospital, Bilaspur. The test report provided by her is Ex.P.1. 28. It has also been stated by Dr. Smt. Geeta Pradhan (PW-1) that the sonography report was given to her by lady constable Shobha Tirkey. The sonography report presented before him stated that the victim was pregnant. She stated that she was 26 weeks pregnant and had a baby inside her uterus. The query report she provided is Ex.P.2, which bears her signatures. 29. Investigating officer Rajkumar Soni (PW-11) has stated that he had sent the accused to CHC Bilha for examination by filling up the examination form Ex.P. 6-A, which has been supported by constable No. 1390 Santosh Markam (PW-5), which is corroborated by the statement of Dr. Prakash Ghodeshwar (PW 40-7) and the examination report Ex.P. 6 given by him. 30. Dr. Prakash Ghodeshwar (PW-10) has stated that the accused was produced before him for examination by Constable No. 1309 Santosh Markam. He examined the accused and submitted a report as Ex.P-6, parts of which are signed by him. In his opinion, the accused is capable of sexual intercourse, which has not been denied by the accused. 31. As stated above, the victim stated that the accused threatened her and raped her and that she became pregnant. Medical evidence also confirmed that the victim was pregnant. Medical evidence also 14 established that the accused was capable of sexual intercourse. The victim stated that she told her sister and father about the incident, which was corroborated by her sister (PW-14) and this has also been proved by the evidence of her father (PW-7). The victim (PW-8) lodged a report of the incident at the police station, which is confirmed by Ex.P. 19. The cross-examination of the witnesses has not revealed any significant contradiction or discrepancy regarding the incident, which makes the statements of the witnesses appear unreliable. Thus, the prosecution has been completely successful in proving the presumption made under Sections 29 and 30 of the Protection of Children Act through the evidence statements of the victim (PW-4) and other witnesses. Therefore, on the basis of the above discussion, it was found proved that by entering the residence of the victim, who is a girl of about 15 years, he committed house trespass to commit rape and penetrative sexual assault, and he committed rape by threatening to kill her and her father and by committing penetrative sexual assault on the victim more than once, he committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault. 32. In view of above discussion, we also affirm finding recorded by the trial Court that the appellant is the perpetrator of instant crime. 33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384, while considering the reliability of the statement of the victim has held that “minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise 15 reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault was enough for conviction and does not require corroboration unless there were compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The Court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience”. The same was reiterated in Pappu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 176. 34. Learned counsel for the appellant during course of argument also raised objection that except victim there is no credible evidence in support of her statement even deposition of her father is based on information given by victim and medical evidence also does not corroborate, therefore, only on the basis of deposition of victim holding guilty to the appellant by the learned trial Court is not sustainable. We are not inclined with the said submission made by learned counsel for the appellant as it is settled proposition of law that conviction of the accused could be based on sole testimony, without corroboration and it has also been held that the sole testimony of victim should not be doubted by the Court merely based on assumptions and surmises. 35. In the case of Ganesan vs. State, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed and held that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the victim is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the series of judgments on conviction on the sole evidence of the victim. In paragraphs 10.1 to 16 10.3, it was observed and held as under: “10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay vs. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191], it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195- 98) “9. In State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 550] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) ‘16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. 17 What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.’ 10. In State of U.P. vs. Pappu [State of U.P. 18 vs. Pappu, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 594] this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12) ‘12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, 19 short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.’ 11. In State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384], this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) ‘8. …The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the 20 investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. …The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self- respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. … Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. …Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. … 21 *** 21. …The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.’ 12. In State of Orissa vs. Thakara Besra [State of Orissa vs. Thakara Besra, reported in (2002) 9 SCC 86], this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire 22 case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. vs. Raghubir Singh [State of H.P. vs. Raghubir Singh, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 622], this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan vs. State of M.P. [Wahid Khan vs. State of M.P., reported in (2010) 2 SCC 9] placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan [Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1952 SC 54]. 14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.” 10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana [Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 130], it is observed and 23 held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 10.3. Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [Rai Sandeep vs. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21]. In para 22, it is observed and held as under: (SCC p. 29) “22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross- 24 examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender 25 guilty of the charge alleged.” 36. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Pankaj Chaudhary, reported in (2019) 11 SCC 575, it was observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It was further observed and held that sole testimony of victim should not be doubted by Court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In paragraph 29, it was observed and held as under: “29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu vs. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 283]. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan vs. N.K. [State of Rajasthan vs. N.K., reported in (2000) 5 SCC 30].” 37. In the case of Sham Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 34, the Supreme Court observed that testimony of the 26 victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It was further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. In paragraphs 6 and 7, it was observed and held as under: “6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384] (SCC 27 p. 403, para 21).] 7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika vs. State of Assam [Ranjit Hazarika vs. State of Assam, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 635)].” 38. Upon a thorough and careful appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has successfully proved the case against the accused beyond 28 reasonable doubt. The age of the victim is conclusively established through the school records and supporting documents (Ex.P-7 series), duly proved by the competent witnesses, which show that she was a minor and therefore a “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act on the date of the incident. The testimony of the victim (PW-8) is consistent, trustworthy and free from material contradictions, and is fully corroborated by the evidence of her sister (PW-14) and father (PW-7). The medical evidence of Dr. Geeta Pradhan (PW-1) and Dr. G.S. Kanwar (PW-2), along with their reports (Ex.P-1, Ex.P-2, Ex.P-4), supports the prosecution version, while the capability of the accused is established by Ex.P-6. The investigative evidence, including FIR (Ex.P- 13), spot map (Ex.P-11), arrest memo (Ex.P-12) and seizure memo (Ex.P-5), has been duly proved by PW-11. No material has been brought by the defence to discredit the prosecution witnesses or to rebut the statutory presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. Thus, the charges of house-trespass, repeated penetrative sexual assault and aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon the minor victim stand firmly established. 39. Consequently, the conviction awarded by the trial Court under Sections 450, 376(3) of the IPC and 5(ठ)/6 of the POCSO Act is hereby upheld. However, this Court is of the view that the sentence of life imprisonment till natural death under Sections 376(3) of the IPC and Section 5(ठ)/6 of the POCSO Act, which would mean imprisonment for rest of the natural life, is too harsh and instead, the same is converted 29 to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years. The imposition of fine amount and the default sentence is upheld. The appellant is stated to be in jail. He is directed to serve out the sentence as modified above. 40. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. 41. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 42. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet