1 2025:CGHC:59049-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 6337 of 2025 Pathozyme Diagnostics Plot No. A-115, Five Star M.I.D.C. Area, Kagal, District Kolhapur, Through Its Authorized Signatory, Preetesh Sahu, Son Of Late Ramsajivan Sahu, Aged About 45 Years, R/o 9/301, Ward No. 9, Om Enterprises, Shukrawari Bazar, Gudhiyari, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Health And Family Welfare Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Chhattisgarh Medical Services Corporation Through Managing Director, Cgmsc, Chhattisgarh Housing Board, Commercial Premises, Fourth Floor, South-East Corner, Sector-27 Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) 3 - General Manager (Equipments) Chhattisgarh Medical Services Corporation, Chhattisgarh Housing Board, Commercial Premises, SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2025.12.11 15:55:34 +0530 2 Fourth Floor, South- East Corner, Sector-27, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) 4 - Vanguard Diagnostics Private Limited C-123, Phase-1, Okhla Industrial Area, Okhla, District South East Delhi, State Delhi ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Petitioner(s) : Shri C. Jayant K. Rao, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Shri S.S. Baghel, Dy. Govt. Advocate. For CGMSC : Shri Raghvendra Pradhan, Advocate. For Respondent No. 4: Shri Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge 05.12.2025 1. By the present petition, the petitioner is seeking quashment of the order/communication dated 11.11.2025 issued by the respondent/CGMSC, whereby after Dawa Apatti Final Summary Sheet of Cover-A, the petitioner has been declared as ‘not eligible’, the petitioner further seeking a direction to consider the clarification submitted by the petitioner regarding the remarks and declare the petitioner eligible in final summary sheet cover- A and further allow the petitioner to participate in the tender process. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that pursuant to the NIT issued by the CGMSC for reagents, 3 including controls, calibrators and amp; consumables (compatible with Semi-automated Bio-chemistry analyser Mokshit Chanda-9903) with maintenance for equipment/ 2025- 2026. Pursuant to the said NIT along with other bidders the petitioner participated in the tender process and submitted the bid. After scrutiny the respondent authorities published the cover-A sheet, wherein the petitioner has been declared ineligible on three counts e.g. (1) Document for submission of TPF and EMD enclosed by the bidder, but amount not received as per CGMSC bank statement (2) D-Dimer Manufacturing License not found, (3) Production details for D-Dimer for year 2022-23, 2023-24 & 2024-2025 provided but manufacturing license not found. According to the petitioner after knowing about the said defects the petitioner submitted his response on 08.11.2025. Thereafter, on 11.11.2025, the respondent authorities published Cover-A after finalization of Dawa Appatti, wherein the first defect of the petitioner has been ignored however, in respect of Defects no. 2 & 3, the petitioner has been declared as ineligible. Petitioner would submit that the respondent authorities have not considered the candidature of the petitioner as also the objections raised by him in its true perspective, whereas, they are extending the benefits to their blue-eyed boys i.e. respondent no.4 herein. Petitioner would submit that despite non-fulfillment of the requisite conditions by the respondent no. 4, the CGMSC declared the said respondent 4 as eligible. Thus, this petition. 3. Per contra, learned respondents counsel oppose the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the petitioner ought to have submit that bid in consonance with the terms and conditions as enumerated in the subject NIT. It is submitted that all conditions are reasonable, uniformly applicable to all bidders, and intended to ensure transparency, quality, and timely execution of the contract. The respondents deny any arbitrariness or mala fides in the tender process and contend that no interference is called for by this Court. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the other documents appended with writ petition. 5. In case of Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd.1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the owner or the employer of a project having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. 6. In N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain2,, the Apex Court has observed as under: “22. The satisfaction whether a bidder satisfies the tender condition is primarily upon the authority inviting the bids. Such authority is aware of expectations from the tenderers while evaluating the consequences of non- performance. In the tender in question, there were 15 bidders. Bids of 13 tenderers were found to be 1 (2016) 16 SCC 818 2 (2022) 6 SCC 127 5 unresponsive i.e., not satisfying the tender conditions. The writ petitioner was one of them. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that action of the Technical Evaluation Committee was actuated by extraneous considerations or was malafide. Therefore, on the same set of facts, different conclusions can be arrived at in a bona-fide manner by the Technical Evaluation Committee. Since the view of the Technical Evaluation Committee was not to the liking of the writ petitioner, such decision does not warrant for interference in a grant of contract to a successful bidder. 23. In view of the above judgments of this Court, the Writ Court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer. The Court does not have the expertise to examine the terms and conditions of the present day economic activities of the State and this limitation should be kept in view. Courts should be even more reluctant in interfering with contracts involving technical issues as there is a requirement of the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon such issues. The approach of the Court should be not to find fault with magnifying glass in its hands, rather the Court should examine as to whether the decision-making process is after complying with the procedure contemplated by the tender conditions. If the Court finds that there is total arbitrariness or that the tender has been granted in a malafide manner, still the Court should refrain from interfering in the grant of tender but instead relegate the parties to seek damages for the wrongful exclusion rather than to injunct the execution of the contract. The injunction or interference in the tender leads to additional costs on the State and is also against public interest. Therefore, the State and its citizens suffer twice, firstly by paying escalation costs and secondly, by being deprived of the infrastructure for which the present-day Governments are expected to work.” 7. The Apex Court, in the matter of Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., reported in (2012) 8 SCC 216, held that in the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities unless the action of the 6 tendering authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers, interference by courts is not warranted. Taking note of its several decisions, the Supreme Court observed as under (at paras No. 10 to 14):- “10. This Court, in a series of decisions, considered similar conditions e incorporated in the tender documents and also the scope and judicial review of administrative actions. The scope and the approach to be adopted in the process of such review have been settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. Since the principle of law is settled and well recognised by now, we may refer to some of the decisions only to recapitulate the relevant tests applicable and approach of this Court in such matters. 11. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India this Court emphasised the need to find a right balance between administrative discretion to decide the matters on the one hand, and the need to remedy any unfairness on the other, and observed: (SCC pp. 687-88, para 94) "(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise, which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract.… 7 (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure." (emphasis in original) 12. In Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. this Court reiterated the principle governing the process of judicial review and held that the writ court would not be justified in interfering with commercial transactions in which the State is one of the parties except where there is substantial public interest involved and in cases where the transaction is mala fide. 13. In Union of India v. International Trading Co. this Court, in similar circumstances, held as under: (SCC pp. 445 & 447, paras 15-16 & 22-23) "15. While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 8 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. The meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness is more easily visualised than precisely defined. A question whether the impugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness. 16. Where a particular mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impediment in adopting the procedure, the deviation to act in a different manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable itself shall be labelled as arbitrary. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason is per se arbitrary. * * * 22. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities and adopt trade policies. As noted above, the ultimate test is whether on the touchstone of reasonableness the policy decision comes out unscathed. 23. Reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint of interests of the general public and not from the standpoint of the interests of persons upon whom the restrictions have been imposed or upon abstract consideration. A 9 restriction cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case, it operates harshly. In determining whether there is any unfairness involved; the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing condition at the relevant time, enter into judicial verdict. The reasonableness of the legitimate expectation has to be determined with respect to the circumstances relating to the trade or business in question. Canalisation of a particular business in favour of even a specified individual is reasonable where the interests of the country are concerned or where the business affects the economy of the country. (See Parbhani Transport Coop. Society Ltd. v. RTA, Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo District Council and Krishnan Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala.)" 14. In Jespar I. Slong v. State of Meghalaya this Court, in para 17, held as under: (SCC p. 494) "17. ... fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive and courts hardly have any role to play in this process except for striking down such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable." 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material placed on record, it appears that the grievance of the petitioner revolves around the alleged arbitrariness and unreasonableness of certain conditions incorporated in the impugned Notice Inviting Tender (NIT). Bare perusal of the NIT 10 particularly Clause 3.1 provides for eligibility criteria whereas, Clause 3.1.1 speaks about manufacturing license and permit. For the sake of convenience it would be appropriate to quote clause 3.1.1 of the NIT for proper adjudication of the present lis, which reads as under:- 3.1.1 Manufacturing license and product permit: The Bidder shall be the manufacturer having valid manufacturing license & sale license for the item(s) quoted or duly acknowledged renewal application with old license issued by the State Licensing Authority / Central Licensing Approving Authority (wherever applicable) or copy of original Treasury Challan regarding manufacturing license retention fee or Manufacturing license issued by competent authority as per Medical Devices Rules, 2017. 9. Bare perusal of the aforesaid Clause, it is evident that the bidders shall be manufacturer having valid manufacturing license & sale license for the item(s) quoted or duly acknowledged renewal application with old license issued by the State Licensing Authority / Central Licensing Approving Authority (wherever applicable) or copy of original Treasury Challan regarding manufacturing license retention fee or Manufacturing license issued by competent authority as per Medical Devices Rules, 2017. On due scrutiny of the bid 11 submitted by the petitioner the authorities of the CGMSC found that the candidature of the petitioner is not eligible to continue the tender process by assigning the reasons that (1) D-Dimer manufacturing License Not Found & (2) Production Details for D-dimer for year 2022-23, 2023-24 & 2024-25 provided but manufacturing license not found. The authorities after appreciating all the details and considering the objections raised by the petitioner, have rightly issued Cover-A on 11.11.2025 under the heading of After Dawa Appatti Final summary Sheet of Cover-A. As far as the allegation regarding extending undue advantage in favour of respondent no. 4 is concerned, the petitioner failed to establish the same by placing sufficient cogent material before the Court. Since, the subject NIT is relating to supply of medical kits and its maintenance the bidders are required to submit all the details including the manufacturing licenses as sought for in the NIT. 10. This Court is conscious of the well-settled principle that the scope of judicial review in contractual and tender matters is limited. Interference by the writ court is warranted only when the action of the tendering authority is found to be arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide, or in violation of statutory or constitutional provisions. The courts are not expected to sit in appeal over the wisdom of the tendering authority in formulating terms and conditions of the tender, unless such terms are manifestly unreasonable or designed to favour a particular 12 bidder. 11. From the material available on record and the tender documents, it is quite vivid that the petitioner failed to fulfill the requisite conditions of the subject NIT. The said condition would be applicable to all the bidders and even the petitioner cannot question the same. 12. It is the trite law that the Court should not interfere in tender matters unless the Government's decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, malicious, or suffers from mala fides. It should exercise restraint and avoid substituting its judgment for the administrative authority's, especially when it comes to the technical and commercial aspects of the tendering process. The court's role is not to act as an employer but to ensure the process adheres to fairness and is not discriminatory. The Government has broad discretion in setting the terms of a tender. It is also the settled law that the Courts lack the specialized expertise to evaluate technical and commercial contract decisions and should not second-guess the employer's choices. Judicial review of tender matters is a limited power, and interference is only warranted for clear-cut cases of arbitrariness, irrationality, or bias. 13. Thus, this Court finds no sufficient ground to hold that the impugned NIT suffer from arbitrariness or violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The decision of the respondent authority 13 appears to be based on commercial prudence and administrative discretion, for which this Court ordinarily would not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Shoaib