ORDER : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. Heard Ms. Deepali Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State/respondents No.1 to 3 as well as Ms. Akanksha Jain, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4. 2. In all the writ petitions, a seminal question for adjudication has been raised. Accordingly, all the writ petitions were clubbed together for hearing and are being disposed of by this common order. 3. For the sake of convenience, WPS No. 5997 of 2023 is treated as the lead case, and for the purpose of adjudication of all the matters, the pleadings filed in WPS No. 5997 of 2023, as well as the return filed by the respondents have been taken into consideration. 4. In WPS No.5997/2023, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:- “10.1 That, the Hon’ble Court be pleased direct respondent state authority no.4 to decide the pending application dated 26/6/23 of the petitioner. 10.2 That, the Hon’ble Court be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to grant the arrears of Rs.6,27,280/- which the petitioner is entitled as per the circulars of the State Government. 10.3 That, any other relief which this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the present facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be granted.” 5. Brief facts of the case for deciding all the writ petitions, in a nutshell, are that all the petitioners are Headmasters posted in different Government Primary Schools in the newly formed District Sarangarh–Bilaigarh. The petitioners were initially appointed as Shiksha Karmis Grade-III under the Panchayat Department during the years 1998–1999. Thereafter, they participated in the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination conducted in accordance with the Chhattisgarh Non-Gazetted Class-III School Education (School Level Services) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2008, and were selected and appointed as Headmasters under the School Education Department on 25.11.2010. Upon such selection, the petitioners were duly relieved from the Panchayat cadre and since then have been continuously working as Headmasters in Primary Schools under the School Education Department. 6. The Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of Chhattisgarh, issued a circular dated 01.05.2012 granting the first time-scale to Assistant Teachers (Panchayat), Teachers (Panchayat), and Lecturers (Panchayat) who were graduates and had completed seven years of service, along with dearness allowance at the rate of 50% of basic pay. 6. The Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of Chhattisgarh, issued a circular dated 01.05.2012 granting the first time-scale to Assistant Teachers (Panchayat), Teachers (Panchayat), and Lecturers (Panchayat) who were graduates and had completed seven years of service, along with dearness allowance at the rate of 50% of basic pay. Subsequently, another circular dated 17.05.2013 was issued granting revised pay-scale to Teachers (Panchayat) who had completed eight years of service as on 01.05.2013, to be calculated from the date of initial appointment. Thereafter, the State Government issued a further circular dated 24.04.2023 granting arrears of pay-scale to Shiksha Karmis. 7. In pursuance of the aforesaid circulars, the petitioners submitted applications before the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad/Jila Panchayat, Baramkela, District Sarangarh–Bilaigarh, seeking grant of arrears towards the first time-scale on completion of seven years and revised pay-scale on completion of eight years of service for the period during which they had worked as Shiksha Karmis under the Panchayat Department, i.e., between the years 2005 and 2010. In WPS No. 5997 of 2023, the petitioner quantified the claim to the tune of Rs.6,27,280/-. However, despite submission of the applications along with calculation charts, the same have neither been decided nor have the arrears been paid to the petitioners till date. 8. It is further the case of the petitioners that their appointment as Headmasters under the School Education Department was made after due participation in the selection process, and the Panchayat Department had no objection to their appearing in the examination or joining the higher post. As per the Circular dated 26.09.1972 issued by the Finance Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh, if an employee, after obtaining prior permission, resigns upon selection to another post under the Government, such resignation is to be treated as a technical resignation and the employee is entitled to the benefit of past service. The same principle is reiterated under the Madhya Pradesh Pay Determination Rules, which provide that past service shall be counted for financial benefits in such cases. 9. Since all the writ petitioners have raised similar grievances and identical reliefs, contending that they have been unlawfully denied the benefit of time-scale, revised pay-scale, dearness allowance, and consequential arrears for the period they served as Shiksha Karmis under the Panchayat Department prior to their appointment as Headmasters, these writ petitions have been filed. 10. Ms. 9. Since all the writ petitioners have raised similar grievances and identical reliefs, contending that they have been unlawfully denied the benefit of time-scale, revised pay-scale, dearness allowance, and consequential arrears for the period they served as Shiksha Karmis under the Panchayat Department prior to their appointment as Headmasters, these writ petitions have been filed. 10. Ms. Deepali Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners were initially appointed as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III during the years 1998–1999 under the Panchayat and Rural Development Department and had joined service in the year 1998 itself. Thereafter, they participated in the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination conducted under the Chhattisgarh Non-Gazetted Class-III School Education (School Level Services) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2008, and upon selection, were appointed as Headmasters under the School Education Department on 25.11.2010. Upon such appointment, the petitioners were duly relieved from the Panchayat cadre with no objection from the Panchayat authorities, and since then they have been continuously working as Headmasters in Government Primary Schools. She further submitted that the Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of Chhattisgarh, issued circulars dated 01.05.2012 and 17.05.2013 granting time-scale on completion of seven years and revised pay-scale on completion of eight years of service, respectively, to Shiksha Karmis, later redesignated as Assistant Teacher (Panchayat), Teacher (Panchayat), and Lecturer (Panchayat). Subsequently, vide circular dated 24.04.2023, arrears were also sanctioned to Shiksha Karmis. 11. According to Ms. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners, these circulars confer a clear financial entitlement based upon length of service rendered under the Panchayat Department. It is contended that the petitioners, having admittedly rendered qualifying service as Shiksha Karmis prior to their appointment as Headmasters, are entitled to the benefit of time-scale, revised pay-scale, and consequential arrears by counting their past service from the date of initial appointment. The mere fact that the petitioners are presently serving under the School Education Department cannot deprive them of the benefit of service already rendered under the Panchayat Department, particularly when the employer throughout remains the State Government. She emphasized that the resignation tendered by the petitioners upon their selection as Headmasters is a technical resignation, protected under the Finance Department Circular dated 26.09.1972 and the Madhya Pradesh Pay Determination Rules, which mandate that past service shall be counted for all service and pay-related benefits when an employee, after due permission, joins another post under the Government. She emphasized that the resignation tendered by the petitioners upon their selection as Headmasters is a technical resignation, protected under the Finance Department Circular dated 26.09.1972 and the Madhya Pradesh Pay Determination Rules, which mandate that past service shall be counted for all service and pay-related benefits when an employee, after due permission, joins another post under the Government. Advancement in service, it was urged, cannot operate to the detriment of an employee by extinguishing accrued service benefits. 12. Ms. Pandey further submitted that the petitioners submitted detailed representations dated 26.06.2023 before the Chief arrears for the period between 2005 and 2010, duly supported by calculation charts. However, the said representations have neither been decided nor have the admissible arrears been released, rendering the inaction of the respondents arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Mukesh Kumar Patel and another v. State of Chhattisgarh and others , WPS No. 2530 of 2017 decided on 28.11.2017 wherein it was held that the benefit of revised pay-scale on completion of eight years of service is to be granted by including service rendered on a lower post. It was contended that the said decision squarely applies to the present case, and denial of identical benefits to the petitioners, despite extension of such benefits to similarly situated employees, amounts to hostile discrimination. 13. Lastly, it is urged by Ms. Pandey that administrative bifurcation between departments cannot defeat accrued service rights, that parity and equal treatment demand extension of the same benefits to the petitioners, and that non-decision of pending representations itself constitutes a failure of public duty. 14. On these grounds, Ms. Pandey, learned counsel prayed that the writ petitions be allowed and directions be issued to count the entire past service rendered by the petitioners as Shiksha Karmis for grant of time-scale, revised pay-scale, and consequential arrears. 15. On the other hand, Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned State counsel vehemently opposes the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners and submitted that the petitioners are not entitled to claim any benefit under the circulars dated 01.05.2012 and 17.05.2013, as on the date of issuance of the said circulars, the petitioners are no longer employees of the Panchayat and Rural Development Department. Rahul Tamaskar, learned State counsel vehemently opposes the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners and submitted that the petitioners are not entitled to claim any benefit under the circulars dated 01.05.2012 and 17.05.2013, as on the date of issuance of the said circulars, the petitioners are no longer employees of the Panchayat and Rural Development Department. It is submitted that the petitioners have already left the Panchayat service and joined the School Education Department on the post of Headmaster through a regular selection process on 25.11.2010. It is contended that the circulars dated 01.05.2012 and 17.05.2013 are issued by the Department of Panchayat and Rural Development and are applicable exclusively to Assistant Teacher (Panchayat), Teacher (Panchayat), and Lecturer (Panchayat) working under the Panchayat Department. The scope of the said circulars does not extend to employees of the School Education Department. Since the petitioners ceased to be employees of the Panchayat Department, they cannot, under any stretch of imagination, claim benefits meant only for teachers continuing in the Panchayat cadre. 16. Mr. Tamaskar submitted that none of the aforesaid circulars provides for extension of benefits to employees who have left the Panchayat Department and joined another department. The petitioners, therefore, cannot seek service benefits under two different departments. The circulars are prospective in nature and do not confer any right to claim arrears with retrospective effect. It is further submitted that the petitioners have approached this Court after an inordinate delay of nearly ten years in claiming benefits under the circulars dated 01.05.2012 and 17.05.2013. No plausible explanation has been furnished for such delay. On the ground of gross delay and laches alone, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. It is contended that the circular dated 24.04.2023 has no application to the present case, as the same pertains to a distinct class of Teacher (Panchayat) cadre employees who were absorbed into the School Education Department in the year 2018. The petitioners herein were appointed as Headmasters in the year 2010 and, therefore, cannot claim any benefit under the said circular. 17. Mr. Tamaskar further contended that the subsequent clarificatory circulars dated 04.12.2013, 22.01.2014, and 28.04.2015 do not envisage grant of time-scale or revised pay-scale to employees who have already exited the Panchayat cadre. These clarifications clearly negate the claim raised by the petitioners. 17. Mr. Tamaskar further contended that the subsequent clarificatory circulars dated 04.12.2013, 22.01.2014, and 28.04.2015 do not envisage grant of time-scale or revised pay-scale to employees who have already exited the Panchayat cadre. These clarifications clearly negate the claim raised by the petitioners. It is also contended that the judgments relied upon by the petitioners, including Mukesh Kumar Patel (supra), are distinguishable on facts and do not apply to the present case. The said judgments pertain to employees who continued within the Panchayat cadre, whereas the petitioners herein joined the School Education Department as Headmasters and ceased to be Panchayat employees. Hence, reliance placed on the said judgments is misconceived. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is contended that the writ petitions are devoid of merit and deserve to be dismissed. 18. Ms. Akanksha Jain, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4, opposes the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners and submitted that the circulars dated 01.05.2012 and 17.05.2013 cannot be given retrospective effect unless the said circulars themselves so provide. It is submitted that since the petitioners had already left the services of the Panchayat Department and joined the School Education Department prior to issuance of the aforesaid circulars, they are not entitled to claim any benefit thereunder. She further submitted that the circular dated 01.05.2012 specifically pertains to grant of increased pay scale to Teachers (Panchayat) category, and a plain reading of the said circular does not contemplate extension of such benefit to teachers who had already left the Panchayat Department and joined another department prior to its coming into force. Similarly, the circular dated 17.05.2013 is applicable only to Teachers (Panchayat) working under the Panchayat and Rural Development Department and not to employees serving under the School Education Department. 19. Ms. Jain contended that upon appointment as Headmasters in the School Education Department in the year 2010, the petitioners ceased to be employees of the Panchayat Department and, therefore, cannot claim parity or benefits at par with employees continuing under the Panchayat Department. The circulars in question are specific in nature and do not extend benefits to those who exited the Panchayat service prior to their issuance. The circulars in question are specific in nature and do not extend benefits to those who exited the Panchayat service prior to their issuance. She submitted that the writ petitions suffer from gross delay and laches, as the circulars relied upon were issued in the years 2012 and 2013, whereas the petitioners approached the authorities only after a lapse of nearly ten years, without furnishing any plausible explanation. It is also submitted that an incorrect statement has been made in the petition that the same is within limitation, which further disentitles the petitioners to discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. She further submitted that the circulars dated 01.05.2012 and 17.05.2013 were issued by the Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of Chhattisgarh, and their applicability is strictly confined to Teachers (Panchayat) working under the said department. The State Government has expressly stipulated that the benefits under the said circulars shall operate prospectively, i.e., with effect from 01.04.2012 and 01.05.2013, respectively. 20. It is submitted by Ms. Jain that admittedly the petitioners have been serving under the School Education Department as Headmasters since the year 2010 and, therefore, no vested or accrued right flows in their favour under the said circulars. Reliance is also placed upon the clarificatory circulars dated 04.12.2013 and 22.01.2014, the validity whereof has been upheld by this Court in Marisha Shrivastava v. State of Chhattisgarh and another , WPS No.106 of 2014 to buttress her submissions. She further submitted that vide subsequent clarificatory circulars dated 14.11.2014 and 28.04.2015, the State Government revoked the monetary benefits of revised pay scale and time- bound pay scale granted to Teachers (Panchayat) with retrospective effect from 01.05.2013, and therefore the petitioners cannot claim any monetary benefit thereunder. She submitted that the petitioners are selectively relying upon only those portions of the circulars which are favourable to them, while ignoring the conditions attached thereto, which is impermissible in law as a party cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate simultaneously. 21. It is lastly submitted by Ms. Jain that even otherwise, the petitioners have been drawing a higher pay scale of Rs.9300– 34800 with Grade Pay Rs.4200 since the year 2010 while working as Headmasters, which is equivalent to the revised pay scale applicable to Teachers (Panchayat), and thus no additional monetary benefit or arrears are payable. 21. It is lastly submitted by Ms. Jain that even otherwise, the petitioners have been drawing a higher pay scale of Rs.9300– 34800 with Grade Pay Rs.4200 since the year 2010 while working as Headmasters, which is equivalent to the revised pay scale applicable to Teachers (Panchayat), and thus no additional monetary benefit or arrears are payable. She further submitted that the Scrutiny Committee constituted pursuant to the directions of this Court has examined and rejected the claim of the petitioners, and the said report has attained finality. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted that the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 22. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length and perused the pleadings, documents placed on record, and the impugned orders as well as the judgments relied upon by them. 23. It is a settled principle of law that any circular, notification, or executive instruction which does not expressly provide for retrospective operation is to be construed as prospective in nature. Unless a circular specifically indicates an intention to apply retrospectively, it cannot be so enforced. In P. Tulsi Das and others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others , (2003) 1 SCC 364 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that executive instructions affecting service conditions operate prospectively unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed. 24. Though learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the order passed by this Court in Mukesh Kumar Patel (supra), the same is clearly distinguishable on facts. The said case pertained to Teachers who were admittedly continuing in service under the Panchayat Department. 25. In P. Tulsi Das (supra), while dealing with the similar issue, as held as follows :- “14. On a careful consideration of the principles laid down in the above decisions in the light of the fact situation in these appeals we are of the view that they squarely apply on all fours to the cases on hand in favour of the appellants. On a careful consideration of the principles laid down in the above decisions in the light of the fact situation in these appeals we are of the view that they squarely apply on all fours to the cases on hand in favour of the appellants. The submissions on behalf of the respondent-State that the rights derived and claimed by the appellants must be under any statutory enactment or rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and that in other respects there could not be any acquisition of rights validly, so as to disentitle the State to enact the law of the nature under challenge to set right serious anomalies which crept in and deserved to undone, does not merit our acceptance. It is by now well settled that in the absence of Rules under Article 309 of the Constitution in respect of a particular area, aspect or subject, it was permissible for the State to make provisions in exercise of its executive powers under Article 162 which is co- extensive with its Legislative powers laying conditions of service and rights accrued to or acquired by a citizen would be as much rights acquired under law and protected to that extent. The orders passed by the Government, from time to time beginning from February 1967 till 1985 and at any rate upto the passing of the Act, to meet the administrative exigencies and cater to the needs of public interest really and effectively provided sufficient legal basis for the acquisition of rights during the period when they were in full force and effect. The orders of the High Court as well as the Tribunal also recognised and upheld such rights and those orders attained finality without being further challenged by the Government, in the manner known to law. Such rights, benefits and perquisites acquired by the Teachers concerned cannot be said to be rights acquired otherwise than in accordance with law or brushed aside and trampled at the sweet will and pleasure of the Government, with impunity. Consequently we are unable to agree that the Legislature could have validly denied those rights acquired by the appellants retrospectively, not only depriving them of such rights but also enact a provision to repay and restore the amounts paid to them to State. Consequently we are unable to agree that the Legislature could have validly denied those rights acquired by the appellants retrospectively, not only depriving them of such rights but also enact a provision to repay and restore the amounts paid to them to State. The provisions of the Act, though can be valid in its operation 'in future' can not be held valid in so far as it purports to restore status quo ante for the past period taking away the benefits already available, accrued and acquired by them. For all the reasons stated above the reasons assigned by the majority opinion of the Tribunal could not be approved in our hands. The provisions of Section 2 and 3(a) insofar as they purport to take away the rights from 10-2- 1967 and obligates those who had them to repay or restore it back to the State is hereby struck down as arbitrary, unreasonable and expropriatory and as such is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. No exception could be taken, in our view, to the prospective exercise of powers thereunder without infringing the rights already acquired by the appellants and the category of the persons similarly situated whether approached courts or not seeking relief individually. The provisions contained in Section 2 have to be read down so as to make it only prospective, to save the same from the unconstitutionality arising out of its retrospective application.” 26. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and another v. B.D. Singhal and others , (2021) 17 SCC 435 , has observed as follows :- “28. In State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd., Ranchi, (2023) 10 SCC 634 , this court speaking through of one us (D Y Chandrachud J) elaborated on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which is grounded in fairness and reasonableness. Explaining that there is a legitimate expectation that the actions of the State are fair and reasonable, it was observed: “45. …The state must discard the colonial notion that it is a sovereign handing out doles at its will. Its policies give rise to legitimate expectations that the state will act according to what it puts forth in the public realm. In all its actions, the State is bound to act fairly, in a transparent manner. …The state must discard the colonial notion that it is a sovereign handing out doles at its will. Its policies give rise to legitimate expectations that the state will act according to what it puts forth in the public realm. In all its actions, the State is bound to act fairly, in a transparent manner. This is an elementary requirement of the guarantee against arbitrary state action which Article 14 of the Constitution adopts.” (emphasis supplied) 29. Since the enhancement of the age of superannuation is a ‘public function’ channelised by the provisions of the statute and the service regulations, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to challenge the action of NOIDA. Though NOIDA sought the approval of the State government for the enhancement with ‘immediate effect’, it never intended or portrayed to have intended to give retrospective effect to the prospectively applicable Government order. The representation of NOIDA could not have given rise to a legitimate expectation since it was a mere recommendation which was subject to the approval of the State Government. Hence, the doctrine of legitimate expectation also finds no application to the facts of the present case” 27. Reverting to the facts of the present batch of cases in the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (supra), it is manifest that the petitioners do not possess any enforceable or vested right to claim the benefit of pay-scale revision or arrears by seeking application of the circulars dated 01.05.2012 and 17.05.2013 with retrospective effect. The said circulars neither confer any accrued right upon the petitioners nor do they create any legitimate expectation in their favour, particularly when the petitioners were not governed by the Panchayat Department at the time of issuance of the said circulars. 28. In the present batch of cases, the petitioners had already left the Panchayat Department upon their appointment as Headmasters under the School Education Department in the year 2010. Once the petitioners ceased to be employees of the Panchayat Department, they cannot claim the benefit of circulars which are prospective in nature and confined to a particular cadre. 28. In the present batch of cases, the petitioners had already left the Panchayat Department upon their appointment as Headmasters under the School Education Department in the year 2010. Once the petitioners ceased to be employees of the Panchayat Department, they cannot claim the benefit of circulars which are prospective in nature and confined to a particular cadre. Further, the clarificatory circulars dated 04.12.2013 and 22.01.2014 specifically stipulate that no arrears shall be payable and that the benefit of time-scale and revised pay-scale would be granted only prospectively upon completion of seven and eight years of service, respectively, and not from the date of appointment on a lower post. These circulars, being clarificatory in nature, clearly manifest the intent of the State Government that the benefits are to be extended only to Teachers of the Panchayat Department, namely Assistant Teacher (Panchayat), Teacher (Panchayat), and Lecturer (Panchayat), and not to employees serving under other departments such as the School Education Department. 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion and upon careful consideration of the factual matrix and the applicable legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out by the petitioners for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent authorities to grant them time-scale, revised pay-scale, or arrears in terms of the circulars dated 01.05.2012 and 17.05.2013 issued by the Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of Chhattisgarh. The petitioners, having ceased to be employees of the Panchayat Department prior to issuance of the said circulars, are not entitled to claim any benefit thereunder. The benefits contemplated under the said circulars are intended to operate prospectively and are confined to employees continuing under the Panchayat and Rural Development Department. 30. Consequently, all the writ petitions (WPS/5997/2023, WPS/5999/2023, WPS/6003/2023, WPS/6005/2023, WPS/6018/2023, WPS/6001/2023, WPS/6004/2023, WPS/6026/2023, WPS/6029/2023, WPS/7405/2023, WPS/7443/2023, WPS/8647/2023, WPS/6439/2023, WPS/6430/2023, WPS/7094/2023, WPS/6436/2023, WPS/7084/2023, WPS/7105/2023, WPS/7008/2023, WPS/7116/2023, WPS/6693/2023, WPS/6431/2023, WPS/7061/2023, WPS/7051/2023, WPS/7371/2023, WPS/7090/2023, WPS/7359/2023, WPS/7361/2023, WPS/7362/2023, WPS/7185/2023, WPS/7198/2023, WPS/7337/2023, WPS/8386/2023, WPS/8382/2023, WPS/8399/2023, WPS/8379/2023, WPS/8411/2023, WPS/8381/2023, WPS/8391/2023, WPS/8656/2023, WPS/8649/2023, WPS/8615/2023, WPS/8667/2023, WPS/8654/2023, WPS/8634/2023, WPS/8644/2023, WPS/8620/2023, WPS/8640/2023, WPS/8659/2023, WPS/8653/2023, WPS/7437/2023, WPS/2227/2024, WPS/7372/2023, WPS/7394/2023, WPS/6738/2023, WPS/7439/2023, WPS/7373/2023, WPS/8648/2023, WPS/8618/2023, WPS/8384/2023 and WPS/7440/2023, being devoid of merit, are liable to be and are hereby dismissed. 31. There shall be no order as to costs.