JUDGMENT : RAVINDRA KUMAR AGRAWAL, J. 1. The present first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the defendant No.1 against the Digitally impugned judgment and decree dated 05.07.2014, passed by learned 3 rd Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 33-A/2013, whereby the decree for specific performance of contract has been passed in favour of the plaintiffs. 2. For the sake of convenience, the status of the parties as shown in the civil suit is being referred to in the present appeal. 3. The plaintiffs, Ravindra Jaiswal and Triloki Prasad Bhargava, filed a civil suit for specific performance of the contract and for possession of the suit land bearing khasra No. 418/1, area 0.36 acres situated in the village Sakari, P.H. No. 26, Tahsil Takhatpur, District Bilaspur. It is pleaded in the plaint that, in the year 2008, the Sakri-Turkadih bypass road was constructed and the plaintiffs came into contact with the defendant No.1, who was in need of money and wanted to sell his land, which was situated adjacent to the bypass road. The plaintiffs tentatively get the measurement of the land of the plaintiffs and found that it was only 20-22 dismil land remaining with the defendant No.1 after acquisition of his remaining land for the said bypass road and then an agreement to sell was executed between the parties for total consideration of Rs. 4 lakhs, and on 02.06.2008, the advance amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- was paid to the defendant No.1 and agreement was executed. It was the condition in the agreement that, after acquisition of the land by the State Government, whatever land remaining with the defendant No.1, the sale deed is to be executed for the said remaining land on the agreed sale consideration of Rs. 4 lakhs. It was also a condition in the agreement that, the remaining sale consideration is to be paid at the time of registration of the deed and the sale-deed would be registered after completion of the land acquisition proceeding, and before that the documents are to be provided by the defendant No.1 and the sale-deed was to be registered in the name of persons suggested by the plaintiffs. It is also pleaded in the plaint that, within one month of the execution of the agreement in the year 2008 itself, the plaintiffs requested the defendant No.1 for registration of the sale-deed, but the defendant informed that the land acquisition proceeding is still pending and the revenue authorities are not issuing the relevant documents. The defendant No.1 kept them under assurance that the land acquisition proceeding is pending before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kota, and he is participating in the proceeding regularly, and as and when it will conclude, he would inform them and would execute the sale-deed in their favour. Since the plaintiff No.2 is also the resident of village Sakari, he was well aware of the pendency of land acquisition proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kota and therefore, they waited for conclusion of the land acquisition proceedings. In the month of May 2011, the plaintiffs again requested the defendant for registration of the sale-deed; at that time, he remained stand that the land acquisition proceeding was still not concluded. It is also pleaded that, on 18.01.2012, when the plaintiffs obtained information from the Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kota about the land acquisition proceeding, they came to know that, though the proceeding is not concluded, but the area of the lands of the respective land owners is clear, as to how much lands are under acquisition and they also came to know that, the ban of alienation of the lands was removed. Thereafter, the plaintiffs again requested the defendant No.1 for registration of the sale deed as soon as possible, but the defendant No.1 evaded the registration of the sale deed and sought time repeatedly. Under the agreement dated 02.06.2008, it was the condition that after the conclusion of the land acquisition proceeding and removal of the ban from alienation of the land, the defendant No.1 would inform the plaintiffs, but he failed to do so. Considering the conduct of the defendant No.1, the plaintiffs served a legal notice on 01.02.2012 to the defendant No.1 and asked for registration of the sale deed. The notice was served upon him, but he neither replied to the notice nor executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have possessed the remaining sale consideration, and they are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract from the very beginning to date. The notice was served upon him, but he neither replied to the notice nor executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have possessed the remaining sale consideration, and they are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract from the very beginning to date. It is the defendant No.1, who evaded the registration of the sale deed and failed to perform his part of the contract; therefore, the suit was filed on 21.02.2012. 4. The defendant No.1 contested the suit of the plaintiffs and filed his written statement, denied the plaint averments and pleaded that, the part of the land of khasra No. 418/1, area 0.36 acre is acquired by the State Government for Sakari-Turkadih bypass road and some part of the said land is remaining with the defendant No.1, but the plaintiffs have annexed an incorrect map of the suit land with their plaint as schedule-A. The defendant No.1 does not have the entire 0.36 acre of land, but the suit for specific performance of the contract has been filed with respect to the entire 0.36 acre of land, which is not maintainable. He denied that after tentative measurement of the remaining land, 20-22 dismil of land remained with the defendant No.1, for which the agreement was executed. He also denied the execution of the sale agreement for a total consideration of Rs. 4 lakhs with respect to the remaining land of the defendant No.1, and also denied the execution of the agreement on 02.06.2008 after receiving the advance amount of Rs. 2,50,000/-. He also denied that, within one month of execution of the agreement, the plaintiffs requested him for registration of the sale deed, and he informed them about the pendency of the land acquisition proceeding and the ban on the sale transaction of the land. He also denied that he was given any assurance to the plaintiffs that, as and when the land acquisition proceeding would be concluded, and the ban would be removed, he would execute the sale deed in their favour. It is further pleaded that the plaintiffs are engaged in property dealing. He also denied that he was given any assurance to the plaintiffs that, as and when the land acquisition proceeding would be concluded, and the ban would be removed, he would execute the sale deed in their favour. It is further pleaded that the plaintiffs are engaged in property dealing. In the year 2008, when the defendant No.1 was in dire need of money, he contacted the plaintiffs for sale of his land, and then, they assured him that within a month, they would arrange the purchaser of the land and got executed an agreement on 02.06.2008, however, the plaintiffs failed to arrange the purchaser and the defendant No.1 suffered a lot. It is further pleaded that the land acquisition proceeding before the Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kota, was already concluded in the year 2008 itself, and the plaintiffs were well within knowledge since then. Since the plaintiffs have not obtained any purchaser of the land, they have not obtained the sale-deed registered in their favour and have not even tried or processed for registration of the sale-deed. The plaintiffs were never ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and were not interested in the registration of the sale deed in their favour. It is also pleaded that there is no specific pleading in the plaint as to how much land is remaining with the defendant No.1 out of the total 0.36 acre of land after acquisition of some part of it, and therefore, the terms of the agreement are not certain, and therefore, it is an in-executable agreement and void ab initio. The ban was removed in the year 2008 itself, but the plaintiffs have failed to perform their part of the contract and have done nothing for the registration of the sale deed in their favour. The plaintiff No.2 is the resident of the village Sakari and is well aware about the fact that the land acquisition proceeding was concluded in the year 2008 itself. It is further pleaded that the plaintiffs have pleaded in the plaint that, on 18.01.2012, when they got information from Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kota, about the land acquisition proceeding that it is still pending, then the suit of the plaintiffs is premature in view of the conditions of the said agreement. It is further pleaded that the plaintiffs have pleaded in the plaint that, on 18.01.2012, when they got information from Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kota, about the land acquisition proceeding that it is still pending, then the suit of the plaintiffs is premature in view of the conditions of the said agreement. The plaintiffs never had in possession the remaining sale consideration and were never ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The agreement was said to have been executed on 02.06.2008; however, the suit was filed on 21.02.2012, which is barred by limitation. The agreement dated 02.06.2008 is already cancelled after its validity period, and the plaintiffs are not entitled to any decree of specific performance of the said contract. The suit is not properly valued, and no proper court fee has been paid. The State Government and Public Works Department, in whose possession the part of the land is under acquisition, have not been made as a party defendant in the suit, and the suit suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties and the same is liable to be dismissed. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court has framed the following issues:- 6. In support of their case, the plaintiffs have examined Ravindra Jaiswal/PW-1, Krishna Kumar Pathak, Patwari/PW-2, Triloki Prasad Bhargava/PW-3 and Rajkumar Tiwari/PW-4 and had relied upon the documents i.e. exhibit P-1, which is the agreement dated 02.06.2008, exhibit P-2 is the copy of legal notice dated 01.02.2012, exhibit P-3 and P-4 are the postal receipts. 7. The defendant No.1 has examined Sunil Kumar Soni/DW-1 and has relied upon the documents, exhibit D-1, which is the reply to the notice, exhibit D-2 is the postal receipt, exhibit D-3 is the acknowledgment, exhibit D-4 is the copy of B-1/22 column form, issued by the Patwari. 8. After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the respective parties, the learned trial Court has decreed the suit of the plaintiffs holding that the agreement was executed between the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 with respect to sale of the remaining land of khasra No. 418/1, out of total 0.36 acre after acquisition of the land for bypass road and an amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- was paid as an advance towards sale agreement on 02.06.2008 and the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and further that, the defendant No.1 is bound to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs under the agreement. Against the said judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, the present first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC has been filed by the defendant No.1. 9. In the present first appeal, the defendant No.1/appellant has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC, along with a copy of the award dated 01.07.2018 passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bilaspur, for taking the additional evidence on record. 10. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant/defendant No.1, would submit that the learned trial Court has committed an error in law and facts, while granting a decree for specific performance of the contract. The proper pleading with respect to being ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (in short ‘the Act of 1963’), has not been pleaded and proved. The plaintiffs have also failed to establish that they had sufficient funds or were in a position to raise funds in time to perform their part of the contract, and their willingness has also not been established. He would further submit that the terms of the contract itself were uncertain, and it was a contingent contract. The measurement of the land itself was not certain. Except the self served statement of the plaintiffs that, they repeatedly requested the defendant No.1 for registration of the sale-deed, no any other evidence have been produced, as to what effort they have made from 02.06.2008 till 01.02.2012, which is the date on which the notice has been issued to the defendant No.1. He would further submit that, the plaintiff No.2 is the resident of village Sakari and he was well aware about the land acquisition proceeding, yet they have not tried to get the sale-deed registered within time. The notice itself has been issued after more than 03 years, which is sufficient to hold that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The notice itself has been issued after more than 03 years, which is sufficient to hold that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. He would also submit that the plaintiffs are two different persons and in the agreement, it was the condition that the sale-deed was to be executed in the name suggested by the plaintiffs, which clearly demonstrate that the plaintiffs were not the purchaser of the land, but they are middle men and since, the actual purchaser of the land could not be arranged, sale-deed could not be executed. It is further submitted that the decree for specific performance of a contract is a discretionary and equitable relief. The unexplained delay in filing the suit disentitles the plaintiffs to get the equitable relief of specific performance of the contract, and as such, the impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside. In support of his submission, he would rely upon the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of “ P. Ravindranath and another v. Sasikala and others ” 2024 SCC Online SC 1749, “ Pydi Ramana @ Ramulu v. Devarasetty Manmadha Rao ” 2024 (7) SCC 515 , “ Vijay Kumar and others v. Om Prakash ” 2019 (17) SCC 429 , “ Vimlesh Kumari Kulshrestha v. Sambhajirao and another ” 2008 (5) SCC 58 , “ Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary and others ” 2024 (3) SCC 224 , “ Gangamma and others v. Shivalingaiah ” 2005 (9) SCC 359 and “ Ramashankar Rao and another v. Nandlal Occhwani ” judgment dated 08.08.2025, passed by Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in FA No. 88 of 2022. 11. Mr. Somnath Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 1 and 2, would submit that the defendant No.1, from the very beginning, evaded the registration of the sale-deed by saying that the land acquisition proceeding is pending and after its completion, he will execute the sale-deed for the remaining land. The plaintiffs were under assurance of the defendant No.1, as they also came to know about the land acquisition proceeding. The plaintiffs were under assurance of the defendant No.1, as they also came to know about the land acquisition proceeding. Ultimately on 18.01.2012, when they came to know about the land acquisition proceeding and the clarification about the measurement of the lands of the land owners, which were acquired for bypass road, they again requested the defendant No.1 for registration of the sale-deed, and when they feel that the defendant No.1 is avoiding the registration of the sale-deed, they served a legal notice on 01.02.2012 and then the suit has been filed. The plaintiffs were ever ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and were in possession of the remaining sale consideration from its very beginning. They have paid Rs. 2,50,000/- as the advance amount, and due to the pendency of the land acquisition proceeding and ban on sale of the land, the sale deed could not be registered at that time. After appreciating the evidence, produced by the plaintiffs, the learned trial Court has rightly passed the decree in their favour holding that the plaintiffs are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and it is the defendant No.1, who has not performed his part of the contract and has decreed the suit, which is neither perverse nor illegal and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and gone through the record of the trial Court. 13. The subject land of the suit is the land bearing khasra No. 418/1, total area 0.36 acres, situated at Village Sakari, Tahsil Takhatpur, District Bilaspur. It is not in dispute that some part of the said land was acquired for the Sakari-Turkadih bypass road, and the land acquisition proceeding was pending in the year 2008, when the agreement was executed between the parties. On the date of agreement, it was not clear as to how much land of the defendant No.1 is under acquisition and how much land is remaining. It was also the condition mentioned in the said agreement dated 02.06.2008 that after acquisition of the land, the defendant No.1 would execute the sale deed for the remaining land, whatever the measurement of the land remaining after the acquisition. From the conditions of the agreement, it may be of 01 dismil, or it may be of 35 dismil. It was also the condition mentioned in the said agreement dated 02.06.2008 that after acquisition of the land, the defendant No.1 would execute the sale deed for the remaining land, whatever the measurement of the land remaining after the acquisition. From the conditions of the agreement, it may be of 01 dismil, or it may be of 35 dismil. The relevant part of the agreement dated 02.06.2008 (exhibit P-1) is necessary to notice here, which reads as under:- 14. PW-1/Ravindra Jaiswal has stated in para 12 of his evidence that, earlier, the total land was 36 dismils, and he filed the suit for the remaining land after the acquisition of part of the land. He also did not know about its four corners, and he admitted that, in the plaint map, he produced the spot map of the entire 36 dismils of land. He also did not disclose as to from which direction of the land the bypass road was constructed. He admitted that, how much land is remaining with the defendant No.1, he did not know. He also admitted that he did not disclose in his plaint about the measurement of the land, for which he filed the suit. He also did not know as to how much land was acquired and how much land is remaining, and he did not ask the defendant No.1 to get his land demarcated. He further admitted in para 23 that, in the agreement (Exhibit P-1), the measurement of the land under the sale agreement has not been mentioned. He also stated that the plaintiffs were not known as to how much land the defendant No.1 is to acquire. 15. PW-3/Triloki Prasad has also stated in his evidence that he did not tell as to what is the measurement of the land, for which he filed the suit. He also did not know as to how much land from khasra No. 418/1 was acquired and how much land is remaining. He further admitted that he has not tried to collect information from the concerned Patwari about the remaining land with the defendant No.1. In para 12 of his cross-examination, he stated that:- 16. PW-4/Rajkumar Tiwari, who is said to be the witness of the agreement (Exhibit P-1). He further admitted that he has not tried to collect information from the concerned Patwari about the remaining land with the defendant No.1. In para 12 of his cross-examination, he stated that:- 16. PW-4/Rajkumar Tiwari, who is said to be the witness of the agreement (Exhibit P-1). He stated in his evidence that he did not know about the acquisition of the land of the defendant No.1, but it was acquired in the year 2011. He did not know the area of the land under the agreement. He also did not know as to how much land remained with the defendant No.1 and the State Government. There is no mention about the measurement of the land under agreement, but it is mentioned that, out of the total 36 dismils of land, whatever land remained after acquisition, the sale deed would be registered for that part of the land. He further admitted that there is no negotiation in his presence with respect to the sale of the land by the defendant No.1, and the defendant No.1 has not signed the agreement in his presence. 17. The agreement did not describe the particular measurement of the land, but it is stated that whatever land remains after the conclusion of the land acquisition proceeding, the sale deed would be registered with respect to the remaining land, meaning thereby the entire land of 0.36 acres of khasra No. 418/1 is not the subject matter of sale. Dealing with the uncertainty of the subject matter of the suit, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “ Vimlesh Kumari Kulshreshtha ” (supra) considered the legal maxim certum est quod certum reddi potest and held in para 22, 23, 24 and 25 that:- “22. Reliance, has been placed by Mr. Narasimha on a decision of the House of Lords in Hillas & Co. Ltd. Vs. Arcos, Ltd. [(1932 All. E. R. 494], wherein it was held; "It is the duty of the court to construe agreements made by business men - which often appear to those unfamiliar with the business far from complete or precise- fairly and broadly, without being astute or subtle in finding defects; on the contrary, the court should seek to apply the maxim verba ita sunt intelligenda ut res magis valeat quam pereat. That maxim, however, does not mean that the court is to make a contract for the parties, or to go outside the words they have used, except in so far as there are appropriate implications of law, as, for instance, the implication of what is just and reasonable to be ascertained by the court as matter of machinery where the contractual intention is clear but the contract is silent on some detail. Thus in contracts for future performance over a period the parties may not be able nor may they desire to specify many matters of detail, but leave them to be adjusted in the working out of the contract." 23. There is no dispute with regard to the aforementioned legal proposition. However, we have not been called upon to construe an agreement entered into by and between two businessmen. The maxim, Certum est quod certum reddi potest instead of being of any assistance to the appellant, runs counter to her submission. It means that is certain which can be made certain. In relation to 'uncertainty' it is stated : "The office of the habendum is a deed is to limit, explain, or qualify the words in the premises; but if the words of the habendum are manifestly contradictory and repugnant to those in the premises, they must be disregarded. A deed shall be void if it be totally uncertain ; but if the King's grant refers to another thing which is certain, it is sufficient; as, if he grant to a city all liberties which London has, without saying what liberties London has. An agreement in writing for the sale of a house did not describe the particular house, but it stated that the deeds were in the possession of A. The Court held the agreement sufficiently certain, since it appeared upon the face of the agreement that the house referred to was the house of which the deeds were in the possession of A., and, consequently, the house might easily be ascertained, and id certum est quod certum redid potest. Again, the word "certain" must, in a variety of cases, where a contract is entered into for the sale of goods, refer to an indefinite quantity at the time of the contract made, and must mean a quantity which is to be ascertained according to the above maxim." [See Trayner's Latin Maxims, Fourth Edition, Page 76] 24. Again, the word "certain" must, in a variety of cases, where a contract is entered into for the sale of goods, refer to an indefinite quantity at the time of the contract made, and must mean a quantity which is to be ascertained according to the above maxim." [See Trayner's Latin Maxims, Fourth Edition, Page 76] 24. Reference to the said legal maxim is, in our opinion, is not apposite in the facts and circumstances of this case. By reference to the boundaries of the premises alone, the description of the properties agreed to be sold did not become certain. For the purpose of finding out the correct description of the property, the entire agreement was required to be read as a whole. So read, the agreement becomes uncertain. 25. An agreement of sale must be construed having regard to the circumstances attending thereto. The relationship between the parties was that of the landlord and tenant. Appellant was only a tenant in respect of a part of the premises. It may be that the boundaries of the house have been described but a plan was to be a part thereof. We have indicated hereinbefore that the parties intended to annex a plan with the agreement only because the description of the properties was inadequate. It is with a view to make the description of the subject matter of sale definite, the plan was to be attached. The plan was not even prepared. It has not been found that the sketch of map annexed to the plaint conformed to the plan which was to be made a part of the agreement for sale. The agreement for sale, therefore, being uncertain could not be given effect to.” 18. The plaintiffs have also claimed possession of the suit land after execution of the sale-deed in their favour; however, there is a requirement of accurate description of the property in question with all details of measurement and boundaries, which is lacking in the present case, as the measurement and boundaries is uncertain and it could only be determined after conclusion of the land acquisition proceeding. 19. In the matter of “ Mary Pushpam ” (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 24 and 25 of its judgment that:- “24. In order to test the above agreement, we carefully examined the judgement of the Trial Court as also the First Appellate Court. 19. In the matter of “ Mary Pushpam ” (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 24 and 25 of its judgment that:- “24. In order to test the above agreement, we carefully examined the judgement of the Trial Court as also the First Appellate Court. What is discernible is that nowhere it is recorded the actual boundary or the measurements of the property in possession of the mother of the appellant (defendant therein). The respondents-plaintiff therein had based her case on the ground that they had purchased 8 cents of open piece of land and the defendant therein had raised construction over some adjoining land, and had trespassed over part of her purchased land as such decree of possession be granted. 25. We are unable to appreciate the said argument of the respondents. Suit for possession has to describe the property in question with accuracy and all details of measurement and boundaries. This was completely lacking. A suit for possession with respect to such a property would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of its identifiability. Further, it may be noted that if the construction by the defendant were not made over 8 cents of purchased land, then the plaintiff therein would not have a claim to possession of the same. The argument thus has to be rejected not only on facts but also on legal grounds as discussed above.” 20. The defendant No.1 further argued that the agreement dated 02.06.2008 has an uncertain subject land and therefore, it is a void contract due to its uncertainty, and no executable decree can be passed. Section 29 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides that the agreement, the meaning of which is not certain or capable of being made certain or void. It is not enough to show that the meaning of the contract is uncertain; it should further be shown that it is incapable of being made certain. Where a portion out of a larger extent of land was agreed to be sold, but without specification or boundaries; the terms regarding description being uncertain and vague, the Court will not issue a decree, which would not be capable of enforcement. Where a portion out of a larger extent of land was agreed to be sold, but without specification or boundaries; the terms regarding description being uncertain and vague, the Court will not issue a decree, which would not be capable of enforcement. In the present case, there is no measurement or boundaries of the agreed land, and it is totally uncertain as to what measurement of the land is under the agreement and what its four corners are, and thus, the agreement dated 02.06.2008 is squarely covered under Section 29 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 21. With respect to the uncertain description of the property in the agreement, and the agreement is void for uncertainty, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “ Pawan Kumar Dutt and another v. Shakuntala Devi and others ” 2010 (15) SCC 601 has held in para 7 and 8 that:- “7. But the position in the present case is different; that a portion out of the total larger extent was agreed to be sold, but, without specification of the area agreed to be sold. It is clear from the suit agreement that no boundaries of the suit property which was sold are specified in the agreement. It is not clear from what point the area is to be measured. It is also not clear that these 4 bighas 2 biswas is a portion of the land situated in the middle of the total land or in one portion or at the extreme end or at a particular place, in other words, there is no clear identity of the property agreed to be sold. The courts are not expected to pass a decree which is not capable of enforcement in the courts of law. If the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is to be accepted and if a decree is to be granted for specific performance, without identification of the suit property, it will not be possible to enforce such a decree. 8. This Court, in Nahar Singh v. Harnak Singh (1996) 6 SCC 699 in para 5, has also taken a view that if the property itself cannot be identified, the relief of specific performance cannot be granted.” 22. 8. This Court, in Nahar Singh v. Harnak Singh (1996) 6 SCC 699 in para 5, has also taken a view that if the property itself cannot be identified, the relief of specific performance cannot be granted.” 22. In the case of “ Surjeet Singh and another v. Manoharlal and others ” AIR 2005 P & H 37, the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana has held in para 12 and 14 that:- “12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the pleadings and the evidence and also the documents produced by way of evidence, I am of the view that the Courts below have correctly declined to grant the relief of specific performance of the contract of sale and that have correctly granted the alternative relief by way of passing decree of Rs. 10,000/- in favour of the plaintiff and against defendant No.1 only. The perusal of the agreement Ex.P 1 shows that the vendor was not clear as to how much land is available to be sold out of the land measuring 52 Kanals 18 Marlas, the agreement also does not specify as to how much land out of the aforestated total land stood sold and what was the remaining land available for execution of the sale deed. It is also not recorded as 1o from which revenue record the aforestated factum would be determinable, again a vague averment that upon elucidation of the revenue record whatever land is available to be sold the same shall be sold by way of execution of the sale deed. The vendee obviously was also not aware as to how much land is being bought by him. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that the agreement Ex.P 1 cannot be termed as vague because the right to seek execution of the sale deed pursuant to the area mentioned in the agreement had been duly converged as no plea had been set up before the trial Court in this regard. Thus, in the absence of such plea the plaintiff-appellant was not required to lead any affirmative evidence. I am afraid this argument is without any substance as the document executed between the parties is required to be interpreted in accordance with the applicable provisions of law. Thus, in the absence of such plea the plaintiff-appellant was not required to lead any affirmative evidence. I am afraid this argument is without any substance as the document executed between the parties is required to be interpreted in accordance with the applicable provisions of law. In the case at hand, the document has been produced by the plaintiff-appellant on the basis of which the specific performance has been asked for. However, the question arises as to with regard to what subject-matter the document i.e. the sale deed can be executed. The plain reading of the document in question does not spell out as to how much area is saleable and how much consideration would be payable accordingly. There is no doubt the rate per acre has been defined in the agreement but it shall be applicable to what area is not reflected. Thus, the argument that the agreement is not vague deserves to be rejected.” 23. In the present case, there is also no measurement or specification of the subject matter of the agreement, and even its four corners are not certain. Therefore, the agreement (Exhibit P-1) is inexecutable and no decree can be passed upon such agreement. 24. In the second limb of submission, it is settled that in order to obtain a decree for specific performance of the contract, the plaintiffs have to prove their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract, and the same has to be shown throughout and has to be established by the plaintiffs. 25. In the matter of “ Manjunath Anandappa @ Shivappa v. Tammanasa and others ” 2003 (10) SCC 390 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the plaintiffs should not only plead, but also prove their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract and held in para 27 that:- “27. The decisions of this Court, therefore, leave no manner of doubt that a Plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract not only must raise a plea that he had all along been and even on the date of filing of suit was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, but also prove the same. The decisions of this Court, therefore, leave no manner of doubt that a Plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract not only must raise a plea that he had all along been and even on the date of filing of suit was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, but also prove the same. Only in certain exceptional situation where although in letter and spirit, the exact words had not been used but readiness and willingness can be culled out from reading all the averments made in the Plaintiff as a whole coupled with the materials brought on record at the trial of the suit, to the said effect, the statutory requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act may be held to have been complied with.” 26. In the matter of “ P. Ravindranath ” (supra), it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that, Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 requires the readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiffs in the suit filed for specific performance of the contract and the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 are mandatory in nature. It has been held in para 22 of its judgment that:- “22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as follows: (i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the Courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. A few of authorities on the point are referred hereunder: a) In the case of Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, this Court held in paragraph 40 which is reproduced hereunder: “40………A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct………….” b) In the case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs. v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, following was held in paragraph 46: “46. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the Plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform the part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the Plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.” c) In the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar , it was held under paragraph 2: “2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. According to the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was to supply the draft sale deed to the defendant within 7 days of the execution of the agreement, i.e., by 27-2-1975. The draft sale deed was not returned after being duly approved by the petitioner. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff’s part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The facts of this case would amply demonstrate that the petitioner/ plaintiff was not ready nor had the capacity to perform his part of the contract as he had no financial capacity to pay the consideration in cash as contracted and intended to bide for the time which disentitles him as time is of the essence of the contract.” (ii) In the present case, we find from a perusal of the plaint that, at the first instance, the plaintiffs failed to plead specifically with details about the restriction said to have been imposed by the State on registration of sale deeds relating to similar survey numbers and revenue sites. No details of the Government Order are mentioned. Neither the Government Order is placed on record as evidence to connect that such restriction was actually applicable to the land in question. (iii) Defendant nos.1 to 5 executed sale deeds in April and June, 1983 in favour of the appellant as also other purchasers. It is recorded by the Trial Court as also the High Court, that these sale deeds were executed by the defendants 1 to 5 after depositing some betterment charges, getting the land converted and then effecting the transfer. (iii) Defendant nos.1 to 5 executed sale deeds in April and June, 1983 in favour of the appellant as also other purchasers. It is recorded by the Trial Court as also the High Court, that these sale deeds were executed by the defendants 1 to 5 after depositing some betterment charges, getting the land converted and then effecting the transfer. The plaintiffs do not seem to have ever approached the defendants to get this kind of a status change and, thereafter, get the sale deeds executed. It has not come either in pleadings or in evidence of the plaintiffs that the alleged ban imposed by the State Government had been lifted but still the sale deeds were executed in favour of the appellants and other purchasers in 1983. (iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard. Neither any specific date has been mentioned in the pleadings or in the evidence, on which date the plaintiffs tendered the balance amount with a request to the defendants 1 to 5 to get the land status changed and execute the sale deed, or otherwise also, request the defendants 1 to 5 to execute the sale deed with the same status of the land in suit. (v) Even before filing a suit, there is no evidence forthcoming on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that they tendered the balance consideration or a draft sale deed to the defendants 1 to 5 and requested for execution and registration of the sale deed. (vi) The Courts below have proceeded to hold that there was readiness and willingness primarily relying upon the restriction imposed by the State. According to them, as the restriction had not been lifted, there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiffs to have expressed any readiness or willingness. However, the Courts below failed to take into consideration that there was no evidence regarding the said ban. Further the Courts below also failed to take into consideration that a keen and a willing buyer would have found out a way for execution of the sale deed just as defendants 6 & 7 and C. Nagaraju. However, the Courts below failed to take into consideration that there was no evidence regarding the said ban. Further the Courts below also failed to take into consideration that a keen and a willing buyer would have found out a way for execution of the sale deed just as defendants 6 & 7 and C. Nagaraju. (vii) The Courts below also fell into error in recording a finding that the defendants 1 to 5 had committed breach of contract and had dishonestly proceeded to get the status of the land changed and, thereafter, execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant and other purchasers. (viii) It is clear from the record that the defendant no.1 had given a written notice in September, 1981, then legal notice in November, 1981 and also another communication in December, 1981 requesting for payment of balance sale consideration and, thereafter communicating that advance amount had been forfeited and the agreement to sell had come to an end as the plaintiffs failed to get the sale deed executed within three months. After December, 1981, the plaintiffs kept silent. They neither responded to the last communication of the defendant no.1 of December, 1981, nor did they take any steps to file the suit for specific performance of contract for more than one and a half years after the defendant no.1 had communicated forfeiture of the earnest money and the cancellation of the agreement to sell. There is no communication from the plaintiffs after December, 1981 till July, 1983 when they filed the suit. There is not even a notice by the plaintiffs before filing the suit of showing their readiness and willingness by tendering the amount of balance sale consideration and sending a draft sale deed for approval and fixing a date for execution and registration of the sale deed. (xi) We are thus unable to agree with the findings of the courts below that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to get the sale deed executed and registered. As a matter of fact, the conduct of the plaintiffs throughout gives credence and strength to the contention of the defendant nos.1 to 5 that the plaintiffs never had the funds available with them to clear the balance sale consideration and that they were middlemen only interested in blocking the property and, thereafter, selling it on a higher price to third parties and make profit thereof. The plaintiffs were never the real purchasers interested in buying the land in suit for themselves. (x) Under such facts and circumstances as discussed above, we are of the confirmed view that the decree of specific performance was not warranted in the present case and ought to have been denied and the suit was liable to be dismissed. (xi) In view of the finding on the issue of readiness and willingness being decided against the plaintiffs in the facts of the present case, we are not inclined to enter into other arguments raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties. (xii). However, in order to adjust equities between the parties, as the plaintiffs made a payment of Rs.12,000/- as advance money on 24.05.1981 or before, that being an admitted position, they need to be suitably compensated for the same. About 43 years have passed since the date of the agreement to sell. According to the appellant as stated in the written brief, the value of the property is about four crores. The respondents have not given any such figure of the approximate value of the property in question. Considering the facts and circumstances, we direct that the appellant compensate the plaintiffs by paying an amount of Rs.24 lakhs in lieu of the advance and further Rs.6 lakhs as cost of litigation. Total amount of Rs.30 lakhs to be paid within a period of three months from today and file proof of such payment before this Court within the next four months. In the event, such proof is not filed, the Registry will list the matter before the Court immediately after expiry of the aforesaid period for further orders. ” 27. Further, in the matter of “ Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agrawal 2024 SCC Online SC 2937, the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 are again considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and held in para 8 and 9 that:- “I. Readiness and Willingness of the Plaintiffs to Perform the Contract. 8. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, mandates that a plaintiff seeking specific performance of a contract must aver and prove that they have performed or have always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by them. This requirement is a condition precedent and must be established by the plaintiff throughout the proceedings. This requirement is a condition precedent and must be established by the plaintiff throughout the proceedings. The readiness and willingness of the plaintiff are to be determined from their conduct prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit, as well as from the terms of the agreement and surrounding circumstances. The rationale behind this provision is to ensure that a party seeking equitable relief has acted equitably themselves. Specific performance is a discretionary relief, and the plaintiff must come to the court with clean hands, demonstrating sincerity and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Any laxity, indifference, or failure to perform their part of the contract can be a ground to deny such relief. The Importance of readiness and willingness for enforcement of specific performance has been summarized by this Court in U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, as follows: 23. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars the relief of specific performance of a contract in favour of a person, who fails to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. In view of Explanation (1) to clause (c) of Section 16, it may not be essential for the plaintiff to actually tender money to the defendant or to deposit money in court, except when so directed by the Court, to prove readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of a contract, which involves payment of money. However, Explanation (II) says the plaintiff must aver performance or readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction. 24. To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to pay money, in terms of a contract, the plaintiff would have to make specific statements in the plaint and adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time, In other words, the plaintiff would have to plead that the plaintiff had sufficient funds or was in a position to raise funds in time to discharge his obligation under the contract. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds with him to discharge his obligations in terms of a contract, which requires payment of money, the plaintiff would have to specifically plead how the funds would be available to him. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds with him to discharge his obligations in terms of a contract, which requires payment of money, the plaintiff would have to specifically plead how the funds would be available to him. To cite an example, the plaintiff may aver and prove, by adducing evidence, an arrangement with a financier for disbursement of adequate funds for timely compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract involving payment of money. xxx xxx xxx 45. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice." 9. The Trial Court rightly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract. The agreement dated 06.06.1993 explicitly required the plaintiffs to ensure that Defendant Nos, 6 to 8 would come to Baripada within three months to execute the sale deed. The plaintiffs, however, did not take any concrete steps to secure the consent or presence of the sisters within the stipulated period. They relied solely on Defendant No. 1 and late Soumendra to procure the sisters, despite knowing that the sisters were not signatories to the agreement and held a significant share in the property. The Trial Court observed that the plaintiffs did not issue any notices or correspondence to Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 during the three-month period, nor did they make any efforts to communicate with them directly to expedite the execution of the sale deed. This inaction on the part of the plaintiffs indicated a lack of diligence and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Furthermore, the plaintiffs continued to operate their petrol pump on the suit land without taking proactive steps to complete the purchase, suggesting complacency and a lack of urgency.” 28. In the case of “ Ramashankar Rao ” (supra), the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has considered the distinction between readiness and willingness and in para 20 of its judgment, it has been held that:- “20. In the case of “ Ramashankar Rao ” (supra), the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has considered the distinction between readiness and willingness and in para 20 of its judgment, it has been held that:- “20. In light of principles of law flowing from the aforesaid judgments (supra) of the Supreme Court, there is distinction between the terms “readiness” and “willingness”. “Readiness” is the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the sale consideration, whereas, “willingness” is the conduct of the party. The plaintiff must plead and establish that he is ready and willing to perform his part of contract from the date of agreement to sale till the date of decision in the suit.” 29. In order to consider the readiness and willingness, when this Court examined the averments made in the plaint by the plaintiff, it appears that, in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have pleaded that:- 30. From perusal of the plaint averments, it would reveal that the plaintiff No.2 was also in knowledge of land acquisition proceeding pending before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kota and they waited for its conclusion and in May 2011, when they again had gone to the defendant No.1 along with one Rajkumar Tiwari, the defendant No.1 again informed that the land acquisition proceeding was still not concluded and due to the official proceeding, he was unable to perform his part of the contract. He also pleaded that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In this paragraph, the plaintiffs pleaded that he had gone with Rajkumar Tiwari to the plaintiffs in May 2011, whereas Rajkumar Tiwari/PW-4 has admitted in para 12 of his cross-examination that after execution of the agreement (exhibit P-1), he had never gone along with the plaintiffs to the defendant to ask for registration of the sale-deed. He also did not know as to whether the land acquisition proceeding is still pending or not, and whether the measurement of the land under acquisition is settled or not. 31. The plaintiff Ravindra Jaiswal has admitted in his evidence that he asked the defendant No.1 for registration of the sale-deed within one month from 02.06.2008, but the defendant No.1 has not executed the sale-deed within one month. 31. The plaintiff Ravindra Jaiswal has admitted in his evidence that he asked the defendant No.1 for registration of the sale-deed within one month from 02.06.2008, but the defendant No.1 has not executed the sale-deed within one month. When the defendant No.1 has not executed the sale deed in his favour, even then, he has not issued any notice to him nor filed any suit for specific performance of the contract. He voluntarily stated that, since the land acquisition proceeding was pending, and it was the condition that, after the conclusion of the land acquisition proceeding, whatever land would remain, the sale deed would be registered for the remaining land, and therefore, they were waiting for the same. On the date, when he requested the defendant No.1 for registration of the sale deed within one month from 02.06.2008, the land acquisition proceeding was not concluded. In para 21, he admitted that he had not tried to get the status of the land acquisition proceeding, and his partner Triloki had obtained the information about the land acquisition proceeding. He further admitted that Triloki had not informed him about the conclusion of the land acquisition proceeding. In para 23, he stated that they were not known of the measurement of the acquired land. 32. Triloki/PW-3, who is the plaintiff No.2 has admitted in para 18 of his cross-examination that:- 33. In para 19, he further stated that he did not tell as to when he had gone to the house of the defendant to ask him for registration of the sale deed. 34. From the evidence laid by the plaintiffs, it is quite vivid that, even after knowing the pendency of the land acquisition proceeding, the agreement was executed by the plaintiffs, in which the time of one month or after completion of the land acquisition proceeding was fixed for registration of the sale deed. From the evidence of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses PW-3/Triloki Prasad Bhargava and PW-4/Rajkumar Tiwari, they asked the defendant No.1 for registration of the sale-deed, but the sale-deed could not be registered, as the land acquisition proceeding was pending and despite lapse of one month, the plaintiffs had not tried to get the status of the land acquisition proceeding and has not issued any notice to the defendant No.1 to ask him for registration of the sale-deed. Except from self served statement that they were under assurance of the defendant No.1 that the land acquisition proceeding is still pending and it is only on 18.01.2012, when they obtained the status of land acquisition proceeding from Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kota, they came to know that, though the land acquisition proceeding was not concluded, but the measurement of the acquired land has been settled and the ban on sale of the land was removed and they issued the notice to the defendant No.1 on 01.02.2012. From 02.06.2008 to 18.01.2012, i.e. within 3 ½ years of the execution of the agreement, the plaintiffs have not shown their readiness and willingness to get the sale deed registered. The plaintiffs have not brought on record any sufficient evidence to establish that they contacted the defendant No.1 within the period of 3 ½ years from the date of the agreement till the issuance of notice to supply the necessary documents and to get the sale-deed registered. 35. The defendant No.1 Sunil Kumar Soni/DW-1 has stated in para 14 of his evidence that, after completion of the land acquisition proceeding, he contacted the concerned Patwari and then the Patwari had given him 22 column form of remaining land and when he had gone to the plaintiff No.1 Ravindra Jaiswal, he sent him to Triloki Bhargava by saying that the land was purchased by him. Both of them have sent him here and there for about 5-6 months, and thereafter, they said that whenever they would get the purchaser of the land, the remaining sale consideration would be paid. The 22-column form is Exhibit D-4, which is dated 28.01.2009. He further stated in pursuance of the condition of the agreement that he will provide the revenue documents to the plaintiffs, he obtained the 22-column form Exhibit D-4 and contacted the plaintiffs. The suggestion given by the plaintiffs to the defendant No.1 that he had gone to Patwari to obtain a 22-column form, which he admitted in para 23 of his evidence. 36. The suggestion given by the plaintiffs to the defendant No.1 that he had gone to Patwari to obtain a 22-column form, which he admitted in para 23 of his evidence. 36. In the matter of “ Pydi Ramana ” (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, the continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent to grant a decree for specific performance of the contract and held that the steps taken by the plaintiffs from the date of agreement till the date of filing of the suit will have to be explained in the plaint to prove in evidence. In para 17, 18 and 20, it has been held that:- “17. As rightly pointed out by the trial court, the respondent-plaintiff has not produced any satisfactory evidence to prove his readiness and willingness. As regards "willingness" of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, the conduct of the plaintiff warranting the performance has to be looked into. The following conduct of the plaintiff warrants consideration: (a) Plaintiff got issued legal notice nearly after two years after the expiry of one year period as prescribed in the agreement. (b) Plaintiff has not brought anything on record to prove that he contacted the defendant after the expiry of one year period and was interested in finalising the deed. (c) There was total inaction of the plaintiff from 6-6-1994 (expiry of one year period) to 30-5- 1996 (date of issuance of legal notice) (d) Suit was filed on 9-6-1997 i.e. after a period of more than one year from the date of issuing of legal notice. Said delay has not been sufficiently explained by the plaintiff. 18. The continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. The trial court has rightly held that the plaintiff has not sufficiently explained and proved that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. As such the High Court and the first appellate court had erred in holding that the plaintiff had proved his readiness and willingness. 20. The trial court has rightly held that the plaintiff has not sufficiently explained and proved that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. As such the High Court and the first appellate court had erred in holding that the plaintiff had proved his readiness and willingness. 20. The long unexplained delay and silence on the part of the plaintiff in this regard while in the witness box would not entitle the plaintiff to a decree of specific performance and it is for this precise reason, the trial court as noticed supra has refused to grant the equitable relief which has been reversed by the appellate court without assigning proper and cogent reason and the one assigned are at tangent or in other words contrary to the facts. The resultant effect of filing the suit for specific performance on the verge of limitation coming to an end came to be examined by this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar and held that the plaintiff would not be entitled to the equitable relief (vide paras 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18).” 37. In the matter of “ Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar and others ” 2024 (13) SCC 80 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 23 to 25 of its judgment has considered the effect of filing of the suit for specific performance at the fag end of the limitation period and held that:- “23. The effect of filing a suit for specific performance after long delay, may be at the fag end of period of limitation fell for consideration before this Court in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan 12 wherein this Court held thus in para 10: (SCC p. 7) "10. It has been consistently held by the courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. It has been consistently held by the courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time-limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean f nothing. Would it be reasonable to say that because time is not made the essence of the contract, the time- limit(s) specified in the agreement have no relevance and can be ignored with impunity? It would also mean denying the discretion vested in the court by both Sections 10 and 20. As held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani13: (SCC p. 528, para 25).…" 24. In Azhar Sultana v. B. Rajamani14, this Court held thus in para 28: (SCC p. 35) "28. The court, keeping in view the fact that it exercises a discretionary jurisdiction, would be entitled to take into consideration as to whether the suit had been filed within a reasonable time. What would be a reasonable time would, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast law can be laid down therefor. The conduct of the parties in this behalf would also assume significance." 25. In Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi15, this Court held that every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring time-limits stipulated in the agreement. The courts will also frown upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean that a purchaser can wait for one or two years to file a suit and obtain specific performance.” 38. The courts will also frown upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean that a purchaser can wait for one or two years to file a suit and obtain specific performance.” 38. From the aforesaid consideration of the evidence led by the plaintiffs and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs were ever ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. From the date of execution of the agreement, they were in knowledge about the pendency of the land acquisition proceeding, and there was no area of land was fixed at that time, as to how much is to be acquired, yet they entered into an agreement to purchase the land. Even after one month of execution of the agreement till the notice dated 01.02.2012, they simply asked the defendant about the land acquisition proceeding, to which the defendant replied that it is still pending. If we go by the second part of the sentence of the agreement that, “ vFkok vf/kxzg.k dh dk;Zokgh iw.kZ gksus ds mijkUr jftLVªh ds le; ”, the land acquisition proceeding was still pending as has been admitted by the plaintiffs’ witnesses, and it is in the pleading itself that the said land acquisition proceeding was still not concluded, and then the suit of the plaintiffs could be said to be premature. It is also important to note here that the plaintiffs were not willing to get the sale deed registered in their own name, but it was to be registered in the name suggested by the plaintiffs. It is mentioned in the agreement in ‘A’ to ‘A’ part that “ ;g fd Hkwfe dk iath;u dzsrk ds fgr esa vFkok dszrk ftlds uke ij dgsaxs mlds uke d:axk ”, which clearly reflects that the plaintiffs were intended to get the sale-deed registered in the name of someone else. Therefore, the evidence produced by the plaintiffs does not demonstrate that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract from the date of execution of the agreement till the filing of the suit. 39. Therefore, the evidence produced by the plaintiffs does not demonstrate that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract from the date of execution of the agreement till the filing of the suit. 39. Another submission raised by learned counsel for the appellants is that the plaintiffs have not proved by producing evidence that they had sufficient funds for the sale consideration, and they had the capacity to pay the balance sale consideration. The plaintiffs have not produced their account books, passbooks or other statements of the account to establish that they had sufficient funds to pay the remaining sale consideration. 40. The plaintiff Ravindra Jaiswal/PW-1 has admitted in para 25 of his evidence that he has not filed any document with respect to the availability of funds for registration of the sale-deed. PW-3/Triloki Prasad has also admitted in para 22 of his evidence that they have not filed any document with respect to the availability of the fund. In the matter of “ Vijay Kumar v. Omprakash ” (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 6 and 7 that:- “6. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and the readiness and willingness has to be shown through out and has to be established by the plaintiff. In the case in hand, though the respondent-plaintiff has filed the suit for specific performance on 29th April, 2008, the respondent-plaintiff has not shown his capacity to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.22,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Two Lakhs). In his evidence, the respondent- plaintiff has stated that he has borrowed the amount from his friends and kept the money to pay the balance sale consideration. As rightly pointed out by the Trial Court, the respondent- plaintiff could not produce any document to show that he had the amount of Rs.22,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Two Lakhs) with him on the relevant date; nor was he able to name the friends from whom he raised money or was able to raise the money. As rightly pointed out by the Trial Court, the respondent- plaintiff could not produce any document to show that he had the amount of Rs.22,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Two Lakhs) with him on the relevant date; nor was he able to name the friends from whom he raised money or was able to raise the money. Further more, as rightly pointed out by the Trial Court, the respondent- plaintiff could have placed on record his Accounts Book, Pass Book or the Statement of Accounts or any other negotiable instrument to establish that he had the money with him at the relevant point of time to perform his part of the contract. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view taken by the Trial Court that the respondent-plaintiff has not been able to prove his readiness and willingness on his part. 7. The relief for specific performance is purely discretionary. Though the respondent-plaintiff has alleged that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the First Appellate Court ought to have examined first whether the respondent-plaintiff was able to show his capacity to pay the balance money. In our considered view, the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court has not properly appreciated the evidence and the conduct of the parties. The First Appellate Court as well as the High Court, in our view, was not right in reversing the judgment of the Trial Court and the impugned order cannot be sustained and liable to be set aside.” 41. In the matter of “ His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar ” 1996 (4) SCC 526 , in para 2 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- “ 2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity d of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract.……..” 42. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract.……..” 42. In the case of “ Shenbagam and others v. K.K. Rathinavel ” 2022 SCC Online SC 71, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has analysed the readiness and willingness to perform the obligation under the contract, and in para 16, it has been held that:- “16. Similarly, in His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar , a two-judge Bench of this Court observed that 'readiness' means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which would include the financial position to pay the purchase price. To ascertain 'willingness', the conduct of the plaintiff has to be properly scrutinised. The Court noted: "2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. [….] The factum of readiness and willingness to perform the with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. the plaintiff's part of the contract is to be adjudged The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The facts of this case would amply demonstrate that the petitioner/plaintiff was not ready nor had the capacity to perform his part of the contract as he had no financial capacity to pay the consideration in cash as contracted and intended to bide for the time which disentitles him as time is of the essence of the contract.” 43. One more aspect of the case with respect to the readiness and willingness is that the plaintiffs waited for registration of the sale deed, as the land acquisition proceeding was pending. The plaintiffs have examined PW-2/Krishna Kumar Pathak, who is the Patwari. One more aspect of the case with respect to the readiness and willingness is that the plaintiffs waited for registration of the sale deed, as the land acquisition proceeding was pending. The plaintiffs have examined PW-2/Krishna Kumar Pathak, who is the Patwari. He stated in his evidence that, out of 36 dismils of land, 17 dismils of land was acquired by the State Government, and 19 dismils of land is remaining with the defendant No.1. The said acquisition of land was in the year 2008; however, he does not bring any official record with respect to the land acquisition. He further admitted that there was no ban on selling the land during the land acquisition proceeding, and there was no ban on the sale of any remaining land after the land acquisition proceeding. Since the notification of the acquisition of land was already published in the year 2008 itself, it must specify the area of the land under acquisition and the remaining land with the defendant No.1, and there was no ban on the sale of the land. Therefore, there was no reason for the defendant No.1 not to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs, if they actually intended to purchase the land and to ready and willing for the same. From all the aforesaid aspects of the evidence produced by the parties, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. 44. With respect to the consideration of the issues No. 9, 10 and 11, which are the issues of maintainability of the suit, issue of limitation and valuation of the suit. The plaintiffs have pleaded in the plaint that they regularly asked the defendant No.1 for registration of the sale deed, but he regularly informed them that the land acquisition proceeding is still pending, and when they came to know that the land acquisition proceeding is concluded, they served a legal notice on 01.02.2012, and thereafter, filed the suit on 23.02.2012. Since, there was a condition in the agreement that, the sale-deed would be registered within one month from execution of agreement or after completion of the land acquisition proceeding and as per the plain averment and evidence, the land acquisition proceeding was still not completed, however, the measurement of the land was settled, and therefore, it cannot be said that the suit is barred by limitation. There is no any notice with respect to cancellation/revocation of the agreement by the defendant No.1. From the evidence of the defendant No.1, it transpires that on 28.07.2009, he got prepared the 22 column form (Exhibit D-4), which was required for registration of the sale-deed and till that day, the defendant No.1 was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, and thereafter on 01.02.2012 the notice has been served and when the sale-deed could not be executed, the suit has been filed on 23.02.2012 considering that the defendant No.1 denied for execution of the sale- deed. Therefore, the consideration of the learned trial Court that the suit is within limitation appears to be correct. Further, the plaintiffs have valued the suit as Rs. 4 lakhs, which was the total sale consideration under the agreement (Exhibit P-1), which is the correct valuation of the suit and the proper court fee has been paid by the plaintiffs. 45. So far as the application filed by the appellant under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC and prayer for taking additional evidence on record is concerned, it transpires from the application and documents that the defendant No.1 sought permission to take the award dated 01.07.2018 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bilaspur as additional evidence in the case. Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC empowers the Appellate Court to take additional evidence, if the party seeking to produce additional evidence establishes that the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, has refused to admit evidence or even after exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time, when the decree was passed or the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any substantial cause. In the present case, from the document produced by the appellants seeking it to be taken as additional evidence, it transpires that it is the award with respect to the Land Acquisition Case No. 39/A-82 of 2016-17. In the present case, from the document produced by the appellants seeking it to be taken as additional evidence, it transpires that it is the award with respect to the Land Acquisition Case No. 39/A-82 of 2016-17. The subject matter of the case is the land acquisition proceeding of the year 2008, whereas the proposed additional evidence is with respect to the land acquisition proceeding of the year 2016-17 and with respect to the notification issued under Section 3-A of the National Highways Act, 1956, dated 01.09.2017 for acquisition of the land for widening of Bilaspur-Katghora National Highway No. 130, which is after passing of the judgment in the present case, and the same is not necessary to be taken for adjudication of the present case, as the pendency of the land acquisition case of the year 2008 is relevant consideration and not the land acquisition case of the year 2016-17, therefore, the application filed by the appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC is rejected. 46. Since the plaintiffs have not prayed for refund of the advance amount in their plaint and have not sought any relief for the same, in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of “ K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima and others ” 2025 SCC Online SC 1014, no order for refund of the advance amount can be passed. 47. From the foregoing considerations, this Court does not find any sufficient ground to sustain the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court granting a decree of specific performance of the contract in favour of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant/defendant No.1 is allowed, and the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is set aside . Consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is also dismissed. 48. The parties shall bear their own costs. 49. An appellate decree be drawn accordingly.