1 2025:CGHC:58849 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 10 of 2020 1 - Smt. Pooja Sahu Wd/o Late Mahendra Sahu Aged About 22 Years R/o House No. 274, Mohan Takij Road, Jamnipali, Tahsil Katghora, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 2 - Rudra Sahu S/o Late Mahendra Sahu, Aged About 2 Year (Minor), Being Minor Represented Through Her Mother i.e. Smt. Pooja Sahu, W/o Late Mahendra Sahu, R/o House No. 274, Mohan Takij Road, Jamnipali, Tahsil Katghora, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 3 - Smt. Bigni Devi Wd/o Late Dhannu Sahu Aged About 62 Years R/o House No. 274, Mohan Takij Road, Jamnipali, Tahsil Katghora, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 4 - Jitendra Sahu S/o Late Dhannu Sahu Aged About 42 Years R/o House No. 274, Mohan Takij Road, Jamnipali, Tahsil Katghora, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 5 - Satyendra Sahu S/o Late Dhannu Sahu Aged About 37 Years R/o House No. 274, Mohan Takij Road, Jamnipali, Tahsil Katghora, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 6 - Suraj Sahu S/o Late Dhannu Sahu Aged About 25 Years R/o House No. 274, Mohan Takij Road, Jamnipali, Tahsil Katghora, District : Korba Chhattisgarh.------ (Claimants) ... Appellants Versus 1 - Ansar Ahmad S/o Saduran Ansari Aged About 42 Years R/o Near Coal - Washery Beltara, Police Station Ratanpur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Permanent Address M - 1, Yadunandan Nagar, Tifra, Tahsil And District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. (Driver Of Vehicle C.G. 08-L-3851) 2 - Dinesh Singh S/o Late Harinath Singh Aged About 52 Years R/o M - 1, Yadunandan Nagar, Tifra, Tahsil And District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. (Owner Of Vehicle C.G. 08-L-3851) 3 - The New India Insurance Company Ltd. Through Its Branch Manager, The New India Insurance Company Ltd. Branch Office Vardhman Complex, Raipur Road, Parsada, Sirgitti, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. (Insurance Co.) ... Respondents Digitally signed by RAMESH KUMAR VATTI Date: 2025.12.05 10:58:41 +0530 2 For Appellants/Claimants : Ms. Soniya Kuldeep, Advocate For Respondents No. 1 & 2 For Respondent No. 3 : : None Mr. H.B. Agrawal, Senior Advocate with Ms. Swati Agrawal, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment on Board 04/12/2025 1. Heard on I.A. No. 01/2019, application for condonation of delay in filing the instant appeal. 2. The appellants/claimants have challenged the award passed by the learned Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) in Claim Case No. 127/2016 dated 02.05.2018 with delay of 503 days. The learned Claims Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 31,23,400/- with interest @ 7% per annum on account of death of one Mahendra Sahu. 3. Ms. Soniya Kuldeep, learned appearing for the appellants/claimants would argue that the award was passed by the learned Claims Tribunal on 02.05.2018 and the instant appeal was preferred on 16.12.2019. She would contend that there is delay of 503 days in filing the instant appeal. It is also contended that the appellants are illiterate and they could not arrange money as well as documents to approach their Advocate for filing of an appeal. She would pray to condone the delay of 503 days caused in filing the appeal. 4. On the other hand, Mr. H.B. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent No. 3/Insurance Company would oppose. He would contend that the appellants have not explained the reasons for delay properly in the application. He would further contend that there is 3 inordinate delay of 503 days and same has not properly been explained. He would submit that the award was passed on 02.05.2018 and the appellants took 503 days to prefer the instant appeal. He would contend that the application i.e. I.A. No. 01/2019 deserves to be rejected. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the contents of the application (I.A. No. 01/2019) for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 6. In para- 1, the appellants/claimants have stated date of award i.e. 02.05.2018. In para- 3, it is stated that delay of 503 days has been caused in filing the appeal. In para- 4, it is pleaded that the appellants are illiterate and they took time to arrange funds to prefer appeal. The appellants have mentioned only one date of award i.e. 02.05.2018. The appellants failed to assign sufficient cause for filing appeal with delay of 503 days. The reasons assigned in the application (I.A. No. 01/2019) are not just and proper. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 4 11.Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 8. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 5 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.” 9. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be 6 kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 10. In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have 7 been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re- opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 12. Considering the contents of application for condonation of delay and facts discussed above and further the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), I am not inclined to allow the application (I.A. No. 01/2019) for condonation of delay. Accordingly, same is liable to be and is hereby rejected. 13. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge vatti