1 2025:CGHC:59102-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1386 of 2021 Omprakash Sahu S/o Late Shri Vishwanath Sahu Aged About 35 Years R/o Shankarpur Near Hanuman Mandir Rajnandgaon , Present Address Under Beneath of Under Bridge Near Post Office Rajnandgaon District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station City Kotwali, Rajnandgaon District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Hanuman Prasad Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Soumya Rai, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on board Per Ramesh Sinha, C hief Justice 05.12.2025 1. Heard Mr. Hanuman Prasad Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondent. ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.12.06 11:16:26 +0530 2 2. The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) questioning the impugned judgment dated 10.08.2021 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (POCSO), Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) in Special Case (POCSO) No.03/2019, whereby the trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant with a direction to run all the sentences concurrently in the following manner :- CONVICTION SENTENCE Under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rigorous imprisonment for 07 years with fine amount of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for one year. Under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine amount of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for one year. Under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Life imprisonment (till natural life) with fine amount of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for one year. Under Section 376AB of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Life imprisonment (till natural life) with fine amount of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for one year. Under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 Life imprisonment with fine amount of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for one year. 3 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that, in between 12:00 am to 1:00 am on the night of 29.12.2018 to 30.12.2018, the accused took the victim under the over bridge situated within the ambit of City Kotwali Police Station, Rajnandgaon and committed the crime of rape with her, about which the victim's parents came to know in the morning and after getting the information from the complainant, a written application was submitted before the City Kotwali Police Station, on which the City Kotwali Police Station, Rajnandgaon registered a First Information Report under Crime No. 709/2018 under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) vide Ex.P/7 and the case was taken into investigation. 4. 4. During the course of investigation, after taking consent from the parents of the victim (Ex.P/11 and Ex.P/14), the medical examination of the victim was conducted. The lower which the victim was wearing at the time of incident was seized vide Ex.P/9. The pant of the appellant was also seized vide Ex.P/2. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.P/3 and the query report of the seized lower was obtained vide Ex.P/5. Crime details from was prepared vide Ex.P/8. Further, the victim's statement was recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. vide Ex.P/12. The accused was also medically examined vide Ex.P/16. Birth certificate of the victim was seized vide Ex.P/23. Dr. Sohadra Thakur (PW-6) conducted the medical examination of the victim and gave its report vide Ex.P/4 as also she prepared vaginal slides of the victim, which along with the lower of the victim were seized vice Ex.P/1. The seized articles like 4 vaginal slides, clothes of the victim as also the accused were sent to its chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur and according to the FSL report (Ex.P/26), semen stains were present on the seized articles, as such the FSL report was found to be positive. The appellant was arrested vide arrest memo Ex.P/22. 5. After completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed before the jurisdictional Criminal Court against the accused under Sections 363, 376 (a) of the IPC as well as Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’). 6. On the basis of the material contained in the charge-sheet, the trial Court found that a prima facie case was made out against the accused for the offences under Sections 363, 366, 376(3) and 376AB of the IPC, along with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 7. Accordingly, charges under the aforesaid provisions were framed, read over and explained to the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 8. The statement of the accused was thereafter recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him, abjured his guilt, and asserted that he had been falsely implicated in the case and had not committed any offence. 5 9. So as to prove the complicity of the accused/appellant in the crime in question, prosecution has examined as many as 11 witnesses as PW-1 to PW-11 and exhibited 26 documents in support of its case as Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/26. In support of the defence, appellant/accused neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document. 10. The trial Court after completion of trial and after appreciating oral and documentary evidences available on record, by the impugned judgment dated 10.08.2021 convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner mentioned in the second paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by him calling in question the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 11. Mr. Hanuman Prasad Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contends that the findings of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court are wholly unsustainable in law and on facts. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The entire conviction is based on assumptions and conjectures, without any cogent, reliable or consistent evidence to support the prosecution story. It is urged that the prosecution version suffers from material contradictions and inherent improbabilities, particularly regarding the manner in which the alleged incident occurred between 12:00 am and 1:00 am. under the over-bridge 6 within the jurisdiction of City Kotwali Police Station, Rajnandgaon. He submits that the prosecution has not produced any independent eyewitness, nor is there any corroborative evidence to establish that the appellant had taken the victim to the said location at the relevant time. 12. Mr. Agrawal further submits that the statement of the victim is highly inconsistent and unreliable, containing clear embellishments and exaggerations. It is further argued that the trial Court failed to appreciate that the victim’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. does not align with her oral deposition at trial, thereby creating a serious doubt about the veracity of her version. It is further argued that the medical evidence does not conclusively support the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse, and that the mere presence of semen stains on clothing, as reflected in the FSL report, cannot by itself lead to the conclusion that the appellant committed the alleged act, particularly when the prosecution has not proved an unbroken chain of custody of the seized articles or their proper preservation. He submits that the investigation suffered from procedural irregularities, including the unexplained delay between the alleged incident, the lodging of the complaint, and the medical examination. The absence of any injuries on the victim, the lack of any clear identification of the appellant from the spot, and the failure of the prosecution to rule out false implication further strengthen the defence. 7 13. It is also contended by Mr. Agrawal that the age of the victim, based solely on a photocopy of the birth certificate seized during investigation (Ex.P/23), was not proved in accordance with law, and therefore the presumption of minority could not have been drawn against the appellant without proper foundational evidence. Lastly, it is submitted that the trial Court erred in placing undue reliance on selective evidence while ignoring material omissions and contradictions which strike at the root of the prosecution case. Learned counsel asserts that the prosecution has miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof, and as such, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, the conviction recorded against the appellant under Sections 363, 366, 376(3), 376AB of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act deserves to be set aside. 14. On the other hand, Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondent, submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is fully justified and calls for no interference. It is argued that the prosecution has successfully proved the case against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt through consistent, cogent and reliable evidence. He further submits that the testimony of the victim is natural, trustworthy and inspires confidence, and her statement stands duly corroborated by the medical evidence (Ex.P/4), seizure memos, the FSL report (Ex.P/26) showing presence of semen on the seized articles, and 8 other contemporaneous documents prepared during investigation. It is further submitted by Mr. Rai that the victim was a minor at the time of the incident as she was aged about 5 years and 11 months, and therefore the ingredients of the offences under Sections 376(3) and 376AB of the IPC, as well as Section 6 of the POCSO Act, are clearly attracted. He further argued that there are no material contradictions or omissions in the prosecution evidence which may create any doubt in the mind of the Court. On the contrary, the chain of events right from the lodging of the FIR (Ex.P/7), seizure of clothes, preparation of spot map, recording of the victim’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and the subsequent medical and forensic reports, fully establishes the complicity of the appellant. Hence, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 16. The first question for consideration before this Court would be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that on the date of incident, the victims were minor? 17. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the 9 child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means any person below the age of eighteen years. 18. In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles for determining the age of a child, which read as follows: “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the 10 child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or 11 juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or 12 any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW- PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a 13 preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 19. In the present case, the prosecution has presented birth certificate of the victim (Ex.P/23), in which the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 02.01.2013. The defence has not presented any 14 oral or documentary evidence to refuse the said date of birth, therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the date of birth of the victim, as 02.01.2013 hence, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly held that the date of birth of the victim is 02.01.2013 and the age on the date of incident i.e. 29.12.2018-30.12.2018 was about more than 5 years and 11 months. 20. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 363, 366 of the IPC ? 21. The appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 363, and 366 of the IPC, which is punishable for kidnapping and kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage. Kidnapping has been defined under Section 359 of the IPC. According to Section 359 of the IPC, kidnapping is of two kinds: kidnapping from India and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. Section 361 of the IPC defines kidnapping from lawful guardianship which states as under:- “361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.-Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap 15 such minor or person from lawful guardianship.” 22. The object of Section 359 of the IPC is at least as much to protect children of tender age from being abducted or seduced for improper purposes, as for the the protection of the rights of parents and guardians having the lawful charge or custody of minors or insane persons. Section 361 has four ingredients:- “(1) Taking or enticing away a minor or a person of unsound mind. (2) Such minor must be under sixteen years of age, if a male, or under eighteen years or age, if a female. (3) The taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind. (4) Such taking or enticing must be without the consent of such guardian. So far as kidnapping a minor girl from lawful guardianship is concerned, the ingredients are : (i) that the girl was under 18 years of age; (ii) such minor was in the keeping of a lawful guardian, and (iii) the accused took or induced such person to leave out of such keeping and such taking was done without the consent of the lawful guardian. 23. The Supreme Court while considering the object of Section 361 of the IPC in the matter of S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras, AIR 16 1965 SC 942 took the view that if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so and held that if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking, it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian and held as under:- “It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. If evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of the girl. But that part falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to “taking”.” 17 24. Reverting to the facts of the present case, and considering the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 361 IPC, which is punishable under Sections 363 and 366 IPC, as well as the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in S. Varadarajan (supra), it is clear from the evidence on record that, during the intervening night of 29.12.2018 and 30.12.2018, the appellant had taken the minor victim from her lawful guardianship and brought her under the over-bridge situated within the jurisdiction of City Kotwali Police Station, Rajnandgaon, where the alleged act of sexual assault was committed. The victim’s parents came to know of the incident the following morning, and upon receiving the information from the complainant, a written report was submitted (Ex.P/6), on the basis of which the First Information Report (Ex.P/7) under Section 363 IPC was registered and investigation commenced. 25. In view of these established facts, and keeping in mind that the victim was a minor at the relevant time, thereby rendering her legally incapable of giving valid consent or voluntarily leaving the protection of her guardians, we are of the considered view that the learned trial Court was fully justified in holding the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC. 26. The next question for consideration before us is whether the appellant has committed rape on minor victim? 18 27. The victim (PW-9) in her statement as well as in her examination- in-chief categorically stated that she knew the accused prior to the incident. She deposed that the accused used to visit her house frequently and was engaged in the same occupation as her father, i.e., collecting scrap materials. The accused himself admitted during cross-examination that he was acquainted with the victim and her family. 28. Similarly, the victim’s father (PW-8) deposed that he knew the accused well, that the accused resided in close proximity, and that he would often eat, drink, and sit with their family. He further stated that the accused worked as a ragpicker. These statements, coupled with the admission of the accused during trial, clearly establish the identity of the accused and his familiarity with the victim and her family. 29. The victim (PW-9), aged around 12 years, stated in her examination-in-chief that at the time of the incident she was residing with her parents under an overbridge. The accused was living separately but in the same locality. On the night of the incident, she was sleeping under the overbridge when the accused lifted her in his arms and took her to a secluded place with trees. She specifically stated that the accused removed her clothes, committed rape on her and did "dirty work" with her. She said the accused placed his private part where she used to urinate. She tried to resist and told him not to do so but the 19 accused did not listen. She sustained injury on her mouth and experienced severe pain. After committing the act, the accused left her and fled. She affirmed that she had narrated the incident before the Court earlier as well and that the accused had taken her away secretly and raped her. 30. PW-8, the father of the victim, deposed that on the next day of the incident, people from Gayatri Mandir and other locals questioned the victim, whereupon she narrated the entire incident. Subsequently, the accused was apprehended and taken to the police station. Though the witness was declared partially hostile, during leading questions he admitted that his police statement was recorded and that on the night of the incident the victim had woken him up, crying in pain. He observed that her lips were bleeding and that her pyjamas and underwear bore blood stains. He further stated that the victim’s mother had informed him of the incident, but as she had died later, she could not be examined during trial. 31. Nand Kishore Surjan (PW-7) stated in his examination-in-chief that he regularly went for a morning walk. On the date of the incident, while walking under the overbridge, he saw the victim’s mother crying over her child. On enquiry, the victim’s mother informed him that her daughter had been forcibly raped between 12:00 midnight and 1:00 am, and was abandoned around 4:00 am. He observed that the child appeared semi-conscious and that 20 red, blood-like stains were present on her clothes and body. As he was speaking with the victim’s mother, the victim’s father brought the accused, stating that he had raped his daughter. PW-7 then accompanied them to the police station. This witness, though declared partially hostile, admitted in cross-examination that he had given the statement recorded in Ex.P/10. He confirmed that when the victim’s father presented the accused and asked the child whether he had done “dirty work” with her, the victim confirmed, stating that the accused had taken her on the pretext of giving “khuwa,” carried her to the backside near the temple, removed her clothes, and committed rape. PW-7 further stated that the victim’s pyjamas were stained with blood. 32. In view of the consistent and trustworthy testimonies of PW-9, PW-8 and PW-7, the sequence of events emerging from the record leaves no room for doubt. The evidence clearly establishes that on the date of the incident, the accused, who was already well-acquainted with the victim and her family, kidnapped and abducted the minor victim and committed penetrative sexual assault upon the victim, inserting his private part into the urinary tract, thereby causing severe pain, injury and bleeding, as noticed immediately thereafter by PW-8 and PW-7. The cumulative effect of the victim’s categorical deposition, supported by the medical condition in which she was found and the corroborative statements of the other witnesses, renders the fact of rape irrefutable. The acts committed by the accused fall squarely within 21 the definition of aggravated penetrative sexual assault, and the prosecution has successfully established these facts beyond reasonable doubt. 33. In the case of Ganesan v. State Represented by its Inspector of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 573, the Supreme Court observed and held that that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. 34. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575, it was observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It was further observed and held that sole testimony of prosecutrix should not be doubted by court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. 35. In the case of Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34, the Supreme Court observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It was further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. 22 36. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of the case on hand and as observed hereinabove, we see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the victim. She is found to be reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, without any further corroboration, the conviction of the accused relying upon the sole testimony of the victim can be sustained. 37. The view taken by the learned trial Court that the appellant is the author of the crime is a pure finding of fact based on evidence available on record and we are of the opinion that in the present case, the only view possible was the one taken by the learned trial Court. 38. From the above analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has been successful in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has not committed any legal or factual error in arriving at the finding with regard to the guilt of the appellant/convict. 39. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 40. The appellant/convict is stated to be in jail. He shall serve out the sentence awarded by the trial Court by means of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 10.08.2021. 41. Registry is directed to forward a certified copy of this judgment to the Superintendent of the Jail concerned, where the appellant is 23 presently undergoing sentence. The Superintendent shall ensure that the copy of the judgment is duly served upon the appellant and that the appellant is informed of his right to challenge this judgment before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by preferring an appropriate appeal, with the assistance of the High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee, as may be permissible under law. 42. Let a certified copy of this order alongwith the original record be transmitted to trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and action, if any. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu