ORDER : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The present First Appeal is filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 27.03.2017 (Annexure A/1) passed by the Fourth Additional District Judge, Raipur, in Civil Suit No. 83-A/2015, whereby the learned trial Court has partly allowed and partly dismissed the suit, hence, the appellant has preferred the present appeal before this Court. 2. The plaintiff’s case, in brief, is that the defendant is the owner of the suit house, an LIG unit situated on Khasra No. 293/1 under R.D.A. Scheme No. 27 at Shailendra Nagar, Raipur. The defendant allegedly entered into an agreement to sell the said property to the plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs. 25,00,000/-. Out of the agreed amount, the plaintiff claims to have paid Rs. 10,00,000/- as part sale consideration. It was further agreed between the parties that the defendant would evict the tenant residing in the suit premises within six months and would obtain requisite permissions from the Raipur Development Authority (R.D.A.) for freehold conversion and sale of the property. The plaintiff asserts that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and was financially capable of paying the balance sale consideration. However, according to the plaintiff, the defendant avoided fulfilling his obligations and displayed no interest in performing his part of the agreement. Although the defendant eventually submitted an application for permission to sell the property, he took no steps to evict the tenant from the suit premises, despite repeated reminders from the plaintiff. It is pleaded that the plaintiff issued legal notices dated 09.04.2012, 27.06.2013, 06.05.2014 and 18.02.2015, calling upon the defendant to comply with the terms of the agreement. As the defendant neither responded nor complied, the plaintiff instituted the present suit seeking specific performance of the contract. The defendant filed a written statement denying execution of the agreement to sell. According to him, the plaintiff is engaged in money-lending and land-transactions. He alleges that he and his sister-in-law had taken a loan of Rs. 6,00,000/- from the plaintiff and issued a cheque towards securing the said loan. He further claims to have repaid Rs. 1,75,000/- on 26.03.2013, for which the plaintiff obtained a receipt on a non- judicial stamp of Rs. 10/-, witnessed by Ram Kumar Sahu and Master Ashok. He alleges that he and his sister-in-law had taken a loan of Rs. 6,00,000/- from the plaintiff and issued a cheque towards securing the said loan. He further claims to have repaid Rs. 1,75,000/- on 26.03.2013, for which the plaintiff obtained a receipt on a non- judicial stamp of Rs. 10/-, witnessed by Ram Kumar Sahu and Master Ashok. The defendant contends that the plaintiff misused his illness to obtain signatures on blank stamp papers and blank NOC forms, and that no agreement to sell was ever executed. He therefore prayed for dismissal of the suit. 3. The trial Court held that execution of the agreement and payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- were proved, and also found that the agreement was not forged. However, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove his readiness and willingness to perform the contract and was therefore not entitled to specific performance or registration of the property in his favour. Despite finding the agreement genuine, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit for specific performance, but directed the defendant to refund Rs. 4,25,000/- to the plaintiff within two months. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 27.03.2017, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal, contending that the findings of the Court below are illegal, perverse, and unsustainable in law. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment and decree dated 27.03.2017 (Annexure A/1) passed by the learned Fourth Additional District Judge, Raipur, is wholly unsustainable in law and on facts. It is argued that the findings recorded by the Court below are perverse, contrary to the evidence available on record, and suffer from serious legal infirmities. The learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that once it had categorically held the agreement to sell dated 07.10.2011 to be duly executed by the defendant and had further found the payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- as earnest money to be proved, there remained no basis to deny the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff. It is further contended that the trial Court committed grave illegality in overlooking the fact that the defendant himself had signed and submitted documents relating to freehold conversion and permission for sale of the suit property before the Raipur Development Authority (RDA), thereby acknowledging the existence and validity of the agreement to sell. It is further contended that the trial Court committed grave illegality in overlooking the fact that the defendant himself had signed and submitted documents relating to freehold conversion and permission for sale of the suit property before the Raipur Development Authority (RDA), thereby acknowledging the existence and validity of the agreement to sell. Despite this, the Court below failed to consider the overwhelming documentary evidence indicative of the defendant’s clear intention to complete the sale transaction. Learned counsel submits that the trial Court also ignored the undisputed fact that the plaintiff had issued four legal notices dated 09.04.2012, 27.06.2013, 06.05.2014 and 18.02.2015, calling upon the defendant to perform his part of the contract. The defendant did not reply to any of these notices nor took steps to fulfill his contractual obligations, particularly the eviction of the tenant and obtaining of requisite permissions from the RDA. This conduct clearly demonstrates that the defendant was solely responsible for the non-performance of the agreement. It is further argued that the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is wholly erroneous and contrary to the evidence on record. The plaintiff had, from the inception, expressed his readiness and willingness to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 15,00,000/-, but as expressly stipulated in the agreement, his obligation to pay arose only after the defendant fulfilled his part, namely, eviction of the existing tenant and obtaining necessary RDA permissions. Since the defendant failed to perform these reciprocal obligations, the plaintiff cannot be held responsible for not tendering the balance amount. The impugned judgment thus reflects a misplaced understanding of the law governing reciprocal promises under Section 52 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the defence raised by the respondent was self-contradictory and unsustainable. Although in the written statement the defendant denied execution of the agreement to sell, claimed that the plaintiff was a moneylender, and alleged that the plaintiff had taken his signatures on blank papers and misused them, these allegations stood demolished during his own cross-examination. The defendant even raised a plea that the transaction pertained to a loan of Rs. 10,00,000/-, out of which he had repaid Rs. The defendant even raised a plea that the transaction pertained to a loan of Rs. 10,00,000/-, out of which he had repaid Rs. 1,75,000/-, but this plea was unsupported by any cogent evidence and was rightly rejected by the trial Court as relating to a different transaction. However, despite rejecting this plea, the learned Court below inexplicably doubted the earnest money payment, which is contrary to its own findings. It is emphasized that the conduct of the defendant in failing to carry out his obligations under the agreement, coupled with the plaintiff’s consistent demand for performance, clearly establishes that the plaintiff was always ready and willing and that the defendant had deliberately avoided the contract. The exhibited sale agreement is a textbook example of reciprocal obligations to be performed in a defined sequence, attracting Section 52 of the Contract Act. In this context, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nathulal v. Phoolchand , reported in (1969) 3 SCC 120 wherein it has been categorically held that when the order of performance of obligations is expressly fixed by contract, parties must adhere to that sequence. Applying the said principle, the appellant’s readiness and willingness cannot be questioned until the respondent first performed his stipulated obligations. Lastly, it is submitted that the original appellant has passed away during the pendency of this appeal, and his legal representatives, who are now prosecuting this appeal, stand fully entitled to the relief of specific performance. The impugned judgment, which denies such relief despite findings in favour of the plaintiff regarding execution of the agreement and payment of earnest money, is therefore liable to be set aside. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the appeal is wholly misconceived and deserves outright dismissal, as the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court is based on a proper appreciation of facts, evidence, and settled legal principles. It is contended that the appellant has attempted to challenge well-reasoned findings of the Trial Court without any substantive grounds or material to demonstrate perversity or illegality. At the outset, it is submitted that the appellant has failed to establish the due execution of the alleged agreement to sell in the manner required by law. It is contended that the appellant has attempted to challenge well-reasoned findings of the Trial Court without any substantive grounds or material to demonstrate perversity or illegality. At the outset, it is submitted that the appellant has failed to establish the due execution of the alleged agreement to sell in the manner required by law. Although the Trial Court held the signature of the respondent proved, the respondent constantly maintained that the alleged agreement was not executed voluntarily and that the appellant, who is admittedly engaged in money-lending activities, had misused blank signed papers obtained during financial transactions. The respondent consistently contended that the appellant had forcibly taken original documents of the suit property and fabricated the alleged agreement. These specific pleadings, coupled with admitted past financial dealings between the parties, clearly indicate that the agreement relied upon by the appellant is tainted with suspicion. Therefore, the Trial Court rightly exercised caution while evaluating the genuineness and enforceability of the said document. It is further submitted that the Trial Court rightly held that the appellant had failed to prove his readiness and willingness, which is a mandatory requirement under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. The appellant not only failed to show continuous financial readiness but also failed to produce any cogent evidence regarding his capacity to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 15 lakhs. Instead of complying with his own contractual obligations, the appellant attempted to shift the entire burden on the respondent by relying solely on issuance of notices. The Trial Court correctly concluded that mere issuance of notices does not amount to readiness and willingness, particularly when the appellant did not take any demonstrable steps to tender the amount at the relevant time. With regard to the respondent’s obligations, it is submitted that the appellant has grossly misinterpreted the terms of the alleged agreement. The respondent never admitted any binding promise to vacate the tenant or obtain permission from the Raipur Development Authority as a condition precedent. Even otherwise, the appellant failed to prove that such conditions were mandatory or that the timeline for performance was clearly fixed. The Trial Court rightly evaluated the evidence, including cross-examination of witnesses, and found that the appellant failed to establish the alleged reciprocal obligations in the manner required by law. Even otherwise, the appellant failed to prove that such conditions were mandatory or that the timeline for performance was clearly fixed. The Trial Court rightly evaluated the evidence, including cross-examination of witnesses, and found that the appellant failed to establish the alleged reciprocal obligations in the manner required by law. Therefore, the appellant’s reliance on Section 52 of the Contract Act and the judgment in Nathulal (supra ) is wholly misplaced and inapplicable to the facts of the present case. 7. Furthermore, the appellant has suppressed material facts, including the existence of previous monetary dealings and the filing of a criminal case under Section 420 IPC by the respondent’s brother. These facts indicate that the relationship between the parties was not purely contractual but had a strong financial background. The Trial Court, while considering the surrounding circumstances, rightly held that the transaction was in the nature of a financial arrangement rather than a genuine agreement to sell. Therefore, the finding that the respondent had repaid Rs. 1,75,000/– towards a loan transaction is fully justified and supported by evidence. It is lastly submitted that the discretionary relief of specific performance cannot be granted merely because an agreement is alleged to exist. The Trial Court, having found serious inconsistencies regarding the appellant’s conduct, financial capability, and the circumstances surrounding the alleged agreement, rightly exercised its discretion in refusing specific performance. The appellant has failed to show any perversity or illegality in this finding. The direction to refund Rs. 4,25,000/– is equitable and balances the rights of both parties. No ground is made out for interference by this Court. For these reasons, the respondent prays that the present appeal be dismissed with costs, and the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court be affirmed in toto. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents enclosed along with the appeal. 9. This First Appeal, preferred under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, calls into question the judgment and decree dated 27.03.2017 passed by the learned Fourth Additional District Judge, Raipur in Civil Suit No. 83-A/2015, whereby the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff was partly allowed and partly dismissed. 9. This First Appeal, preferred under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, calls into question the judgment and decree dated 27.03.2017 passed by the learned Fourth Additional District Judge, Raipur in Civil Suit No. 83-A/2015, whereby the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff was partly allowed and partly dismissed. On the basis of the rival pleadings, the learned trial Court framed several issues, including whether an agreement to sell was executed, whether part consideration was paid, whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part, and whether the agreement dated 07.10.2011 was forged. 10. The learned Trial Court, while holding the agreement dated 07.10.2011 (Ex. P-1) to be duly executed by the defendant, declined the relief of specific performance on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove his readiness and willingness as mandated under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Trial Court, however, directed the defendant to refund a sum of Rs. 4,25,000/– to the plaintiff, representing the admitted outstanding amount arising from earlier financial dealings. Aggrieved by the refusal to decree the suit for specific performance, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. 11. The plaintiff, Ramesh Jadwani, examined himself as PW-1 and reiterated the pleadings contained in the plaint. He deposed that the respondent / defendant had agreed to sell the suit property, being LIG House No. E-37, Khasra No. 293/1, admeasuring 1250 sq. ft. situated at Shailendra Nagar Scheme No. 27, Raipur, for a total sale consideration of Rs. 25,00,000/–. According to him, on 07.10.2011, a written agreement to sell (Ex. P-1) was executed in the presence of two witnesses, and an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/– was paid in cash to the defendant on the same day. PW-1 further stated that under the terms of the agreement, the balance consideration of Rs.15,00,000/– was to be paid within six months from the date the existing tenant vacated the property and after the defendant obtained freehold and sale permission from the Raipur Development Authority (RDA). He also stated that he constantly reminded the defendant of these obligations, and when the defendant failed to act, he sent repeated legal notices dated 09.04.2012 (Ex. P-4), 27.06.2013 (Ex. P-7), 06.05.2014 (Ex. P- 10) and 18.02.2015 (Ex. P-13). PW-1 produced various receipts, acknowledgments, and RDA application documents in support of his assertions. He also stated that he constantly reminded the defendant of these obligations, and when the defendant failed to act, he sent repeated legal notices dated 09.04.2012 (Ex. P-4), 27.06.2013 (Ex. P-7), 06.05.2014 (Ex. P- 10) and 18.02.2015 (Ex. P-13). PW-1 produced various receipts, acknowledgments, and RDA application documents in support of his assertions. However, during cross-examination, PW-1 admitted that he had earlier given Rs. 6,00,000/– to the defendant in 2010, out of which the defendant had repaid Rs. 1,75,000/– and Rs. 4,25,000/– remained outstanding. He further conceded that he had not filed any income-tax return showing possession of Rs. 10,00,000/– in cash or any corresponding financial capacity. These admissions cast a serious shadow on the plaintiff’s claim of having paid Rs. 10,00,000/– as earnest money under the sale agreement and raised doubts regarding the nature of the transaction. 12. PW-2, Ashok Davda, is one of the attesting witnesses to the alleged agreement to sell. He confirmed that the plaintiff and the defendant were known to him and that the defendant had executed Ex. P-1 in his presence and in the presence of another attesting witness, Ashish Shrivastava. He supported the plaintiff’s version that the defendant had received Rs. 10,00,000/– in cash as earnest money on the same day and that the balance amount was to be paid after eviction of the tenant and after obtaining requisite permissions from RDA. He identified his own signature and those of the parties on the agreement. In cross-examination, however, PW-2 admitted that he did not know who prepared or brought the agreement and that he had no knowledge of the denominations or specific composition of the cash amount allegedly paid. This lack of awareness regarding material details of the transaction shows that although PW-2 proves execution of the document, he does not corroborate the plaintiff’s capacity or the actual payment of such a large sum of money. His testimony, thus, only partially supports the plaintiff’s case and fails to remove the doubts arising from PW-1’s own admissions. 13. Whereas, the defendant, examined as DW-1, denied execution of any agreement for sale and asserted that the plaintiff was engaged in money-lending business. He deposed that he had borrowed Rs. 6,00,000/– from the plaintiff in 2010 for medical treatment, for which the plaintiff obtained his house documents, a blank stamp paper bearing his signature, and a blank cheque issued by his sister-in-law. He deposed that he had borrowed Rs. 6,00,000/– from the plaintiff in 2010 for medical treatment, for which the plaintiff obtained his house documents, a blank stamp paper bearing his signature, and a blank cheque issued by his sister-in-law. DW-1 stated that the plaintiff, seeking to misuse these documents, fabricated the agreement to sell and filed a false suit to grab his property. He further deposed about other money-lending transactions of the plaintiff, including a pending case under Section 138 of the NI Act against another borrower. He also referred to a criminal complaint filed by his brother under Section 156(3) CrPC and Sections 420 and 211 IPC against the plaintiff. Though DW-1 denied receiving Rs. 10,00,000/–, he admitted borrowing Rs. 6,00,000/– and repaying Rs. 1,75,000/–, leaving Rs. 4,25,000/– outstanding. Importantly, DW-1 could not produce any cogent evidence to prove that the signature on Ex. P-1 was obtained by fraud or coercion. His admission that he signed blank papers, coupled with the absence of expert evidence, weakens his defence of forgery. However, his testimony, along with the plaintiff’s own admission of the Rs. 6,00,000/– loan transaction, considerably undermines the plaintiff’s assertion of having paid Rs. 10,00,000/– as earnest money. 14. Execution of Agreement and Receipt of Advance - The testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 sufficiently establish that the defendant did sign the agreement Ex. P-1, and therefore execution is proved. However, the plaintiff has failed to satisfactorily establish that a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/– was actually paid as advance consideration. His inability to explain the source of funds, absence of supporting financial records, and admissions regarding prior loan dealings create considerable doubt. Accordingly, while execution of the agreement stands proved, the finding of the Trial Court modifying the amount of advance stands justified. 15. Readiness and Willingness - The plaintiff failed to produce any documentary evidence demonstrating his continuous readiness and financial capacity to perform his part. Mere issuance of notices does not establish readiness and willingness, particularly when the plaintiff did not produce bank statements, income-tax returns, or proof of arrangements to tender the balance consideration. Therefore, the finding that the plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness is supported by evidence. 16. Forgery - Although the defendant alleged forgery, he produced no evidence to substantiate the same. As execution was otherwise proved, the finding of “not proved” on this issue is correct. 17. Therefore, the finding that the plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness is supported by evidence. 16. Forgery - Although the defendant alleged forgery, he produced no evidence to substantiate the same. As execution was otherwise proved, the finding of “not proved” on this issue is correct. 17. Entitlement to Specific Performance & Relief - Given the failure of the plaintiff to prove readiness and willingness, and considering the admissions regarding a prior loan transaction, the Trial Court rightly refused the discretionary relief of specific performance. The direction to refund the admitted outstanding amount of Rs. 4,25,000/– is equitable. 18. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having meticulously examined the pleadings, oral depositions, and documentary materials placed on record, this Court finds no reason to differ from the factual appreciation undertaken by the Trial Court. As regards the execution of the agreement to sell, the evidence of the plaintiff (PW-1) and the attesting witness (PW-2) sufficiently establishes that the defendant did sign the agreement dated 07.10.2011. The defendant’s plea that his signatures were obtained on blank papers during prior loan transactions remains unsupported by any credible evidence. The defence of forgery has not been substantiated by expert opinion or corroborating testimony. Accordingly, the finding that the agreement was executed stands affirmed. However, the crucial question does not revolve merely around execution, but around whether the plaintiff proved the payment of Rs. 10,00,000/– as advance consideration and whether he continuously remained ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. On these issues, the plaintiff’s evidence is substantially deficient. 19. In cross-examination, PW-1 admitted that he had earlier advanced a loan of Rs. 6,00,000/– to the defendant in 2010, out of which Rs. 1,75,000/– had been repaid and Rs. 4,25,000/– was still outstanding. He further admitted that he had not shown possession of Rs. 10,00,000/– in his income-tax returns or any financial record. These admissions cast serious doubt on the plaintiff’s assertion of having paid Rs. 10,00,000/– in cash as earnest money under the agreement. 20. The attesting witness PW-2, although affirming execution, admitted that he had no knowledge of the denominations or details of the alleged cash transaction. The plaintiff produced no bank documents, receipts, or contemporaneous proof indicating the availability or movement of such a substantial amount. The Trial Court, therefore, rightly concluded that the plaintiff had not proved payment of Rs. 20. The attesting witness PW-2, although affirming execution, admitted that he had no knowledge of the denominations or details of the alleged cash transaction. The plaintiff produced no bank documents, receipts, or contemporaneous proof indicating the availability or movement of such a substantial amount. The Trial Court, therefore, rightly concluded that the plaintiff had not proved payment of Rs. 10,00,000/– and that the only amount satisfactorily established and admitted by the defendant was Rs. 4,25,000/–. The next and most decisive factor relates to the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to perform his part as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 21. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sangita Sinha vs. Bhawana Bhardwaj and Others , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 723 has held as under : “ 17 . It is trite law that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ are not one but two separate elements. ‘Readiness’ means the capacity of the Respondent No. 1- buyer to perform the contract, which would include the financial position to pay the sale consideration. ‘Willingness’ refers to the intention of the Respondent No. 1-buyer as a purchaser to perform his part of the contract, which is inferred by scrutinising the conduct of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser, including attending circumstances. 18 . Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser from the date of execution of Agreement to Sell till the date of the decree, is a condition precedent for grant of relief of specific performance. This Court in various judicial pronouncements has held that it is not enough to show the readiness and willingness up to the date of the plaint as the conduct must be such as to disclose readiness and willingness at all times from the date of the contract and throughout the pendency of the suit up to the decree. A few of the said judgments are reproduced hereinbelow:- A. In Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, (1967) 1 SCR 227 , it has been held as under:— “6. But the respondent has claimed a decree for specific performance and it is for him to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail. But the respondent has claimed a decree for specific performance and it is for him to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43: “In a suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit.” The respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit….” (emphasis supplied) B. In Vijay Kumar v. Om Parkash, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1913, it has been held as under:— “6. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and the readiness and willingness has to be shown throughout and has to be established by the plaintiff….” (emphasis supplied) C. In J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, (2011) 1 SCC 429 , it has been held as under:— “27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. “Readiness and willingness” to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties.” (emphasis supplied) D. In Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) By LRs., (2005) 6 SCC 243 , it has been held as under:— “30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties, with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the plaintiff-respondents were all along and still are ready and willing to perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required under Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act must be determined having regard to the entire attending circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement made in the examination-in- chief would not suffice. The conduct of the plaintiff- respondents must be judged having regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the evidence brought on records.” (emphasis supplied) E. In Mehboob-Ur-Rehman (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. Ahsanul Ghani (supra), it has been held as under:— “16. Such a requirement, of necessary averment in the plaint, that he has already performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him being on the plaintiff, mere want of objection by the defendant in the written statement is hardly of any effect or consequence. The essential question to be addressed to by the Court in such a matter has always been as to whether, by taking the pleading and the evidence on record as a whole, the plaintiff has established that he has performed his part of the contract or has always been ready and willing to do so…” (emphasis supplied) F. In C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy (Dead) by Legal Representatives (supra), it has been held as under:— “16. The words “ready and willing” imply that the plaintiff was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract. 17. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115 ], it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available. 18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582 ], this Court has held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus : (SCC p. 584, para 5) “5. 18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582 ], this Court has held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus : (SCC p. 584, para 5) “5. … So far these being a plea that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading, we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready and willing in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now examining the first of the two circumstances, how could mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a circumstance about willingness or readiness of the plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have this property. It may be for such a desire this suit was filed raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said Act makes it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be proved.” (emphasis supplied) 19 . Consequently, the readiness and willingness of the buyer to go ahead with the sale of the property at the time of the institution of the suit loses its relevance, if the Respondent No. 1- buyer is unable to establish that the readiness and willingness has continued throughout the pendency of the suit.” 22. The law is well-settled through numerous decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that readiness and willingness must be established through consistent pleadings and cogent evidence, showing continuous preparedness from the date of agreement till the date of decree. A plaintiff cannot rely solely on oral assertions or issuance of legal notices to discharge this burden. In the present case, the plaintiff has failed to produce any documentary evidence, such as bank statements, income-tax returns, or proof of financial arrangements, demonstrating his ability to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 15,00,000/–. Despite alleging repeated reminders to the defendant, the plaintiff did not appear before the Sub-Registrar on the date when the defendant claims to have presented himself for execution of the sale deed. This conduct is inconsistent with the claim of readiness and willingness. 15,00,000/–. Despite alleging repeated reminders to the defendant, the plaintiff did not appear before the Sub-Registrar on the date when the defendant claims to have presented himself for execution of the sale deed. This conduct is inconsistent with the claim of readiness and willingness. 23. A careful reading of the agreement (Ex. P-1) further reveals that the obligations of both parties were reciprocal in nature, and that certain acts, such as obtaining permissions from the Raipur Development Authority and ensuring vacating of the tenant, were indeed to precede the plaintiff’s payment of the balance consideration. However, even assuming that some obligations were to be fulfilled by the defendant, the plaintiff was nonetheless required to demonstrate his ongoing financial capacity and genuine intention to perform his share. The complete absence of documentary proof of financial capability, combined with his own admissions of prior loan dealings and inability to explain possession of substantial cash, justifies the finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the mandatory requirement of Section 16(c). The Trial Court’s reasoning in this regard is comprehensive and well-supported by evidence. 24. It is equally pertinent to note that specific performance is no more an equitable and discretionary remedy. Even when execution of an agreement is proved, the Court must be satisfied that granting such relief would be fair, just, and reasonable in light of all surrounding circumstances. The plaintiff’s inconsistent conduct, absence of financial proof, failure to appear before the Registrar, and inability to substantiate payment of alleged earnest money cumulatively demonstrate that the equities in this case do not favour decreeing specific performance. On the contrary, the learned Trial Court, while refusing specific performance, has equitably ordered refund of Rs. 4,25,000/–, which both parties admitted remained outstanding. This relief is balanced, fair, and fully supported by the evidence. 25. In light of the foregoing analysis, this Court finds no perversity, illegality, or infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. The plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proving continuous readiness and willingness, which is the cornerstone of a claim for specific performance. The refusal of specific performance is, therefore, entirely justified. The direction for refund of Rs. 4,25,000/– is proper and calls for no interference. 26. Accordingly, the First Appeal stands dismissed as being devoid of merit. The plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proving continuous readiness and willingness, which is the cornerstone of a claim for specific performance. The refusal of specific performance is, therefore, entirely justified. The direction for refund of Rs. 4,25,000/– is proper and calls for no interference. 26. Accordingly, the First Appeal stands dismissed as being devoid of merit. The judgment and decree dated 27.03.2017 passed by the Fourth Additional District Judge, Raipur, in Civil Suit No. 83-A/2015 is hereby affirmed in its entirety. There shall be no order as to costs.