Page No.1 2025:CGHC:58232 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 1321 of 2025 ABC ... Applicant. versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Station House Officer, Police Station Dabhra, Distt- Sakti (C.G.) ---- Respondent For Applicant : Mr. Pawan Kumar Kashyap, Advocate For State/Respondent : Ms. Laxmeen Kashyap, PL. Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma Order On Board 01/12/2025 1. Challenge in this revision is to the order dated 10.10.2025, passed in Criminal Appeal No.141/2025 (Annexure A-1), whereby the appeal preferred by the applicant/juvenile against the order of Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Janjgir-Champa, dated 25.09.2025, has been dismissed, whereby the applicant has been denied bail. Page No.2 2. Brief facts of this case are that the applicant is having love affair with the victim. On 12.04.2025, applicant alongwith other co-accused person have committed forceful sexual intercourse with the minor victim and they have also taken her obscene videos and threatened her to viral the said videos. Based upon report lodged by victim/complainant, FIR was registered against the applicant/accused for offence punishable under Sections 65(1), 70(2), 61, 3(5) of BNS; Section 4 of POCSO Act & Section 67-B of the IT Act. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that the applicant has been falsely implicated in this case, no offence has been committed by him, medical report of victim has not supported the case of prosecution, applicant is minor, therefore, he may be enlarged on bail. 4. Learned State Counsel opposes the submission of counsel for applicant and submits that on 11.04.2025, applicant has forcefully tried to establish physical relationship with the victim whose videos has been taken by the co-accused persons; on 12.04.2025 applicant called the victim near Bandha Narva, Bhatapara Kataudh and established physical relationship with her and the co-accused persons who came with the applicant threatened her to viral the said videos and committed forceful sexual intercourse with her, they have Page No.3 again taken her obscene video. Hence, looking to the nature of offence, applicant may not be released on bail. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. Pursuant to order of this Court, victim and her father were appeared before this Court on 20.11.2025 and they raised objection in granting bail to the applicant. 7. Provision of Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (in short 'JJ Act 2015’) manifest that ordinarily, the Juvenile Justice Board is under obligation to release the juvenile on bail with or without surety. The juvenile shall not be released in certain circumstances as the latter part of the section also uses the word 'shall' imposing certain mandatory conditions prohibiting the release of the juvenile by the Juvenile Justice Board. If there are any reasonable grounds for believing; (a) that the release is likely to bring him into association with any known criminal; (b) that release is likely to expose him to moral, physical, or psychological danger and (c) that release of the juvenile is in conflict with law and would defeat the ends of justice, the gravity of the offence is not a relevant consideration for declining the bail to the juvenile. A juvenile can be denied the concession of bail if any of the three contingencies specified under Section 12(1) of the JJ Act Page No.4 2015 is available. 8. The term 'known criminal' has not been defined in "the Juvenile Justice Act" or Rules framed thereunder. 9. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that in the absence of any statutory definition of any term used in any particular statute the same must be assigned meaning as is commonly understood in the context of such statute as held by Supreme Court in Appasaheb Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 in para 11 as under: (SCC p. 726 para 11) "11......It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understand to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. [See: Union of India V. Garware Nylons Ltd., (1996) 10 SCC 413: AIR 1996 SC 3509 and Chemical and Fibers of India v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 664: AIR 1997 SC 558]..." 10. In proviso to Section 12 of JJ Act 2015, observed that "as regards the first exception, before it can be invoked to deny bail to a juvenile there must be a reasonable ground for believing that his release is likely to bring him into Page No.5 association with any known criminal. The expression known criminal is not without significance when the liberty of a juvenile is sought to be curtailed by employing the exception, the exception must be construed strictly. Therefore, before this exception is invoked, the prosecution must identify the 'known criminal', and then the court must have reasonable grounds to believe that the juvenile if released would associate with this 'known criminal'. It cannot be generally observed that the release of the juvenile would bring him into association with criminals without identifying the criminals and without returning a prima facie finding with regard to the nexus between the juvenile and such criminal." 11. There is no jurisdictional error, procedural irregularity, or legal infirmity in the impugned order. The trial court after considering the facts and circumstances of the present case as also the social investigation report, which reflects that there are reasonable grounds had dismissed the appeal. As per case diary, on 11.04.2025 applicant has forcefully tried to establish the physical relationship with victim whose videos has been taken by co-accused persons; on 12.04.2025 applicant called the victim near Bandha Narva, Bhatapara Kataudh and established physical relationship with her and co-accused persons who came with applicant Page No.6 threatened her to viral the said videos and committed forceful sexual intercourse with her, they have again taken her obscene video. The manner in which the incident of rape by the applicant alongwith co-accused has been committed, wherein role of the applicant is well established. 12. In the facts and circumstances of the instance case, as far as the challenge to the impugned order in the present revision is concerned, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned order, which is wholly impeccable. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court is of the considered view that no legal or factual error has been committed by the Court below in passing the impugned order. 13. Resultantly, this revision is found sans merit, fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge J.