- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL WRIT PETITION NO. 100148 OF 2022 (GM-CPC) BETWEEN SMT. SHAKILA W/O. AFSARKHAN PATHAN, AGE: 59 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD, R/O. #973, AYODHYA NAGAR, BELAGAVI, PIN-590006. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI. PRASHANT F. GOUDAR, ADVOCATE) AND SMT. POOJA W/O. SUNIL PATIL, AGE: 41 YEARS, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O. CCB 178, WARD NO.48, KOLHAPUR CIRCLE, BELAGAVI, PIN-590001. …RESPONDENT (BY SRI. VISHWANATH HEGDE, ADVOCATE) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI SETTING ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER 24.09.2021 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND CJM, BELAGAVI IN EP NO.80/2018 VIDE ANNEXURE-A AND ISSUE A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF DECLARATION DECLARING THAT THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING BEFORE PRINCIPAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND CJM, BELAGAVI IN EP NO.80/2018 IS ILLEGAL AND ETC. THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 11.09.2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: Digitally signed by CHANDRASHEKAR LAXMAN KATTIMANI Location: High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 CAV ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL) This petition is filed seeking for following reliefs: “1) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari setting aside the Impugned Order 24.09.2021 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Belagavi in EP No.80/2018 vide Annexure-A. 2) Issue a writ in the nature of declaration declaring that the proceedings pending before Principal Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Belagavi in EP No.80/2018 is illegal. 3) Issue any writ/direction/order of this Hon’ble Court deems necessary.” 2. Sri.Prashant F.Goudar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff for relief of specific performance was decreed on 30.03.2017 by directing the petitioner/defendant to execute registered sale deed in favour of respondent/plaintiff after receiving balance sale consideration amount of Rs.5,12,500/- within a period of six months from the date of judgment, failing which, the plaintiff is at liberty to get the sale deed registered as per law. It is submitted that the petitioner challenged the same before the Appellate Court and appeal came to be dismissed and second appeal in RSA No.100840/2018 filed before this Court also came to be dismissed. However, the - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 decree holder could not deposit or pay the balance consideration amount of Rs.5,12,500/- during the pendency of the appeal despite there being no stay. It is further submitted that the decree holder has deposited the amount in the executing proceedings without seeking any extension of time for deposit of amount and none of the aspects have been considered by the trial Court while rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Section 28(1) of the Specific Act, 1963. It is also submitted that the decree holder has failed to pay the balance sale consideration amount as per the decree within the stipulated time of six months. Therefore, the decree would become unenforceable. It is contended that, without seeking extension of time to deposit the amount, the execution proceedings are not maintainable and none of the aspects have been considered by the trial Court while dismissing the application for rescinding the contract. The non-payment of amount as per the decree and non-seeking of extension of time disentitles the respondent/plaintiff from execution of the decree. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PREM JEEVAN v. K.S.VENKATA - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 RAMANA AND ANOTHER1. Thus, he seeks to allow the petition by rescinding the contract. 3. Per contra, Sri.Vishwanath Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the respondent supports the impugned order of the trial Court and submits that as per the judgment and decree, the burden is on the petitioner/defendant to execute the sale deed by receiving the balance sale consideration amount within a period of six months. It is submitted that no time is stipulated for the defendant to pay the balance sale consideration amount. It is further submitted that the petitioner/judgment debtor has not sent notice nor made any demand for payment of balance sale consideration amount. Hence, there is no lapse on the part of the respondent/decree holder as per the decree and she has deposited balance sale consideration amount along with the execution petition. Thus, he seeks to dismiss the petition. 4. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondent, meticulously perused the material available on record. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions advanced. 1 (2017) 11 SCC 57 - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 5. The point that arises for consideration in this petition is whether the impugned order of the trial Court dated 24.09.2021 passed on an application in IA No.6 filed by the petitioner/judgment debtor under Section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 calls for any interference? 6. The above point is answered in the ‘negative’ for the following reasons: (a) The respondent filed OS No.36/2011 for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 19.07.2005 and supplementary agreement dated 09.01.2007. The petitioner filed OS No.48/2012 for declaration that the agreements of sale are invalid. The suit in OS No.36/2011 filed by the respondent was decreed and suit in OS No.48/2012 filed by the petitioner was dismissed vide common judgment and decree dated 30.03.2017. The operative portion of the judgment reads as under: “IN O.S. No.36/2011 The suit of plaintiff is hereby decreed with costs. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 The defendant is hereby directed to execute the registered sale deed by receiving consideration balance amount sale of Rs.5,12,500 /- in favour of plaintiff in property the respect of mentioned in the agreement of sale dated: 19.07.2005 followed by supplementary agreement dated: 09.01.2007 within six months from the date of this judgment, failing which the plaintiff is at liberty to get the sale deed registered as per law. The plaintiff is hereby directed to complete the construction within six months from the date of this judgment and execute the sale deed in terms of agreement of sale. The defendant and her agents, servants or anybody acting on her behalf are hereby restrained by way of perpetual injunction to alienate the property mentioned in the agreement 19.07.2005 of sale dated: followed by supplementary agreement dated: 09.01.2007. Draw decree accordingly. IN O.S. No.48/2012. The suit of plaintiff is hereby dismissed with costs. The original judgment shall be kept in O.S. No.36/2011 and copy of the judgment shall be kept in O.S. No.48/2012 (Dictated to the stenographer and transcribed by her, corrected by me and then signed and pronounced in the open court on this the 30th day of March, 2017” (b) The records indicate that the petitioner challenged the judgment and decree dated 30.03.2017 before the District and Sessions Judge, Belagavi. The regular appeal in RA No.165/2017 came to be dismissed vide - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 judgment and decree dated 07.09.2018. The petitioner challenged the same in RSA No.100840/2018. This Court vide order dated 07.06.2019 dismissed the regular second appeal. (c) The respondent/decree holder filed execution petition in EP No.80/2018 seeking to execute the judgment and decree dated 30.03.2017 in OS No.36/2011. It is to be noticed that the execution petition is filed on 27.04.2018 and along with the execution petition, the decree holder has deposited the balance sale consideration amount of Rs.5,12,500/- as per the decree. It is further noticed that the execution petition is filed during the pendency of RA No.165/2017. There is no dispute that there was no interim order of stay in the appeal proceedings. Perusal of the judgment and decree in OS No.36/2011 indicates that there is a direction to the petitioner/defendant to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the respondent/plaintiff by receiving the balance sale consideration amount of Rs.5,12,500/- as per the - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 agreement of sale dated 19.07.2005 and supplementary agreement dated 09.01.2007 within a period of six months from the date of judgment, failing which, the liberty was reserved to the respondent/plaintiff to get the sale deed registered as per law. The primary burden is on the petitioner/defendant to execute the sale deed within a period of six months. The petitioner/defendant has not contacted the respondent/plaintiff for execution of the sale deed making demand for payment of balance sale consideration amount, which clearly goes to show that there is a lapse on the part of the petitioner/defendant/judgment debtor. The records indicate that the petitioner/defendant was pursuing his remedies of appeal and the regular second appeal filed by the petitioner came to be dismissed on 07.06.2019. In other words, the judgment and decree in OS No.36/2011 dated 30.03.2011 merged in the decree of this Court in RSA No.100840/2018. Even from that date, if the time is calculated, then the decree holder can make the deposit of the balance amount within a period of six months. However, the respondent/decree - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 holder has deposited the balance sale consideration amount before the judgment in first appeal. (d) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ishwar (Since Deceased) thr. Lrs and others v. Bhim Singh and Another2 at para numbers 29 and 30 has held as under: “29. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant(s) that there was no proper prayer for condonation of delay in making the deposit of the balance consideration, or that there was no proper application for extension of time to make deposit, is unworthy of acceptance. Because, in the execution application itself, which was promptly filed after expiry of 60 days from the date of the appellate court decree, the decree holder had sought permission to make deposit. Not only that, the application filed after dismissal of second appeal also sought permission to make deposit. The prayer to extend the time to make deposit was therefore implicit in the prayer to permit the decree holder to make deposit of the balance consideration. In this view of the matter, we reject the submission of the appellants that as there was no proper application for extension of time to make deposit, the Court held no jurisdiction to extend the same. 30. In light of the discussion above and on an overall assessment of the facts, we are of the considered view that the respondents had all throughout shown their intention to pay the balance consideration for execution of the sale deed whereas the appellants appeared interested only in challenging the decree before higher Courts. In these circumstances, taking 2 2024 SCC ONLINE SC 2338 - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 note of all the events, the Execution Court justifiably exercised its discretion in favour of the decree- holder(s) by allowing them to deposit the balance consideration. In our view, therefore, substantial justice has been done to the parties and if we interfere with the impugned order only on the technical ground that the application was not dealt with as one on the original side, grave injustice would be caused to the decree holder(s). More so, when the judgment- debtor(s) themselves applied to the Execution Court for rescinding the contract under Section 28(1) of the 1963 Act, and raised no such jurisdictional issue either before the Execution Court or the High Court. Therefore, in our view, no interference with the impugned order is called for in exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.” (e) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (now Deceased) through its LRS and Others3 at para numbers 36 to 54 has held as under: 36. However, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court came to be challenged before the appellate court. Once the judgment passed by the trial court is challenged before the appellate court the judgment and order passed by the trial court would get merged with the judgment of the appellate court irrespective of the fact whether the appeal is allowed or dismissed. In the case on hand the appeal stood dismissed. 37. The law in the aforesaid context is well settled. The doctrine of merger is founded on the rationale that there cannot be more than one operative decree at a given point of time. The doctrine of merger applies irrespective of whether the appellate court has affirmed, modified or reversed the decree of the trial court. 3 2025 SCC ONLINE SC 584 - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 38. In Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359, while explaining the doctrine of merger, this Court held thus:— “12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way — whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.” 39. Further, while explaining the position that emerges on the grant of special leave to appeal by this Court, it was observed in Kunhayammed (supra) that:— “41. Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking one.” 40. The position of law as aforesaid has been affirmed and reiterated by a three-Judge Bench decision of this - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376. 41. The decision in Kunhayammed (supra) was followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724, which held thus:— “23. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of propriety in the hierarchy of the justice delivery system. The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. 24. It is trite that when an appellate court passes a decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court and even if and subject to any modification that may be made in the appellate decree, the decree of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the trial court. In other words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellate court affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the trial court.” 42. The decision in Chandi Prasad (supra) was followed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Shanthi v. T.D. Vishwanathan, (2019) 11 SCC 419 rendered on 24-10-2018 in the following terms:— “7. … When an appeal is prescribed under a statute and the appellate forum is invoked and entertained, for all intents and purposes, the suit continues. When a higher forum entertains an appeal and passes an order on merit, the doctrine of merger would apply. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of the propriety in the hierarchy of the justice delivery system. The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time.” (Emphasis supplied) 43. The doctrine of merger operates as a principle upon a judgment being rendered by the appellate court. In the present case, once the appellate court affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court, there was evidently a merger of the judgment of the trial court with the decision of the appellate court. Once the appellate court renders its judgment, it is the decree of the appellate court which becomes executable. 44. The decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree. Both the parties have reciprocal rights and obligations flowing out of the decree. The decree may fix the time limit for performance and in some cases may also provide for the consequence for non-performance within the time limit or the decree may even be silent on this aspect. 45. The decree enforces specific performance of the contract. The contract between the parties is thus not extinguished by passing of a decree for specific performance and it subsists despite the decree. Section 28 (1) of the Act, makes it clear that the Court does not become a functus officio after the grant of the decree for specific performance and it retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree till the sale deed is executed. 46. The Court has been conferred with the power to extend the time to pay the amount and while taking into consideration the delay that is sought to be condoned by the plaintiff, the Court does not adjudge the same like an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, where each day's delay must be explained. The Court is given the discretion to extend the time and the provision therefore seeks to provide complete relief to both the parties in terms of the decree for specific performance. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 47. The power and jurisdiction granted under Section 28 (1) of the Act, enables the Court to extend the period for payment of the purchase money if it has not been paid within the period allowed by the decree. It also enables the judgment debtor to seek for rescinding the contract for non-compliance of the directions given in the decree and while considering this application, the Court is given the discretion to rescind the contract or in an appropriate case to even extend the time for paying the purchase money. 48. It should also be borne in mind that appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and the power of the Court to extend the time for depositing the amount can be exercised even in the appellate stage by the Court. 49. In the considered view of this Court, the Appellate Court, after deciding the appeal on merits, could have called upon the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration by fixing a time limit. This would have at least given an opportunity to the plaintiff to fulfil his obligation. The non-payment of the balance sale consideration within the time period fixed by the Trial Court does not amount to abandonment of the contract and consequent rescinding of the same. The real test must be to see if the conduct of the plaintiff will amount to a positive refusal to complete his part of the contract. There must be an element of wilful negligence on the part of the plaintiff before a Court proceeds to invoke Section 28 of the Act and rescind the contract. (See : Krishnamoorthy v. Shanmugasundaram, 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 963) 50. This litigation is an eye-opener for the appellate courts reminding that they owe a duty to comply with the provisions of Order XX Rule 12A of the CPC. Where an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify time to deposit the balance sale consideration. It is too much to say that since the trial court had granted two months time to the decree holder to deposit the balance sale consideration the - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 same time period would apply even to the decree that may be drawn by the appellate court. What is executable is the decree passed by the appellate court. The appellate court owes a duty to specify the time period. If during the specified time period the decree holder is not in a position to deposit the balance sale consideration or, in other words, fails to deposit the balance sale consideration and later upon expiry of the specified time period seeks permission to deposit, then it would be within the discretion of the trial court to grant further time to deposit the balance sale consideration or decline. This discretion has to be exercised judiciously keeping in mind various factors like bona fide of the decree holder, the cause for failure to deposit the balance sale consideration in time, the length of delay and also the equities that might have been created during the interregnum period in favour of the judgment debtor. It is the cumulative effect and considerations of such factors that should weigh with the court concerned while permitting the decree holder to deposit the balance sale consideration beyond the time period that might have been prescribed by the trial court in its final decree. 51. In the case on hand, undoubtedly, there was a delay on the part of the decree holder in filing the execution petition and thereby seeking permission to deposit the balance sale consideration. Just because a decree of specific performance can be executed within 12 years from the date of original decree or from the date the appellate court affirms such decree that, by itself, does not mean that a decree holder deposits the balance sale consideration at his own sweet will. 52. If the appellate court had failed to stipulate any particular time period then it is expected of the decree holder to deposit the same within a reasonable period of time. 53. As noted earlier, the balance sale consideration of Rs. 4,87,000/- came to be deposited by the decree holder way back in 2019. In the overall facts and circumstances of the case we have reached the - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 conclusion that High Court should not have interfered with the order passed by the executing court. 54. In Ramankutty Guptan (supra) this Court while holding that the application for extension of time for payment of balance amount of consideration can be filed in the Court of the first instance as well as in the appellate court, observed that. “It is to be seen that the procedure is hand-maid for justice and unless the procedure touches upon jurisdictional issue, it should be moulded to subserve substantial justice. Therefore, technicalities would not stand in the way to subserve substantive justice” (f) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of BALBIR SINGH AND ANOTHER Vs. BALDEV SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS4 at para numbers 24 to 27 has held as under: “24. The present section corresponds to Section 35(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (hereinafter referred to as “the repealed Act”) under which it was open to the vendor or lessor in the circumstances mentioned in that section to bring a separate suit for rescission; but this section goes further and gives to the vendor or lessor the right to seek rescission in the same suit, when after the suit for specific performance is decreed the plaintiff fails to pay the purchase money within the period fixed. The present section, therefore, seeks to provide complete relief to both the parties in terms of a decree for specific performance in the same suit without requiring one of the parties to initiate separate proceedings. The object is to avoid multiplicity of suits. Likewise, under the present provision where the purchaser or lessee has paid the money, he is entitled 4 (2025) 3 SCC 543 - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 in the suit for specific performance to the reliefs as indicated in sub-section (3) like, partition, possession, etc. A suit for specific performance does not come to an end on passing of a decree and the court which has passed the decree for specific performance retains the control over the decree even after the decree has been passed. 25. The decree for specific performance has been described as a preliminary decree. The power under Section 28 of the Act is discretionary and the court cannot ordinarily annul the decree once passed by it. Although the power to annul the decree exists yet Section 28 of the Act provides for complete relief to both the parties in terms of the decree. The court does not cease to have the power to extend the time even though the trial court had earlier directed in the decree that payment of balance price to be made by certain date and on failure the suit to stand dismissed. The power exercisable under this section is discretionary. [See : Chanda v. Rattni [Chanda v. Rattni, (2007) 14 SCC 26] 26. As stated above upon the decision of the High Court in the second appeals filed by the plaintiffs (decree-holders) there was a merger of the judgment of the trial court with the decision which was rendered by the High Court in the second appeals. Consequent upon the passing of the decree of the second appellate court, the decree of the trial court merges with that of the same. 27. The doctrine of merger is founded on the rationale that there cannot be more than one operative decree at a given point of time. The doctrine of merger applies irrespective of whether the appellate court has affirmed, modified or reversed the decree of the trial court. The doctrine has been discussed and explained succinctly by this Court in Surinder Pal Soni v. Sohan Lal [Surinder Pal Soni v. Sohan Lal, (2020) 15 SCC 771].” - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 (g) Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, it is clear that non-payment of the balance sale consideration within the time period fixed by the Trial court does not amount to abandonment of the contract and consequent rescinding of the same. The real test would be to see if the conduct of the plaintiff amounts to positive refusal to complete his part of the contract and whether there is any wilful negligence on the part of the plaintiff before invoking Section 28 of the Act and rescinding the contract. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also makes it clear that a decree for specific performance, when appealed, merges with the decree of the Appellate court despite the modification or affirmation to the original decree. It is further the duty of the Appellate court that when an appeal is filed against a decree passed by the trial Court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify the time to deposit the balance sale consideration. However, if the appellate court fails to stipulate any particular time period then it is expected of the decree - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 holder to deposit the same within a reasonable period of time. (h) In the instant case, the respondent/decree holder has deposited the balance sale consideration amount of Rs.5,12,500/- along with filing the Execution proceedings on 27.04.2018. I am of the considered view that the conduct of the respondent/decree holder was neither amounting to positive refusal to fulfil his part of the contract nor wilful negligence. Moreover, with regard to the time period for making the payment of balance sale consideration, it is observed that the Execution petition was filed along with the deposit of the balance sale consideration before the disposal of RA No.165/2017 and RSA No.100840/2018. Furthermore, the decree of the trial Court was subsequently re- affirmed by the first as well as the second Appellate Court. Therefore, in my considered view, the deposit of the balance sale consideration was well within a reasonable period of time as it was made even before the passing of the Appellate decrees. Hence, the finding - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:12581 WP No. 100148 of 2022 of the Trial Court that there was no ground made out by the appellant-judgment debtor to allow the recession of contract under Section 28 of the Act is neither perverse nor opposed to the settled position of law calling for interference in this present writ petition. 7. For the aforementioned reasons, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER The writ petition is devoid of merits and the same is rejected. Sd/- (VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL) JUDGE RH CT-AN List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1