1 2025:CGHC:59458 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 3706 of 2025 Surendra Sinha S/o Shri Salik Ram Sinha Aged About 27 Years R/o 57 Near Durga Mandir, Banspara, P.S. Arjuni, District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through, P.S. Arjuni, District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. R.S. Patel, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Ms. Pragya Shrivastava, Dy. G.A. Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma Order on Board 08/12/2025 1. With the consent of the parties, the present matter is heard finally. 2. The present petition is filed by the petitioner under section 528 of 2 BNSS, 2023 being aggrieved by the order dated 11.11.2025 in Special Sessions Case No. 20/2023 passed by the Special Judge (SC&ST) Act Dhamtari (C.G.) whereby the trial court has wrongly closed the statutory right of the petitioner of cross-examination under Section 142-143 of the BSA, 2023. 3. Brief facts of the case is that the period of alleged incident is from 15/11/2022 to 15/02/2023, whereas the Prosecutrix lodged the F.l.R on 01/07/2023, which is delay is about 6 - 7 month. Wherein she stated that she is a married woman, who had been deserted by her husband and was residing with her parents, during which she came in to the contact of the applicant. Further stated that both of them have acquaintance gradually develop in to a close relationship, by which applicant started visiting her house frequently, and on the assurance of the marriage applicant develop a physical relations with the prosecutrix near about 3months after which prosecutrix asked him to marry her but the applicant sternly rebuked her and married with another woman. Thereafter P.S Arjuni Distt. Dhamtari has registered the offence u/s 417,376 and 506 of Barcla Ney Sahid at crime no. 212/2023 against applicant. Copy of F.I.R dated 01.07.2023 is being filed herewith as Annexure P/2. On 11.11.2025, the date fixed for cross examination of the prosecutrix, the petitioner counsel submitted request for withdrawal of his Power, as the petitioner intended to engage another counsel for effective Defence. The withdrawal was bona fide and never meant to avoid, delay or refuse cross- examination. However, the Trial Court treated the withdrawal as an expression of inability to cross-examine and, without granting any reasonable time to the petitioner to appoint new counsel, proceeded to close the opportunity of cross-examination. It is evident from the order that no deliberate default, negligence, or obstruction was attributable by the petitioner. Rather, the circumstances were created due to counsel's withdrawal. Despite repeated requests, the Trial Court did not provide even a short 3 adjournment. Closing such an essential right has caused grave prejudice to the Defence, particularly when cross-examination is a vital component of a fair trial under Sections 142-143 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner never intended to give up his right of cross-examination and was always ready and willing to proceed with the trial through newly engaged counsel. cross-examination is a statutory right under Sections 142-143 of the Indian Evidence Act and a procedural right under Sections 254 BNSS, and the Trial Court has infringed such essential right without granting any reasonable time. the denial of cross-examination causes serious prejudice to the Defence and violates the petitioner's right to fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The newly appointed counsel of the petitioner is ready and willing to cross-examine the Prosecutrix on the next date fixed by the Trial Court and undertakes not to seek any unnecessary adjournment. During the prosecution evidence, the very important and necessary questions were not asked by the defense side to the prosecutrix by the earlier counsel due to which the decision of the said case may be adversely affected. Due to the impugned order, the petitioner has suffered grave prejudice, and denial of such opportunity amounts to denial of fair trial. 5. Learned Counsel for the State vehemently opposes the contentions of the counsel for the petitioner. 6. Heard learned counsels for the respective parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 7. From a perusal of the impugned order sheet, it is evident that the prosecutrix was present before the Trial Court and her cross- examination had commenced. During the course of proceedings, the learned counsel for the accused expressed his inability to continue the cross-examination on account of personal difficulty 4 and sought time. Though the Trial Court has observed that such request was oral and was declined, it is equally clear that no finding has been recorded that the conduct of the accused was wilful, deliberate, or intended to protract the trial. 8. It is also apparent that the cross-examination had already begun and was not at the initial stage. Closure of cross-examination is a serious matter, as it directly affects the valuable right of defence of the accused. Such power is required to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances, where persistent and contumacious conduct of the party is clearly established. 9. In the present case, the impugned order does not reflect that sufficient and reasonable opportunity was consciously and deliberately misused by the accused. Mere inability of the counsel to proceed further on the same day, without recording any finding of abuse of process or intentional delay, cannot justify denial of the statutory right of cross-examination. The Trial Court appears to have proceeded on presumption rather than recording concrete reasons demonstrating prejudice to the prosecution or harassment to the witness. 10. It is well settled that denial of opportunity of cross-examination causes serious prejudice and may vitiate the trial itself. The ends of justice would be better served by affording one effective opportunity to the accused to complete the cross-examination, subject to appropriate safeguards. 11. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed at the cost of Rs. 3000/- which shall be payable to the victim and one last opportunity is granted to the petitioner to cross-examine the victim and the impugned order dated 11.11.2025 is hereby set-aside. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) JUDGE Madhurima