- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R. KRISHNA KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO. 100429 OF 2014 (S-RES) BETWEEN: SRI. MALLAYYA MATHAPATI S/O. PARAVAYYA MATHAPATI, AGE: 46 YEARS R/O. AT POST: HONAPUR (PRABHUNAGAR), TQ: DHARWAD, DIST: DHARWAD. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. J.S.SHETTY, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE SCIENCES KRISHINAGAR, DHARWAD-580005, BY ITS REGISTRAR. 2. THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES, KRISHNINAGAR, DHARWAD-580005. 3. DEAN (AGRICULTURE) AND CHAIRMAN OF THE ENQUIRY COMMITTEE, UNIVERISTY OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES, Digitally signed by SAMREEN AYUB DESHNUR Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 KRISHINAGAR, DHARWAD. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. RAMACHANDRA A.MALI, ADVOCATE) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECT THE RESPONDENTS TO REINSTATE THE PETITIONER IN THE POST OF FARM LABOURER HELD BY HIM IN ARS PRABHUNAGAR BY CANCELING THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION AND ALSO TO RELEASE ALL THE MONETARY BENEFITS BY CONSIDERING THE REPRESENTATIONS DATED 22.02.2010, 23.07.2010, 11.02.2011 AND 03.06.2011, MADE BY THE PETITIONER, THE COPIES OF WHICH HAVE BEEN PRODUCED HEREWITH AND MARKED AS ANNEXURE-G, ANNEXURE-L, ANNEXURE-R AND ANNEXURE-S AND QUASH THE ENQUIRY REPORT NO.DEEN(KRU)/ KRI.MA.V.DA/D.REP/10-11 AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE THIRD RESPONDENT, DATED 24.01.2011, MADE BY THE THIRD RESPONDENT, THE COPY OF WHICH HAS BEEN PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-Q AND ETC. THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN ‘B’ GROUP THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 ORAL ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R. KRISHNA KUMAR) In this petition, petitioner seeks the following reliefs: “Therefore the petitioners pray for: a) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in the post of Farm Labourer held by him in ARS Prabhunagar by cancelling the order of suspension and also to release all the monetary benefits by considering the representations dated 22.02.2010, 23.07.2010, 11.02.2011 and 03.06.2011, made by the petitioner, the copies of which have been produced herewith and marked as Annexure G, Annexure L, Annexure R and Annexure S. b) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ or direction to quash the Enquiry report No.Deen (Kru)/Kri.Ma.V.Da/D.Rep/10-11 and recommendation of the third respondent, dated 24.01.2011, made by the third respondent, the copy of which has been produced at Annexure Q. c) Issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order No.AaKa/SiSha-5/Aa.Ma.Kra/517.B/11-12 dated 25.05.2011 by the second respondent- Administrative Officer, the copy of which has - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 been produced herewith and marked as Annexure-S. d) Any other writ or direction which this Hon’ble court deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the case, may kindly be granted in favour of the petitioners by allowed this writ petition, with cost through out, in the ends of justice and equity.” 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondents-University and perused the material on record. 3. The petitioner was working as a Farm Labourer in the respondent-University. On 14.01.2006, he was arrested pursuant to a FIR in Crime No.09/2006 for alleged offences punishable under Sections 302, 452, 504 and 506 read with Section 134 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). In the said proceedings, one Sangayya arrayed as accused No.1 and the petitioner – Mallayya was arrayed as accused No.2. It is a matter of record and undisputed fact that the petitioner was arrested on 14.01.2006 and was in judicial custody during the pendency of the proceedings in - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 SC No.63/2006 before the Sessions Court. By judgment and order dated 29.08.2007, the Sessions Court convicted the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 34 of IPC. Meanwhile, the petitioner was kept under suspension pending enquiry with effect from 23.02.2006. Aggrieved by the said judgment dated 29.08.2007passed by the Sessions Court in SC No.63/2006, the petitioner/accused No.2 approached this Court in Criminal Appeal No.1794/2007, which was allowed and disposed of by this Court vide final order dated 09.12.2009. The said final order at Annexure-E is reads as hereunder; “The material facts of the prosecution case disclose that one Shankarayya (deceased) was in love with one Manjula-CW.15. The appellant No.1(A.1), appellant No.2(A.2) are the brothers and CW. 15 is the daughter of A.2 who was running a grocery shop in the village. The deceased was visiting the shop and fell in love with CW15. A proposal was made by the accused to marry CW15. The accused were not willing for the proposal. The CW.15 informed the deceased that she is not willing to marry. The deceased felt frustrated, attempted to commit suicide by consuming sleeping pills. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 In that regard he was admitted to hospital and successfully treated. 2) The deceased after discharge from the hospital was telling the people that since CW.15 refused to marry he attempted to commit suicide. The A.1 and A.2 did not like the conduct of the deceased giving publicity of his love to the people. On 14-01-2006 at 07- 00 a.m., the A.1 and A.2 accosted the deceased. A2 abused the deceased and assaulted him. The A.1 who had concealed a knife at his waist took out and stabbed twice on the chest of the deceased. The A.2 advised the A.1 to run away from the scene. One Kashavva-PW3- mother of the deceased is an eyewitness to the incident and has lodged a complaint at Ex.P.6. The police conducted inquest and subjected the dead body to P.M. The autopsy report discloses that the death is due to hemorrhage and shock on account of injury to heart and lung. The death is homicidal death. The accused are charged for committing offence U/S.302, 452, 504, 506 r/w Sec.34 IPC. The charge U/S.452, 506 504 IPC are redundant and unnecessary. 3) The PW.3 has testified to the incident of assault by A.1 and A.2 in the manner stated in FIR. The PW.4 the brother of the deceased is also a witness to the incident and he testified to the incriminating acts of the accused and assault on the deceased by them. The PW.5 and PW.7 are the witnesses who come to the scene immediately after the incident and noticed the presence - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 of A.2 at the scene and A.1 running away from the scene. The said witnesses also testify to the motive. The Trial Court convicted the A1 and A2 for the above offences. The accused are in appeal. 4) The evidence of PW.3, PW4, PW5 and PW7 with regard to the incident is credible. There is nothing to disbelieve their veracity. In that view their evidence clinchingly establish the incident. However with regard to nature of offence and guilt of each of the accused we find that the finding of the Trial Court is bad in law. 5) It is evident from the prosecution version that the deceased was frustrated by love failure, attempted to commit suicide and he was making it public to the people that he committed suicide because of love failure. The accused persons found that such publicity would damage reputation of their family and the marriage prospects of CW.15. Therefore in order to prevent the deceased from making such publicity they go and accost him. There is no evidence to suggest common intention on the part of the A.1 and A.2 to cause murder. In the course of the transaction A.2 assaults the deceased with hand. The A.1 who had concealed the knife in the waist belt, takes up and stabs on the chest. The A.2 felt perplexed by the act and advised A1 to run away. The above conduct of the accused and the manner of assault suggest that there was no - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 common intention of causing death on the part of both the accused. The acts of A.1 und A.2 are to be judged individually and separately. 6) The A.1 and A.2 were offended by the conduct of the deceased in giving publicity of his love failure and they apprehended that it would damage reputation of their family and marriage prospects of CW.15. The said conduct of deceased constitutes a provocative factor to commit the offence. In that view of the matter Exception-1 of Sec.300 would attract the facts of the case. Under the circumstances the conviction of A1 U/s. 302 IPC is set aside. A1 is convicted U/s.304 Part-I IPC and sentenced to R.1. for a period of 6 years and to pay fine of Rs.50000/- in default to suffer S.I. for a period of 4 years. 7) The A.2 is convicted U/s.323 IPC for assaulting the deceased and sentenced, to undergo R.1. for a period of 3 months and to pay compensation of Rs.50,000/- to PW3. The entire fine levied on A1 shall be paid as compensation to the PW.3. The accused are entitled to benefit of set off U/s.428 Cr.P.C. In the event A.2 has served the sentence and deposit the compensation amount he - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 should be set fee forthwith if not required to be detained in any other case.” 4. As can be seen from the aforesaid order passed by this Court, the conviction of the petitioner/accused No.2 was modified by convicting him only for the offences punishable under Section 323 of IPC and acquitting him for the remaining offences. In fact, this Court has also specifically stated that in the event the petitioner/accused No.2 had already served the sentence and deposits the compensation amount, he should be set free forthwith. Accordingly, pursuant to the order dated 09.12.2009, the petitioner was set at liberty/free and released from judicial custody. Immediately, upon his release from judicial custody in January-2010, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 22.02.2010, requesting the respondent No.2 to revoke the suspension order and permit the petitioner to continue in service. However, since enquiry proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, the respondent No.2 did not revoke the suspension order and - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 instead directed the respondent No.1 to conduct an enquiry by appointing an enquiry committee. Accordingly, the enquiry committee conducted enquiry and submitted a report dated 24.01.2011 holding that the charges against the petitioner were proved on the ground that the petitioner had been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC, which was admitted by him during the course of enquiry and as a result of said conviction, the charges of misconduct levelled against him were proved and recommended imposition of major penalty of dismissal. 5. The petitioner subsequently submitted representations dated 11.02.2011 and 03.06.2011, requesting them to revoke the suspension, which were not considered by the respondents and as such, the petitioner initially approached the Court seeking quashing of the enquiry report and recommendation as well as for a direction to consider his representations. 6. During the pendency of the present petition, the order sheet discloses that on 10.07.2017, the learned - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 counsel for the respondents made a submission that the final order had already been passed in the year 2011 dismissing the petitioner from service and the learned counsel for the respondents was directed to file the said order after having served a copy of the same on the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, after receiving the order dated 25.05.2011 at Annexure-S, the petitioner filed an application in IA No.01/2020 dated 19.07.2017, under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, seeking permission to amend the petition by incorporating a prayer to challenge the dismissal order at Annexure-S, along with necessary pleadings in this regard. 8. The said application has been opposed by the respondents-University. 9. This Court passed a detailed order on I.A. No.1/2020. The said order dated 24.06.2022, is reads as under; - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 “Heard learned counsel for petitioner as well as learned counsel for respondents No.1 to 3. Registry is directed to show the name of Sri Ramachandra A. Mali, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 & 2 as counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.3 also. ORDER ON IA NO.1/2020 This application is filed by the petitioner seeking amendment to the writ petition. The writ petition came to be filed by the petitioner for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in the post of Farm Labour in ARS, Prabhunagar by canceling the order of suspension and to release the monitory benefits by considering the representation made by the petitioner. The writ petition came to be filed on 16.01.2014. It is the case of the petitioner that despite several representations no action has been taken by the respondents on the enquiry report and the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer by exceeding his authority directed the respondent No.2 – Administrative Officer of the University to dismiss the petitioner from service and also treat the suspension period of the petitioner till his dismissal as the period of suspension and - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 not to take said period of suspension, for any of the service benefits. Petitioner clams that such a recommendation made by the Inquiry Officer is illegal and without any authority of law. Learned counsel for petitioner contends that the mater was listed before this Court on 10.07.2017 and he came to know pursuant to the submission made by the learned counsel for respondents that the University had already passed an order on 25.05.2011 dismissing the petitioner from service, which according to him was never communicated and informed and he was not aware of the said dismissal order. He further submits that in view of such information of dismissal of the petitioner from service, he has filed the present application to amend the writ petition to include one paragraph as Para-8(a) and include certain grounds as Para-20(a) and also in prayer column include prayer-(c) as stated in the amendment application. By virtue of this amendment petitioner is seeking for quashing of the order dated 25.05.2011 issued by respondent No.2, which is produced as Annexure-S along with this application. Learned counsel for respondents has filed detailed objections to the said application and contends that the application is devoid of - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 merits, barred by law of limitation and the same is liable to be out rightly dismissed. It is the vociferous contention of the learned counsel for respondents that the order of dismissal passed on 25.05.2011, which is claimed to be not served and communicated to the petitioner is fictitious and imaginary for the reason that petitioner himself has given a representation dated 26.03.2012 after his dismissal from service thereby requesting the University to reinstate him in service and now he claims that he was not communicated with the order of the dismissal, which is farfetched and cannot be sustained in the eye of law and even under the facts and circumstances of the case. It is also contended by the learned counsel for respondents that there is an appeal remedy available under the Statute, if at all petitioner is aggrieved he is entitled to challenge the order of dismissal and he will have to approach the Appellate Authority as contemplated under the Act. Therefore, the present writ petition even otherwise would not be maintainable in the eye of law. Learned counsel for respondents brings to the notice of this Court the appeal provisions available under the Statute as provided under UAS Act, 1963 and Rules made thereunder by the University. Learned counsel for respondents - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 further contends that the Board is the authority before whom the petitioner would have to seek redressal and not before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Per contra, learned counsel for petitioner by way of reply submits that his Appointing Authority is the Vice-Chancellor of the University, whereas the impugned order communicated to him is by the Administrative Officer vide Annexure-S, which has been recommended by the Board. Therefore, the question of petitioner going again before the Board against the order of dismissal dated 25.05.2011 does not arise, in view of the fact that there is no proper remedy of appeal under the Statute. Learned counsel for petitioner further contends that he is left with no other alternative to approach this Court by filing this application for amendments. Having heard the learned counsel for petitioner and learned counsel for respondents and having perused the Statute of the Board referred to by both the parties and the fact, the Board, which is admittedly the Appointing Authority of petitioner; Vice-Chancellor is the Chairman of the Board, the Board has recommended the dismissal of petitioner, which is communicated by the Administrative Officer to the petitioner vide Annexure-S. Therefore, in - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 my opinion, petitioner cannot be relegated to go back to the Board for redressal of challenging the dismissal order. Hence, the application as sought for by the petitioner deserves to be allowed for him to be directed to make him necessary amendment to seek reliefs as sought in the application. Accordingly, I pass the following order: ORDER Application seeking amendment under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC is allowed. Petitioner is permitted to amend the writ petition by incorporating the additional paragraphs in the body of the writ petition as Para-8(a) and grounds as Para-20(a) and prayer at (c). However, it is made clear that merely because this application of amendment is allowed, this Court has not expressed any opinion with regard to merits of the matter and maintainability of the writ petition itself and the same are kept open for adjudication. Learned counsel for petitioner to carry out amendment and furnish fresh amended petition after serving the same on the learned counsel for respondents.” - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 10. The aforesaid order dated 24.06.2022 passed by this Court allowing IA No.1/2020, has attains finality and become conclusive and binding upon the respondents who subsequently filed their statement of objections to the main petition. 11. In this context, it is well settled that unless specified otherwise, any amendment would relate back to the date of original petition and in the instant case, since the dismissal order was passed much prior to the present petition being offered, the effect of allowing IA No.1/2020 on 24.06.2022, without any condition would be that the amendment would relied back to the date on which the petitioner filed the present petition i.e., on 16.01.2014. 12. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was convicted only for the offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC and the major penalty/punishment of dismissal from service was grossly/wholly - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 disproportionate to the order of conviction passed against the petitioner particularly when the said conviction had nothing to do and no nexus or connection whatsoever with his employment. 12.1. Secondly, he contended that the conviction of the petitioner under Section 323 of IPC could not be construed as the petitioner being guilty of moral turpitude so as to attract the major penalty/punishment of dismissal. 12.2. Lastly, it is contended that a mere conviction of the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC cannot be a disqualification from being continued in service in view of the Rules governing that the petitioner who was a direct recruit and the impugned order imposing the major penalty of dismissal deserves to be set aside on this ground also. 13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents- University would submit that in view of the conviction of the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC, the respondent-University was fully justified in - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 dismissing the petitioner from service. It was also contended that the conduct of the petitioner in being charged and convicted for offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC was clearly unbecoming of a Government servant and thereby his dismissal from service was fully justified by the respondents. 14. It was also contended that by virtue of Rule 14 of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules), 1957, a disciplinary authority would be entitled to pass such orders including imposition of major penalty/punishment upon the petitioner and as such, there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 15. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that while modifying the judgment of the Sessions Court, this Court has convicted the petitioner only for the offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC, which reads as under; “323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.— Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.” 16. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision will clearly indicate that the maximum punishment permissible to be imposed for offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC was one year or with fine, which would extend only to Rs.1,000/- or with both. 17. The petitioner having already been in judicial custody for more than one year, immediately upon this Court acquitting the petitioner for offence punishable under 302 of IPC, the petitioner was released from judicial custody. 18. The material on record clearly establishes that the offence under Section 323 of IPC for which the petitioner was convicted had no nexus/connection whatsoever to his employment or service. Similarly, merely because the petitioner was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC, it cannot be said that - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 the petitioner was guilty of misconduct involving moral turpitude as held by the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India and Others Vs. P. Soupramaniane1, as hereunder: “8. Though we do not agree with the reasons given by the High Court for setting aside the order of discharge of the respondent from service, it is necessary to examine whether Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act is applicable to the facts of the case. Conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude disqualifies a person from continuing in service in a bank. The conundrum that arises in this case is whether the conviction of the respondent under Section 324 IPC can be said to be for an offence involving moral turpitude. 9. “Moral Turpitude” as defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) is as follows: “Moral Turpitude.—The act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in the private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.” “implies something immoral in itself regardless of it being punishable by law”; “restricted to the gravest offences, consisting of felonies, infamous crimes, and those that are malum in se and disclose a depraved mind.” 1 2019 (8) SCC 135 - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 10. According to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, “Moral Turpitude” is: “An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.” 11. Burton Legal Thesaurus defines “Moral Turpitude” as: “Bad faith, bad repute, corruption, defilement, delinquency, discredit, dishonour, shame, guilt, knavery, misdoing, perversion, shame, vice, wrong.” 12. There is no doubt that there is an obligation on the management of the Bank to discontinue the services of an employee who has been convicted by a criminal court for an offence involving moral turpitude. Though every offence is a crime against the society, discontinuance from service according to the Banking Regulation Act can be only for committing an offence involving moral turpitude. Acts which disclose depravity and wickedness of character can be categorised as offences involving moral turpitude. Whether an offence involves moral turpitude or not depends upon the facts and the circumstances of the case. 13. Ordinarily, the tests that can be applied for judging an offence involving moral turpitude are: (a) Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience or society in general; (b) Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one, and - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 (c) Whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrators could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society. 14. The other important factors that are to be kept in mind to conclude that an offence involves moral turpitude are : the person who commits the offence; the person against whom it is committed; the manner and circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed; and the values of the society. 15. According to the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), a crime data collection system used in the United States of America, each offence belongs to one of the three categories which are : crimes against persons, crimes against property, and crimes against society. Crimes against persons include murder, rape, and assault where the victims are always individuals. The object of crimes against property, for example, robbery and burglary is to obtain money, property, or some other benefits. Crimes against society, for example, gambling, prostitution, and drug violations, represent society's prohibition against engaging in certain types of activities. Conviction of any alien of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law in the United States of America. To qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude for such purpose, it requires both reprehensible conduct and scienter, whether with specific intent, deliberateness, wilfulness or recklessness. - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 16. There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences which can straightaway be termed as involving moral turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, the NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises for our consideration in this case is whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorised as a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorised as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the respondent to cause the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the crime committed by the respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged from service.” 19. In the aforesaid case, before the Hon’ble Apex Court, the person was dismissed from service on the ground that his misconduct involved moral turpitude and though he was charged for the offence of attempt to murder under - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 Section 307 of IPC, he was ultimately convicted for the offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC only. 20. In the instant case also, though the petitioner was initially convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, this Court modified the conviction and convicted him only for the offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC and consequently, it cannot be said that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct involving moral turpitude, so as to attract a major penalty of dismissal from the service. 21. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the petitioner was convicted in relation to a private dispute involving his family members. It is therefore, clear that the imposition of the major penalty/punishment of dismissal is wholly/grossly/shockingly disproportionate to the nature of offence for which the petitioner was convicted, especially when the maximum punishment under Section 323 of IPC is one year or fine of Rs.1,000/- or both. - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 22. Under these circumstances, applying the doctrine/principles of proportionality, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the respondent No.2 dismissing the petitioner from service vide Annexure-S dated 25.05.2011, is illegal and arbitrary warranting interference by this Court in the present petition. 23. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order at Annexure-S dated 25.05.2011, deserves to be set aside and the petitioner be reinstated into service. 24. The next question that would arise for consideration is with regard to grant of consequential benefits to the petitioner upon reinstatement into service. In this context, it is pertinent to note that the petitioner was in judicial custody for a period of four years between 2006- 2010. So also, the petitioner was under suspension during the course of enquiry and the report of the enquiry committee was submitted on 24.01.2011 and the present petition was filed on 16.01.2014. - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 25. Under these circumstances, the period during which the petitioner was in judicial custody i.e., for a period of four years between 2006-2010 and the period of three years from 2011-2013 when the enquiry report was submitted and the petitioner ultimately filed the present petition, is a total number of period of seven years would necessarily have to be excluded for the purpose of computing the service benefits of the petitioner by issuing appropriate directions in this regard. 26. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The petition is allowed. (ii) The order dated 25.05.2011 at Annexure-S, is hereby set aside. (iii) Respondents-University are directed to reinstate the petitioner into service together with all service benefits and all other benefits within a period of two (2) months - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:11979 WP No. 100429 of 2014 from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (iv) It is made clear that while computing the service benefits of the petitioner i.e., a period of 7 years i.e., 2006 - 2010 and from 2011 – 2014, shall be excluded and the respondents shall proceed further in accordance with law. Sd/- (S.R. KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE SMM / Ct:vh List No.: 1 Sl No.: 4