JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with judgment & decree dated 27-10-2023 passed by the 2 nd Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No.502-A/2019, the appellant herein has preferred this appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, by which the application under Section 10(ix) & (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 filed by the respondent herein has been allowed. 2. Following facts are necessary to adjudicate this appeal preferred by the appellant herein/wife: - 3. Marriage between the appellant and the respondent was solemnized on 15-5-1986 as per the Christian rituals at Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh and out of their wedlock, they were blessed with two daughters – Martina & Monica and one son – Richard. However, Martina entered into marriage with one E. Vijay Kumar on 24-11- 2011 against the wish of the respondent that has led to matrimonial discard between them leading to which the appellant lodged a complaint against the respondent which is said to be false by the respondent and consequently, the appellant/wife started residing with her daughter Martina and son-in-law E. Vijay Kumar. 4. It is the case of the respondent/husband that on 16-9-2016, the appellant/wife forced him to leave the house and both started living separately in the same house, but in different floors, as the husband started living in ground floor and the wife started living in first floor along with her daughter Martina & son-in-law E. Vijay Kumar and other family members. Furthermore, application for maintenance was filed by the appellant/wife which was granted by the Family Court, Bilaspur on 23-12-2017. Thereafter, on 2-8-2019, the respondent/husband filed application for divorce under Section 10(ix) & (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 i.e. on the ground of desertion under Section 10(ix) and on the ground of cruelty under Section 10(x). 5. It is the further case of the respondent/husband that he and his wife both are residing separately from 16-9-2016 and since then they were not residing as husband & wife and as such, there is abandonment with intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end and therefore he is entitled for decree of divorce on the ground of desertion and furthermore, qua the ground of cruelty, as since last more than two years they have not lived as husband & wife and she made false report to the police station. In that view of the matter, he is entitled for divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion as well. 6. The appellant/wife filed written statement before the Family Court disputing the correctness of pleadings made in the application for divorce and denying and refuting that it is the husband who is responsible for such a conduct and as such, the respondent/husband is not entitled for decree of divorce on the aforesaid grounds. She has further stated that since her daughter Martina entered into love marriage, therefore, the respondent/husband started saying her and her daughter to be criminals and he used to commit marpit, and it is the respondent who is residing separately deliberately leaving his wife and other family members. 7. The Family Court framed four issues and answered the same in affirmative as under: - 8. Mr. Ravindra Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein/wife, would submit that the Family Court is absolutely unjustified in granting decree of divorce on the ground of desertion and cruelty, as both the grounds are not established by the respondent herein/husband and only by recording finding perverse to the record, decree of divorce has been granted which is liable to be set aside by allowing the appeal. 9. Mr. Sourabh Sahu, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent herein/husband, would support the impugned judgment & decree and oppose the appeal and submit that the Family Court is absolutely justified in granting decree of divorce in favour of the respondent on both the grounds i.e. desertion and cruelty which are fully established and as such, the Family Court has rightly granted decree. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the record with utmost circumspection. 11.Decree has been granted on two grounds i.e. desertion under Section 10(ix) of the Divorce Act, 1869 and cruelty under Section 10(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869. We will deal with both the findings of the Family Court qua desertion and cruelty one by one in order to judge the correctness of those findings. 11.Decree has been granted on two grounds i.e. desertion under Section 10(ix) of the Divorce Act, 1869 and cruelty under Section 10(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869. We will deal with both the findings of the Family Court qua desertion and cruelty one by one in order to judge the correctness of those findings. Desertion 12.The word “desertion” has been defined under Section 3(9) of the Divorce Act, 1869, which states as under: - “(9) “desertion”, implies an abandonment against the wish of the person charging it; and” 13.Similarly, Section 10(ix) of the Divorce Act, 1869, defines the ground of desertion as one of the grounds for dissolution of marriage, which states as under:- “ 10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage .—(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent— (i) to (viii) xxx xxx xxx (ix) has deserted the petitioner for at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or” 14.Sub-section (9) of Section 3 of the Divorce Act, 1869 defines the word “desertion” as “desertion”, implies an abandonment against the wish of the person charging it. Sub-section (9) of Section 3 of the Divorce Act, 1869 was considered by the Bombay High Court in the matter of Virbala Sumant Lokhande v. Sumant Madhav Lokhande , AIR 1974 Bom 297 in which it has been held as under: - “ 8. In s. 3, cl. (9) of the Indian Divorce Act, the word ‘desertion’ is defined. ‘Desertion’ implies an abandonment against the wish of the person charging it. The definition of ‘desertion’ by itself does not give much assistance while considering all the implications of the act of desertion. The term is judicially interpreted by Courts. Desertion may be actual desertion in the sense that the husband has driven away his wife and is not prepared to take her back. But there may be cases where there may not be actual desertion of one spouse by the other. It may be styled as a case of constructive desertion. The term is judicially interpreted by Courts. Desertion may be actual desertion in the sense that the husband has driven away his wife and is not prepared to take her back. But there may be cases where there may not be actual desertion of one spouse by the other. It may be styled as a case of constructive desertion. Even such desertion will amount to an abandonment against the wish of the person charging it within the meaning of s. 3(9) of the Act.” 15.Similarly, the word “desertion”, though in the context of Section 13(1) (ib) and 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has been considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi , AIR 2002 SC 88 and to establish “desertion”, their Lordships have laid down two essential ingredients in order that it may furnish a ground for relief, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Their Lordships observed in paragraph 6 of the report as under: - “6. ‘ Desertion’ in the context of matrimonial law represents a legal conception. It is difficult to give a comprehensive definition of the term. The essential ingredients of this offence in order that it may furnish a ground for relief are: 1. The factum of separation 2. The intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end — animus deserendi; 3. The element of permanence which is a prime condition requires that both these essential ingredients should continue during the entire statutory period; The clause lays down the rule that desertion to amount to a matrimonial offence must be for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. This clause has to be read with the Explanation. The Explanation has widened the definition of desertion to include ‘wilful neglect’ of the petitioning spouse by the respondent. It states that to amount to a matrimonial offence desertion must be without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of the petitioner. From the Explanation it is abundantly clear that the legislature intended to give to the expression a wide import which includes wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage. It states that to amount to a matrimonial offence desertion must be without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of the petitioner. From the Explanation it is abundantly clear that the legislature intended to give to the expression a wide import which includes wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage. Therefore, for the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively and their continuance throughout the statutory period.” 16.Similarly, in the matter of Roi (Bari) Stree v. Rassinga Naik and another , AIR 1935 Mad 541 relying upon the observations of GORELL BARNES, J. in the matter of Sickert v. Sickert , (1899) P. 278, 282 it has been held by the Madras High Court that in order to constitute desertion there must be a cessation of cohabitation and an intention on the part of the accused party to desert the other, and it has been observed as under:- “In order to constitute desertion there must be a cessation of cohabitation and an intention on the part of the accused party to desert the other. In most cases of desertion the guilty party actually leaves the other, but it is not always or necessarily the guilty party who leaves the matrimonial home. In my opinion, the party who intends bringing the cohabitation to an end, and whose conduct in reality causes its termination, commits the act of desertion. In most cases of desertion the guilty party actually leaves the other, but it is not always or necessarily the guilty party who leaves the matrimonial home. In my opinion, the party who intends bringing the cohabitation to an end, and whose conduct in reality causes its termination, commits the act of desertion. There is no substantial difference between the case of a husband who intends to put an end to a state of cohabitation, and does so by leaving his wife, and that of a husband who with the like intent obliges his wife to separate from him.” 17.Coming to the facts of the case in light of the aforesaid principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court and other High Courts, it is quite vivid that the appellant/wife in her cross-examination in paragraph 13 has clearly admitted that she and her husband both are residing separately since 2016, which according to the respondent, they are residing separately since 16-9-2016 and no effort has been made by her for establishing the matrimonial relationship. The respondent/husband has also stated in his statement before the Court that on 16-9-2016, the appellant has forced him to live separately and admittedly, they are residing separately from 16-9- 2016, which goes to show that they are living separately physically and mentally as well and the application for divorce was filed by the respondent/husband on 2-8-2019. As such, it is established that the appellant/wife has deserted the respondent/husband for at least two years immediately preceding the date of presentation of the application for divorce. In that view of the matter, the factum of desertion—physical separation and animus of desertion—intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, is established. More particularly, vide Ex.P-6-C – order dated 23-12-2017 passed by the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bilaspur in MJC No.156/2016, which is a proceeding before the Family Court, the appellant/wife had already admitted that she has lodged complaint against her husband, however, it is nowhere established in the record nor it appears from the record that the same has been established against the respondent/husband. As such, the Family Court considering the aforesaid evidence on record rightly granted decree under Section 10(ix) of the Divorce Act, 1869 that the appellant/wife has deserted the respondent/husband for at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the application for divorce. Cruelty 18. As such, the Family Court considering the aforesaid evidence on record rightly granted decree under Section 10(ix) of the Divorce Act, 1869 that the appellant/wife has deserted the respondent/husband for at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the application for divorce. Cruelty 18. Section 10(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869, lays down the ground of cruelty as one of the grounds for dissolution of marriage, which states as under: - “(x) has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent.” 19.The word “cruelty” has not been defined in the Divorce Act, 1869. However, in this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court, though with reference to Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in the matter of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh , (2007) 4 SCC 511 may be noticed herein profitably in which their Lordships have laid down broad parameters defining “cruelty” in paragraph 101 of their report, which states as under: - “101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of “mental cruelty”. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive: (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. (vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty. (viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. (xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilisation without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.” 20.Reverting to the facts of the case in light of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court, particularly with regard to paragraph 101(ii), (iv) and (xii), it would appear that making false report against the husband would attract Section 10(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869. More particularly, as held in the preceding paragraph, it is the appellant/wife who has deserted the respondent/husband and has brought an end to their conjugal relationship for a considerable period of time which amounts to cruelty, as the appellant was influenced with her daughter and son-in-law and living separately abandoning the conjugal relationship with effect from 16-9-2016, and at least from 16-9-2016 till date, there has been conjugal separation between the parties herein. Thus it is concluded that matrimonial bond is beyond repair and making false complaint against the husband itself is a very serious matter which the appellant/wife has also admitted stating that the main dispute between the appellant and the respondent is staying of son-in-law E. Vijay Kumar in their house permanently which is not liked by the respondent/husband, despite that, the appellant/wife is staying with her daughter and son-in-law. In that view of the matter, decree of divorce granted on the ground of cruelty is also established. 21.In consequence of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the Family Court is absolutely justified in granting decree of divorce on both the grounds of desertion and cruelty. We do not find any merit in this appeal, it deserves to be and is hereby dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).