- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13873-DB WP No. 106820 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B. WRIT PETITION NO. 106820 OF 2023 (S-KAT) BETWEEN: 1. THE KARNATAKA UPALOKAYUKTA M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-560001. R/BY ITS REGISTRAR UPALOKAYUKTA. 2. THE ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR, ENQUIRIES-1, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, M.S. BUILDING, DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-560001. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. SRINIVAS B. NAIK, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SRI. S.B. BIRADAR S/O BASANA GOUDA AGE. 69 YEARS, OCC. RETIRED WATERSHED DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, RESIDING AT NO.262, 2ND MAIN, 5TH CROSS, BHARATHNAGAR, DHARWAD-576163. 2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, R/BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, M.S. BUILDING, DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-560001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. G.K. HIREGOUDAR, PRL. GOVT. ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO, ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 17-07-2020 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL BELAGAVI IN APPLICATION NO.2362/2017 (PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A); AND PERMIT THE PETITIONERS FOR CONTINUATION OF DEPARTMENTAL ENQUIRY AGAINST THE RESPONDENT NO.1 IN ENDS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY & ETC. MOHANKUMAR B SHELAR Digitally signed by MOHANKUMAR B SHELAR Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13873-DB WP No. 106820 of 2023 THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B. ORAL ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT) This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed by the Karnataka Lokayukta represented by Registrar/Addl. Registrar against the order dated 17.07.2020 in Application No.2362/2017 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Belagavi (for short, ‘Tribunal’) whereby 1st respondent’s application questioning the order of entrustment of enquiry dated 08.07.2016 passed under Rule 14A of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 19571; Enquiry order dated 26.07.2016 passed by 2nd respondent/Upa-Lokayukta; Articles of charge dated 8.8.2016 and order dated 31.12.2016 passed by 3rd respondent rejecting the preliminary objections raised by the 1st respondent is allowed by quashing those orders. 1 For short ‘CCA Rules’ - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13873-DB WP No. 106820 of 2023 2. Heard learned counsel Srinivas B. Naik for petitioners as well as learned Government Advocate Sri.G.K.Hiregoudar for respondent/State and perused the writ petition papers. 3. On hearing the learned counsels for the parties and on perusal of the entire writ petition papers, we are of the considered opinion that no ground is made out to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. 4. Respondent No.1 was working as District Watershed Development Officer and he retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.07.2013 and whereas articles of charges were issued on 08.08.2016 in respect of an event which had taken place in March, 2011. 5. Rule 214 (2)(b) of KCSRs reads as follows: “The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment. i) Shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Government; ii) Shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution; and - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13873-DB WP No. 106820 of 2023 iii) Shall be conducted by such authority and in such place as the Government may direct and in accordance with the. Procedure applicable to departmental proceedings in which an order of dismissal from service could be the made in relation to the Government servant during his service.” 6. In terms of above Rule, departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, shall not be initiated in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution. 7. Further Rule 214(6)(a) makes it abundantly clear that Departmental proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted on the date on which the statement of charges is issued to the Government servant or pensioner, or if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and others V/s Anil Kumar Sarkar reported in (2013) 4 SCC 161 has made it clear that Departmental proceedings are commenced only when charge sheet is issued to the delinquent employee. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13873-DB WP No. 106820 of 2023 8. In the instant case, since respondent No.1 retired from service on 31.07.2013 and as the articles of charge was issued on 8.8.2016 in respect of the incident that took place during March, 2011, issuance of articles of charge is clearly barred by Rule 214(2)(b) of KCSR. In terms of Rule 214 of KCSR, no enquiry against respondent No.1 could be initiated in respect of any event which took place during March, 2011 since it would be more than four years before such institution. 9. It is seen that the impugned order was passed by the Tribunal on 17.07.2020, whereas the present writ petition is filed on 8.6.2023. There is a delay of nearly three years in preferring the writ petition. Respondent No.1 was aged about 63 years as on the date of filing the application before the Tribunal in the year 2017. As on this date, he is more than 70 years of age. There is no averment in the writ petition explaining the delay in filing the writ petition by the petitioner/Institution. The delay by the petitioner/Lokayukta in preferring the writ petition should not prejudice the case of respondent No.1 in the evening of his life. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13873-DB WP No. 106820 of 2023 10. It is relevant to note the law laid down by the Apex Court in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others2 on delay in filing the writ petition, at paragraphs 9 to 12, which read thus: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on 2 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13873-DB WP No. 106820 of 2023 facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13873-DB WP No. 106820 of 2023 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13873-DB WP No. 106820 of 2023 there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13873-DB WP No. 106820 of 2023 circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13873-DB WP No. 106820 of 2023 inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 11. For the reasons recorded above, we find no merit in the writ petition. Accordingly, writ petition stands rejected. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of as not surviving for consideration. Sd/- (S G PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (GEETHA K.B.) JUDGE JTR CT:VP LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 18