1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 447 of 2019 1 - Jeevan Patre S/o Kalap Singh Patre Aged About 48 Years R/o Village Parsada, Police Station Chakarbhatha, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh --- Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Chakarbhatha, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Ravi @ Vikas Pahadi S/o Raju Pahadi Aged About 23 Years R/o Village Bharni, Parsada, Police Station Chakarbhatha, Presently Police Station Sakti, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. (Accused), District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Durga Pahadi S/o Shani Pahadi Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Bharni Parsada, Police Station Chakarbhatha, Presently Police Station Sakti, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) CRA No. 903 of 2019 1 - Shanee (Shani) Pahadi S/o Raju Pahadi Aged About 25 Years R/o Village - Bharni Parsada, Thana, Chakarbhata, (At Present Thana - Sakri) District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 ---Appellant Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondents For Appellant(s) :- Dr. Kumaresh Tiwari, Advocate in ACQA No. 447/2019 and Mr. Dhirendra Prasad Mishra, Advocate in CRA No. 903/2019 For State :- Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate For Respondents No. :- Mr. Vijay Mishra, Advocate on behalf 2 & 3 in ACQA No. of Mr. Arvind Sinha, Advocate 447/2019 Division Bench : Hon'ble Smt. Rajani Dubey and Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, JJ. Judgment on Board 01.12.2025 Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. CRA No.903/2019 :- This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant/accused person herein under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.10.2018 passed in Sessions Case No.113/2017 by the 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, C.G., whereby the appellant-Shanee (Shani) Pahadi has been convicted and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence U/s. 302 of Indian Penal Rigorous Imprisonment for life 3 Code (for short, ‘IPC’) and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one year. 2. ACQA No.447/2019:- This acquittal appeal preferred by the Appellant- Jeevan Patre arises out of the same judgment dated 30.10.2018 passed in Sessions Case No.113/2017 by the 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, C.G., whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused persons / respondent No.2- Ravi @ Vikas Pahadi & respondent No.3- Durga Pahadi herein of the charge under Sections 302/34 of IPC. 3. It is pertinent to mention that, during the pendency of this appeal, respondent No. 2 – Ravi @ Vikas Pahadi died on 08.10.2021, and the death certificate has been placed on record. Consequently, the acquittal appeal, insofar as it concerns respondent No. 2 – Ravi @ Vikas Pahadi, stands abated. 4. Since both the above captioned appeals arise out of the same impugned judgment dated 30.10.2018, they are being heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. 5. Prosecution case, in brief, is that on 15.06.2017 at about 6:00 PM, the three accused—Shani Pahadi (accused in CRA No. 903/2021), Durga Pahadi, and Ravi Pahadi (accused in ACQA No. 447/2019)—allegedly confronted the deceased, Rinki Patre, at her residence. It is alleged that when Durga Pahadi enquired 4 about the presence of Rinki’s father and was informed that he was not at home, she became enraged, whereupon all three accused abused the deceased in filthy language and assaulted her. Thereafter, Rinki Patre/deceased went inside the house, poured kerosene on herself, and returned outside, stating that if the accused intended to kill her, they should do so. At this juncture, accused- Shani Pahadi allegedly stated, ‘If you are so eager to die, I will kill you today,’ and immediately set her ablaze by lighting a matchstick. 6. On the basis of the information given by the deceased/complainant- Kumari Rinki Patre, a Dehati Nalsi vide Ex.P-12 was initially registered at Tarbahar Police Station, and a zero numbered First Information Report vide Ex.P-13 was recorded against the accused persons for the offence under Section 307/34 IPC. Thereafter, a numbered FIR vide Ex.P-11 was subsequently registered at Chakarbhatha, Police Station. During the course of investigation conducted by Tarbahar Police Station, an application vide Ex.P-32 was submitted to the District Magistrate, Bilaspur, seeking permission to record the dying declaration of the deceased- Kumari Rinki Patre. Upon receiving permission, the Executive Magistrate, Bilaspur, recorded the dying declaration of the deceased vide Ex.P-22. While undergoing treatment, the deceased- Kumari Rinki Patre succumbed to her injuries on 22.06.2017. Consequently, merg intimation vide Ex.P-8 regarding her death was registered at 5 Tarbahar Police Station, and the offence was altered from Section 307/34 IPC to Section 302/34 IPC. Following the death of the deceased- Rinki Patre, summons were issued and inquest proceedings were conducted vide Exs. P-2 and P-3 respectively, and the dead body was sent for postmortem examination vide Ex.P-14 and the medical officer vide its postmortem report Ex. P- 26 opined that the cause of death was cardiorespiratory failure due to burns and their complications and nature of death is not given. Spot map was prepared by the police vide Ex.P-4. Memorandum statement of accused-Shani Pahadi was recorded vide Ex.P-15, pursuant to which, one packet of match-box was seized vide Ex.P-16. From the spot, burnt clothes and other articles of deceased were seized vide Ex.P-17. Accused persons were taken into custody vide Exs.P-19 to 21 respectively. 7. After due investigation, accused persons were charge-sheeted before the jurisdictional Criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they have not committed the offences. 8. In order to bring home the offences, prosecution has examined as many as 21 witnesses and brought on record 37 documents vide Ex.P/01 to P/37 whereas, the accused persons in their defence have examined none but exhibited 2 documents vide Ex.D/01 & D/02. Statements of the accused persons were recorded under 6 Section 313 of Cr.P.C., in which, they denied the circumstances appearing against them in the evidence brought on record, pleaded innocence and false implication. 9. The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused persons, namely Ravi @ Vikas Pahadi (since deceased) and Durga Pahadi, of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, while convicting and sentencing the accused Shani Pahadi for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. Aggrieved by the said judgment, separate appeals have been preferred by the accused- Shani Pahadi and the father of the deceased- Jeevan Patre. 10. CRA No. 903/2021 – Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the conviction of the appellant, as recorded by the trial Court, is wholly unsustainable in law. He contends that a perusal of the dying declaration (Ex. P-22) reveals certain discrepancies. It is argued that no certificate was issued by the doctor regarding the mental and physical condition of the deceased at the time of recording the dying declaration, and therefore Ex. P-22 is not worthy of reliance. It is further submitted that the entire prosecution case rests solely on the dying declaration (Ex. P-22), and in view of the acquittal of the other co- accused, the appellant is also entitled to acquittal on the ground of parity. In the alternative, it is argued that even if this Court 7 ultimately concludes that the appellant is guilty, at best the case would fall under Section 304 Part II IPC. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the appellant has already undergone 8 years, 3 months, and 4 days of imprisonment, and therefore the sentence may be reduced to the period already undergone by him. 11. On the other hand, learned State counsel argued that the complicity of the appellant- Shani Pahadi, has been clearly established through the statements made by the deceased during her lifetime, as reflected in the FIR, the Dehati Nalisi (Ex. P/12), and the dying declaration (Ex. P/22). It is not a case resting solely on the dying declaration. Therefore, even assuming the correctness of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant, he cannot be exonerated from the offence for which he has been convicted. The conviction of the appellant- Shani Pahadi, is fully justified, and it is also not a case that can be converted into one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. Learned State counsel further submits that, upon a perusal of the FIR and other material on record, it appears that the other accused persons were also involved in the incident and could have been held liable with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC. However, he fairly submits that the State has not preferred any appeal against the acquittal of the co-accused persons. 12. ACQA No.447/2019 - Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the trial Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused Durga Pahadi by recording findings that are wholly 8 perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. It is contended that the statements of the deceased, as reflected in the FIR, the Dehati Nalisi (Ex. P/12), and the dying declaration (Ex. P/22), clearly implicate the co-accused as an active participant in the commission of the offence. Counsel submits that the trial Court failed to appreciate the consistent and cogent evidence demonstrating her involvement, and that the acquittal recorded in her favour is unsustainable in law. He further submits that, in view of the clear and categorical attribution of an overt act to the co- accused, her acquittal deserves to be set aside and she is liable to be convicted for the offence in question with the aid of Section 34 IPC. 13. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 supports the impugned judgment and submits that the trial Court, upon a proper appreciation of the evidence on record, has rightly acquitted respondent No.3, and that the said finding calls for no interference by this Court. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 15. The first question for consideration would be, whether the death of the deceased- Rinki Patre/deceased was homicidal in nature which has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the postmortem report (Ex.P-26) proved by Dr. Ajay 9 Tawarkar (PW-15), which is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 16. Now, the question is whether the appellant-Shani Pahadi the perpetrator of the crime in question. 17. Considering the statements of PW-10 Pradeep Ratre, the contents of the Dehati Nalisi (Ex. P-12) and the FIR (Ex. P-11), the dying declaration of the deceased (Ex. P-22), and the testimony of PW-22 Shweta Yadav, who recorded the dying declaration, it is evident that on the date of the incident, the accused Shani Pahadi reached the house of the deceased and quarreled with her while abusing her. In response, the deceased went inside the house, poured kerosene on herself, and returned, reportedly stating that he could set her ablaze. At that moment, the accused Shani Pahadi ignited a matchstick and set her on fire, resulting in burn injuries covering approximately 30% of her body, however, she succumbed to her injuries during the course of treatment. The trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, rightly recorded a finding that it was the appellant- Shani Pahadi who committed the aforesaid offence. In our considered opinion, such a finding is a finding of fact, based on reliable evidence on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to the material on record, and therefore, we affirm the said finding. 10 18. In the matter of Hari Shanker v. State of Rajasthan 1998 (8) SCC 355, the appellant therein picked up a burning kerosene wickstove and threw it on the deceased. Kerosene from the stove spilled over the clothes of the deceased and as the burning wick came in contact with his clothes, they caught fire and the deceased ultimately died as a result of the burns received by him. In this case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that since the appellant had thrown a burning stove on the deceased, he would have known that his act was likely to cause burns resulting in death and altered the conviction of the appellant therein from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II of IPC. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the judgment state as under : “2. Only question that we have to consider in this appeal is what offence can be said to have been committed by the appellant on the basis of the facts found by the High Court. It has been held that (1998) 8 SCC 3552022:CGHC:9050-DB while the appellant, deceased Bheem Singh and one Shah Megan were taking tea in the teaclub of the Air Force, 32 Wing (MT Section), an exchange of words took place between the appellant and the deceased on account of the demand made by the appellant for returning Rs 50,000 which he had advanced to the deceased. The appellant became angry and picked up the burning kerosene wickstove and threw it on the deceased. Kerosene from the stove spilled over the clothes of the deceased and as the burning wicks came in contact with his clothes they caught fire. The 11 deceased ultimately died as a result of the burns received by him. 3. What was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the appellant had no enmity with the deceased. He had no intention to kill the deceased as by killing him he could not have recovered the amount of Rs 50,000 which he had advanced to the deceased. He further submitted that the quarrel between the two took place all of a sudden and in the heat of the moment the appellant had picked the stove and had thrown it towards the deceased. He, therefore, submitted that it was merely a rash and negligent act on the part of the appellant. We cannot agree with the submission of the learned counsel. Since the appellant had thrown a burning stove on the deceased, he would have known that his act was likely to cause burns resulting in death. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, he can be said to have committed an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. 4. We, therefore, allow this appeal partly, alter the conviction of the appellant from under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC and reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to rigorous imprisonment for five years.” 19. The decision rendered in Hari Shanker (supra) was followed with approval by the Supreme Court subsequently in the matter of Kalabai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2019 SC 2135 wherein the appellant threw burning stove on the deceased due to which 12 clothes of deceased caught fire and serious burn injuries were caused. The deceased was admitted to the hospital with 96% burn injuries pursuant to which she herself stated in her dying declaration that the incident happened when quarrel was going on between parties. Their Lordships came to the conclusion that there is no evidence to come to conclusion that the appellant had any intention to kill deceased and in absence of intention, accused is liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part II instead of Section 302 of IPC. It has been pertinently observed in paragraph 13 as under : “13. The trial Court has taken pains to evaluate the entire material on record and has rightly come to the conclusion that the so called dying declaration (Exh.P2) is unbelievable and not trustworthy. Valid reasons have also been assigned by the trial Court for coming to such a conclusion. Per contra, the High Court while setting aside the said finding has not adverted to any of the reasons assigned by the trial Court relating to the authenticity or reliability of the dying declaration. The view taken by the trial Court, in our considered opinion, is the only possible view under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 20. The Supreme Court in the matter of Kaluram Vs. State of Rajasthan (2000)10 SCC 324 has converted the offence under Section 302 of IPC to Section 304 Part II of the IPC as the appellant therein, who was in a highly inebriated condition, 13 demanded ornaments from his wife and on her refusal, he got infuriated and doused her with kerosene oil and set her ablaze but finding the flames flaring up he poured water to save her life and accordingly his conviction was altered from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II of IPC which has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme court as under: “7. But then, what is the nature of the offence proved against him? It is an admitted case that the appellant was in a highly inebriated stage when he approached the deceased when the demand for sparing her ornaments was made by him. When she refused to oblige he poured kerosene on her and wanted her to light the matchstick. When she failed to do so he collected the matchbox and ignited one matchstick but when the flames were up he suddenly and frantically poured water to save her from the tongues of flames. This conduct cannot be seen divorced from the totality of the circumstances. Very probably he would not have anticipated that the act done by him would have escalated to such a proportion that she might die. If he had ever intended her to die he would not have alerted his senses to bring water in an effort to rescue her. We are inclined to think that all that the accused thought of was to inflict burns to her and to frighten her but unfortunately the situation slipped out of his control and it went to the fatal extent. He would not have intended to inflict the injuries which she sustained on account of his act. Therefore, we are persuaded 14 to bring down the offence from first degree murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.” 21. Now, the question that requires consideration is whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant-Shani Pahadi for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC or his case is covered under Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC and as such, his conviction can be altered to either Part-I or Part-II of Section 304 of IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant. 22. In order to consider whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, it would be appropriate to notice the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana 1 wherein it has been observed as under :- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder 1 (2002) 3 SCC 327 15 punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 23. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana 2 , has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen for its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c)The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; 2 (2009) 15 SCC 635 16 (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused with premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 17 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 24. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda 3 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It is further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 25. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh4 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- 3 (2012) 8 SCC 450 4 (2017) 3 SCC 247 18 “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual 19 manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 26. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that when and if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of IPC. 20 27. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir vs. State (NCT of Delhi) 5 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested for bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 28. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is evident from the statement of PW-10 Pradeep Ratre, the contents of the Dehati Nalisi (Ex. P-12) and FIR (Ex. P-11), the dying declaration of the deceased (Ex. P-22), and the testimony of PW-22 Shweta Yadav, who recorded the dying declaration, that on the date of the incident the accused- Shani Pahadi reached the house of the deceased and quarreled with her while abusing her. In response, the deceased went inside the house, poured kerosene on herself, and at that moment, the accused- Shani Pahadi ignited a matchstick and set her on fire, resulting in burn injuries, to which she succumbed during the course of treatment. Thus, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the injuries 5 (2019) 6 SCC 122 21 sustained and the sequence of events leading up to the occurrence, it becomes clear that the incident arose out of a sudden altercation. There was no premeditation on the part of the appellant- Shani Pahadi to cause the death of the deceased. In the heat of passion and under the influence of sudden anger, he ignited the matchstick, due to which, the deceased caught fire and suffered burns that ultimately led to her death. As such, the appellant- Shani Pahadi must have had the knowledge that his act would likely to cause the death of the deceased, but no intention of causing her death can be attributed to him. 29. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the case of the appellant- Shani Pahadi is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC and since the appellant had no intention and premeditation to cause the death of the deceased, however, he must have had the knowledge that his act would likely to cause the death of the deceased, his conviction for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC is altered to Section 304 Part-II of IPC. Accordingly, appellant-Shani Pahadi is convicted for the ofence under Section 304-4 Part-II of IPC. The appellant– Shani Pahadi has remained in custody since 17.06.2017 and has undergone 8 years, 3 months and 4 days i.e. more than 7 years of imprisonment. Accordingly, his sentence is reduced from life imprisonment and confined to 7 years’ rigorous imprisonment which he has already undergone. However, the fine amount and 22 the default stipulation imposed by the Trial Court shall remain intact. 30. In the result, the criminal appeal (CRA No.903/2021) is partly allowed. 31. So far as acquittal appeal filed by the father of the deceased-Jeevan Patre is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- 25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 32. Upon careful consideration of the entire evidence and the findings recorded by the learned trial Court, this Court finds that no material has emerged either from the dying declaration of the deceased- Rinki Patre (Ex.P-22), or from the testimonies of her father- Jeevan Patre (PW-12), and brother- Pradeep Patre (PW- 10), to indicate that respondent No. 3- Durga Pahadi, shared any common intention with the accused- Shani Pahadi in setting the 23 deceased on fire, or that she committed any act in furtherance of such intention. The evidence consistently demonstrates that the act of igniting the matchstick and setting the deceased ablaze was solely attributable to the accused- Shani Pahadi. There is a complete absence of any overt act, participation, or incriminating conduct on the part of respondent No. 3. The view taken by the trial Court, holding that the charge under Section 302/34 IPC was not proved against her, is reasonable, supported by evidence, and free from perversity or illegality. Accordingly, the acquittal of respondent No. 3- Durga Pahadi, warrants no interference and stands affirmed. 33. Having considered the material on record and the well- reasoned judgment of the trial Court, and keeping in view the settled legal position that in an appeal against acquittal, if two views are reasonably possible on the basis of the evidence and the trial Court has adopted one such view favouring the accused, the appellate Court cannot substitute its own view to reverse the acquittal, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment acquitting respondent No. 3 is just, proper, and calls for no interference. 34. For the foregoing discussions, the acquittal appeal (ACQA No.447/2019) filed by the father of the deceased-Jeevan Patre against the acquittal of respondent No.3, being without any substance, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed, whereas the 24 criminal appeal (CRA No.903/2021) filed by the appellant/accused- Shanee (Shani) Pahadi is allowed in part. 35. Appellant-Shanee (Shani) Pahadi is reported to be in jail, we direct that he be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other matter/case. 36. In compliance with Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the appellant directed to furnish a personal bond of ₹25,000/- with two surety of the like amount before the concerned court. The bond shall be effective for six months and include an undertaking that in case of filing a Special Leave Petition or grant of leave against this judgment, the appellant will appear before the Supreme Court upon receipt of notice. 37. Registry is directed to transmit the lower Court record along with a copy of this judgment to the concerned trial Court forthwith for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Vishakha