Ramesh Chakradhari, S/o. Jayram Chakradhari v. State of Chhattisgarh Through Police of Police Station- Kumhari
2025-11-26
Bibhu Datta Guru, Ramesh Sinha
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
Judgment : Ramesh Sinha, CJ. 1. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19.10.2023 passed by the the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, District Durg, in Sessions Trial No. 70/2022, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the IPC) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. 2 The appellant/convict was charged under Section 302 of the IPC for murdering his wife Lalita Chakradhari (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’) by pouring kerosene on her and setting her on fire with a matchstick on 09.01.2022 at 19.00 hours in his own house situated at Ward No. 9, Shivnagar, Kumhari, under Police Station Kumhari, District Durg. 3 The admitted facts in this case is that the deceased is the wife of the appellant. Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1) is the daughter and Roshan Chakradhari (PW-3) is the son of the deceased and the appellant. Appellant is the brother of Rajesh Chakradhari (PW-2). The appellant is the nephew of Sukalya Bai (PW-4) and Harish Chakradhari (PW-6). 4 The case of the prosecution, in brief is that two to three months prior to the incident dated 09.01.2022, the appellant had been abusing and assaulting his wife, i.e. the deceased, due to suspicions about her character, claiming she was having an affair with one Laxminarayan Chakradhari. On 09.01.2022, when the deceased returned home at approximately 7:00 p.m. after buying vegetables from the weekly market in Kumhari, the appellant said that she had gone to market with Laxminarayan and and began assaulting her. At that time, the complainant, Pooja Chakradhari, (PW-1) and her younger brother, Roshan Chakradhari (PW-3), were present at home. Displeased by the abuse, the complainant, Pooja Chakradhari, left the house and went to her grandmother's house next door. At that moment, a loud screaming sound was heard. Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1) saw her mother emerge from the house in a burning condition upon which the neighbours doused the flames. The deceased was then brought to the Community Health Centre, Kumhari, in an Ambulance.
At that moment, a loud screaming sound was heard. Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1) saw her mother emerge from the house in a burning condition upon which the neighbours doused the flames. The deceased was then brought to the Community Health Centre, Kumhari, in an Ambulance. The deceased was talking at that time when Pooja Chakradhari asked her mother how it happened, to which the deceased replied that her father i.e. the appellant poured kerosene on her and set her on fire with a matchstick to kill her. On 09.01.2022 itself, the statement of the deceased (Exhibit P/20) was recorded by the police. On 10.01.2022, Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1) lodged a Dehati Nalishi (Exhibit P/1) at DKS Hospital, Raipur. Based on the Dehati Nalishi, an offence under Section 307 of the IPC was registered and investigation was initiated in the case. 5 During the investigation, on 10.01.2022, upon the presentation of the complainant Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1), the deceased’s plain clothes and the burnt clothes were seized as per Exhibit P/4. On the same date, a site map (Exhibit P/2) of the incident was prepared, plain soil, soil smeared with kerosene, match box, and a plastic container with kerosene, were seized from the scene, as per seizure memo (Exhibit P/13). On 10.01.2022 itself, upon the appellant’s instance, the clothes worn at the time of the incident were seized, as per seizure memo (Exhibit P/12). On 10.01.2022, the deceased’s dying declaration (Exhibit P/17) was recorded by the Executive Magistrate at DKS Hospital, in which the deceased stated that her husband, i.e. the appellant had assaulted her, poured kerosene on her, and set her on fire. On the same date, the scene was inspected and a Panchnama (Exhibit P10) was prepared and the appellant was arrested after evidence of incrimination was found against him 6 During treatment, on 16.01.2022, following the deceased’s death, a merg intimation (Exhibit P/18) was recorded on the information by Police of Police Station, Gol Bazar, Raipur. The deceased’s body was then sent to Dr. B.R.Ambedkar Hospital, Raipur for postmortem, where the postmortem was conducted on 16.01.2022. On receipt of the case diary from Golbazar Police Station, the offence under Section 302 of the IPC was added to the case. During the investigation, statements of the complainant, Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1) and other prosecution witnesses were recorded.
The deceased’s body was then sent to Dr. B.R.Ambedkar Hospital, Raipur for postmortem, where the postmortem was conducted on 16.01.2022. On receipt of the case diary from Golbazar Police Station, the offence under Section 302 of the IPC was added to the case. During the investigation, statements of the complainant, Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1) and other prosecution witnesses were recorded. On 02.02.2022, a letter was sent to the Chief Medical Officer, Kumhari, regarding providing of query report with respect to the seized articles. On 10.02.2022, the seized items were sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, for chemical testing. In light of the memo (Exhibit P/22) sent by the Station House Officer, Kumhari, the Patwari prepared a map of the incident (Exhibit P/3). 7 After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was presented against the appellant in the Court Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhilai 3, District Durg. Since the offence charged against the appellant was triable by the Court of Session, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions vide order dated 13.04.2022. 8 Charge was framed against the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. The appellant abjured the guilt and prayed for trial. 9 In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses, namely, Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1) Rajesh Chakradhari (PW-2), Roshan Chakradhari (PW-3), Sukalya Bai (PW-4), Dr. Shivnarayan Majhi (PW-5), Harish Chakradhari (PW-6), Parmeshwar Mahana (PW-7), Ganesh Rajput (PW-8), Abhishek Rathore, Tehsildar (PW-9) Kamal Singh Segar Sub Inspector (PW-10) and Sudhashu Baghel, Inspector (PW-11). The prosecution exhibited as many as 29 exhibits. 10 On examination of the appellant/accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C, he stated that he was innocent and that he had been falsely implicated. He denied most of the questions and in respect of some questions, he expressed his ignorance. 11 The learned trial Judge, after considering the evidence on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant/accused as detailed in the opening paragraph of this judgment. Hence, the present appeal by the appellant/convict. 12 Mr. Shikhar Bakhtiyar, learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is no dispute with regard to the fact that the deceased died of the burn injuries sustained by her. However, there is no material available on record so as to connect the appellant with the offence in question. The appellant has been falsely implicated in this case.
12 Mr. Shikhar Bakhtiyar, learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is no dispute with regard to the fact that the deceased died of the burn injuries sustained by her. However, there is no material available on record so as to connect the appellant with the offence in question. The appellant has been falsely implicated in this case. There is no eye witness to the incident. Merely on the basis of suspicion, the appellant has been roped in this case. With respect to the dying declaration, it is submitted by learned counsel that there is no valid certificate of the Doctor available in this case which may suggest that the deceased was in a fit mental state to give her dying declaration as such, on what basis the dying declaration has been recorded, is a question to be considered. Accordingly, he prays that the appeal may be allowed and the appellant may be acquitted of the charges. 13 On the other hand, Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondent submits that the learned trial Court has rightly arrived at a finding with regard to the guilt of the appellant and the learned trial Court was fully justified in convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offences in question. The judgment is based on evidence available on record and as such, the same does not warrant any interference and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 14 We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 15 It is not in dispute that the deceased died of burn injuries as is evident from the deposition of the Doctor who had conducted the postmortem, namely Dr. Shiv Narayan Manjhi (PW-5) and also the postmortem report (Exhibit P/8) where the said Doctor has opined that the cause of death was due to cardio respiratory failure as a result of burns and their complications.
Shiv Narayan Manjhi (PW-5) and also the postmortem report (Exhibit P/8) where the said Doctor has opined that the cause of death was due to cardio respiratory failure as a result of burns and their complications. In the postmortem report, the Doctor found superficial infected burns with greenish yellowish discoloration with foul smelling and sloughing due to infection following parts of the body with partial healing effect all around wound:- under surface chin, tip of nose, lower lip, neck all over, both maxillary region, chest all over, both upper limb all over, abdomen all over, genitalia and both lower limb all over burnt (except frontal region, cheek and rest part of nose, both thumbs and planter, and in the nape of neck to heal all over burnt. The burns were found to be antemortem in nature. The burns were dry (flame) burns and were sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. The said fact has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant and as such, this Court proceeds to ascertain as to whether it was the appellant who is the author of the crime in question? 16 Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1) who is the daughter of the deceased and the appellant has deposed before the learned trial Court that she was in her grandmother’s house adjacent to their house. She saw her mother coming out of her own house in a burnt condition and she alongwith her brother, grandmother doused the fire and they took her to the hospital. She stated that she was informed by the deceased that the deceased had herself poured kerosene and set herself ablaze. The deceased was taken to the Hospital at Kumhari, and from there, she was referred to DKS Hospital, Raipur where during the course of treatment, after a week, she died. This witness was declared hostile. In cross examination, she stated that her mother did not like the appellant as he used to utter filthy language and doubt her character. 17 Rajesh Chakradhari (PW-2), is the brother of the appellant. He stated that when he reached the place of incident, the fire had already doused. Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1) did not state anything to him. The deceased was taken to the hospital in his autorickshaw. This witness was also declared hostile. 18 Rakesh Chakradhari (PW-3) is the son of the appellant and the deceased.
He stated that when he reached the place of incident, the fire had already doused. Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1) did not state anything to him. The deceased was taken to the hospital in his autorickshaw. This witness was also declared hostile. 18 Rakesh Chakradhari (PW-3) is the son of the appellant and the deceased. At the time of incident, he had gone to play alongwith his friends who informed him that something was burning and when he reached home, he saw that his mother was burning then he alongwith other friends doused the fire. He called his Uncle (Bade Pitaji) who brought his autorickshaw in which they took the deceased to the hospital. He was also declared hostile as he stated that he was unaware as to who set his mother ablaze and how the incident happened. Sukalya Bai (PW- 4) is the Aunt (Chachi) of the appellant. She also turned hostile and did not support the prosecution story. Harish Chakradhari is the Uncle of the appellant. He has also turned hostile and not supported the prosecution case expressing ignorance with regard to the incident. Similarly, Parmeshwar Mahana (PW-7), who is the witness of seizure, has also turned hostile and stated that nothing was seized in his presence by the police. Another witness namely Ganesh Rajput (PW-8) has also turned hostile and not supported the prosecution case as he stated that no clothes were seized by the police in his presence. 19 The most important witness in this case is the Tahsildar, Abhishek Rathore (PW-9) who had recorded the dying declaration (Exhibit P/17). He stated that he received an order from the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Raipur for recording of the dying declaration and in compliance of the said order, he reached DKS Hospital, Raipur at 11:50 a.m. and recorded the dying declaration, as was stated by the deceased. When he saw the deceased, she was in a burnt condition but was well oriented. When he asked as to how she sustained the burn injuries, the deceased informed him that there had been a quarrel between her and the appellant after coming back from the market. She further stated that firstly, the appellant assaulted her and thereafter, poured the kerosene on her and set her ablaze.
When he asked as to how she sustained the burn injuries, the deceased informed him that there had been a quarrel between her and the appellant after coming back from the market. She further stated that firstly, the appellant assaulted her and thereafter, poured the kerosene on her and set her ablaze. In cross examination, this witness stated that with respect to the fit mental state of the deceased so as to give the dying declaration, he had orally asked the treating Doctor upon which the Doctor had stated that she was mentally fit to give her dying declaration. 20 Except for the dying declaration, there is no material on record which may connect the appellant with the offence in question. Surprisingly, there is no MLC report or any document exhibited with regard to the treatment of the deceased. The merg intimation (Exhibit P/18) states that the deceased had sustained 90% deep thermal injury. 21 It is undisputed in the case that the deceased died as a result of burn injuries Furthermore, the evidence of prosecution witnesses, namely Pooja Chakradhari (PW-1), Rajesh Chakradhari (PW-2), and Roshan Chakradhari (PW-3) shows that though they saw the deceased burning in the fire and took her to the hospital for treatment, but none of them had seen as to how the fire took place. There is no eye witness to the incident. It is also undisputed in the case that the deceased died during treatment on 16.01.2022. The appellant has solely been convicted on the basis of dying declaration (Exhibit P/17) and there is no other piece of evidence, no legal evidence much less oral or circumstantial evidence to convict the appellant except the aforesaid dying declaration. 22 The incident is said to have taken place on 09.01.2022 and she died during the course of treatment on 16.01.2022. The dying declaration was recorded by the Tahsildar, Abhishek Rathore (PW-9) wherein the deceased stated that it was the appellant who poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. However, there is no certificate of the treating Doctor to certify that the deceased was in a fit mental state to give her dying declaration.
The dying declaration was recorded by the Tahsildar, Abhishek Rathore (PW-9) wherein the deceased stated that it was the appellant who poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. However, there is no certificate of the treating Doctor to certify that the deceased was in a fit mental state to give her dying declaration. 23 On 19.11.2025, when this matter was taken up for hearing, this Court had observed that the Tahsildar had not disclosed the name of the Doctor who had orally stated that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give her dying declaration. Further, the name of the Doctor who attended the deceased has also not been brought on record and as such, the Dean, DKS Hospital, Raipur, was directed to file his personal affidavit informing this Court with regard to the Doctor who had informed the Tahsildar about the mental fitness of the deceased. Further, the Chief Secretary of the State was also directed to file his personal affidavit to call upon the Tahsildar who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased and to clarify the name of the Doctor from whom the Tahsildar obtained such information, and the matter was directed to be listed today. 24 In compliance of the order dated 19.11.2025, the Medical Superintendent-cum-Academic Incharge, DKS Superspeciality Hospital and PG Institute Raipur, has filed an affidavit stating that a Committee comprising of Khemlal Verma, Deputy Director, Medical Education, Dr. Ravikant Das, Head of Department, Orthopedics, Dr. S.B.S.Netam, Head of Department, Radio Diagnostics, Dr. Snigdha Jain, Head of Department, Forensic Medicine and Dr. Nagendar Singh Sonwani, Assistant Professor, Forensic Medicine, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Medical College, Raipur, was constituted regarding enquiry into the dying declaration of the deceased. The said Committee has opined that Dr. Azeez Alam and Dr. Samriddhi Agrawal were the Doctors on duty and were responsible to declare about medical fitness of the patient to record dying declaration and from perusal of the records, it was evident that the patient was conscious and oriented. It has further been opined that neither the Executive Magistrate nor the Investigating Officer took opinion and signature from the duty Doctor on the dying declaration.
It has further been opined that neither the Executive Magistrate nor the Investigating Officer took opinion and signature from the duty Doctor on the dying declaration. 25 A document (Annexure A/2) has been annexed with the affidavit which is a memo sent by the Station House Officer, Police Station, Kumhari, District Durg, to the Medical Officer, Government Hospital, Kumhari, with respect to the medical condition of the deceased to give dying declaration as she was stated to be 70% burnt. Dr. Shrey Chandrakar, Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Kumhari, District Durg, has made a remark on the same memo stating that the victim was in a position to give her dying declaration. The said memo is dated 09.11.2022. The medical records of the deceased has been enclosed alongwith the affidavit which in fact should have been part of the exhibits and should have been exhibited by the prosecution before the learned trial Court. 26 An affidavit has also been filed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Chhattisgarh, which states that pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the concerned Tehsildar, Abhishek Rathore, was issued memo in response to which the said Tehsildar has given his reply stating that he had taken oral instructions from one Doctor who was attending the deceased but he was not able to recall the name of the said Doctor. The said affidavit further reiterates what has been stated by the Medical Superintendent in her affidavit. 27 A dying declaration is the statement of a person who expects to die, giving the cause and circumstances of their death, and can be made orally, in writing, or through gestures. The procedure involves recording the statement's exact words as soon as possible after the injury by a competent person, ideally a Magistrate or Doctor, ensuring the declarant is mentally sound and understands the questions. Another important aspect is that the statement must be made voluntarily and without any coercion or influence.
The procedure involves recording the statement's exact words as soon as possible after the injury by a competent person, ideally a Magistrate or Doctor, ensuring the declarant is mentally sound and understands the questions. Another important aspect is that the statement must be made voluntarily and without any coercion or influence. 28 This Court, in a similar facts and circumstances, in Arjun Singh Rajput v. State of Chhattisgarh Cr.A. No. 114/2021 after taking note of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the decision of the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 Devinder alias Kala Ram and others v. State of Haryana (2012) 10 SCC 763 , Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2020) 11 SCC 489 , Kans Raj v. State of Punjab AIR 2000 SC 2324 gave benefit of doubt to the appellant therein and acquitted him of the charges. 29 The so called remark of fitness was recorded by Dr. Shrey Chandrakar of Community Health Centre, Kumhari, District Durg, on 09.01.2022 at about 8:35 p.m. but the patient was referred and admitted to the DKS Hospital, Raipur, where the dying declaration was recorded on the next day i.e. 10.01.2022 at about 11:58 a.m. and there is no fitness certificate issued by any Doctor who was attending the patient in the DKS Hospital, Raipur. 30 A careful perusal of the dying declaration would show that the deceased stated that her husband poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze after a quarrel. The question for consideration would be, whether the dying declaration given by her was true and voluntary and conviction can be based upon it without corroboration? 31 The Supreme Court in the matter of Jayamma and another v. State of Karnataka , (2021) 6 SCC 213 , has considered the case of Chacko v. State of Kerala (2003) 1 SCC 112 , paras 3 and 4 and held as under: - “14.2. In Chacko v. State of Kerala , this Court declined to accept the prosecution case based on the dying declaration where the deceased was about 70 years old and had suffered 80 per cent burns.
In Chacko v. State of Kerala , this Court declined to accept the prosecution case based on the dying declaration where the deceased was about 70 years old and had suffered 80 per cent burns. It was held that it would be difficult to accept that the injured could make a detailed dying declaration after a lapse of about 8 to 9 hours of the burning, giving minute details as to the motive and the manner in which he had suffered the injuries. That was of course a case where there was no certification by the doctor regarding the mental and physical condition of the deceased to make dying declaration. Nevertheless, this Court opined that the manner in which the incident was recorded in the dying declaration created grave doubts to the genuineness of the document. The Court went on to opine that even though the doctor therein had recorded “patient conscious, talking” in the wound certificate, that fact by itself would not further the case of the prosecution as to the condition of the patient making the dying declaration, nor would the oral evidence of the doctor or the investigating officer, made before the court for the first time, in any manner improve the prosecution case.” 32 The Supreme Court, in the matter of Irfan @ Naka v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1060 has considered certain parameters to trust whether a dying declaration could be acted upon solely for securing conviction or not. It was observed as under: “62. There is no hard and fast rule for determining when a dying declaration should be accepted; the duty of the Court is to decide this question in the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case and be fully convinced of the truthfulness of the same. Certain factors below reproduced can be considered to determine the same, however, they will only affect the weight of the dying declaration and not its admissibility: - (i) Whether the person making the statement was in expectation of death? (ii) Whether the dying declaration was made at the earliest opportunity? “Rule of First Opportunity” (iii) Whether there is any reasonable suspicion to believe the dying declaration was put in the mouth of the dying person? (iv) Whether the dying declaration was a product of prompting, tutoring or leading at the instance of police or any interested party?
(ii) Whether the dying declaration was made at the earliest opportunity? “Rule of First Opportunity” (iii) Whether there is any reasonable suspicion to believe the dying declaration was put in the mouth of the dying person? (iv) Whether the dying declaration was a product of prompting, tutoring or leading at the instance of police or any interested party? (v) Whether the statement was not recorded properly? (vi) Whether, the dying declarant had opportunity to clearly observe the incident? (vii) Whether, the dying declaration has been consistent throughout? (viii) Whether, the dying declaration in itself is a manifestation / fiction of the dying person’s imagination of what he thinks transpired? (ix) Whether, the dying declaration was itself voluntary? (x) In case of multiple dying declarations, whether, the first one inspires truth and consistent with the other dying declaration? (xi) Whether, as per the injuries, it would have been impossible for the deceased to make a dying declaration? 63. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the charge against the accused beyond the reasonable doubt. The benefit of doubt must always go in favour of the accused. It is true that dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind. It is just not enough for the court to say that the dying declaration is reliable as the accused is named in the dying declaration as the assailant.” 33 With regard to the absence of separate certificate regarding fit state of mind of victim before making dying declaration, relying on the judgment, the Supreme Court in the matter of Paparambaka Rosamma and others v. State of A.P. (1999) 7 SCC 695 has held as under: “9. It is true that the medical officer Dr. K.Vishnupriya Devi (PW 10) at the end of the dying declaration had certified “patient is conscious while recording the statement”. It has come on record that the injured Smt. Venkata Ramana had sustained extensive burn injuries on her person. Dr. P.Koteswara Rao (PW 9) who performed the post-mortem stated that injured had sustained 90% burn injuries. In this case as stated earlier, the prosecution case solely rested on the dying declaration.
It has come on record that the injured Smt. Venkata Ramana had sustained extensive burn injuries on her person. Dr. P.Koteswara Rao (PW 9) who performed the post-mortem stated that injured had sustained 90% burn injuries. In this case as stated earlier, the prosecution case solely rested on the dying declaration. It was, therefore, necessary for the prosecution to prove the dying declaration as being genuine, true and free from all doubts and it was recorded when the injured was in a fit state of mind. In our opinion, the certificate appended to the dying declaration at the end by Dr. Smt. K.Vishnupriya Devi (PW 10) did not comply with the requirement inasmuch as she has failed to certify that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of recording the dying declaration. The certificate of the said expert at the end only says that “patient is conscious while recording the statement”. In view of these material omissions, it would not be safe to accept the dying declaration (Ex.P-14) as true and genuine and as made when the injured was in a fit state of mind. From the judgments of the courts below, it appears that this aspect was not kept in mind and resultantly they erred in accepting the said dying declaration (Ex.P-14) as a true, genuine and as made when the injured was in a fit state of mind. In medical science two stages namely conscious and a fit state of mind are distinct and are not synonymous. One may be conscious but not necessarily in a fit state of mind. This distinction was overlooked by the courts below.” 34 Applying the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Paparambaka Rosamma (supra) to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that the dying declaration suffers from infirmity where the victim had suffered about 90% deep thermal injury {as per the merg intimation and the documents enclosed with the affidavits, as above} and still there is no certificate by the Doctor declaring that the victim was in a fit state of mind to give the dying declaration. 35 In the present case, the investigating officer (PW-11) Sudhashu Baghel, has not bothered to collect any certificate to be given by the Doctor with respect to the mental fitness of the deceased.
35 In the present case, the investigating officer (PW-11) Sudhashu Baghel, has not bothered to collect any certificate to be given by the Doctor with respect to the mental fitness of the deceased. The dying declaration of a victim is a strong piece of evidence and carries great value, but it is equally important that the said declaration has been made by the victim in a sound state of mind. 36 In the present case, the dying declaration (Exhibit P/17) was recorded by Abhishek Rathore, Tahsildar (PW-9) who did not bother to obtain a certificate from the treating Doctor. In his deposition before the Court, the said witness though stated that only after obtaining the oral consent from the Doctor, he proceeded to record the dying declaration but no where he has been able to tell even the name of the Doctor who had certified that the deceased was in a fit mental state to give her statement. Absence of such certificate is fatal for the prosecution. 37 The name of the treating Doctors, i.e. Dr. Samriddhi Agrawal and Dr. Azeez Alam, has surfaced only after filing of the affidavit by the Chief Secretary of the State and the Medical Superintendent, DKS Superspeciality Hospital, Raipur. These Doctors have not been examined as witness in this case who could have thrown some light with respect to the mental state of the deceased. The absence of a certificate from the treating Doctor with regard to mental fitness of the deceased is a big lacuna on the part of the investigating agency and the said lacuna would definitely be beneficial for the accused/appellant as in absence of any such certificate, it would not be safe to convict the appellant. 38 As such, there appears to be a grave suspicion as to whether the deceased herself attempted suicide and falsely roped the appellant as admittedly, on the date of incident, the deceased and the appellant had a quarrel and in a fit of anger, she could have attempted the suicide or it might be a case of accidental fire. 39 From the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that there is no corroborative evidence to the dying declaration and there is no other evidence led by the prosecution to connect the appellant with the offence in question.
39 From the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that there is no corroborative evidence to the dying declaration and there is no other evidence led by the prosecution to connect the appellant with the offence in question. Therefore, it would be unsafe to convict the appellant merely on the basis of dying declaration. 40 In view of the aforesaid analysis, and with a heavy heart, we are constrained to observe that the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error in convicting and sentencing the appellant as the prosecution has failed to prove its case its beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the conviction recorded by the trial Court on the basis of dying declaration (Exhibit P/17) cannot be sustained. The conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 is liable to be and is accordingly set aside. 41 For the foregoing reasons, criminal appeal filed by the appellant- Ramesh Chakradhari is allowed and his conviction and sentence under Section 302 of the IPC, awarded by the learned trial Court, are hereby set aside. The accused / appellant is acquitted of the charge levelled against him. The appellant, who is reported to be in jail, shall be set at liberty forthwith if no longer required in any other criminal case. 42 Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the accused-appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
43 Before parting with the case, this Court deems it appropriate to remind the authorities of the State, especially the Chief Secretary, Government of Chhattisgarh and the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh, that earlier, this Court, vide order dated 07.10.2025 in Cr.A. No. 1293/2022 { Bhemeshvar v. State } had directed to ensure that necessary and comprehensive instructions are issued forthwith to all concerned authorities and investigating agencies so that in such matters, no procedural lapses occur which may result in unwarranted acquittal of the accused persons for want of credible evidence. The Magistrates/ Executive Magistrates, Medical Officers, and Investigating Officers across the State shall be specifically instructed that while recording a dying declaration, a clear, written, and contemporaneous certificate must invariably be obtained from the attending Medical Officer certifying the mental fitness of the declarant at the relevant time. Such certification shall be treated as a mandatory procedural safeguard to eliminate any doubt regarding the genuineness and voluntariness of the dying declaration. Compliance with these directions shall be strictly monitored by the supervisory authorities to ensure that the integrity of the criminal justice process is preserved and that the trial courts are aided by reliable and admissible evidence in recording findings of conviction or acquittal. 44 Further, this Court, in order dated 07.08.2025 in Cr.A. No. 499/2025, { Sitaram Ravi v. State of Chhattisgarh } had directed that these authorities shall strictly follow the mandatory provisions of law so that the accused may not take benefit of such lapses as the offence like the present one. Such offence has to be dealt strictly in accordance with law with heavy hand in order to maintain rule of law in the State and the guilty should not be allowed to escape from the clutches of law. The trial Courts shall also oversee the actions of prosecution and investigating agencies as indicated by the Supreme Court in Chhotan Sao and another v. State of Bihar { (2014) 4 SCC 54 } and State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai and others { (2014) 5 SCC 108 }. 45 The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back forthwith to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. 46 A copy of this judgment be sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of Chhattisgarh, as well as Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh, for information and necessary action, forthwith.