1 2025:CGHC:56853-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 852 of 2025 M/s. N.R. Marketings 15, New Panchsheel Nagar, Civil Lines, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh Through Authorised Partner- Mr. Navratan Bhattad S/o Shri P.R. Bhattad, Aged About 48 Years, R/o- 15, New Panchsheel Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Principal Secretary, Chhattisgarh Revenue And Disaster Management Department, S - 2-48, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, India Pin- 492001. 2 - Chief Judicial Magistrate (Acting Under Ministerial/ Administrative Capacity U/s 14 Of The Securitisation And Reconstruction Of Financial Assets And Enforcement Of Security Interest Act, 2002 (Sarfaesi Act)), District Court Premises, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, India Pin- 492001. 3 - Tahsildar - Raipur Tahsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, India, Pin- 492001. 4 - M/s. Authum Investment And Infrastructure Limited (A Company Registered Under Company Act 1956) (Cin - L51109mh1982plc319008), Having Its Registered Address - 707, Raheja Centre, Free Press Journal Marg, Nariman Point, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India Pin- 400021. 5 - M/s. Reliance Commercial Finance Limited (A Company Registered Under Company Act 1956 Having Company Identification No. ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 U66010mh2000plc128301), Reliance Centre, 6th Floor, South Wing, Off-Western Express Highway, Santacruz (East) Mumbai, Maharashtra, India, Pin 400055. 6 - Branch Manager, M/s. Reliance Commercial Finance Limited, Having Their Branch Office At 3rd Floor, Simran Tower, Opposite LIC Building, Pandri, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, India, Pin- 492001. ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Rajkamal Singh, Advocate through video-conferencing and Mr. Suryapratap Yuddhveer Singh, Advocate For State/respondents : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Govt. Advocate For respondent No.4 : Mr. Ritesh Sharma, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 24 . 11 .202 5 1. Heard Mr. Rajkamal Singh through video-conferencing and Mr.Suryapratap Yuddhveer Singh, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondents and Mr. Ritesh Sharma, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No.4. 2. By way of present writ appeal under Section 2 of Sub-Section (1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench Act, 2006, the appellant, who was writ petitioner in the writ petition has challenged the impugned order dated 08.09.2025 passed by 3 learned Single Judge in WPC No.3887 of 2025 (M/s. N.R. Marketing Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), by which the writ petition filed by the appellant / writ petitioner has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge as not maintainable with the following prayers :- “6.1 That, the hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to allow the writ appeal & set aside the order dated 08.09.2025 passed by the hon'ble Single Judge in WPC No. 3887/2025. 6.2 That, the hon'ble court may please be kind enough to quash and set aside the orders dated 09.05.2024 and 28.03.2025 passed by the Ld. CJM, Raipur u/s 14 SARFAESI Act & declare that no action under SARFAESI Act can be taken against appellant in respect of the alleged loans. 6.3 That, the hon'ble court may please be kind enough to Direct the respondents to drop all recovery proceedings relating to Loan Agreement Nos. RLCPRAI000042308 & RLCPRAI000042289. 5. Restrain the respondents from disturbing appellant's peaceful possession over House No. 18, Plot No. 18, Municipal House No. 42/18, New Panchsheel Nagar, Raipur. 6.4 That, any other reliefs and costs deemed fit may please be allowed to the appellants.” 3. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are that the appellant / writ petitioner has filed WPC No.3887 of 2025 (M/s. N.R. Marketing Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others) challenging the order dated 14.11.2024 passed by the respondent No.3 (affixed on 08.05.2025 at the house of the partners of the 4 petitioner firm) against the petitioner and its partners/ guarantors at the instance of respondent No.3-5 under the ministerial administrative order dated 09.05.2024 passed by the respondent No.2 under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, ‘SARFAESI Act, 2002’) and the order dated 28.03.2025 passed by the respondent No.2 on the ground that the actions of the officials of the respondent No.4 and 5 are illegal, and arbitrary, without there being any recoverable debt in view of the provisions of Article 57 of the Schedule in terms of Section 2(j) & 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and without giving the appellants any opportunity of hearing to show the factual & legal aspects of the case. The said writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge holding that the same is not maintainable. Hence, this appeal. 4. Mr. Rajkamal Singh, learned counsel for the appellant appearing through video-conferencing submits that the learned Single Judge has not considered the law declared by the 3 Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in "Jignesh Shah Vs. Union of India; Writ Petition (C) No.455 of 2019 reported as (2019) 10 SC 750" wherein it has been categorically held that, for invoking action under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002, the Debt in question must be a legally enforceable debt. It is urged that in the present case, since the claim of the respondent-Bank is barred by limitation, the debt is not legally enforceable and therefore the 5 proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 are liable to be quashed". He submits that the appellant is a partnership firm who has taken a commercial loan of Rs.58,71,390/- under the Loan Agreement No. RLCPRAI000042308 and Rs.66,28,610/- under Loan Agreement No. RLCPRAI000042289, a total of Rs.1,25,00,000.00 (One Crore Twenty Five Lakh) from the respondent No.4 and in relation to which the appellant's joint residential land bearing House No.18, Plot No.18, Municipal House No.42/ 18, New Panchseel Nagar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh admeasuring 4140 square feet was proposed for mortgage, but the mortgage deed could not be registered and therefore, the security interest could also not be created thereupon in terms of the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and rules thereunder. 5. Mr. Singh also submits that the appellant firm was regularly paying the installments / interests through Electronic Clearing Services (ECS) up till 22.05.2015 through their current A/c No. 30622538325 held by them with the State Bank of India, SME Branch Raipur, Chhattisgarh and paid back almost Rs.1,25,00,000/- and after 22.05.2018, there was neither any payment request nor thereafter there was no communication or transaction between the appellant & the respondent No.5, hence the respondent made a final request by email dated 22.05.2019 for recommencing the transactions with regard to the above- mentioned loan, but the said letter fetched no response as such the debt has become time barred with effect from 22.05.2022 by 6 efflux of 3 years' time, in view of the provisions of article 57 of the Schedule in terms of section 2 (j) & 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 therefore, there is no any recoverable debt in absence of any mutual agreement between parties under section 25 (3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and hence the actions being carried out by respondents under the provisions SARFAESI Act, 2002 are baseless, unjustified & inapplicable in the matter. 6. Mr. Singh contended that since the recovery of loan itself is time barred and without authority therefore, the petitioner's writ petition could not have been dismissed as not maintainable on the basis of the Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110 and PHR Invent Eduction Certificate V. UCO Bank and Others (2024) 6 sec 559 those have no application in the present case because it is already held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that, in the time barred cases the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 has no application at all therefore, it cannot be said that, the petitioner has a statutory forum available under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. He contended that the respondent private respondents have committed egregious fraud with the appellant by misusing the provisions of law & misleading the law enforcing authorities by suppressing the facts that the alleged loan was non-recoverable debt being time barred in view of the provisions of article 57 of the schedule in terms of section 2 (j) & 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and whereas the respondent 7 authorities have not given the petitioners any opportunity of hearing as to show the factual & legal aspects of the case though there was nothing on record to show the compliance with the provisions of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Ritesh Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent No.4 opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant / writ petitioner, as non-maintainable, as the petitioner has already availed the statutory remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur by filing SA No. 13/2025 and the same is pending consideration, in which no interference is called for. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 9. Contention of the counsel for the petitioner before learned Single Judge was that the recovery proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 are wholly without jurisdiction, in as much as the alleged recovery is already barred by limitation. It was contended that the mortgage deed in question being unregistered is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose. He further argued that respondent No.5 has preferred an application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for taking possession of the mortgaged property and for recovery of the loan, even though at the relevant time, the 8 concerned authority was not in existence. On the strength of these submissions, it was urged that the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India deserves to be invoked. Further, learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed his reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Kerala State financial Enterprises Ltd. Vs.C.S.Saji and Others (2018) 14 SC 486, wherein it has been held that for invoking action under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002, the Debt in question must be a legally enforceable debt. It was urged that in the present case, since the claim of the respondent-Bank is barred by limitation, the debt is not legally enforceable and therefore the proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 are liable to be quashed. 10. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State as well as and respondent No.4 submitted that the petitioner has already availed the statutory remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur by filing SA No. 13/2025 which is pending consideration. It was further submitted that an efficacious alternative remedy being available to the petitioner, the writ petition is not maintainable. 11. It is the trite law that when the statutory remedy available under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act, 2002 the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised because the same have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. Even 9 such practice has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions {Union Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 110}. 12. By placing reliance upon the decision rendered in Satyawati Tondon (supra), recently the Supreme Court in the matter of PHR Invent Educational Society vs. UCO Bank & Ors. reported in (2024) 6 SCC 579 held that the High Court should not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution particularly when an alternative remedy is available. The Supreme Court held thus at Paras 37, 38 and 41 :- “37. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out certain exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. Some of them are thus: (i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question; (ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; (iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and (iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles. of natural justice. 38. It has however been clarified that the High Court will not entertain a a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 41. While dismissing the writ petition, we will have to 10 remind the High Courts of the following words of this Court in Satyawati Tondon3 since we have come across various matters wherein the High Courts have been entertaining petitions arising out of the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act in spite of availability of an effective alternative remedy: (SCC p. 128, para 55) "55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act d and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." 13. Applying the well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case and for the reasons mentioned above and also the fact that the matter is pending before the DRT, which has been filed by the appellant herein, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error while passing the impugned order dismissing the writ petition as not maintainable. 14. Accordingly, the writ appeal, being devoid of merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra