APHC010052962025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3506] MONDAY,THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 386/2025 Between: 1. RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY, 3RD FLOOR. NO.29, NORTH USMAN ROAD, T.NAGAR, CHENNAI. ...APPELLANT AND 1. NUKASANI PURUSHOTTAM, S/O.RAMA KRISHNAIAH AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS, BINGINAPALLI VILLAGE, SINGARAYAKONDA MANDAL, PRAKASAM DISTRICT 2. SIGARAVELAN, S/O.M.GANAPATHI MUDALIAR, AGE 35 YEARS. OLD NO. 101, NEW NO.20, ANGAMMAL KOIL, RED HILLS, CHENNAI-52 3. DHARVEES P, S/O.PAROOK, AGED 40 YEARS, SOURAPATTU VILLAGE, ALLINAGAR, SHOLAVARAM,CHENNAI-67. ...RESPONDENT(S): Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be pleased tomay be pleased to allow this appeal by setting aside the decree and judgment passed in M.V.O.P.No.134 of 2014 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal VIII Additional District court, Ongole dated 11th day of July, 2022 and pass such IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to condone the delay of 835 days in filing the M.A.C.M.A. against the decree and judgment M.V.O.P.No.134 of 2014 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal VIII Additional District court, Ongole dated 11th day of July, 2022, and pass such IA NO: 2 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to grant stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the Judgment and Decree dated 24th day of Febuary, 2024 passed in M.V.O.P.No.134 of 2014 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal VIII Additional District court, Ongole dated 11th day of July, 2022, including the execution proceedings, pending disposal of the main M.A.C.M.A. and pass such Counsel for the Appellant: 1. GUDI SRINIVASU Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. The Court made the following: JUDGEMENT: I.A.No.1 of 2025 IN/AND M.A.C.M.A.No.386 of 2025 This application is filed seeking to condone delay of 835 days in preferring the present appeal. 2. Heard Sri Gudi Srinivasu, learned counsel for appellant/applicant. Despite service of notice, none appeared for respondents. 3. The respondents herein initiated M.V.O.P.No.134 of 2014 under Section 163-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- for injuries sustained in road accident. The Tribunal after considering the evidence on record ultimately passed award on 11.07.2022. In normal course, the appeal ought to have been preferred within 90 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order. In the affidavit filed in support of the present application, it is stated that the copy application for certified copies itself was filed for the first time on 30.09.2024 i.e., nearly after 2 years of passing the award. The copies of the same came to be delivered on 09.10.2024. Yet again, they took considerable time in filing the appeal which ultimately came to be presented only on 31.01.2025. It is stated that on account of delay in making the application and later then presenting the same before this Court, the aforesaid delay occurred. 4. Perused the record and considered the rival submissions. 5. The Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India & anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his Lr 1 , in particular, Para Nos.24 to 27 & 35, held the following: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 1 2024 SCC Online SC 489 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.” 6. Further, in H.Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A.Krishnaiah Since deceased by Lrs.2 Judgment, in particular in Para Nos.15 & 16, reads as under: “15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. 16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.” 2 2025 SCC Online SC 54 7. Though learned counsel for the appellant tried to convince the Court by addressing merits of the matter, this Court is not inclined to go into the merits unless the inordinate delay is condoned. The said view is fortified by Hon’ble Apex Court in judgments as referred to above by learned counsel for the respondents/claimants. This Court is not convinced with the explanation of the learned counsel and finds that the delay of 835 days is not properly explained and does not find sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the same. 8. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed and so also the Appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed. ______________________________ JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN Date: 28th July, 2025 RKS