Bhagwandas Dengwani (Dead) Through LRs. v. Vinesh Kumar Asra, S/o Late Moolji Bhai Asra
2025-12-12
Narendra Kumar Vyas
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Narendra Kumar Vyas, J. 1. This is defendants’ second appeal filed under Section 100 of the C.P.C. against judgment and decree dated 14.11.2017 passed by Sixth Additional District Judge, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 42-A/2017 (Bhagwandas Dengwani & others Vs. Vinesh Kumar Asra) by which the appeal preferred by the defendants was party allowed directing the appellants to pay Rs. 18,000/- to the plaintiff and affirmed the remaining part of the judgment and decree dated 27.03.2017 passed by the First Civil Judge Class-I, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 14-A/2008 by which the suit filed by the plaintiff has been decreed and directed the eviction of the defendants from the rented shop. 2. For sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms of their status shown in Civil Suit No. 14-A/2008 before the trial Court. 3. The instant Second Appeal was admitted for hearing by this Court on 16.04.2019 on the following substantial questions of law:- (1) Whether Courts below were justified in deciding the Issue No. 2 in view of the bar contained under Section 85 of the Waqf Act, 1995 ? (2) Whether finding of the Court below holding that Section 85 of the Waqf Act, 1995, is not independent and dependent upon Sections 6 & 7 of the said Act, is perverse ? 4. The brief facts, as reflected from the plaint averments are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit on 08.07.2008 against the defendants seeking their eviction, vacant possession of the disputed shop, recovery of arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 20,800/-, damages and further damages from the date of presentation of the suit until delivery of vacant possession of the shop mainly contending that:- (A) The property is an old two-storied house with cheap girders situated at Sadar Bazar, Ward 45, R.S. Shukla Road, Raipur, bearing Municipal House No. 45/124, measuring 564.30 sq. ft. (hereafter referred to as “suit property”) in which the shop is located. It has been contended that Abdul Rahim Khan, son of Late Masood Khan, resident of Juni Line, Bilaspur (Tahsil and District Bilaspur), was the sole owner of the suit property. The suit property consists of shop wherein the front portion of the shop is used for business activity and back portion is used for storage of goods.
It has been contended that Abdul Rahim Khan, son of Late Masood Khan, resident of Juni Line, Bilaspur (Tahsil and District Bilaspur), was the sole owner of the suit property. The suit property consists of shop wherein the front portion of the shop is used for business activity and back portion is used for storage of goods. It is also case of the plaintiff that the defendants’ father Parumal, S/o Shivnathmal, was a tenant of Abdul Rahim Khan and resides at ground floor which is used as non-residential purposes on a monthly rent of Rs. 500/-. It is also case of the plaintiff that Parumal was doing cloth business in the said shop and after his death, the defendants being his legal heirs, continued the cloth business in the same shop as tenants of Abdul Rahim Khan. (B) It has been further contended that Abdul Rahim Khan sold the said house to the plaintiff through a registered sale deed dated 13.01.2005 and after purchasing the property by the plaintiff from Abdul Rahim Khan, the defendants became tenants of the plaintiff in respect of the rented portion. The plaintiff sent a notice on 05.07.2005 to the defendants through his counsel informing them about the purchase and demanded rent but the defendants did not pay the rent. It has been further contended that tenancy month commenced on the first day of the English calendar month and ended on the last day of the same month, and the rent was payable in advance every month. Since the defendants failed to pay rent within two months of demand, they became liable for eviction from the suit property. It has been further contended that the plaintiff sent another notice on 10.06.2008 to the defendants through his counsel stating that he has terminated the tenancy w.e.f. 30.06.2008 and demanded vacant possession of the disputed shop along with the entire arrears of rent. Even after receiving the notice, the defendants neither paid the arrears of rent nor handed over vacant possession of the shop and denied the plaintiff’s ownership and status as landlord. On account of non-payment of rent despite demand, the defendants were held liable to pay the arrears of rent from 13.01.2005 to 30.06.2008 amounting to Rs. 20,800/- and damages at Rs. 100/- per day from 01.07.2008 until the date of filing of the suit.
On account of non-payment of rent despite demand, the defendants were held liable to pay the arrears of rent from 13.01.2005 to 30.06.2008 amounting to Rs. 20,800/- and damages at Rs. 100/- per day from 01.07.2008 until the date of filing of the suit. (C) It has been further contended that since the defendants have denied the plaintiff’s ownership and landlordship, they are liable to be evicted from the disputed shop. The plaintiff has also pleaded bonafide requirement of the shop for running his own cloth business as he has no other suitable non-residential premises available at Raipur to run his business. Hence, the defendants are liable to be evicted under Section 12(1)(c) of the Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 5. The defendants have filed written statement denying the allegation made in the plaint mainly contending that:- (A) Abdul Rahim Khan was the owner of the house No. 45/124 and he was merely entitled to receive rent of Shop No. 11/124, which forms part of Waqf property belonging to the State Waqf Board (Chhattisgarh/Madhya Pradesh). It has been further contended that suit property is Waqf property of the State Waqf Board and they being successors of Champalal, were in possession of the suit property and running their business there for the past 50 years and according to the registered Waqfnama dated 14.09.1940 of Haji Akbar Khan (Waqf-al- Aulad), Abdul Rahim Khan was only entitled to receive rent, as such he was not the owner, therefore, he has no authority to execute the sale- deed. It has been further contended that the registered sale-deed dated 13.01.2005 executed in favour of the plaintiff is suspicious as Abdul Rahim Khan signed it on 12.01.2005 and in page 2 of the sale- deed, the number “4” in “45/124” has been manually corrected without signatures endorsing the correction. (B) It has been further contended that in reply to the notice dated 05.07.2005 sent by the plaintiff’s counsel, they had informed that the property belongs to the Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board, therefore, the plaintiff is not the landlord. Since Shop No. 11/124, Sadar Bazar, Raipur is under the jurisdiction of the Waqf Board, the provisions of Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(g) of the Accommodation Control Act do not apply. It has been contended that the plaintiff is not the owner or landlord of the suit property and he cannot terminate the tenancy on 30.06.2008.
Since Shop No. 11/124, Sadar Bazar, Raipur is under the jurisdiction of the Waqf Board, the provisions of Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(g) of the Accommodation Control Act do not apply. It has been contended that the plaintiff is not the owner or landlord of the suit property and he cannot terminate the tenancy on 30.06.2008. It has been further contended that the suit valuation has been done as on 13.01.2005 whereas cause of action has been arisen on 30.06.2008, as such the suit is barred by limitation. It has been further contended that the plaintiff owns several shops including one adjacent to the defendants’ shop; hence the plea of bonafide requirement is false. It has been further contended that the Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board, Raipur, through notice dated 27.12.2005, has informed the defendants that the shop is Waqf property, therefore, the suit is not maintainable. It has also been contended that the appeal committee constituted by Municipal Council Raipur has rejected the claim of the plaintiff for mutation but the same has not been challenged by the plaintiff before any court of law, as such the suit is not maintainable. 6. Learned trial Court on the pleadings of the parties has framed as many as eight issues which are extracted below:- 7. The plaintiff to substantiate his case has examined himself as PW-1, Mohammad Ayyub Rajjak (PW-2) and exhibited documents namely Sale Deed dated 11.01.2005 (Ex. P/1) Property and Sewerage Tax Receipt dated 28.02.2005 (Ex. P/2), Property and Sewerage Tax Receipt dated 30.09.2005 (Ex. P/3), Property and Sewerage Tax Receipt dated 31.10.2007 (Ex. P/4), Notice sent through counsel dated 10.06.2008 (Ex. P/5), Postal Receipts (Ex. P/6 to P/9), Acknowledgements (Ex. P/10 to 13), Reply sent by the defendant dated 17.06.2008 (Ex. P/14), Certified copy of the order passed by the Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board dated 06.01.2007 (Ex. P/15). 8. The defendants to substantiate their case have examined Anandram Dengwani (DW-1), Shyamsundar Sharma (DW-2), Dr. S.A. Faruqui (DW-3), Amit Dengwani (DW-4), Shailendra Kumar Dani (DW-5) and exhibited document namely certified copy of the order dated 21.12.2006 passed in the appeal proceedings by the Appellate Committee, Municipal Corporation Raipur (Ex. D/1), Rent Receipt dated 07.05.2004 (Ex. D/2), Letter of Parumal Shivanmal dated 10.02.2004 (Ex. D/3), Information letter submitted by the plaintiff’s Advocate dated 10.06.2008 (Ex. D/4), Reply to the information letter dated 17.06.2008 (Ex.
D/1), Rent Receipt dated 07.05.2004 (Ex. D/2), Letter of Parumal Shivanmal dated 10.02.2004 (Ex. D/3), Information letter submitted by the plaintiff’s Advocate dated 10.06.2008 (Ex. D/4), Reply to the information letter dated 17.06.2008 (Ex. D/5), Information letter submitted by the plaintiff dated 05.07.2005 (Ex. D/6), Reply to the information letter dated 11.07.2005 (Ex. D/7), Certified copy of the petition filed by the Chhattisgarh Waqf Board before the Hon’ble High Court (Ex. D/8), Reply filed in the said petition (Ex. D/9), Certified copy of the order sheets from 20.02.1991 to 15.03.2007 (Ex. D/10), Order of the Hon’ble High Court dated 15.03.2007 (Ex. D/11), Letter sent by the Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board dated 17.02.2006 (Ex. D/12), Details of Waqf properties situated in Raipur District (17 pages) (Ex. D/13), Note- sheet of the Waqf Board (Ex. D/14), Annexure in two pages (Ex. D/15), Gazette dated 25.08.1989 consisting of 30 pages (Ex. D/16), Copy of the show-cause notice sent to the plaintiff dated 18.05.2006 (Ex. D/17), Auqaf Register (Ex. D/18), Application submitted before the Madhya Pradesh Waqf Board (Ex. D/19), Information supplied by the Madhya Pradesh Waqf Board (Ex. D/20), cerified copy of the Auqaf Register, (Ex. D/21) & Waqf Deed (Ex. D/22). 9. Plaintiff- Vinesh Kumar Asra (PW-1) in his examination-in-chief by way of affidavit has reiterated the averments made in the plaint and has stated that the owner of the said property was Abdul Rahim Khan himself and that the property was not Waqf property as evident from order dated 06.03.2007 (Ex. P/15) passed by the Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board. This witness was extensively cross-examined by the defendants wherein he has stated that he is not aware that except Ex. P/15 whether any proceedings in any court has been initiated by the State Waqf Board or not. He has denied that the suit property which was purchased from Abdul Rahim Khan is rented or lease property. He has denied that the ownership of the suit property is with the Waqf Board and also denied the sale-deed (Ex. P/1) is forged and fabricated. 10. Mohammad Ayyub Rajjak (PW-2) in his examination-in-chief has supported the case of the plaintiff and in the cross-examination, he has admitted that when he signed on the Ex.P/1, seller- Abdul Rahim Khan and purchaser- Vinesh Kumar were present. He has also admitted that there was correction by pen in Ex.
P/1) is forged and fabricated. 10. Mohammad Ayyub Rajjak (PW-2) in his examination-in-chief has supported the case of the plaintiff and in the cross-examination, he has admitted that when he signed on the Ex.P/1, seller- Abdul Rahim Khan and purchaser- Vinesh Kumar were present. He has also admitted that there was correction by pen in Ex. P/1 and he has also admitted that there was no mention about said correction in sale-deed. He has denied that correction was done in the sale-deed in his presence and has denied that the correction in D to D part of page 2 Ex. P/1 has been done after his signature over it. 11. Anandram Dengwani (DW-1) in his examination-in-chief by way of affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC has reiterated the stand taken by him in the written statement and in the cross-examination, he has admitted that the shop belongs to Abdul Rahim Khan. He has also admitted that there was no conversation between him and the plaintiff about vacating and depositing the amount as he does not recognize the plaintiff as owner. He has also admitted that after acknowledgment, he has not paid the rent. 12. Shyamsundar Sharma (DW-2) in examination-in-chief has supported the case of the defendants and in the cross-examination he has admitted that he has not seen any document of the Waqf Board in favour of Abdul Rahim Khan. 13. Dr. S.A. Faruqui (DW-3) who was working as Chief Executive Officer in the C.G. Waqf Board has stated that he has placed on record the description of the waqf property in 17 pages and exhibited as Ex. D/13. He has also stated that Sr. No. 21 of Ex. D/13 Page No. 4 which is situated at Sadar Bazar, Gol Bazar and Bayron Bazar are not the waqf property. He has voluntarily stated that the waqfnama dated 14.09.1990 is not the waqf property. He has also stated that he has placed the gazette dated 25.08.1989 in 30 pages and exhibited as Ex. D/16 where there is no description of waqf property at Raipur. In the cross-examination, he has admitted that in Ex. D/13, the property which has been described at Serial No. 21, is not recorded in the survey register and auqaf register.
He has also stated that he has placed the gazette dated 25.08.1989 in 30 pages and exhibited as Ex. D/16 where there is no description of waqf property at Raipur. In the cross-examination, he has admitted that in Ex. D/13, the property which has been described at Serial No. 21, is not recorded in the survey register and auqaf register. He has also stated that the property which has been described at Serial No. 21, is not waqf property, therefore, they have withdrawn the writ petition before the High Court. He has admitted in paragraph 18 that the suit property is not waqf property, as such no question arises to give the suit property on lease to Abdul Rahim Khan. 14. Amit Dengwani (DW-4) in his examination-in-chief has stated that Haji Akbar Khan has exhibited registered waqf deed and has given to the Waqf Board and he has obtained certified copy of registered waqf deed, as such the suit property is waqf property. In the cross- examination, he has admitted that through Ex. D/20, Madhya Pradesh Waqf Board Bhopal has informed that the documents namely registration, survey, gazette and other records have been handed over to Chhattisgarh Waqf Board by special messenger and also admitted that they have not paid any rent to M.P./C.G. Waqf Board. 15. Shailendra Kumar Dani (DW-5) who is record keeper of the office of Deputy Registrar Raipur in his cross-examination has admitted that Ex. D/22, is the register of document only in which neither there is signature of Haji Mohammad Akbar Khan nor any witness. He has voluntarily stated that the original document is signed. 16. Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence and material on record has decreed the suit in favour the plaintiff.
D/22, is the register of document only in which neither there is signature of Haji Mohammad Akbar Khan nor any witness. He has voluntarily stated that the original document is signed. 16. Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence and material on record has decreed the suit in favour the plaintiff. Learned trial Court while deciding Issue No. 2 has examined the provisions of Section 85 of the Waqf Act, 1995 (for short “the Act, 1995”) according to which the dispute pertaining to waqf property can be determined by the Waqf Tribunal only, not by the civil court and has recorded its finding that the jurisdiction of civil court, has not been exclusively barred but only the matters fall within the ambit of Section 6 (1) & 7(1) of the Act, 1995 and by virtue of provisions of Section 85 of the Act, 1995, the civil court has no jurisdiction and has recorded its finding that these two Sections will be applicable when the property is included in the schedule of the waqf property. Learned trial Court after elaborately discussing the evidence and material on record, has recorded its finding that from perusal of Ex. D/22, the suit property is not identified as waqf property and the defendants are unable to prove that the suit property is waqf property and accordingly, answered Issue No. 2 in negative. Learned trial Court after considering the evidence and facts, has held that defendant is tenant of the plaintiff and he has violated the provisions of Section (12) (1)(a), 12(1)(c), 12(1)(e) of the Accommodation Control Act, 1961, has directed for eviction of defendants from the suit property within two months and also directed to pay compensation @ double to the standard rate as per the provisions of Section 12 (6)(b)(1) of the Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 17. Being aggrieved with the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the defendants preferred an appeal which was partly allowed directing the appellants to pay Rs. 18,000/- to the plaintiff but affirmed the remaining part of the judgment and decree dated 27.03.2017 passed by the First Civil Judge Class-I, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 14-A/2008 by which the suit filed by the plaintiff has been decreed and directed for eviction of the defendants from the rented shop.
18,000/- to the plaintiff but affirmed the remaining part of the judgment and decree dated 27.03.2017 passed by the First Civil Judge Class-I, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 14-A/2008 by which the suit filed by the plaintiff has been decreed and directed for eviction of the defendants from the rented shop. Being aggrieved with the judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the defendant has preferred the instant Second Appeal before this Court under Section 100 of the Cr.P.C. which has been admitted by this Court on 16.04.2019 on afore- stated substantial questions of law. 18. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants would submit that the learned Courts below failed to consider the bar contained in Section 85 of the Act, 1995 which provides that no civil suit or other legal proceedings shall lie in any civil court in respect of any dispute, question or other matters relating to any waqf property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a tribunal. He would further submit that the appellant has taken specific plea that the suit property is a waqf property, as such, the plaintiff/respondent is not the owner of the suit property, accordingly, the learned trial Court should have not frame issue and should have return the plaint to the plaintiff for submitting before the tribunal. He would further submit that the respondent has admitted that the disputed property is a waqf property through waqf deed executed on 13.09.1940 by his predecessors and he requested the Waqf Board to give NOC for selling the same which clearly demonstrates that the disputed property is a waqf property and the respondent cannot evict the tenants without obtaining NOC from the Waqf Board. 19. He would further submit that the Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board has filed writ petition before High Court of Madhya Pradesh bearing M.P. No. 655/1991 which has been subsequently transferred and Abdul Rahim Khan has filed reply to the above mentioned petition admitting the fact that the disputed property is a waqf property though subsequently the writ petition was withdrawn, as such there is sufficient material to demonstrate that the suit property is a waqf property, therefore, the civil court has no jurisdiction. He would further submit that Ex.
He would further submit that Ex. D/22 is a waqfnama registered in the year 1940 in which it has been specifically mentioned that the suit property is donated to be a waqf property and the witnesses in their statements have also admitted to the fact that the disputed property is a waqf property still both the Court below erred in proceeding further in the matter instead of returning the plaint for submitting before the appropriate forum. 20. He would further submit that there is concurrent finding of both the courts below to the effect that the suit property is not a waqf property, is perverse, contrary to the law, as such the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court as affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court is liable to be set aside by this Court. He would further submit that the learned Courts below have failed to appreciate the fact that once there is a dispute as to the nature of the property then that dispute has to be forwarded to the Waqf Tribunal for its adjudication but not to the civil courts and would pray for allowing the appeal. To substantiate his submission, he would refer to the judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Rashid Wali Beg Vs. Farid Pindari [ (2022) 4 SCC 414 ] , Mohd. Mashur Kunhi Koya Thangal Vs. Badagara Jumayath Palli Dharas Committee [(2004) 7 SCC 708], Sardar Khan Vs. Najmul Hasan [ (2007) 10 SCC 727 ], Ramesh Gobindram Vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf [(2010) 8 SCC 726], W.B. Wakf Board Vs. Anis Fatma Begum [ (2010) 14 SCC 588 ], Punjab Wakf Board Vs. Pritpal Singh [2013 SCC OnLine SC 1345], Akkode Jumayath Palli Committee Vs. P. Paripalana V. Ibrahim Haji [ (2014) 16 SCC 65 ], Bhanwar Lal Vs. Rajasthan Wakf Board [ (2014) 16 SCC 51 ], Haryana Wakf Board Vs. Mahesh Kumar [ (2014) 16 SCC 45 ], Faseela M. Vs. Munnerul Islam Madrasa Committee [ (2014) 16 SCC 38 ], Rajasthan Wakf Board Vs. Devki Nandan Pathak [ (2017) 14 SCC 561 ], Dharampal Vs. Punjab Wakf Board [ (2018) 11 SCC 449 ], Punjab Wakf Board Vs. Sham Singh Harike [ (2019) 4 SCC 698 ], Kiran Devi Vs. Bihar State Sunnic Wakf Board [ (2021) 15 SCC 15 ], Wakf Telangana State Board Vs. Mohd.
Devki Nandan Pathak [ (2017) 14 SCC 561 ], Dharampal Vs. Punjab Wakf Board [ (2018) 11 SCC 449 ], Punjab Wakf Board Vs. Sham Singh Harike [ (2019) 4 SCC 698 ], Kiran Devi Vs. Bihar State Sunnic Wakf Board [ (2021) 15 SCC 15 ], Wakf Telangana State Board Vs. Mohd. Muzafar [ (2021) 9 SCC 179 ] 21. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs opposing the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants/defendants would submit that there is no dispute that the sale-deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff and the said registered sale-deed is still in existence and has not been challenged the same. He would further submit that vide notice dated 05.07.2005, the plaintiff has informed the defendants/tenants that he had purchased the property from Abdul Rahim Khan and henceforth he would be the owner of the property and now the rent of the accommodation should be paid to him and on 10.06.2008, the tenancy was terminated w.e.f. 30.06.2008, because despite of service of notice in the year 2005, the rent was not being paid and the accommodation is required bonafidely and the ground of denial of title was also there. He would further submit that Shyam Sundar Sharma (DW-2) has admitted that Abdul Rahim Khan was receiving the rent and it was let-out by him and the house is registered in the name of Abdul Rahim Khan as he had executed the sale-deed on 13.01.2005 in respect of the subject house in favor of the plaintiff, therefore, there is no dispute that the sale-deed was executed in favor of the plaintiff and the said registered sale-deed is still in existence and it has not been challenged in any court of law. He would further submit that Anandram Dengwani (DW-1) has specifically admitted that no document has been filed to show the ownership of the Waqf Board and admitted that Waqfnama dated 14.09.1940 has not been produced in the court and no efforts were made to obtain the same. He would further submit that the learned trial Court while deciding the said issue has considered the relevant provisions of Waqf Act, 1995, considered the documents filed by both the parties, the evidence on record and thereafter passed the judgment and decree which are legal and justify. 22. He would further submit that Dr.
He would further submit that the learned trial Court while deciding the said issue has considered the relevant provisions of Waqf Act, 1995, considered the documents filed by both the parties, the evidence on record and thereafter passed the judgment and decree which are legal and justify. 22. He would further submit that Dr. S.A. Faruqui (DW-3) who was working as Chief Executive Officer of the Waqf Board has categorically admitted that no document is available to show that the suit property is a waqf property and even Shailendra Kumar Dani (DW-5), Record Keeper of Registrar (Records) has categorically admitted that in the Waqfnama dated 14.09.1940 there is no signature of Haji Mohammad Akbar Khan and even no signature of the witnesses are there, in fact the same was the photocopy. Learned First Appellate Court has held that Abdul Rahim Khan was the original owner of the suit property and the shop was let-out by him to the ancestors of the defendants on a monthly rent and the subject shop is not a waqf property and no material has been produced to show that, at any point of time the said property was registered as waqf property or no notification has been issued under Section 5 of the Waqf Act, 1995 declaring the property as Waqf property. He would further submit that there is concurrent finding of the fact that the suit property is not a waqf property which cannot be interfered by this Court under Section 100 of CPC unless it is shown that the findings are perverse or contrary to law and contrary to the evidence available on record as held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in case of N. Nagraj Vs. Rajmani & Others [2025 SCC Online SC 762] Suresh Lataruji Ramteke Vs. Suman Bai Pandurang Petkar [2023 (17) SCC 624] and would pray for dismissal of the instant second appeal. 23. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. Discussion and finding on Substantial Questions of Law No. 1 & 2 24. Since both the substantial questions of law are interconnected, therefore, they are being decided commonly.
23. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. Discussion and finding on Substantial Questions of Law No. 1 & 2 24. Since both the substantial questions of law are interconnected, therefore, they are being decided commonly. To appreciate these substantial questions of law, it is expedient for this Court to extract Sections 4 & 5 of the Waqf Act, 1954 as well as Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 & 85 of the Waqf Act, 1995 which are as under:- Waqf Act, 1954 “ Section 4- Preliminary survey of wakfs.- (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint for the State a Commissioner of Wakfs and as many additional or assistant commissioners of wakfs as may be necessary for the purpose of making a survey of wakf properties existing in the State at the date of the commencement of this Act. (2) All additional and assistant commissioners of wakfs shall perform their functions under this Act under the general supervision and control of the Commissioner of Wakfs. (3) The Commissioner shall, after making such inquiry as he may consider necessary, submit his report 2*[in respect of wakfs existing Subs. by s. 2, ibid., for sub-clause (ii). 1 Ins. by Act 38 of 1969, s. 4 (with retrospective effect). 107 at the date of the commencement of this Act in the State or any part thereof,] to the State Government containing the following particulars, namely:- (a) the number of wakfs 1*[in the State, or as the case may be, any part thereof], showing the Shia wakfs and Sunni wakfs separately; (b) the nature and objects of each wakf; (c) the gross income of the property comprised in each wakf; (d) the amount of land revenue, cesses, rates and taxes payable in respect of such property; (e) the expenses incurred in the realisation of the income and the pay or other remuneration of the mutawalli of each wakf; and (f) such other particulars relating to each wakf as may be prescribed. (4) The commissioner shall, while making any inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure.
(4) The commissioner shall, while making any inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 (5 of 1908) in respect of the following matters, namely :-- (a) summoning and examining any witness; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) requisitioning any public record from any court or office; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of any witness or accounts; (e) making any local inspection or local investigation; (f) any other matter which may be prescribed. (5) If, during any such inquiry, any dispute arises as to whether a particular wakf is a Shia wakf or Sunni wakf and there are clear indications in the deed of wakf as to its nature, the dispute shall be decided on the basis of such deed. Section 5- Publication of list of wakfs.- (1) On receipt of a report under sub-section (3) of section 4, the State Government shall forward a copy of the same to the Board. (2) The Board shall examine the report forwarded to it under sub-section (1) and publish, in the Official Gazette, a list of wakfs *[existing in the State, or as the case may be, the part of the State Subs. by Act 38 of 1969, s. 4, for "in the State" (with retrospective effect). 2 Subs. by s. 5, ibid., for "existing in the State" (with retrospective effect). 108 to which the report relates, and] containing such particulars as may be prescribed. Waqf Act, 1995 Section 4. Preliminary survey of 2[auqaf] .—(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint for the State a Survey Commissioner of [Auqaf] and as many Additional or Assistant Survey Commissioners of [Auqaf] as may be necessary for the purpose of making a survey of [auqaf in the State].
Waqf Act, 1995 Section 4. Preliminary survey of 2[auqaf] .—(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint for the State a Survey Commissioner of [Auqaf] and as many Additional or Assistant Survey Commissioners of [Auqaf] as may be necessary for the purpose of making a survey of [auqaf in the State]. [(1A) Every State Government shall maintain a list of auqaf referred to in sub-section (1) and the survey of auqaf shall be completed within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013 (27 of 2013), in case such survey was not done before the commencement of the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013: Provided that where no Survey Commissioner of Waqf has been appointed, a Survey Commissioner for auqaf shall be appointed within three months from the date of such commencement.] (2) All Additional and Assistant Survey Commissioner of [Auqaf] shall perform their functions under this Act under the general supervision and control of the Survey Commissioner of [Auqaf]. (3) The Survey Commissioner shall, after making such inquiry as he may consider necessary, submit his report, in respect of 2[auqaf] existing at the date of the commencement of this Act in the State or any part thereof, to the State Government containing the following particulars, namely:— (a) the number of [auqaf] in the State showing the Shia 2[auqaf] and Sunni [auqaf] separately; (b) the nature and objects of each [waqf]; (c) the gross income of the property comprised in each [waqf]; (d) the amount of land revenue, cesses, rates and taxes payable in respect of each [waqf]; (e) the expenses incurred in the realisation of the income and the pay or other remuneration of the mutawalli of each [waqf]; and (f) such other particulars relating to each [waqf] as may be prescribed. (4) The Survey Commissioner shall, while making any inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in respect of the following matters, namely:— (a) summoning and examining any witness; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) requisitioning any public record from any court or office; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of any witness or accounts; (e) making any local inspection or local investigation; (f) such other matters as may be prescribed.
(5) If, during any such inquiry, any dispute arises as to whether a particular [waqf] is a Shia [waqf] or Sunni [waqf] and there are clear indications in the deed of [waqf] as to its nature, the dispute shall be decided on the basis of such deed. (6) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct the Survey Commissioner to make a second or subsequent survey of 1[waqf] properties in the State and the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) shall apply to such survey as they apply to a survey directed under sub-section (1): Provided that no such second or subsequent survey shall be made until the expiry of a period of [ten years] from the date on which the report in relation to the immediately previous survey was submitted under sub-section (3): [Provided further that the waqf properties already notified shall not be reviewed again in subsequent survey except where the status of such property has been changed in accordance with the provisions of any law.] Section 5. Publication of list of [auqaf] .—(1) On receipt of a report under sub-section (3) of section 4, the State Government shall forward a copy of the same to the Board. (2) The Board shall examine the report forwarded to it under sub- section (1) and [fordward it back to the Government within a period of six months for publication in the Official Gazette] a list of Sunni 4[auqaf] or Shia [auqaf] in the State, whether in existence at the commencement of this Act or coming into existence thereafter, to which the report relates, and containing such other particulars as may be prescribed. [(3) The revenue authorities shall— (i) include the list of auqaf referred to in sub-section (2), while updating the land records; and (ii) take into consideration the list of auqaf referred to in sub-section (2), while deciding mutation in the land records. (4) The State Government shall maintain a record of the lists published under sub-section (2) from time to time.] Section 6. Disputes regarding [auqaf].
(4) The State Government shall maintain a record of the lists published under sub-section (2) from time to time.] Section 6. Disputes regarding [auqaf]. —(1) If any question arises whether a particular property specified as [waqf] property in the list of [auqaf] is [waqf] property or not or whether a [waqf] specified in such list is a Shia [waqf] or Sunni [waqf], the Board or the mutawalli of the [waqf] or [any person aggrieved] may institute a suit in a Tribunal for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal in respect of such matter shall be final: Provided that no such suit shall be entertained by the Tribunal after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the list of [auqaf]: [Provided further that no suit shall be instituted before the Tribunal in respect of such properties notified in a second or subsequent survey pursuant to the provisions contained in sub-section (6) of section 4.] (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no proceeding under this Act in respect of any [waqf] shall be stayed by reason only of the pendency of any such suit or of any appeal or other proceeding arising out of such suit. (3) The Survey Commissioner shall not be made a party to any suit under sub-section (1) and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against him in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rules made thereunder. (4) The list of [auqaf] shall, unless it is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), be final and conclusive. (5) On and from the commencement of this Act in a State, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted or commenced in a court in that State in relation to any question referred to in sub- section (1). Section 7.
(5) On and from the commencement of this Act in a State, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted or commenced in a court in that State in relation to any question referred to in sub- section (1). Section 7. Power of Tribunal to determine disputes regarding [auqaf] .—(1) If, after the commencement of this Act, [any question or dispute] arises, whether a particular property specified as [waqf] property in a list of [auqaf] is [waqf] property or not, or whether a [waqf] specified in such list is a Shia [waqf] or a Sunni [waqf], the Board or the mutawalli of the [waqf], 4[or any person aggrieved by the publication of the list of auqaf under section 5] therein, may apply to the Tribunal having jurisdiction in relation to such property, for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal thereon shall be final: Provided that— (a) in the case of the list of [auqaf] relating to any part of the State and published after the commencement of this Act no such application shall be entertained after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the list of [auqaf]; and (b) in the case of the list of [auqaf] relating to any part of the State and published at any time within a period of one year immediately preceding the commencement of this Act, such an application may be entertained by Tribunal within the period of one year from such commencement: Provided further that where any such question has been heard and finally decided by a civil court in a suit instituted before such commencement, the Tribunal shall not re-open such question. (2) Except where the Tribunal has no jurisdiction by reason of the provisions of sub-section (5), no proceeding under this section in respect of any [waqf] shall be stayed by any court, tribunal or other authority by reason only of the pendency of any suit, application or appeal or other proceeding arising out of any such suit, application, appeal or other proceeding. (3) The Chief Executive Officer shall not be made a party to any application under sub-section (1). (4) The list of [auqaf] and where any such list is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), the list as so modified, shall be final.
(3) The Chief Executive Officer shall not be made a party to any application under sub-section (1). (4) The list of [auqaf] and where any such list is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), the list as so modified, shall be final. (5) The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter which is the subject-matter of any suit or proceeding instituted or commenced in a civil court under sub-section (1) of section 6, before the commencement of the Act or which is the subject-matter of any appeal from the decree passed before such commencement in any such suit or proceeding or of any application for revision or review arising out of such suit, proceeding or appeal, as the case may be. [(6) The Tribunal shall have the powers of assessment of damages by unauthorised occupation of waqf property and to penalise such unauthorised occupants for their illegal occupation of the waqf property and to recover the damages as arrears of land revenue through the Collector: Provided that whosoever, being a public servant, fails in his lawful duty to prevent or remove an encroachment, shall on conviction be punishable with fine which may extend to fifteen thousand rupees for each such offence.] Section 85. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts .—No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie in any [civil court, revenue court and any other authority] in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any [waqf], [waqf] property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal.” 25. From perusal of Section 4 of the Waqf Act, 1954 and 1995, it is quite vivid that the State Government should conduct preliminary survey for preparing a list of auqaf in the State and the State Government should maintain the list of auqaf thereafter, the Survey Commissioner after making such enquiry will submit his report in respect of waqf or auqaf existing at the time of commencement of the Act. The details of the waqf or auqaf in the Siya or Sunni waqf or auqaf should be separately maintained, the nature, income of the property, amount of land revenue and other expenses or such other particulars relating the waqf thereafter the list of waqf or auqaf should be forwarded to the Waqf Board.
The details of the waqf or auqaf in the Siya or Sunni waqf or auqaf should be separately maintained, the nature, income of the property, amount of land revenue and other expenses or such other particulars relating the waqf thereafter the list of waqf or auqaf should be forwarded to the Waqf Board. Thereafter, the Waqf Board shall examine the report and forwarded back to the State Government within a period of six months for publication it in the official gazette and thereafter the State Government shall maintain a record of list published under sub Section 2 of Section 5 of the Act, 1995. This section makes it incumbent on the Waqf Board to submit survey report and forward it to the State Government within a period of three months for publication it in the Government gazette. The appellant has not produced any such evidence that after due process, survey has been conducted and included in the list of auqaf. The defendants have heavily relied upon the Ex. D/22 which is a register of documents other than Will maintained in the office of Registrar, Raipur which is not the record under the Waqf Act, 1954 or 1995. This fact also establishes from the evidence of Shailendra Kumar Dani (DW-5) who is Record Keeper in the office of Registrar. This witness in the cross-examination has admitted that in the register, neither signature of Hazi Mohammad Khan nor witness is available. He has voluntarily stated that in the original document, signature may be available, but not original document was produced. The defendant has relied upon letter dated 20.03.2013 which has been addressed to the defendant’s son from the Chief Executive Officer of the Waqf Board. Neither the author of the said document has been examined before the trial Court nor the document on the basis of which the letter has been produced has been placed on record by the defendants, as such it is incumbent upon the defendant to produce prima facie material to suggest that it is a waqf property. The defendant has relied upon the notice dated 14.04.1984 as well as Ex. D/21 which have been issued by the Madhya Pradesh Waqf Board for registering the property by Hazi Akbar Khan as per registered waqf deed dated 14.09.1940 as a waqf al-aulad which is merely notice.
The defendant has relied upon the notice dated 14.04.1984 as well as Ex. D/21 which have been issued by the Madhya Pradesh Waqf Board for registering the property by Hazi Akbar Khan as per registered waqf deed dated 14.09.1940 as a waqf al-aulad which is merely notice. This clearly demonstrates that the preliminary survey of the property was initiated but it has not reached to its logical end by publishing it in the Government gazette in the list of waqf or auqaf. Unless and until the said proceedings cannot be completed, it cannot be held that it is waqf property, as such there is no occasion for treating present suit for eviction of a tenant as dispute regarding waqf property. 26. The necessity of preliminary survey under Section 4 of the Act, 1954 or under the Act, 1995 and its importance has come up for consideration before Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Salem Muslim Burial Ground Protection Committee Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & others [ (2023) 16 SCC 264 ] wherein it has been held in paragraphs 31 & 32 as under:- “31. The Wakf Act, 1954, which actually is relevant for our purpose, provides that, first, a preliminary survey of wakfs has to be conducted and the Survey Commission shall, after such inquiry as may be deemed necessary, submit its report to the State Government about certain factors enumerated therein whereupon the State Government by a notification in the official Gazette direct for a second survey to be conducted. Once the above procedure of survey is completed and the disputes arising thereto have been settled, on receipt of the report, the State Government shall forward it to the Wakf Board. The Wakf Board on examining the same shall publish the list of wakfs in existence with full particulars in the official Gazette as contemplated under Section 5 of the Act. Similar provisions exist under the Waqf Act, 1995. 32. A plain reading of the provisions of the above two Acts would reveal that the notification under Section 5 of both the Acts declaring the list of the wakfs shall only be published after completion of the process as laid down under Section 4 of the above Acts, which provides for two surveys, settlement of disputes arising thereto and the submission of the report to the State Government and to the Board.
Therefore, conducting of the surveys before declaring a property a wakf property is a sine qua non. In the case at hand, there is no material or evidence on record that before issuing notification under Section 5 of the Wakf Act, 1954, any procedure or the survey was conducted as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act. In the absence of such a material, the mere issuance of the notification under Section 5 of the Act would not constitute a valid wakf in respect of the suit land. Therefore, the notification dated 29.04.1959 is not a conclusive proof of the fact that the suit land is a wakf property. It is for this reason probably that the appellant Committee had never pressed the said notification into service up till 1999.” 27. The defendant has referred to the interim order passed by High Court of Madhya Pradesh in M.P. No. 655/91 as well as the alleged return filed by the respondent No. 3 in that writ petition but the writ petition was not decided on merits as the Chhattisgarh Waqf Board has withdrawn the writ petition, as such neither the interim order nor any admission in the return by respondent No. 3 can suggest that the suit property is a waqf property. The Chief Executive Officer of the Chhattisgarh Waqf Board who was examined as DW-3 before the trial Court has admitted in the cross-examination that since property described in Sr. No. 21 is not a waqf property and it has not been recorded in any waqf record, therefore, they have withdrawn the said petition from the High Court. The said witness has also admitted in paragraph 9 that he has brought the original auqaf register (Ex. D/18) in which also the suit property has not been registered as waqf property. He has again stated that the suit property is not waqf property, as such no question arises to give it to Abdul Rahim Khan. He has also stated that in the photocopy of auqaf register at Sr. No. 73, the entry was forged, therefore, notice was forged. He has also admitted that in the survey register as well as Government gazette, the property is not included, therefore, vide order dated 06.01.2007, the case was closed and copy was also exhibited as Ex. D/15. 28.
He has also stated that in the photocopy of auqaf register at Sr. No. 73, the entry was forged, therefore, notice was forged. He has also admitted that in the survey register as well as Government gazette, the property is not included, therefore, vide order dated 06.01.2007, the case was closed and copy was also exhibited as Ex. D/15. 28. Learned counsel for the appellants would further submit that even if an objection with regard to the suit property to be a waqf property is taken then jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted in view of Section 85 of the Act, 1995 which is being considered by this Court. To appreciate this submission, this Court has to go through the provisions of Section 6 of the Act, 1995 which clearly deals that any question arises whether a particular property specified as waqf property in the list of auqaf is waqf property or not or whether a waqf specified in such list is a Shia or Sunni, the Board or the mutawalli of the waqf or any person aggrieved may institute a suit in a Tribunal for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal in respect of such matter shall be final. 29. From perusal of the aforestated provisions, it is quite vivid that for invoking Section 85 of the Act, 1995, the property should specify as a waqf property in the list of waqf or auqaf and the Board or Mutwalli of the waqf or any person aggrieved may institute a suit. The appellants are neither Waqf Board nor Mutawalli of the waqf or person aggrieved with any action of specifying the property to be a waqf property, as such he has no locus standi to raise dispute. Even as per Section 2(k) of the Act, 1995, he will not be treated as person interested in the waqf. As per clause 2(k) the definition of ‘person interested in waqf’ means any person who is entitled to receive any pecuniary other benefits from the waqf and include any person who has right to worship or to perform any religious right in the mosque, idgah, imambada, dargah, khanquah, peerkhana and karbala, makbara, graveyard or any other religious institution connected with the waqf or to participate in any religious or charitable institution under the waqf.
Similarly, the appellant is not wakif or any descendant of the wakif and the mutwalli. The word ‘wakif’ means any person making such dedication. Since the appellant does not fall any of the category as defined in clause 2 (k) of the Act, 1995 of a person interested in waqf, the appellant cannot claim that there is dispute as such the civil court has no jurisdiction in view of Section 85 of the Act, 1995. 30. In the present case, neither the Waqf Board nor the Mutwalli has ever been impleaded as party to the case. The defendant had moved an application for impleading Waqf Board as a party by filing petition before this Court bearing WP (227) No. 169/2012 and this Court vide order dated 09.10.2012 has rejected the same which has not been challenged by the defendant before any court of law. The operative part of the order dated 09.10.2012 reads as under:- “8. W. P. (227) No. 169 of 2012 In this writ petition, the petitioners/tenants have challenged the order passed by the trial Court on 02.03.2012 dismissing their application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC. The said application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC has been preferred on the ground that since the property belongs to the C.G. State Wakf Board and the Officers of the said Board have colluded with the defendants and are not producing the record, it has become necessary to implead the said Board as defendant. 9. It is settled law that in a suit filed by the plaintiff claiming to be the owner and landlord of the property, no third party can be joined as defendant. The burden to prove his ownership in case where the eviction is sought on the ground covered u/s 12(1)(e) & (f) of the C.G. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 lies on the plaintiff. If the plaintiff fails to prove his ownership, or for that matter, ownership of the person from whom he has acquired title, the suit shall fail. Since the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove this fact, no other party who has been referred by the defendants owner of the property can be joined as defendant. Even otherwise while deciding W.P(227).
Since the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove this fact, no other party who has been referred by the defendants owner of the property can be joined as defendant. Even otherwise while deciding W.P(227). No.102/2012 in the preceding paragraphs of this order, this Court has already directed the trial Court to summon the witnesses from Chhattisgarh State Wakf Board and Municipal Corporation, Raipur with further direction to the C.E.O. of the State Wakf Board and Commissioner of Municipal Corporation, Raipur to make available the entire records pertaining to the suit property, therefore, there is no necessity of joining any other person as defendant in the suit. 10. This writ petition has no substance. It deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 11. In the result, W.P (227). No.102/2012 is allowed and W.P (227).No.169/2012 is dismissed.” 31. Thus, it is quite vivid that the appellant cannot be said to be person interested in waqf and even he cannot be aggrieved person to raise such dispute. The 'aggrieved person' means a person must show that he has a more particular or peculiar interest of his own beyond that of the general public in seeing that the law is properly administered and such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest. It is demonstratively clear that the appellants have not been denied or deprived of a legal right. The appellants have not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. They have suffered no grievance. They have no legal leg for a justifiable claim to hand on, therefore, they are neither person interested in waqf nor a ‘person aggrieved’ to raise the dispute. 32. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Shripal Bhati & another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others [ (2020) 12 SCC 87 ] has examined the issue relating to aggrieved person and has held that unless injury is suffered personally a person cannot be said to be aggrieved and has no locus standi. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in paragraph 25 has held as under:- “25. For the aforesaid facts and reasons the challenge made by the appellants to the appointment and absorption of respondent no. 4 is not tenable and they have no locus standi in the matter.
Hon’ble the Supreme Court in paragraph 25 has held as under:- “25. For the aforesaid facts and reasons the challenge made by the appellants to the appointment and absorption of respondent no. 4 is not tenable and they have no locus standi in the matter. It may be relevant to refer to the observations made by this Court in the case Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors. [ AIR 1976 SC 578 ], relied upon by the High Court, holding that unless injury is suffered personally a person can not be said to be aggrieved and has no locus standi: “48. In the light of above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore, he is not a ‘person aggrieved’ and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of ‘No Objection Certificate”.” 33. In view of the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, the appellants have no locus standi to raise dispute regarding title of the plaintiff over the suit property as right of the appellants is not being adversely affected being tenant and the tenant has no locus standi to question the title of the land owner as it is trite that in a suit for eviction, the proof of ownership of tented premises not to be strictly looked at as in a suit for declaration of title as held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Jyoti Sharma Vs. Vishnu Goyal & another [2025 INSC 1099] 34.
Vishnu Goyal & another [2025 INSC 1099] 34. So far as the judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellants in case of Devki Nandan Patkak (supra) is concerned, the plaintiff was Rajasthan Waqf Board and they are claiming the property to be a waqf property whereas in the present case, the witness examined by the appellant itself who was the Chief Executive Officer of the Waqf Board has categorically stated that the suit property is not the waqf property and the Waqf Board was not made party to the suit, as such judgment in case of Devki Nandan Patkak (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of the case. Similarly in case of Rashid Wali Beg (supra), Hon’ble the Supreme Court in that case has held that property is admittedly a waqf property and accordingly it has held in paragraph 69 as under:- “69. In the case on hand, the property is admitted to be a waqf property. Therefore, to allow the plaintiff to ignore the Waqf Tribunal and to seek a decree of permanent injunction and mandatory injunction from a civil court, would be ignore the mandate of section 83 and 85 which speak of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf or a waqf property. There is also one more issue. In the written statement, the Defendant No.1 has admitted the existence of the waqf and also admitted that the father of the plaintiff by name Riyaz Ahmad is the mutawalli. But the claim of the plaintiff that he is the beneficiary of the waqf has been denied. Therefore, a question as to the nature of the waqf and whether the plaintiff is a beneficiary of the waqf, has also arisen in this case. This question has necessarily to be decided by the Tribunal and not the civil court.” 35.
But the claim of the plaintiff that he is the beneficiary of the waqf has been denied. Therefore, a question as to the nature of the waqf and whether the plaintiff is a beneficiary of the waqf, has also arisen in this case. This question has necessarily to be decided by the Tribunal and not the civil court.” 35. Thus, the judgment is distinguishable and not applicable to the present facts of the case as in the present case, the witness of the defendants itself has stated that the suit property is not a waqf property and the appellants are not aggrieved person and in fact he intends to question title of the landlord in a landlord-tenant suit without seeking declaration of sale-deed executed in favour of the plaintiff to be null and void which is not permissible as it is trite that in a suit for eviction, the proof of ownership of rented premises not to be strictly looked at as in a suit for declaration of title. 36. Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence and material placed on record has categorically recorded its finding that the suit property was not a waqf property, therefore, the provisions of Waqf Act are not applicable as Sections 6 (i) & 7(i) of the Act, 1995 provide that these provisions will be applicable to the property which are included in the schedule as per Section 5 of the Act, 1995 and after appreciating the evidence and material on record has recorded its finding that the plaintiff is unable to prove that the suit property is waqf property accordingly, it has allowed the suit. Thereafter, the First Appellate Court after re-appreciating the evidence and material on record and relying upon the evidence, it has recorded its finding that the defendant is unable to establish that it is waqf property and accordingly dismissed the appeal. Both the Courts below have also recorded their findings that the defendant is a tenant and son of the plaintiff requires the suit house for bonafide reason to start the business, as such the judgment and decree has been passed by the trial Court which has been rightly affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court which does not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court. 37.
37. It is well settled legal position of law that the jurisdiction in second appeal is not to interfere with the findings of fact on the ground that findings are erroneous, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be. The findings of fact will also include the findings on the basis of documentary evidence. The jurisdiction to interfere in the second appeal is only where there is an error in law or procedure and not merely an error on a question of fact. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Damodar Lal Vs. Sohan Devi , [ (2016) 3 SCC 78 ], Pakeerappa Rai Vs. Seethamma Hengsu , [ (2001) 9 SCC 521 ], Randhir Kaur Vs. Prithvi Pal Singh , [ (2019) 17 SCC 71 ], Gurdev Kaur Vs. Kaki , [ (2007) 1 SCC 546 ] have examined this scope of interference by the High Court in the Second Appeal. In view of the above preposition of law it is quite vivid that this Court should not interfere with the findings of fact recorded after appreciation of evidence merely because this Court thought that another view would be a better view. 38. In view of the above, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and does not warrant any interference by this Court. Thus, the substantial questions of law framed by this Court deserve to be answered against the defendants and in favour of plaintiff. 39. Accordingly, the instant Second Appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. A decree be drawn up accordingly. 40. The interim order passed by this Court on 15.12.2017 is vacated. The appellant is directed to vacate the suit property within three months from the date of judgment and decree passed by this Court.