JUDGMENT : Radhakishan Agrawal, J 1. CRA No. 175 of 2020 - This criminal appeal, preferred by appellants No.1 to 5/accused persons under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.11.2019 passed by the learned Special Judge (Atrocities), Balodabazar, District Balodabazar- Bhatapara (C.G.) in Special Sessions Case No.23/2016, whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:— (All sentences were directed to run concurrently) 2. ACQA No. 71 of 2020 - This acquittal appeal, preferred by the appellant/complainant, arises out of the judgment dated 29.11.2019 passed by the Special Judge (Atrocities), Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) in Special Sessions Case No.23/2016, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted respondents/accused persons Nos.1 to 13 of the charges under Sections 148, 302/149, 307/149, 323/149 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, “the Act, 1989”). 3. Since both the above captioned appeals arise out of the same Special Sessions Case No.23/2016, they are being heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, the convicted accused shall be referred to as ‘A-1 to A-5’, and the acquitted co-accused shall be referred to as ‘R-1 to R-13’ respectively. 4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that deceased- Ramlal had a long-standing dispute with accused- Shankar (died during trial), appellant No.1 Gajanand and appellant No.2 Seuk regarding his ancestral land, which the said accused persons had allegedly encroached upon and raised constructions over there. In 2012, the Naib-Tehsildar, Balodabazar had issued notices and passed a stay order against them, which was repeatedly violated, resulting in registration of Case No.134/2013 under Section 188 of IPC. On 21.06.2016 at about 8:30 a.m., deceased- Ramlal, his wife- Taman Bai (deceased) and their sons Aniket (deceased) and Manoj (PW-1) were digging a pit to install a pole for fencing the disputed land. At that time, the female/co-accused (acquitted)- Jama Bai (R-5), Brihaspati Bai (R-6), Satrupa Bai (R-7), Baisakhin Bai (R-8), Chandrabhaga Bai (R-9), Lalita Bai (R-10), Ku. Lata (R-11), Amrika Bai (R-12) & Rupa Bai (R-13), arrived at the spot, objected to the digging, claimed ownership over the land, abused the deceased family and threatened them to life. At that time, the female/co-accused (acquitted)- Jama Bai (R-5), Brihaspati Bai (R-6), Satrupa Bai (R-7), Baisakhin Bai (R-8), Chandrabhaga Bai (R-9), Lalita Bai (R-10), Ku. Lata (R-11), Amrika Bai (R-12) & Rupa Bai (R-13), arrived at the spot, objected to the digging, claimed ownership over the land, abused the deceased family and threatened them to life. Immediately thereafter, appellant Nos.1 to 5, namely, Gajanand, Seuk, Khemraj, Pitambar and Umesh along with deceased accused-Shankar and respondent Nos.1 to 4, Hemant, Kamal, Leeladhar & Kamlesh, reached the spot. When deceased- Ramlal asserted that he had succeeded in the alleged land proceedings, the accused persons abused him. Appellant No.2 Seuk snatched the axe from Ramlal; appellant No.4 Pitambar snatched a small axe from Taman Bai; appellant No.5 Umesh snatched the spade from Aniket; appellant No.3 Khemraj picked up a shovel lying there; respondent No.1 Hemant carried a stick; and appellant No.1 Gajanand snatched a stick from Manoj (PW-1) and thereafter, appellant No.2 Seuk assaulted deceased- Ramlal on the head with axe, following which, Pitambar, Umesh, Khemraj, Hemant and Gajanand also assaulted Ramlal and Taman Bai with their respective tools. As a result of multiple blows, both Ramlal and Taman Bai fell on the ground and died on the spot. 5. When deceased- Aniket and Manoj (PW-1) tried to save their parents, appellant No.4 Pitambar assaulted PW-1- Manoj with a crowbar, due to which, he ran from there and deceased- Aniket also ran towards the house of his brother-Vinod, where Saraswati (PW-2), Vinod’s wife, was present. Appellant No.2 Seuk also assaulted PW-2 Saraswati on her head with a crowbar. Thereafter, the accused persons chased Aniket and Vinod and killed them inside the house of PW-3 Vinod Kumar. 6. Information of the incident was received at Police Station City Kotwali, Balodabazar, upon which, Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P-4) & FIR (Ex.P-122) were registered against the accused persons based on the information of injured- Manoj (PW-1). Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Exs.P-59 to 62 and dead bodies of deceased persons were sent for postmortem examination which was conducted by PW-15 Dr. B.K. Sahu and gave PM reports vide Exs.P-86 to 89 respectively. According to PW-15 Dr. B.K. Sahu, cause of death of deceased persons, namely, Ramlal Dhruw; Taman Bai; Vinod Dhruw and Aniket Dhruw was cardiopulmonary arrest due to brain injury resulting from head trauma and the nature of their death was homicidal. 7. B.K. Sahu and gave PM reports vide Exs.P-86 to 89 respectively. According to PW-15 Dr. B.K. Sahu, cause of death of deceased persons, namely, Ramlal Dhruw; Taman Bai; Vinod Dhruw and Aniket Dhruw was cardiopulmonary arrest due to brain injury resulting from head trauma and the nature of their death was homicidal. 7. During investigation, memorandum statement of appellant No.1-Gajanand was recorded vide Ex.P-19, pursuant to which, one club was seized vide Ex.P-20; memorandum statement of appellant No.2- Seuk was recorded vide Ex.P-21, consequent to which, one blood-like- stained iron sabbal was seized vide Ex.P-22; memorandum statement of appellant No.3- Khemraj was recorded vide Ex.P-25, consequent to which, one blood-like-stained spade was seized vide Ex.P-26; memorandum statement of appellant No.4- Pitambar was recorded vide Ex.P-27, pursuant to which, one blood-like-stained club and one full T-shirt & pant were seized vide Ex.P-28 & memorandum statement of appellant No.5- Umesh Yadav was recorded vide Ex.P-33, consequent to which, one blood-like-stained club, full T-shirt and black pant were seized vide Exs.P-34 & P-35. From the spot, plain and blood stained soil, slippers, mobile phones, weapons and other articles were seized vide Exs.P-63 to 69 respectively. Injured- Manoj (PW-1) and Saraswati (PW-2) were also sent for medical examination and they were examined by PW-15 Dr. B.K. Sahu who upon examination noticed lacerated wound measuring 3 x 1 x 1 cm on the right parietal region of PW-1 Manoj and also found bruises on the right parietal region and on the right arm of PW-2 Saraswati and gave their MLC reports vide Exs.P-92 & 93 respectively. The seized articles were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical analysis and the FSL Report is marked as Ex.P-127. 8. Statements of the witnesses were recorded, and after completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused persons before the concerned trial Court. The accused persons abjured their guilt and sought trial. 9. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 20 witnesses and exhibited 201 as well as Articles A-1 to A-7 documents connecting the appellants/accused persons with the crime in question. However, in their defence, the appellants/accused persons did not examine any witness, but exhibited five documents, marked as Exs. D-1 to D-5. 10. The learned trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted co-accused persons/respondent Nos. However, in their defence, the appellants/accused persons did not examine any witness, but exhibited five documents, marked as Exs. D-1 to D-5. 10. The learned trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted co-accused persons/respondent Nos. 1 to 13 in ACQA No. 71/2020 of the charges leveled against them, but convicted and sentenced appellant Nos. 1 to 5 in CRA No. 175/2020 for the offences mentioned in paragraph 1 of this judgment. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused persons as well as the complainant/victim have filed separate appeals before this Court. 11. CRA No. 175 of 2020- Learned counsel for the appellant Nos.1 to 5 would submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting and sentencing the appellant Nos. 1 to 5 for the aforesaid offences as the prosecution has failed to prove the offences beyond reasonable doubt. They would further submit that the conviction of appellant Nos.1 to 5 is based primarily on the testimonies of PW-1 Manoj and PW-3 Vinod Kumar, whose evidence does not inspire confidence and is not reliable, as they are not the actual eye-witnesses to the incident. They would further submit that the statements of PW-1 Manoj and PW-3 Vinod Kumar are riddled with material contradictions, omissions and improvements, thereby rendering their evidence unreliable. They would also submit that the prosecution has failed to establish the existence of any common object or unlawful assembly involving these appellants, and that no clear or specific overt act has been attributed to any of them. They would also submit that the memorandum and the alleged seizures made from the appellants, as well as the FSL report, do not support the prosecution case and, therefore, the oral statements of the prosecution witnesses cannot be made the sole basis for conviction. They would also contend that the medical evidence does not fully support the ocular version and the longstanding land dispute between the parties raises a strong possibility of false implication of the appellants No.1 to 5. In view of these inconsistencies, investigational lapses, and absence of cogent evidence, it is argued that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt and that the impugned judgment of conviction deserves to be set aside. 12. In view of these inconsistencies, investigational lapses, and absence of cogent evidence, it is argued that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt and that the impugned judgment of conviction deserves to be set aside. 12. On the other hand, supporting the impugned judgment, learned counsel for the State would submit that there is direct evidence on record in the form of the testimonies of PW-1 Manoj, PW-2 Saraswati Bai and PW-3 Vinod Kumar, before whom the incident occurred, which clearly establishes that the appellants No.1 to 5 are the authors of the crime in question. He would further submit that when credible direct evidence is available, the other corroborative piece of evidence is not required. Thus, the conviction of the accused persons/appellants No.1 to 5 is strictly in accordance with law, and there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment warranting interference by this Court. 13. ACQA No. 71 of 2020: Learned counsel for the Appellant/Complainant would submit that the learned trial Court is unjustified in acquitting respondents No. 1 to 13 of the charges by recording perverse findings. He would further submit that from the testimonies of PW-1 Manoj Kumar Dhruv, PW-2 Saraswati Bai & PW-3 Vinod Kumar, it clearly emerges that respondents No. 1 to 13 had also actively participated in the crime in question along with the other co-accused persons and committed the aforesaid offences and despite such consistent and reliable ocular evidence, the learned trial Court has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused persons/respondents No.1 to 13 for the aforesaid offences without appreciating the evidence on record in its correct perspective. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 14.On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 13 /accused persons would support the impugned judgment insofar as it relates to their acquittal and submit that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, particularly in the testimonies of PW-1 Manoj Kumar Dhruv, PW-2 Saraswati Bai, and PW-3 Vinod Kumar and their statements do not corroborate with each other. They would further submit that no specific or overt act has been attributed to respondent Nos.1 to 13 and even their presence at the spot of occurrence is doubtful. They would further submit that no specific or overt act has been attributed to respondent Nos.1 to 13 and even their presence at the spot of occurrence is doubtful. They would further submit that there is no reliable evidence to show their participation in the alleged assault. Therefore, the acquittal of respondent Nos.1 to 13 recorded by the learned trial Court for the aforesaid offences is fully justified and well-merited, and does not call for any interference by this Court. 15.Learned counsel for the State/respondent No.14 would support the contention made by learned counsel for the appellant/complainant. 16.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. CRA No. 175 of 2020 17. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the deaths of the four deceased persons were homicidal in nature. 18. PW-15 Dr. B.K. Sahu conducted the post-mortem examination of deceased- Ramlal. On external examination, he found that the eyes of deceased-Ramlal were closed and the mouth was open. Rigor mortis was present in the hands and feet. Blood stains were present on the head, face, neck, chest and both upper arms. The head was severely crushed, resulting in multiple fractures of the facial and skull bones, including the upper and lower jaws. The following injuries were noted: Injury No. 1: Lacerated wound with irregular margins and blood stains on the frontal region of the head, measuring 8 × 4 cm, extending deep into the brain. Injury No. 2: Lacerated wound with irregular margins and blood stains on the left side of the lower jaw, measuring 5 × 4 cm, extending up to the bone; multiple teeth of the lower jaw were broken and the upper jaw was also fractured. Injury No. 3: Lacerated wound measuring 4 × 1 × 0.5 cm on the right leg below the knee. Injury No. 4: Fractures on the frontal bone, upper jaw, lower jaw, parietal bone and right zygomatic arch. 19. PW-15 Dr. B.K. Sahu also conducted the post-mortem examination of deceased- Taman Bai and found that her eyes and mouth were closed, bloodstains on the head, face, neck and hands were present; rigor mortis was present in both the upper and lower limbs; and the head was severely bruised and disfigured. The injuries noted were: Injury No. 1: Left ear cut into two parts from the middle. The injuries noted were: Injury No. 1: Left ear cut into two parts from the middle. Injury No. 2: Swelling and blood accumulation around the right eye. Injury No. 3: Fracture of the right parietal bone with an incised-lacerated wound measuring 6 × 4 cm, extending deep up to the brain tissue (brain matter visible externally). Injury No. 4: Lacerated wound on the left parietal region, measuring 5 × 4 cm, extending up to the brain-stem (externally visible). Injury No. 5: Multiple fractures on the right and left parietal bones, temporal bones and occipital bone. 20.Further, PW-15 conducted the post-mortem examination of deceased-Vinod and found bloodstained on the head, face, neck, ears, chest, abdomen and both arms. Blood was oozing from the mouth and nose. The head was severely crushed and multiple facial and cranial fractures were present. Rigor Mortis was noted in all limbs. The injuries noted were: Injury No. 1: Lacerated wound on the occipital region, measuring 8 × 4 cm, extending up to the brain. Injury No. 2: Lacerated wound on the right parietal region, measuring 6 × 4 cm, extending up to the brain tissue. Injury No. 3: Lacerated wound on the lower occipital region, measuring 5 × 3 cm, extending into the brain. Injury No. 4: Bruise measuring 3 × 2 cm on the left knee. Injury No. 5: Lacerated wound measuring 1.5 × 0.5 × 0.5 cm on the left side of the abdomen. Injury No. 6: Fractures of the parietal bones, occipital bone, maxilla, mandible and right temporal bone. 21.PW-15 Dr. B.K. Sahu further conducted the post-mortem examination of deceased- Aniket. On external examination, he found both eyes were closed and the mouth was open, and rigor mortis was present in all limbs. The injuries found were: Injury No. 1: Lacerated wound on the frontal region of the head, with irregular margins, measuring 10 × 2 cm, extending into the brain; fracture of the frontal bone also present. Injury No. 2: Lacerated wound with irregular margins above the left eye, measuring 4 × 2 cm, extending to the brain tissue. Injury No. 3: Lacerated wound measuring 3 × 1 × 1 cm above the right eye, with fracture of the right zygomatic bone. Injury No. 4: The head was crushed and disfigured, with fractures of the parietal bones, frontal bone, maxilla and right nasal bone. According to PW-15 Dr. Injury No. 3: Lacerated wound measuring 3 × 1 × 1 cm above the right eye, with fracture of the right zygomatic bone. Injury No. 4: The head was crushed and disfigured, with fractures of the parietal bones, frontal bone, maxilla and right nasal bone. According to PW-15 Dr. B.K. Sahu, all the injuries found on the bodies of the deceased persons were ante-mortem in nature and caused by a hard and blunt object. He opined that the cause of death of deceased persons was cardiopulmonary arrest due to brain injury resulting from head trauma and the nature of death of deceased persons was homicidal and gave his reports vide Exs. P-86 to P-89 respectively. 22.Upon careful consideration of the medical evidence, we find that the learned trial Court rightly relied upon the post-mortem reports (Exs.P-86 to P-89) and the testimony of PW-15 Dr. B.K. Sahu to conclude that the deaths of the deceased persons were homicidal in nature. The said conclusion, supported by cogent and clinching medical evidence, is a finding of fact based on the material on record and is neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence. We, therefore, affirm the finding of the trial Court that the death of deceased persons in question were homicidal in nature. 23. Now, the next question that arises for consideration is whether appellant Nos. 1 to 5 are the authors of the crime in question. 24.Case of the prosecution is based on direct evidence of PW-1 Manoj Dhruv and PW-3 Vinod Kumar, S/o Heera Dhruv, who are the eye- witnesses to the incident. PW-1 Manoj Dhruv, an injured eye-witness to the incident has stated that on 21.06.2016 at about 07:00 a.m., he, along with his father- Ramlal (deceased), mother- Tamanabai (deceased) and brothers- Aniket (deceased) and Vinod (deceased), was digging pits near their house. At that time, acquitted female co-accused-persons arrived at the spot, objected to the digging, claimed ownership over the land, abused the deceased family and threatened them to life. Immediately thereafter, accused persons Gajanand (A-1), Seuk (A-2), Khemraj @ Lalu (A-3), Pitambar (A-4), Umesh (A-6), Shankar (deceased) and others arrived there, abused them in filthy language, questioned them about digging the pits, snatched the tools from their hands and thereafter appellant Nos. 1 to 5, having formed an unlawful assembly, brutally assaulted him and his family members. Immediately thereafter, accused persons Gajanand (A-1), Seuk (A-2), Khemraj @ Lalu (A-3), Pitambar (A-4), Umesh (A-6), Shankar (deceased) and others arrived there, abused them in filthy language, questioned them about digging the pits, snatched the tools from their hands and thereafter appellant Nos. 1 to 5, having formed an unlawful assembly, brutally assaulted him and his family members. He has further stated that deceased/accused- Shankar assaulted his mother- Taman Bai with a large axe, and accused- Pitambar (A-4) assaulted his father- Ramlal with a small axe, by which, they suffered grievous injuries and died on the spot and that Pitambar (A-4) also assaulted him on his head. After that, he and his brothers- Aniket and Vinod ran from there, but the accused persons chased them and assaulted his brothers- Vinod & Aniket. When he and PW-2 Saraswati, tried to save Vinod (deceased), accused- Seuk (A-2) attempted to assault PW-2 Saraswati’s two-year-old son- Veernarayan, with a crowbar and when PW-2 Saraswati protected the child, she was assaulted on her head. Thereafter, his brothers- Aniket and Vinod ran towards the roadside and he and PW-2 Saraswati ran towards the house of one Shivendra Paikra, where he hid in an injured condition. From the window of Shivendra Paikra’s house, situated approximately twenty metres from the place of occurrence, he saw accused- Seuk (A-2) armed with a crowbar; accused -Gajanand (A-1) holding a stick and accused- Khemraj (A-3) wielding a shovel, assaulting his already injured parents to ensure their deaths. Thereafter, these three accused persons came to Shivendra Paikra’s house searching for him, PW-2 Saraswati and the child and after they left, the police arrived and he narrated the incident to them. Thus, on a perusal of the testimony of this witness (PW-1), it is evident that he has consistently named accused persons/appellant Nos.1 to 5 as active participants in the brutal assaults that resulted in the deaths of his family members and the injuries sustained by him and PW-2 Saraswati. He has remained firm and consistent in his deposition and the defence has not been able to elicit anything in cross-examination that would render his evidence untrustworthy or unreliable. 25. PW-3 Vinod Kumar, S/o Heera Dhruv, an eye-witness to the incident, has stated that at the time of the incident, he was repairing a bicycle at his house. He has remained firm and consistent in his deposition and the defence has not been able to elicit anything in cross-examination that would render his evidence untrustworthy or unreliable. 25. PW-3 Vinod Kumar, S/o Heera Dhruv, an eye-witness to the incident, has stated that at the time of the incident, he was repairing a bicycle at his house. He then saw deceased- Aniket and Vinod running from the side of the government well and trying to enter his house to save themselves. Aniket (deceased) managed to enter his house, but when Vinod (deceased) was about to step inside, accused- Gajanand caught him, pulled him back and threw him on the ground. Immediately after this, the accused persons/appellants No.1 to 5 started assaulting deceased- Vinod with the weapons they were carrying. He has further stated that at that time, accused- Seuk was carrying a crowbar-like rod, while accused- Gajanand and accused- Umesh used tendu sticks, and accused- Khemraj used a shovel to assault deceased- Vinod. As Vinod (deceased) began bleeding heavily, he scared and moved towards a nearby banyan tree and sat over there. He has also stated that accused- Seuk and Gajanand then asked him to bring Aniket (deceased) out of the house, but he refused and ran away out of fear. He has also stated that when the police arrived, he returned and saw the dead body of Vinod (deceased) lying near the doorstep of his house and the dead body of Aniket (deceased) inside the courtyard near the kitchen. In his evidence, he has clearly admitted that the accused persons/appellants No.1 to 5 jointly assaulted deceased- Vinod. He remained consistent in his evidence and nothing adverse surfaced in his cross-examination to doubt his presence at the scene or to discredit his testimony. 26. PW-2 Saraswati, an injured witness to the incident, has stated that on the date of incident, she was cooking at home, while her husband- Vinod (deceased) had gone to the pond. Her mother-in-law- Tamanbai, father-in-law- Ramlal, and brother-in-law- Aniket were fencing the garden, and her two-year-old son Veernarayan was playing nearby. She has further stated that upon hearing abusive language and loud shouting from outside, she came towards the stairs and saw the accused persons/appellant Nos. 1 to 5 assaulting her in-laws and her brother-in-law- Aniket. Her mother-in-law- Tamanbai, father-in-law- Ramlal, and brother-in-law- Aniket were fencing the garden, and her two-year-old son Veernarayan was playing nearby. She has further stated that upon hearing abusive language and loud shouting from outside, she came towards the stairs and saw the accused persons/appellant Nos. 1 to 5 assaulting her in-laws and her brother-in-law- Aniket. She has also stated that her husband- Vinod was near the stairs at that time and her son- Veernarayan was also present there. According to her, during assault, accused- Seuk attempted to strike the child with a crowbar and when she intervened to protect him, she was assaulted on her head. She has further stated that the accused persons had snatched her spade, hoe and sickle. She has also stated that she saw accused-Seuk & deceased/accused-Shankar holding a sickle, whereas accused- Gajanand was holding a stick. She has also stated that the accused persons were also assaulting her brothers-in- law- PW-1 Manoj and Aniket (deceased). She has also stated that as soon as her brother-in-law- Aniket and her husband (Vinod) moved towards the house, all the accused persons, chased and brutally assaulted them. The testimony of this witness clearly establishes the presence of the accused persons/appellant Nos.1 to 5 at the scene of occurrence and their active participation in the assault on her in-laws, brothers-in-law and husband, as well as the attempt to harm her and her minor child. The evidence of PW-3 Saraswati remained firm and also corroborates with the evidence of PW-1 Manoj Dhruv and PW-3 Vinod Kumar. There is no reason to disbelieve her evidence. 27. In the matter of Jarnail Singh and Others vs State of Punjab , (2009) 9 SCC 719 , the Supreme Court has held that the testimony of an injured witness carries great evidentiary value and should ordinarily be relied upon, unless strong and convincing reasons exist to discard it. Paras 27 to 29 are relevant and read as under:- “27. Sikandar Rai (PW 6) and Babu Lal (PW 7) had been the two independent witnesses. They had come from Bihar as migrant labourers. No explanation could be furnished by Shri Subhash Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants as to for what reason either of the said witnesses could depose falsely. Sikandar Rai (PW 6) had been all along with the deceased Jaldhar and he had also witnessed the throwing of his dead body in the canal. No explanation could be furnished by Shri Subhash Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants as to for what reason either of the said witnesses could depose falsely. Sikandar Rai (PW 6) had been all along with the deceased Jaldhar and he had also witnessed the throwing of his dead body in the canal. The Tata Sumo vehicle used in the offence was recovered. It belonged to Inderjit Singh, vendee of the land. There is full corroboration of the prosecution case by Sikandar Rai (PW 6) and Babu Lal (PW 7). Both of them had been cross-examined by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants but nothing could be elicited which could shake their credibility. 28. Darshan Singh (PW4) was an injured witness. He had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the incident as he was present at the time when the assailants reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka , 1994 Supp (3) SCC 235 this Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident. 29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand , (2004) 7 SCC 629 a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross-examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana , (2006) 12 SCC 459 ). Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the courts below.” 28.Similarly, in the matter of Maqsoodan vs. State of UP , (1983) 1 SCC 218 , the Supreme Court has held that the presence of injured witness receiving injuries during course of incident at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted. The relevant paragraph 8 of the said judgment is reproduced herein under:- “8. The High Court has found that the testimony of the eye witnesses, namely, P.W.s 1, 2, 3 and C.W.1 "suffer from numerous infirmities". It, therefore, sought support to their testimony from the two earlier statements, erroneously called dying declarations, Exhibits Ka-22 and Ka-23 made by P.W. 3 Vijai Kumar and P.W. 2 Jagdish respectively. The infirmities referred to by the High Court consisted in, according to the High Court, improvements made by the witnesses and variations in their earlier and latter statements. In our opinion, on that ground alone, the testimony of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and C.W. 1 cannot be held to be infirm. It is the duty of the court to remove the grain from the chaff. These four witnesses are the injured witnesses having received the injuries during the course of the incident. Their presence at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted; in fact it has not been challenged by the defence. As both the parties were inimical for a long time, it will be prudent to convict only those persons whose presence and participation in the occurrence have been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. We agree with the finding of the High Court that the presence and participation of appellants Maqsoodan, Madan Mohan, Prayagnath and Nando, who are appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 175 of 1974 has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, despite the improvements and variations in their evidence.” 29. Yet in another case rendered in the matter of Bhagwan Jagannath Markad and others vs. State of Maharashtra , (2016) 10 SCC 537 , the Supreme Court observed that evidence of injured eye-witness cannot be rejected on the basis of discrepancies of trivial nature and held in para 31 as under:- “31. As already observed, the discrepancies of trivial nature could not be the basis of rejecting the evidence of injured eye-witnesses nor non-examination of some of the witnesses be a ground to reject the prosecution case when injured eye-witnesses were examined.” 30. Likewise, the Supreme Court in the matter of Balu Sudam Khalde and Another vs The State of Maharashtra , 2023 Livelaw (SC) 279 has held that the evidence of injured witness has greater evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. Likewise, the Supreme Court in the matter of Balu Sudam Khalde and Another vs The State of Maharashtra , 2023 Livelaw (SC) 279 has held that the evidence of injured witness has greater evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. Para 26 is relevant and reads as under:- “26. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: (a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. (b) Unless, it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. (c) The evidence of injured witness has greater evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. (d) The evidence of injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. (e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of injured, but not the whole evidence. (f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded.” 31. Further, in the matter of Gurdeep Singh vs the State of Punjab , 2025 INSC 957 , CRA No.705 of 2024 dated 11.08.2025 , the Supreme Court, relying on its own judgments, has held in paras 18.4 & 18.6 which read as under:- “18.4 It is equally well settled that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if found trustworthy and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. In Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras , (1957) SCR 981 : AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000, this Court held that if the sole witness is of a sterling quality and inspires confidence, a conviction can be safely based upon such testimony. In Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras , (1957) SCR 981 : AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000, this Court held that if the sole witness is of a sterling quality and inspires confidence, a conviction can be safely based upon such testimony. The following paragraphs are pertinent in this regard: "...Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act has categorically laid it down that " no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact." The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872, presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. In England, both before and after the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there have been a number of statutes as set out in Sarkar's I Law of Evidence-9th Edition, at pp. 1 100 and 1 101, forbidding convictions on the testimony of a single witness. The Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule recognized in Section 134 quoted above. The section enshrines the well recognized maxim that "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted". Our Legislature has given statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence, where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well- established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for, proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way-it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court, equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being that of a participator in crime. But, where there are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. We have, therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of the first witness, which is the only reliable evidence in support of the prosecution. xxxx xxxx xxxx 18.6 A similar view was taken in Kuna v. State of Odisha , (2018) 1 SCC 296 where the Court upheld a conviction solely on the basis of a trustworthy eyewitness, emphasizing that credible testimony alone is sufficient in law. The following paragraph is pertinent in this regard: “19. That conviction can be based on a testimony of a single eyewitness if he or she passes the test of reliability and that it is not the number of witnesses but the quality of evidence that is important, have been propounded consistently in Anil Phukan [ Anil Phukan v. State of Assam , (1993) 3 SCC 282 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 810], Ramji Surjya [Ramji Surjya Padvi v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 3 SCC 629 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 748], Patnam Anandam [State of A.P. v. Patnam Anandam, (2005) 9 SCC 237 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1225] and Gulam Sarbar [Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 3 SCC 401 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 195] with the apparent emphasis that evidence must be weighed and not counted, decisive test being whether it has a ring of truth and it is cogent, credible, trustworthy or otherwise." 32. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Namdeo vs State of Maharashtra , (2007) 14 SCC 150 , relying on its own judgments, has held in paras 23 to 25 which read as under:- ““….23. In the leading case of Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra , (1973) 2 SCC 793 , this Court held that even where a case hangs on the evidence of a single eye witness it may be enough to sustain the conviction given sterling testimony of a competent, honest man although as a rule of prudence courts call for corroboration. "It is a platitude to say that witnesses have to be weighed and not counted since quality matters more than quantity in human affairs.” (SCC p.807, para 19) 24. In Anil Phukan v. State of Assam , (1993) 3 SCC 282 , the Court observed; (SCC p.285 para 3) "Indeed, conviction can be based on the testimony of a single eye witness and there is no rule of law or evidence which says to the contrary provided the sole witness passes the test of reliability. So long as the single eye-witness is a wholly reliable witness the courts have no difficulty in basing conviction on his testimony alone. However, where the single eye witness is not found to be a wholly reliable witness, in the sense that there are some circumstances which may show that he could have an interest in the prosecution, then the courts generally insist upon some independent corroboration of his testimony, in material particulars, before recording conviction. It is only when the courts find that the single eye witness is a wholly unreliable witness that his testimony is discarded in toto and no amount of corroboration can cure that defect.” 25. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar , (1996) 1 SCC 614 , referring to several cases, this Court stated; (SCC pp.619-20, para 7) "7. On a conspectus of these decisions, it clearly comes out that there has been no departure from the principles laid down in Vadivelu Thevar case[ AIR 1957 SC 614 ] , therefore, conviction can be recorded on the basis of the statement of a single eye witness provided his credibility is not shaken by any adverse circumstance appearing on the record against him and the court, at the same time, is convinced that he is a truthful witness. The Court will not then insist on corroboration by another eye witness particularly as the incident might have occurred at a time or place when there was no possibility of any other eye witness being present. Indeed, the courts insist on the quality, and not on the quantity of evidence...”” 33. Likewise, the Supreme Court in the matter of Abdul Sayeed and others vs State of Madhya Pradesh , (2010) 10 SCC 259 has held in para 28 which reads as under:- “ Injured Witness 28. The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of the occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. “Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness.” [Vide Ramlagan Singh vs State of Bihar , (1973) 3 SCC 881 , Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P. , (1975) 3 SCC 311 , Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab , (1983) 3 SCC 470 , Appabhai v. State of Gujarat , 1988 Supp SCC 241 , Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra , (1995) 6 SCC 447 , Bhag Singh v. State of Punjab , (1997) 7 SCC 712 , Mohar v. State of U.P. , (2002) 7 SCC 606 (SCC p.606b-c), Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan , (2008) 8 SCC 270 , Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan , (2009) 10 SCC 477 , Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P. , (2009) 12 SCC 546 , and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra , (2010) 6 SCC 673 ] 34. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of aforesaid decisions of Supreme Court, it is quite vivid from the testimonies of PW-1 Manoj, PW-3 Vinod Kumar, who are eye-witnesses to the incident and PW-2 Saraswati, injured witness to the incident, that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through reliable and direct eye-witness accounts. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of aforesaid decisions of Supreme Court, it is quite vivid from the testimonies of PW-1 Manoj, PW-3 Vinod Kumar, who are eye-witnesses to the incident and PW-2 Saraswati, injured witness to the incident, that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through reliable and direct eye-witness accounts. All three witnesses (PW-1, PW-2 & PW-3) have consistently stated that on the date of the incident, while the deceased persons were digging pits to install a boundary pole on the alleged disputed land, the accused persons/appellants No.1 to 5 came there, abused them filthily, snatched their tools and brutally assaulted them. Due to these assaults, Ramlal and Taman Bai died on the spot. When deceased- Aniket and Vinod tried to run away, the accused persons/appellant Nos. 1 to 5 chased them upto the house of PW-3 Vinod Kumar and also brutally assaulted them there, causing their deaths. PW-2 Saraswati was also assaulted by them when she tried to protect her young child. The statements of these three witnesses are clear, consistent and mutually supportive. There are no significant contradictions or omissions that would make their evidence doubtful or untrustworthy. This apart, their version is also fully supported by the medical evidence of PW-15 Dr. B.K. Sahu, who proved the postmortem reports (Exs.P-86 to 89) and MLC reports (Exs.P-92 & 93) as well as the contents of FIR (Ex.P-122). Though the trial Court has not relied upon the memorandum, seizure and FSL report, but it is well settled that when trustworthy direct evidence of eye-witnesses is available, the other corroborative piece of evidence is not required. The learned trial Court has elaborately discussed the evidence adduced by the prosecution and upon analyzing the entire evidence, has held that on the date of the incident, appellants No.1 to 5, formed an unlawful assembly, committed the murder of the deceased persons and also caused injuries to PW-1 Manoj and PW-2 Saraswati. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based on a proper appreciation of the evidence available on record. We, therefore, find no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment of the learned trial Court convicting and sentencing the appellants No.1 to 5 for the aforesaid offences. 35. We, therefore, find no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment of the learned trial Court convicting and sentencing the appellants No.1 to 5 for the aforesaid offences. 35. As a result, criminal appeal (CRA No.175 of 2020) filed by the appellants No.1 to 5 / accused persons has no merit and is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court are hereby affirmed. 36.Appellant Nos.1 to 5 are reported to be in jail, therefore, there is no need to pass any order regarding their arrest/surrender etc. ACQA No. 71 of 2020 37.So far as the acquittal appeal filed by the victim/complainant is concerned, the Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala , (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 38.Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 INSC 114 , whereby in Para-11 & 12, it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under: “ 11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka , (2024) 8 SCC 149 , a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 39.Thus, in light of the above-quoted guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 40.In the present case, the learned trial Court, while recording the finding of acquittal in favour of respondent Nos.1 to 13, has observed that although these accused persons/respondent Nos.1 to 13 raised shouts calling the other co-accused persons, but they neither participated in the assault nor inflicted any injury upon the deceased persons or the injured witnesses. Their mere presence at the spot and raising an alarm, in the absence of any overt act, does not amount to participation in an unlawful assembly. Consequently, they cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 149 of the IPC. The learned trial Court has elaborately discussed the evidence adduced by the prosecution and upon analyzing the entire evidence, concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly, acquitted the respondent Nos. 1 to 13 of the charges under Sections 148, 302/149, 307/149 and 323/149 of the IPC, which finding warrants no interference by this Court. 1 to 13 of the charges under Sections 148, 302/149, 307/149 and 323/149 of the IPC, which finding warrants no interference by this Court. Insofar as the charge under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is concerned, the prosecution has failed to produce any cogent evidence to establish that the alleged offence was committed on the ground that the deceased persons or the injured persons belonged to the Scheduled Tribe community. The material on record merely indicates a civil dispute relating to land encroachment and does not reveal any caste-based motive. Hence, the essential ingredients of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989 are not attracted and the finding of the trial Court on this aspect also calls for no interference. 41. In view of the above analysis, this Court finds no perversity or illegality in the reasoning adopted by the trial Court. The acquittal of the aforesaid accused persons/respondent Nos.1 to 13 is well-founded and does not call for any interference in this appeal filed by the complainant/victim. Consequently, the Acquittal appeal filed by the victim/complainant is hereby dismissed. 42. In the result, criminal appeal (CRA No. 175 of 2020) filed by the accused persons/appellant Nos.1 to 5 against their conviction and sentence, as well as the acquittal appeal (ACQA No. 71 of 2020) filed by the complainant/victim, being devoid of any merit, are liable to be and are hereby dismissed.